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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 A Capsule Summary
The Roman Catholic Church is one world Church made up of many local churches. Since its
inception, the leadership of the Church has sought to forge an internal unity that transcends
the diversity of its membership. Over the course of centuries, the Pope and other bishops of
the Church have served as symbols and proponents of this desired unity. The Pope in union
with the college of bishops constitutes the hierarchy which guides the Church and is
responsible for its adherence to “one Lord, one faith, one baptism.”
When conflicts arise within the Catholic hierarchy, the unity of the Church is called into
question. The reality of this threat is easily demonstrated by historical reference to the
Reformation and to the Roman Catholic-Orthodox Catholic separation. But it is also seen in
more contemporary examples, as in Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre’s post-Vatican II conflict
with the Holy See, which resulted in the departure of Lefebvre and many of his followers
from the Church.
Conflicts such as the Rome-Lefebvre conflict may be described as “center-periphery”
conflicts: the central authority in Rome is pitted against the authority of the local Church, and
the authority of the Pope is placed in opposition to the authority of one or more local bishops.
(Following Rahim 1992, I define conflict as an interactive process manifested in
incompatibility, disagreement or dissonance within or between social entities.) Center-
periphery conflicts are not the only kind of conflict to arise within the hierarchy. Conflicts
may arise within the bounds of the organizational center (as in conflicts among bishops
serving in the Roman Curia) or they may take place on the periphery (as in conflicts within a
national or regional conference of bishops). But center-periphery conflicts are notable for the
way they dramatize, in an especially clear way, the tension that exists generally in the Church
between central and local control.
Since the Second Vatican Council, several cases of center-periphery conflict have come
before the public eye. Apart from the Lefebvre case, one thinks of such highly publicized
cases as the Holy See’s exchanges with the Dutch Cardinal Bernard Alfrink, with the
American Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen, and with the French Bishop Jacques Gaillot.
Typically, such cases have been assessed from journalistic and theological perspectives, but
systematic descriptions focusing on the conflict handling as such have been lacking. Whereas
the surface issues and a number of relevant theological questions have received consideration,
one is hard pressed to find accounts that identify and break down the strategies employed to
manage the conflicts. At best we have a sketchy picture of how participants seek to advance
their own interests strategically in the course of such conflicts. The present case study is
designed to address this information gap.
This investigation attempts to make the handling of center-periphery conflict more transparent
by conducting an exploratory and descriptive case study of a recent empirical example of the
phenomenon. The empirical example I have chosen for study is the conflict between the Holy
See and Seattle Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen, which took place during the years 1983-
1989. (A brief summary of the case follows in section 1.7.) I have selected this case because it
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is recent enough in time to be reflective of current conflict-handling patterns within the
hierarchy (many key figures from the case, including Pope John Paul II, Cardinal Ratzinger
and Bishop Donald Wuerl, still hold office) and accessible to a variety of forms of
information gathering (the extent to which the conflict handling came into the open is
unusual). The case is also fascinating for being something of an extreme example. Not only
did it draw a remarkably high level of public attention, especially in the American Church; it
was exceptional, too, for the degree of polarization it demonstrated between the points of
universal and local leadership in the Church. Another intriguing dimension of the case is the
effectiveness with which Hunthausen defended his own position in the conflict. Although the
Vatican, almost by definition, has the upper hand in the management of such conflicts,
Hunthausen was able to achieve something that at first glance would appear to be unlikely in
the handling of center-periphery conflict: he pressed the Vatican into a limited retreat. Though
neither Hunthausen nor representatives of the Holy See were ever inclined to speak of
winning or losing the conflict, there is reason to believe that both parties lost in substantial
ways, as did the institutional Church. While it is striking that Hunthausen managed to resist
Vatican imperatives without being forced from office, and also to induce Rome to retract
sanctions it had already imposed at his expense, Roman priorities appear to have prevailed in
the long run. No local bishop has so boldly made the case for local priorities in the years
since. Though Hunthausen may in a limited sense have “won” simply by holding his ground,
the Vatican appears to have sent a message that has been heard loud and clear by other
bishops in ensuing years: the final say rests with the center. The loss for the institutional
Church, as I see it, is that the opportunity for a more robust dialogue between center and
periphery in the post-Vatican II era has been missed amid the center’s fear of losing control
and the college of bishops’ constrained approach to conflict handling. Why I hold these
conclusions should become clear as I present the findings from my intensive study of the
Rome-Hunthausen case.
First and foremost, my intention here is to describe how the principal parties (that is,
Hunthausen, members of the hierarchy representing the Holy See and, to a lesser extent,
bishops participating as third parties) managed the conflict strategically, with special attention
going to their use of language. The research falls within the realm of practical theology, with
practical theology understood to be an interdisciplinary field that draws extensively on the
techniques of the social sciences. Though at no point in this research do I theologize
explicitly, I do believe that this study of the Church organization can offer direct benefits to
the Church’s own process of ecclesiological discernment.
I have oriented my study by articulating a guiding question: What coping strategies are
observable in center-periphery conflict discourse? This question indicates the phenomenon
under consideration (center-periphery conflict), the data I intend to examine (discourse
samples), the type of results I am seeking (coping strategies), and the exploratory and
descriptive nature of the research. I will expound upon this question’s components later. By
answering the guiding question, I hope to bring us to a clearer understanding of how center-
periphery conflicts in the Church are managed in practice.
1.2 Center-Periphery Conflict in the Church
There is nothing new or surprising about leadership conflicts in the Church. From the
beginning of its existence, the life of the Church has been shaped by divergent viewpoints,
various kinds of party alignments, and debates that have ranged from the amicable to the
violent (Hume 1999, 6; Reese 1996, 25; McBrien 1992, 44; Cooke 1989, 3; O’Connor 1986,
79; Ashby 1955, 5). Nor, given the actual and potential costs to the Church through losses of
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membership, material resources or prestige, should we be surprised to find that Church
leaders might want to curb the likelihood for conflict to arise. Some observers have gone so
far as to assert that an aversion to conflict prevails generally among Church leaders (Van der
Ven 1996, 280-281; Stevens 1994, 7; Laeyendecker 1967, 307).
Understandably, Church leaders concerned to promote harmony within the Church
organization will tend to downplay the image of Jesus as controversialist, who promises to
bring division, and to disrupt peace rather than to establish it (cf. Luke 12:51, Matthew
10:34). Nonetheless, conflicts have not disappeared from the life of the Church, because
conflicts are intrinsic to social life itself. Indeed, in an age of democratization, globalization
and efficient information technologies, one might say that conflicts within the Catholic
Church are more visible than ever, especially when those conflicts involve the hierarchy. The
challenge for the Church appears to be not to rid itself of conflict altogether, an unrealistic
goal, but to manage conflict in productive rather than counterproductive ways.
Present-day intraecclesial conflicts touch the membership of the Catholic Church more
immediately, directly and (in some instances) extensively than they have in the past, thanks in
part to developments in information technologies (Reese 1996, 2; Hanson 1987; Hume 1989,
185; Seidler and Meyer 1989, 5. See also: Soukup, Plude & Philibert 1995; Aetatis Novae
1992). Moreover, such conflicts gain widespread attention because they surface questions
concerning freedom and authority which are of interest even to those who are not part of the
Church’s membership (Quinn 1996, 14; K. A. Briggs 1992, 1).
In a context of modernity, conflicts are more quickly and widely publicized than ever before,
thanks to the facility of information technologies. With the arrival of global and instantaneous
transmissions has come the participation of a broad public in conflictual matters as the
conflicts themselves unfold. Thus recent disputes between the Vatican and certain bishops,
and between the Vatican and certain theologians -- to name just two among many forms of
intraecclesial conflict -- have drawn countless others, Catholic or not, into the conflict
process. These new “participants” in the conflict, varying in the extent of their involvement,
reside the world over. The Vatican exchanges with Bishop Gaillot of France in 1995 and with
the theologian Leonardo Boff of Brazil in 1985, to cite just two examples, both received
worldwide press coverage, eliciting comment from Catholics and non-Catholics alike.
Conflicts between the Vatican and representatives of the local Church have taken on an
increased significance for the Church universal because the whole Church now has more
opportunity than ever to watch and speak to the process, and to be affected by it. In an
information age, such conflicts become a performance of identity (cf. Tjosvold & Johnson
1983, 2-3; Bartholomaus 1978, 97; C. L. Briggs 1996, 3; Cheney 1991, 88; Cox 1988, 4)
wherein questions of who the Church is and who it seeks to be are made manifest in the words
and actions of the participants.
Apart from the fact that intraecclesial conflict is much publicized in our time, it is also not
surprising that such conflict gets attention in light of the widespread (especially in Western
countries) contemporary focus on local and individual autonomy. Intraecclesial conflict
reveals in a vivid way present-day societal tensions between the claims of unity versus those
of diversity -- or, to put it another way, the claims of institutional authority relative to
individual or group autonomy (Ashby 1955, 10). One aspect of the heritage of the
Enlightenment has been a readiness to question the self-evidence of institutional authority (be
it governmental, religious, corporate or of another sort), particularly when the insights of
individual reason run counter to the will of the institutional authority. The Church, being one
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of the world’s most readily recognized bearers of institutional authority, naturally draws
attention to itself when it experiences conflict within its ranks. Such conflict symbolically
demonstrates for the public the current “state of the question,” as far as the Church is
concerned, in matters of unity and diversity, authority and obedience, and institutional identity
relative to individual freedom (Granfield 1987, 1; McKenzie 1969, 11; Ashby 1955, 10). It
also poses a challenge to non-ecclesiastical institutions to clarify their own stand on these
issues.
Since the Second Vatican Council -- to limit the historical scope of our discussion -- the world
has had many opportunities to watch the Church cope with internal conflicts taking place at
all levels of the organization. Cases involving the Vatican, however, tend to garner the most
attention because the papacy serves on a day-to-day basis as the highest decision-making
entity in the Church and as a focal point of the Church’s unity. Typically, a conflictual matter
must be fairly significant, even globally significant, for the Vatican to become involved at all.
The Holy See’s conversational partners in intraecclesial conflicts come from all regions of the
world. Conflicts between the Holy See and local bishops – center-periphery conflicts -- are
among the more noteworthy kinds of conflict experienced within the Church because both
parties lead significant sectors of the Church membership. Such conflicts hold a special
significance for the life of the Church as a whole, since the leadership of the pope in union
with the bishops greatly determines the course that the Church will take. Conflicts between
Rome and a local Ordinary pit two primary symbols of the Church’s unity one against
another. Bishops, like the Pope himself, symbolize and have responsibility for the unity of not
only their own diocese, but of the universal Church as well. Conflicts between the Pope (or
papal office) and members of the episcopacy are perilous for the Church as a whole, in that
they may produce doubt, fractiousness and antagonism within the ranks of the faithful (Reese
1996, 25). Catholics and non-Catholics alike may be alienated by the sight of two successors
to the apostles in tense or oppositional relationship.
Such conflicts are often painful for those involved. The principal parties and those loyal to
them may experience anxiety and disillusionment as a result of the proceedings (Bernardin
1987, 256). In addition, intrahierarchical conflicts may interfere with the Church’s progress
toward its own stated goals. Conflict that is poorly managed can diminish the Church’s
institutional vitality, making those inside and outside the Church unready to hear the message
the Church wants to proclaim (Quinn 1996, 14). One should note my distinction here between
the desire to see conflicts managed well and the desire for its disappearance from ecclesial life
altogether. The latter does not orient this research. One of my presuppositions is that conflict
can contribute positively to Church life (Hume 1999, 6; Halverstadt 1991, 3; Granfield 1987,
3; Lee and Marty 1964, 5). The Church has a clear interest in seeing the best possible
outcomes emerge when conflicts do arise. Thus it makes sense for the Church to seek to better
understand, in general and specific ways, how such conflicts develop, how they typically
unfold, and how they can most rationally be managed in light of the Church’s own ultimate
objectives.
Since the Second Vatican Council, we have seen conflicts involving the primacy and
episcopacy resolved in various ways. In some cases, the disputes have been resolved with
both parties achieving some of their stated objectives and indicating at least a minimal level of
satisfaction: the Hunthausen case seems to be an example of this. In others, as in the Lefebvre
and Gaillot cases, unwanted final conditions were forced by one party on another and
significant dissatisfaction was expressed publicly by one party or both afterward.
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The three cases of center-periphery conflict I have just mentioned, though isolated examples,
demonstrate that the Vatican ordinarily has the upper hand in such conflicts. In each case the
Vatican took power away from the bishop in question: Hunthausen had certain powers of
governance removed that were later restored; Lefebvre was excommunicated; Gaillot was
reassigned to an inactive See. One should not, however, overlook the power that individual
bishops wield vis-à-vis the papacy, particularly when the individual bishop has the sympathy
of other bishops. Historically, bishops have shown great resourcefulness in conflicts with the
papacy, achieving personal (or local) objectives despite contrary Vatican preferences. This
has been true even when a bishop’s position has been decisively sanctioned. As cases in point,
Bishop Gaillot has found creative ways to continue to spread his views (via the internet)
despite being reassigned to an inactive diocese, and Archbishop Lefebvre resisted the
Vatican’s lead for years before being decisively removed.
The fact that intrahierarchical conflict can be costly for the Church is amply demonstrated by
these few examples. When Archbishop Lefebvre was excommunicated, many loyal followers
left the Church with him. Such disaffection among Catholics, though less drastic in the
Hunthausen and Gaillot cases, was also readily apparent in the outcry heard in the bishops’
own dioceses and beyond. Unity among the leaders of the Church is critical to the
maintenance of unity among those they seek to serve.
Maintaining this unity has never been easy. Quite literally, the Church faces a world of
challenges within its own ranks. Roughly one billion persons across the globe call themselves
Catholic, but they do so according to widely varying cultural viewpoints and individual
experiences (Marzheuser 1995; Fitzpatrick 1987). How is it possible to join and hold such a
diversity together within a single organizational unity? How can individual bishops respect
the specific realities of life in their own diocese while integrating the same into the life of the
Church universal? How can the Pope address the needs of the many and at the same time act
to foster oneness? And when the Pope and a bishop find themselves in disagreement, how do
they know when to listen and when to speak, when to yield and when to stand firm?
1.3 The Problem of Limited Information About Center-Periphery Conflict Handling
Ideally, when evaluating intrahierarchical conflicts in the Catholic Church, one could consult
a comprehensive body of existing concerning such conflicts. But in fact, even more general
studies of intrachurch conflict are fairly limited, especially those done from a social
scientific-organizational management perspective (among those recognizing the problem are
Kniss and Chaves 1995, 172; Gangel and Canine 1992, 11; Vaillancourt 1980, 3). Moreover,
wide ranging agreement about terms and models is lacking, and empirical studies are rare.
Kniss and Chaves (1995, 173), who give specific attention to Christian intradenominational
conflict, have observed that, between 1965 and 1995, the study of such conflict “has left many
interesting and important questions unanswered.”
Among the writings of the past few decades that lend insight concerning intraecclesial conflict
in general are Van der Ven 1996, Stevens et al. 1994, Gangel and Canine 1992, Halverstadt
1991, Lee 1989, Seidler and Meyer 1989, Shawchuck 1983a and 1983b, Bacher et al. 1983,
Bossart 1980, Fray 1969 and Laeyendecker 1967. Though none of these treats Catholic
intrahierarchical conflict in particular, the works introduce concepts that have relevance for
the present research.
Various aspects of intrahierarchical conflict management (as seen from a social scientific or
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journalistic perspective) have been discussed in a limited number of works that I have found
to be especially helpful. These include Reese 1996, Reese 1992, Byrnes 1991, Cheney 1991,
Cooke 1989, Reese 1989, Hanson 1987, Hebblethwaite 1986, Kolbenschlag 1986, Lawler
1986, Nichols 1982, Vaillancourt 1980 and Greeley 1979. I have also found orientation for
this study in works that have examined the handling of particular cases of conflict within the
hierarchy. Among these: Van Schaik 1997, Cox 1988, Coleman 1978 and Congar 1976.
Although my interest here is not directly theological, theological literature has certainly
broadened my knowledge of the Church organization, its mindset and practice. Works that
have been helpful in this way are too numerous to mention, but at a minimum I would single
out the reflections on conflict treatment offered by the (U.S.) National Conference of Catholic
Bishops (1989) and Danneels (1987), and the discussions of papal-episcopal relations found
in Buckley 1998, Quinn 1996, Schatz 1996, Granfield 1987 and Tillard 1983. Granfield 1987
is a good example of a theological work that uses empirical examples to examine the sharing
of power and authority between pope and bishop. But Granfield’s interest is with the limits of
papal power and not with conflict handling as such.
1.4 A Social Scientific Approach: The Church as Organization
While empirical studies of Catholic intrahierarchical conflict are not abundantly available, it
is possible to draw insights from studies of leadership conflicts in other organizations
(Watkins 1991, 689; Seidler and Meyer 1989, xi; Vaillancourt 1980, 3). One starting point of
the present research is the presumption that leadership conflicts in the Church can be
compared with leadership struggles in other organizations.
In many respects, the Church is an organization comparable to other organizations (cf. Reese
1996, 1; Van der Ven 1996, 89; Thung 1996, 343; Watkins 1991; Safranski 1985), but we
should not lose sight of features which make the Church unique among organizations (Tracy
1991, 23; Wilson 1982, 17). The Church is a particular kind of religious organization that can
be distinguished from other religious organizations. Granfield (1987, 58) writes that the
Church “is a society with no counterpart because of its unique origin, means, patterns of
interaction, and goals.”
The Church is a unique combination of several elements: human and divine,
visible and invisible, temporal and transcendent. It is both a mystery, a part of
God’s “hidden plan” (Eph. 1:19), and a social institution (Granfield 1987, 58.
See also Reese 1996, 4-5).
One way the Church is like other organizations is in its experience of internal conflicts.
Tjosvold and Johnson (1983, 1) have made a case for the ubiquity of conflict within
organizational life in general: “To be alive is to be in conflict. To be effective is to be in
conflict. Organizations cannot function without conflict and members of organizations cannot
interact without conflict.” (See also Fraser and Hipel 1984, 3.) On the basis of the Church’s
capability of being compared with other organizations, and its being like other organizations
in its experience of internal conflicts, we may presume that social scientific studies of
leadership conflicts in other organizations will have some relevance to our investigation of
intrahierarchical conflict. Therefore, one of the initial points of orientation of this research is
engagement with terms, categories and models that have emerged from social scientific
studies of intraorganizational conflict.
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1.5 Gaining Insight into Center-Periphery Conflict by Means of a Case Study
Given the complexity of the phenomenon I have chosen to study and my desire to study the
phenomenon in the richness of its social context, I have determined to undertake a case study.
(My perspective on case study research derives primarily from Denzin and Lincoln 2000, Yin
1994, Yin 1993 and Hutjes and Van Buuren 1992. For the definition of a case study and a
detailed discussion of how I apply this method, see chapter five.) Observable cases of center-
periphery conflict are relatively rare, and the variables which have impact on the transpiration
of this phenomenon (societal factors, organizational factors, personal factors) are large in
number and not easily separated out from one another. Therefore it is not a simple matter to
isolate variables for comparison (in a laboratory setting, for example) or to conduct
comparisons across many cases. Conducting a case study offers the advantages of helping us
to see the interrelationship of multiple (at times too many!) variables at once and in their
natural context (to the extent that I have accurately reconstructed it). Another advantage to
pursuing a case study strategy, especially of the exploratory and descriptive kind I have
undertaken here, is that it makes room for a wide range of types of findings to emerge. In my
examination of the Rome-Hunthausen conflict, summarized briefly at the end of this chapter, I
have found myself led in various directions I did not expect to go, to my mind a positive
development.
At an early stage of this research I formulated an intention to compare the findings emerging
from my study of the Rome-Hunthausen case with another case, that of the Vatican’s
exchanges with Cardinal Alfrink of Utrecht during the early post-Vatican II years. The
Alfrink case suggested itself because of apparent similarities in the conflict-handling styles of
Hunthausen and Alfrink (and similar kinds of tensions in the local Church) but with differing
outcomes from the conflict with Rome. For practical reasons, this intention did not come to
fruition. (Investigation of the Hunthausen case proved to be demanding enough by itself.) But
I continue to believe that it would be a worthy research pursuit to take the theoretical
framework developed in this study and make comparisons across cases of center-periphery
conflict.
1.5.1 The Formulation of Expectations through a Process of Theoretical Sensitization
Prior to confronting data from the case itself, I have engaged in a lengthy process of
theoretical sensitization, the results of which are presented in chapters two through five. The
purpose of doing so has been to become acquainted with the state of the question in regard to
center-periphery conflict and to gain some initial points of orientation for our investigation.
This effort has taken as its major topics the structural make-up of the Church organization
(chapter two) and the context of modernity that contains the Church (chapter three). At the
end of chapter three I advance a limited number of expectations about center-periphery
conflict handling, given the Church’s organizational structure and societal placement. These
include expectations about the hierarchy’s approach to center-periphery conflict in general, its
perspective on the use of power, and seven specific coping strategies center-periphery conflict
participants are likely to apply. Chapter four carries the process of sensitization a step further
by offering a descriptive theory of conflict handling in general. Chapter five completes the
process of sensitization by providing a set of reflections, taken from the discipline of critical
discourse analysis, that help us to conceptualize links between applications of language and
power.
1.5.2 A Discourse-Oriented Approach to the Case Study
Organizational conflicts are typically made manifest in language use. Language use is at the
heart of our ability to interact as persons, and as such, it is also an inescapable dimension of
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conflict experience (C. L. Briggs 1996, 3; Jandt 1973, 2). One cannot wage conflict, or
resolve it, or understand it, without being able to send messages, and receive and interpret
them. Language is not the only medium of conflict conduct: behaviors other than speaking
and writing also determine the course of a dispute. But by studying the language used in a
conflict one may gain much insight into the nature of the conflict and the patterns of its
resolution.
In the present case study I place a priority on discerning how language is used to cope with
the center-periphery conflict. It is my view that close attention to the language used by
Church leaders in conflict situations reveals much about what interests are at stake for these
leaders (and for the Church as an institution) and what means they consider appropriate to
secure those interests. On the other hand, language is not the only medium for the strategic
management of conflict, and one cannot tell the whole conflict story by speaking only of
texts. Conflicts will also be carried out by persons through nonverbal means, as for example
through the use of body language, attire, symbols, etc. Therefore, my attention does not go
exclusively to discourse products, but my overall concern remains at the level of conflict
handling.
As a means to distill and analyze (on a micro level) the language used in hierarchical
conflicts, I employ a social-linguistic method of recent origin, critical discourse analysis
(CDA). CDA (Fairclough 1995; 1992; 1989) is a method for illuminating how language use
relates to social practice and social change. A fundamental premise undergirding the method
is the belief that texts negotiate sociocultural contradictions and differences between groups
(Fairclough 1995, 7). Embracing this perspective, I have studied texts produced by members
of the hierarchy participating in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict as a way of gaining deeper
insight into how the parties have defended and advanced their own interests.
1.5.3 Conflict Analysis As a Tool for Bringing Coherence to the Case Study
Having drawn up my own picture of the Rome-Hunthausen conflict in this study, it has been
helpful to make comparisons with existing theories of social conflict as a means for clarifying
my thinking about the case. Rahim 1992 was especially useful at an early stage of the
research. In a later stage I found it profitable to draw on the work of Pruitt and Rubin (1986),
whose focus on conflict participant’s aspirations and perceptions fits well with my own focus
on individual actors’ (bishops’) participation in conflict situations. Pruitt and Rubin also
provide a set of expectations concerning the appearance of particular strategies in particular
stages of conflict, which has enhanced my ability to make distinctions within the conflict
experience.
1.5.4 Interview with a Conflict Insider
The view of the Rome-Hunthausen conflict presented here has been substantially benefited by
my contact with someone who viewed the Rome-Hunthausen conflict from the inside: Very
Rev. Michael G. Ryan, former chancellor and vicar general of the Seattle Archdiocese under
Archbishop Hunthausen. During two two-hour interviews I conducted with him in 2001, Fr.
Ryan shared his own perspective on the conflict experience. His information rounded out my
own understanding of the conflict in a number of ways: by providing a full account that was
not influenced by my own theories (in an open-structured component to the interview), by
supplying missing information that helped me to reconstruct the case (in a semi-structured
interview component), and by allowing me to hear Fr. Ryan’s opinion of certain theories I had
developed (in a validational interview component). Because of the sensitive nature of the
interview materials, Fr. Ryan and I have agreed that the interview will not be reproduced in
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full in this context, but he has given me permission to reproduce selected portions of the
transcribed text. I have taken advantage of this opportunity and the results are presented near
the end of this study. I am most grateful for Fr. Ryan’s cooperation.
1.5.5 Documentation Supplied by a Chancery Employee from the Conflict Years
A second source of information that has immeasurably benefited this research is a collection
of documentation gathered by one who worked for the Archdiocese of Seattle during the years
of the Rome-Hunthausen conflict. While working as an administrative assistant at the
archdiocesan chancery, Ms. Janice Wasden Price began compiling scrapbooks of
documentation relevant to the Hunthausen case. Included in her collection of eight scrapbooks
spanning three years are newspaper clippings from a wide range of sources (The Progress, the
National Catholic Reporter, the Wanderer, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the
National Catholic Register, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, the Seattle Times, the Seattle
Weekly – in other words, sources representing viewpoints right and left, secular and Catholic),
internal office memoranda, photos, letters from conflict participants, mailing lists, invitations
to events of various kinds, buttons in support of Hunthausen and more. Ms. Wasden Price’s
collection added a depth and breadth to my own reconstruction of the case that could not
otherwise have been achieved. I owe a heartfelt debt of gratitude to her for her provision of
these materials. In the near future Ms. Wasden Price’s materials, which amount to a kind of
time capsule from the Rome-Hunthausen conflict, will be made available to other researchers
at an as-yet-undetermined academic institution.
1.6 Findings from the Case
The primary findings identified through this research are a general perspective on, and
specific coping strategies applied within, one empirical example of center-periphery conflict.
These findings are presented in unfolding fashion in my reconstruction of the case itself and
in my subsequent reflection on the case thereafter, as aided by several validation techniques.
Ultimately these findings boil down to my understanding of the strategies used to achieve,
maintain and apply power in a given case of conflict within the Church hierarchy. My
intention is to offer a description of what I have found in the Rome-Hunthausen case, after
having viewed it through a lens of language and power.
Though I write from the perspective of a Catholic believer who is concerned for the future of
the Church, I do not attempt in this analysis to account for how God works through Church
leaders’ efforts at conflict management. My intention has been to describe as precisely and
correctly as possible what actually happened in the selected case. For the sake of relevant
disclosure, I admit that I am predisposed to believe that all people, bishops included, are
motivated by a will to power, which will color their handling of conflict situations. Having
said that, I recognize too that certain strains of Church teaching point to the dangers of
wanting and possessing power and that the ideal of emptying oneself – of becoming
powerless -- is proposed by the Church (as in the image of Jesus in Philippians, chapter two).
My assessment of the Rome-Hunthausen case takes a neutral view of power (power is
necessary and can be put to good or bad ends) and does not speculate about the inner
motivations of individual bishops, but simply takes for granted that bishops possess ample
powers that they will apply – probably for a mixture of selfish and selfless reasons – in
conflict situations. While I hold that God is somehow at work in the conflict handling process,
I confront obvious limits in being able to say exactly how. Limiting myself to the evaluative
framework of organizational management, however, it does seem clear to me that center-
periphery conflicts can be managed more effectively than they are, in light of the Church’s
own stated goals.
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1.7 Relevance of the Study
This study is relevant in theoretical, practical and theological terms. Its theoretical relevance
lies in its provision of a clearer understanding of how conflicts within the Church hierarchy
work, identifying societal and organizational pressures that bear on such conflicts, resources
available for managing the conflicts, and a variety of strategies that may be applied by
bishops in their pursuit of personal and organizational objectives. At most, I offer a mini-
theory of center-periphery conflict here, but it is a useful first step toward a more
comprehensive grasp of the phenomenon.
The practical relevance of the study lies in the consistent grounding of theory in knowledge of
actual practice. In the course of this investigation all theoretical suppositions are measured
against the available empirical evidence. The result is a picture of what strategies tend to be
applied in center-periphery conflict and the effects thereof. Given that center-periphery
conflicts are likely to recur in the future – the structural tension between center and periphery
will not go away – the findings here can contribute to the more effective handling of such
conflicts in the future.
The theological relevance of this study lies not in its advancement of a theological reflection
on center-periphery conflict – no such reflection is offered – but in the foundation it lays for
future theologizing. Before exploring the theological implications of intrahierarchical conflict
for the life of the Church, one needs to have a clear picture of what such conflict involves.
Though my focus here stays with questions of language and power, which at no point are put
in theological perspective, these are crucial concepts that need to be addressed in any valid,
comprehensive ecclesiology.
1.8 Summary of the Hunthausen Case
By way of introduction, I offer the following summary of the Rome-Hunthausen conflict.
In 1983, the Vatican pro-nuncio to the United States, Archbishop Pio Laghi, informed
Archbishop Hunthausen that the Vatican wished to conduct a visitation of the Seattle
Archdiocese, the purpose of which was to assess the merits of complaints made about the
Archbishop’s management of affairs within the Archdiocese. Hunthausen agreed to this
request. Subsequently, the Holy See sent Washington, D.C. Archbishop James Hickey to
Seattle to carry out the visitation, during which time he met with priests, religious and
laypersons within the Archdiocese. Hickey also studied documents which had been issued by
the Archbishop and the Archdiocese. Hickey then reported his findings to the Vatican.
Hunthausen received word of the Vatican’s conclusions from the visitation by means of a
September 1985 letter from Joseph Ratzinger, Cardinal Prefect of the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith. The letter concluded the visitation and summarized Rome’s findings.
The letter mixed praise of Hunthausen’s loyalty to the Church and his leadership as a bishop
with some specific criticisms of his management of the Archdiocese. The Vatican concluded
that among the abuses taking place in the Seattle Archdiocese at that time were: instances in
which divorced persons were allowed to remarry within the Church without an annulment; a
failure to assert the legitimate authoritativeness of the teaching of the magisterium; overuse of
general absolution; common intercommunion at weddings and funerals; inadequate
distinctions made between the roles of priests and laypersons; Church employment of laicized
priests; and insufficient expression of Church teachings on homosexuality.
In December 1985, the Vatican appointed Donald Wuerl auxiliary bishop in Seattle. Though
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not publicly announced at the time of Wuerl’s appointment, it later came to light that Rome’s
intention was for Hunthausen to delegate to Bishop Wuerl “special faculties,” giving Wuerl
final authority in five areas of responsibility. Wuerl would oversee:  (1) the tribunal, (2)
liturgical decisions, (3) priestly formation, (4) decisions concerning former priests, and (5)
moral decisions in matters of medical ethics and the ministry to homosexuals. News of the
Vatican intention for Wuerl to have special faculties became public in September of 1986,
when Archbishop Hunthausen announced that he himself had only recently come to
understand that he was supposed to give Wuerl final authority in these areas.
News of the special powers Wuerl was to receive led to many protests within the Archdiocese
of Seattle and beyond. Priests, religious and laypersons expressed their dismay and openly
questioned the rightness and legality (according to Church law) of such a transference of
authority.
In answer to the public debate that arose in response to Hunthausen’s disclosure of Wuerl’s
faculties, the papal pro-nuncio, Archbishop Laghi, issued a chronology in October of 1986,
which presented the Vatican’s view of the affair up to that point. Some weeks thereafter,
during a closed session of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) November
1986 meeting, Hunthausen offered his own perspective on the events that had transpired.
Having heard both sides, the NCCB found itself divided in opinion.
The controversy persisted in the aftermath of the bishops’ meeting. On February 9, 1987,  the
pro-nuncio announced that the Vatican had appointed a three-man commission (made up of
Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago, Cardinal O’Connor of New York and Archbishop Quinn of
San Francisco) to resolve the matter. In May of 1987 the commission, issued its assessment
report simultaneous with the Vatican-approved implementation of their recommendations.
Hunthausen was restored to full power, Wuerl was reassigned to another diocese (not yet
named at the time), and Bishop Thomas J. Murphy of Great Falls-Billings, Montana, was
appointed Coadjutor Archbishop of Seattle. Murphy had the right of succession to
Hunthausen but no special powers. The commission itself continued in existence until the
April of 1989, with the purpose of helping Hunthausen to further address the problems
identified through he visitation process.
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CHAPTER TWO
CENTER-PERIPHERY CONFLICT IN ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
2.1 In Search of Propositions to Orient the Exploration
Center-periphery conflict is by no means a blank slate. Any number of information sources
stand ready to clarify various aspects of this phenomenon for us and to suggest the sorts of
coping strategies we can find employed therein. My confrontation of the empirical example
has been given direction by a preliminary literature study. In chapters two and three I bring
the results of that study together in the articulation of a set of coping strategies I expect to find
applied in cases of center-periphery conflict (summarized in sections 3.5-3.5.3). These
expected findings do not amount to full-blown hypotheses that are subsequently tested.
Rather, they serve as propositions to orient the exploration and set it underway. Presenting
them here also allows me to be upfront about my presuppositions when addressing the
empirical evidence.
Three main questions focus the discussion of the current chapter. They are
(1) What is center-periphery conflict?
(2) Who participates in center-periphery conflict?
(3) And how does the organizational culture (type of organization, organizational goals,
resources available to leaders, etc.) condition the choice of coping strategies in center-
periphery conflict?
In chapter three I take up the question of how societal pressures are likely to condition the
choice of coping strategies in center-periphery conflict.
2.2 Center-Periphery Conflict
Leadership conflicts in the Catholic Church are one among numberless kinds of conflict
experienced by human persons. Conflict itself is a fundamental theme of human existence.
Human persons have always experienced conflict -- in their quest to survive and prosper in
the world, in their relationships with others, and within themselves. Nisbet (1969, 86) has
written that, “of all experiences in social and political life, conflict is surely one of the deepest
seated and most universal.” Conflict is the dynamic principle of social change. In my study of
conflicts within the Catholic hierarchy, I share the presumption of Stevens et al. (1994, 15)
that conflicts are common, normal and necessary, even for the Church, and that they have the
potential to benefit as well as harm the Church.
Rahim (1992, 34) notes that there is no generally accepted definition of conflict (see also
Aubert 1963 and Fink 1968). Pruitt and Rubin (1986, 4) define conflict as “perceived
divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved
simultaneously.” With this definition they take into account the “psychological under-
pinnings” of social confrontation, as well as the concretely manifested dimensions of the
conflict (resource deployments, counter-deployments). I find Pruitt and Rubin’s overall
perspective on conflict -- especially their emphasis on strategic choice -- and the definition
they offer, to fit well with my decision to give special attention to the calculated pursuit of
personal and organizational interests in center-periphery conflict handling. Attention to
strategic choice has advanced the understanding of leadership conflicts in other types of
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organizations and I believe the same will hold true in regard to Church center-periphery
conflicts. It is my intuition that bishops entertain notions of personal and organizational
interest (which are sometimes compatible and sometimes incompatible) and that these
interests come to be reflected in aspirations that the bishops pursue, at times harmoniously
and at times conflictually, in relation to the aspirations of other Church leaders. A full
discussion of Pruitt and Rubin’s theory of conflict handling follows in chapter four.
In this study my concern is with a specific type of conflict: center-periphery conflict. By this I
mean conflict taking place within the Church hierarchy between the central leadership
position (Rome, the papacy) and one or more peripheral leadership positions (the local
churches, the other bishops). It is manifested in a perceived divergence of interest between
the Pope and other operatives of the Holy See and one or more local bishops and their
representatives. Though members of the hierarchy are not the only ones involved in or
affected by such conflicts, my focus here lies exclusively with how these persons approach
the handling of such conflicts.
2.3 Participants in Center-Periphery Conflict
Center-periphery conflict within the hierarchy may be seen as a conflict that engages two
principal parties – the center party (the Pope and his representatives) and the peripheral party
(the local bishop and his representatives) – and various kinds of third parties (my focus is on
the involvement of other bishops). In the sections that follow, I will describe in general terms
the role that these parties play in the life of the Church organization.
2.3.1 The Center Party: The Pope and His Representatives
The Pope stands at the top of the leadership structure of the Church. He is the center of the
center party and is surrounded by a large number of functionaries who help him to carry out
his responsibilities. As “pastor of the universal Church” and successor to the Apostle Peter,
the Pope’s position and power are unrivalled in the Church. He enjoys “supreme, full,
immediate and universal ordinary power in the Church, which he can freely exercise” (Canon
331, Code of Canon Law). At the Second Vatican Council, the Council Fathers emphasized
the importance of a collegial type of governance of the Church, whereby the Pope has
leadership over but also shares responsibility with all of the bishops of the Church. To a
degree, the practice of collegiality has been enhanced in the post Vatican II Church (cf.
Nichols 1997, 245; Granfield 1994, 9; Watkins 1991, 690-691; Seidler and Meyer 1989, 5;
Gannon 1988, xi; Safranski 1985, 44; Vaillancourt 1980, 12), but one should avoid
overstating the extent of this change (Nichols 1997, 247, 286; Watkins 1991, 700; Granfield
1987, 7; Hanson 1987, 62; Safranski 1985, 44).
Though the Pope guides the Church in company with the entire college of bishops, he stands
as first among equals as the head of the college, with the power to appoint and depose other
bishops. Canon 333 states, “There is neither appeal nor recourse against a decision or decree
of the Roman Pontiff.” Only the Pope has the power to call an ecumenical council which
manifests the most authoritative type of new teaching that the Church can proclaim. The Pope
also possesses a unique power to teach infallibly in matters of faith and morals. Besides
serving as the foremost leader of the universal Church, the Pope serves as the Bishop of
Rome, and the political leader of the Vatican City State. The Pope holds office for life, though
he can resign his office if he so chooses.
In carrying out his duties the Pope is aided by the Vatican bureaucratic apparatus known as
the Roman curia. Current usage applies the term Roman curia to those helping the Pope
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govern the Church, but not to those involved in governing Vatican City or the diocese of
Rome. The curia consists of agencies, or “dicasteries,” which gather and process information,
advise the Pope and implement his decisions (Reese 1996, 106-139). Among the dicasteries
are the Secretariat of State, nine congregations, eleven councils, three tribunals and other
offices.
Reese (1996, 175) likens the Secretariat of State to a combination of the U.S. State
Department and the White House Staff. “It coordinates the work of other Vatican offices and
handles any issue that does not fall into some other offices jurisdiction.”
The nine pontifical congregations and eleven councils in the present-day curia are as follows:
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the Congregation for the Oriental Churches,
the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, the Congregation
for the Causes of Saints, the Congregation for Bishops, the Congregation for the
Evangelization of Peoples, the Congregation for the Clergy, the Congregation for Institutes of
Consecrated Life and for Societies of Apostolic Life, the Congregation for Catholic
Education; the Council for the Laity, the Council for Promoting Christian Unity, the Council
for the Family, the Council for Justice and Peace, the Council for Unum, the Council for
Pastoral Care of Migrants and Travelers, the Council for Pastoral Assistance to Health Care
Workers, the Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts, the Council for Interreligious
Dialogue, the Council for Culture, the Council for Social Communications.
Reese (1996, 112) notes that the basic structure of congregations and councils is the same.
Each has a defined area of competence, a committee membership appointed by the Pope for
renewable five-year terms, and a chair, who is also appointed by the Pope for a renewable
five-year term. Members of congregations are cardinals and bishops only, but councils may
include laypersons. The chair of a congregation is known as its “prefect,” while the chair of a
council is its “president.” Only cardinals serve as the prefect of a congregation. A council
president does not need to be a cardinal, but very often cardinals fill this role. Reese observes
that congregations existed before councils and in general enjoy more prestige and authority
than the councils.
Three tribunals act on behalf of the Holy See. The Apostolic Penitentiary deals with
excommunications reserved to the Holy See. The Roman Rota hears appeals of lower courts
of the Church. The Apostolic Signatura is the supreme court of the Church.
Cardinals play an important leadership role in the Church (the college of cardinals elects a
new pope in “conclave” upon the death or resignation of the previous pope), but it is
necessary to note that the office of cardinal does not constitute an intervening level of
authority between pope and bishop, in the sense that bishops answer to cardinals who in turn
answer to the Pope (Safranski 1985, 46). Cardinals are nominated by the Pope. Though one
need be only a priest and not a bishop at the time of appointment, in the Church of the present
day cardinals are automatically made bishops at the time of their appointment. Cardinals
normally assume high-level administrative functions on behalf of the Church, either in Rome
(leading curial dicasteries, for example, or presiding over ecclesiastical commissions) or in
other dioceses. It has become a papal custom to elevate bishops of large and important sees to
the rank of Cardinal. At the request of the Pope, cardinals may gather in forums known as
“consistories” to advise the Pope. Cardinals are required to submit their resignation to the
Pope at age seventy-five. He then decides whether to accept it. Only cardinals under eighty
years of age at the beginning a conclave can participate in the election of a new pope.
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Apart from the offices of the Roman curia, the Holy See depends on representatives called
“nuncios” to maintain relations with local governments and with local Church leaders around
the world. Nuncios, who are archbishops, represent the Holy See, not the Vatican City State.
They normally have the status of ambassador in the country of their posting. Reese (1996,
230) describes nuncios as “the eyes and ears of the Holy See in a country.” The focus of the
nuncio’s diplomatic efforts is on the welfare of the local Church and on the foreign policy
goals of the Holy See, which center on human rights, economic justice and peace (Reese
1996, 231). Nuncios are especially influential with the Holy See in the intermediary role they
play in the selection of a new bishop to fill a vacant see. Having received candidate
recommendations from bishops in the province that contains the vacant see, the nuncio
investigates the diocese and the candidates and then submits a list of three nominations to
either the Congregation for Bishops or the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples.
The congregation then makes a recommendation to the Pope, who appoints the bishop (Reese
1996, 235).
2.3.2 The Peripheral Party: The Local Bishop
Local bishops represent the position of peripheral power in the Church organization, though
they also share leadership responsibilities for the Church universal. Most commonly, their
power base stands at a distance from the center and is in constant tension with the center
(though the degree of tension varies). Some bishops may much more truly represent positions
of peripheral power in the Church than others. It is possible to identify local bishops who so
strongly identify with the central power in Rome that they hardly represent the peripheral
position (that is, a legitimate power distant from Rome’s) at all. Harder to imagine, though
still conceivable, is the Pope who so downplays the power of the center in favor of local
autonomy that he may no longer be considered a defender of centralized power. In any case,
my attention here goes to cases that do seem to be true instances of center-periphery tension. I
am interested in conflicts in which the structural tension in the Church between center and
periphery is manifest in intentional (though perhaps less than transparent) advocacy.
Like the Pope, local bishops have operatives who work on their behalf and who contribute to
the power of the peripheral party. Sometimes a bishop is accompanied by one or more other
bishops (auxiliary bishops, a coadjutor bishop) who help with the governance of the diocese.
But in general, and sharply in contrast with the pope’s Roman curia, a bishop’s staff is made
up of clergy, religious and lay persons who, by any measure, are less powerful in the Church
organization than center party operatives.
As the ordinary of a particular church, a bishop’s responsibility is to the people of his own
diocese, but it is also to the Church universal. All bishops are understood to be successors of
the Apostles, standing in union with the Roman Pontiff (successor to the Apostle Peter in his
role of leadership) to lead the Church universal. The entire body of bishops is known as the
college of bishops. The college of bishops, under the leadership of the Pope, enjoys full and
supreme power and authority in the Church (Lumen Gentium, arts. 22-23, in Abbot 1966).
Bishops are the chief teachers, priests and ministers of governance of the local Churches. The
Catholic Church considers them, in their capacity as bishop, to be Vicars of Christ in their
own right, and not simply vicars or agents of the Pope (Lumen Gentium, art. 27, in Abbot
1966). Nonetheless, the bishop’s power is always exercised in company and agreement with
that of the other bishops and the Pope. Canon 381.1 of the Code of Canon Law declares that
“a diocesan bishop in the diocese committed to him possesses all the ordinary, proper and
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immediate power which is required for the exercise of his pastoral office except for those
cases which the law or a decree of the Supreme Pontiff reserves to the supreme authority of
the Church or to some other ecclesiastical authority.” Thus a bishop’s power, though
extensive within the Church (he enjoys an especially wide latitude within his own diocese,
where his powers are not separated as in civil society), has limits. This is especially true in
relation to papal power, which supersedes the local ordinary’s power, since the Pope serves as
the chief guardian of unity. Reese (1989, 57) notes that a local bishop has, for example, no
authority to rewrite liturgical texts or ceremonies, ordain women or consecrate a bishop
without Vatican approval. Nor may he issue legislation contrary to laws passed by a higher
authority, namely the Pope or the national bishops’ conference.
Bishops may exercise their authority collectively in a variety of forums. They do so most
prominently and powerfully in an ecumenical council, convened by the Pope, which
assembles all of the world’s Catholic bishops to formulate teachings and decisions binding on
the whole Church. The Second Vatican Council, 1962-1965, is the most recent example of
this. Synods are another forum in which bishops exercise their authority collectively. A
synod’s role, however, is advisory to the Pope and not deliberative, unless the Pope declares it
otherwise (Reese 1996, 43). Bishops may also gather in national or regional episcopal
conferences to address matters of concern and pastoral applications within that national or
regional context. Bishops’ conferences sometimes serve as channels of communication
between local bishops and the Holy See, or between local bishops and bishops in other parts
of the world (Reese 1992, 228).
As the leader of a diocese, a bishop presides over a diocesan hierarchy. (An archbishop is the
ordinary of an archdiocese, which is the lead diocese in an ecclesiastical province.) A bishop
(or archbishop) may be assisted by one or more auxiliary bishops (helper bishops, without
right of succession) or by a coadjutor bishop (a helper bishop with right of succession) in his
administration of the diocese. Normally, these assistant bishops arrive in response to a request
for help which the ordinary himself has made (Canon 403, Code of Canon Law), but
occasionally such bishops are imposed on a bishop despite his wishes (Reese 1989, 15). In
some cases, an auxiliary or coadjutor bishop may be equipped with special faculties of
governance in a diocese (Canon 403, Code of Canon Law). Generally speaking, a bishop fully
determines who serves in the diocesan structure beneath him. Others who serve in the diocese
derive their authority from him (Safranski 1985, 47).
Though structural arrangements vary somewhat from diocese to diocese, common positions
within a diocesan hierarchy include: a vicar general (always a priest), who assists the bishop
in the overall governance of the diocese; other episcopal vicars (always priests), who assume
other leadership responsibilities assigned by the bishop; a chancellor (may be a priest,
religious or layperson), who maintains the diocesan archives and performs other assigned
duties; a finance council (composed of clergy, religious or laity); a presbyteral council
(council of priests); a chapter of canons (all priests), responsible for liturgical functions in the
cathedral and other duties; and a pastoral council (made up of priests, religious or laypersons).
A number of the above-named advisory functions, especially those that include possibilities
for the participation of laypersons, are the product of innovations in Church teaching that
emerged at the Second Vatican Council. Lawler (1986, 26) has noted that members of the
bishop’s staff often play an important intermediary role in press communications, by distilling
the bishop’s message for public consumption.
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2.3.3 Third Parties
Other bishops may become involved in center-periphery conflict as third parties – that is,
parties who cannot be said to fall decisively within the orbit of the principal parties to the
conflict. Third parties enjoy a significant degree of autonomy in regard to the conflict itself.
They may participate of their own initiative (friendship or an interest in the issues may be a
motivating factor), or they may become involved through an invitation from either the center
or periphery party. Their involvement may be informal or formal, behind the scenes or in the
open. Participation in an advisory capacity is the likeliest form of their participation.
Though officers of the Roman curia and papal nuncios commonly act as communications
intermediaries between the Pope and local bishops, I am not inclined to treat these as true
third parties. As I have already suggested, they are better understood as extensions of the
center party. Auxiliary bishops and / or a coadjutor bishop assigned to assist a diocesan
ordinary have a greater possibility for being considered legitimate third parties, though much
depends on the circumstances of their appointment. For while auxiliaries and coadjutor bishop
normally must obey the ordinary, they may also have special obligations or responsibilities to
Rome which keep them from aligning themselves within the periphery party. Vatican
appointees (visitators, special commissions, etc.) also fall into a gray area. They may be
treated as representatives of the center party or as third parties, depending on the degree of
autonomy guaranteed by the circumstances of their appointment.
National or regional bishops’ conferences are likely to at least provide support and advice in
cases of center-periphery conflict. Such groups do not have the legal status of an intermediary
power in the Church between pope and bishop. At most, they are in a position to function in a
consultative fashion.
Many other persons or groups outside of the Catholic hierarchy also play third party roles in
center-periphery conflict. These include members of the clergy and Religious congregations,
lay Catholics, journalists and other media commentators, advocacy groups, political officials
and any number of others who may have a stake in the conflict outcomes. Since my concern
here is with the conflict-handling tactics of the hierarchy, my attention will go to these other
third parties only when their participation appears to have direct bearing on the hierarchy’s
behavior.
2.4 Organizational Role and the Choice of Coping Strategies
The choice of coping strategies in center-periphery conflict will reflect social pressures and
conditioning that apply within the organizational and societal context. I have already
introduced the question of the organizational context by considering key roles of leadership
that members of the hierarchy bear on behalf of the Church organization. Now this picture
needs to be filled in with further depictions of the Church organization, with attention going
specifically to the type of organization the Church is, its goals, and the means by which
members of the hierarchy coordinate and control resources to achieve those goals. In the
section that follows, I consider these aspects of the Church organization and reflect on how
each relates to the handling of center-periphery conflict. Once this treatment of the Church’s
internal functioning is complete, I then turn, in section 2.5, to analyze how elements of the
encapsulating societal context are likely to influence the choice of coping strategies in center-
periphery conflict.
2.4.1 The Church as Organization
Center-periphery conflict may be characterized as an leadership problem occurring in the
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immediate context of the organization that is the Church. To comprehend the organization as
context, we need a basic grasp of the type of organization the Church is, its leadership
structure, goals, resources, and means of coordination and control. In light of the size of the
Catholic Church, its complexity (Reese 1996, 109; Safranski 1985, 43), its long history, and
the multitude of cultures in which it exists, my organizational description will be far from
complete. But I hope at least to capture some of the most prominent aspects of the Church’s
organizational life.
2.4.1.1 Organization Defined
Organizations, according to Morgan (1990, 5), “involve bringing together human beings and
physical resources in a co-ordinated and controlled mechanism in order to achieve certain
objectives, otherwise impossible.” He proposes that the central issue in the study of
organizations is “the tension between actors and individual subjects with their own goals and
interests and the organization as a structure of control and co-ordination which is trying to
guide those actors to act ‘for’ the organization as a system” (Morgan 1990, 7-8). McGuire
(1997, 203), following Coleman (1956, 46), observes that members of religious organizations
are not exempt from experiencing conflicting loyalties, or “cross pressures,” which
complicate their participation in the organization.
It is not difficult to conceive of the Catholic Church as an entity seeking to achieve certain
objectives through coordination and control of its human and material resources (McGuire
1997, 166). Moreover, Morgan’s concern with the role of individual actors within the
organization would seem to be highly relevant for our study of the role that hierarchical
members play in guiding the participation of other individual members who affiliate with the
organization that is the Church. In this latter aspect, Morgan’s approach appears compatible
with Cheney’s (1991, 83-84) notion that bishops engage in a process of “managing multiple
identities” in their leadership of the Church. (I will return to this concept later.)
In forthcoming pages I classify the Church as a type of organization and then turn to consider
the separate components of Morgan’s definition of organization as they apply to the Church.
Thus I describe the means by which the Church coordinates and controls human and physical
resources for the sake of achieving certain objectives.
2.4.1.2 Classification of the Church as a Type of Organization
Through much of the twentieth century, discussions of organizations made heavy use of
Weber’s (1958) concept of bureaucracy, and observers of the Church have not been shy about
applying this concept as well (Seidler and Meyer 1989, 17; Boff 1986, 1; Safranski 1985, 43).
But as Scherer (1988) asserts, exclusive use of this concept is unsuitable for describing
organizations that affirm values or involve strong commitments, as religious organizations do.
Others have noted the more general difficulty of accounting for the organizational behavior of
the Church, which is, at once, “a social phenomenon and a sacred system” (Ashbrook 1965,
397).
In answer to this problem, Scherer employs a fourfold typology to characterize the Catholic
Church as an organization. Scherer’s typology includes four generic complementary models
of organizing, which he offers as “ideal” constructions (or, exaggerations for the purpose of
theoretical clarity). “Real” organizations will contain mixtures of elements of two or more
models (Scherer 1988, 477). Scherer’s ideal types of organization are political-economic
market, bureaucracy, clan and mission.
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Scherer’s typology is not the only one that can help to clarify the Church’s functioning as an
organization. Thung (1976) observes that an organization’s relationship with the environment
can be the basis for an organizational typology (cf. Parsons 1965, and a subsequent
applications along this line in Van der Ven 1996, which draws on Parsons’ work and
Mintzberg 1979). Another basis for an organizational typology that Thung points to is the
means of compliance employed within the organization (cf. Etzioni 1961). Dulles (1974),
working within the theological discipline of ecclesiology, has also provided a set of “models”
-- hierarchy, herald, sacrament, mystical communion, dialogue, and the more recently added
community of disciples (Dulles 1982,7-9) -- which reveals various “ways of being Church.”
All of these approaches make unique contributions to our understanding of the Church’s
organizational life.
My choice to use Scherer’s typology has to do with its concreteness (over and against the
Parsons and Etzioni typologies) and its applicability to a wide range of organizational
structures (as opposed to Dulles’ scheme, which is not empirically but ideologically
interpreted). I find that Scherer’s four types readily call to mind familiar organizational
examples in a way that Parsons’ (adaptation, goal achievement, integration, latency) and
Etzioni’s (utilitarian, coercive, normative) more abstract typologies do not. (Scherer argues
for mid-range theories, which are “general but not too general” -- p. 478.) Examples of a
market, a bureaucracy, a clan and a mission come easily to mind, an advantage when making
comparisons. By virtue of their concrete associations, we also keep in touch with the fact that
an organization is a complex social entity that still must function in the real world.
A description of each of Scherer’s four ideal types follows.
A political-economic market type of organization has a flat, coalitional structural shape. Its
authority source is buyer-seller competition and votes by participants. It is characterized by a
high permeability to environment and is in fact dominated by this permeability. Its control
strategy involves withdrawal and renegotiation and popular or market demand. It embraces a
rationality that is technical, short-term in its focus, and influenced by collective behavior. Its
operational hallmarks are rapid turnover, wheeling dealing and contractualism. Scherer
identifies stock exchanges and federations as among its illustrative organizations.
A bureaucratic type of organization has a tall, interlinked hierarchical structural shape. Its
authority source is procedural authorization. Its level of permeability to environment is
moderate to low. Its control strategy is one of surveillance via hierarchy and rules. It is
marked by a rationality that is technical and long-term in its orientation. The operational
hallmarks of a bureaucracy are rule-procedure books, litigation and boundary maintenance.
As illustrative organizations, Sherer offers the general category of federal bureaus, with the
specific example of the (US) Internal Revenue Service.
A clan type of organization has a generational and territorial structural shape. Its authority
source is seniority, group consensus and family-like trust. Its permeability to environment is
frequently low. Clan-type organizations adopt control strategies of socialization and informal
sanctions. A rationality based on traditionalism and feeling more important is operative.
Operational hallmarks include ceremony and rituals, low turnover and stigma at exit. Among
the illustrative organizations Scherer cites are political machines and mafia. Another example
could be the political power exercised by extended families such as the Kennedys.
A mission type of organization has the structural shape of a charismatic retinue. Its authority
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source is ideology, charisma and a transcendent call. A control strategy of group esprit and
intrinsic values is operative. Its type of rationality is substantive. The operational hallmarks of
a mission-type organization include an overriding commitment to particular goals and
commitments of awesome sacrifice. Illustrative organizations include religious orders and
strategic force operations such as the CIA.
Scherer emphasizes that organizations are not static or fixed entities but instead exist as
constant, ongoing processes, and again, no one type accounts perfectly for any actual
organization. The four models give us perspective on how organizations “come to terms with
the ‘functional imperatives’ of organized life: openness to environment (market), efficiency
and control (bureaucracy), member loyalty (clan), and height of purpose (mission)” (Scherer
1988, 483). In Scherer’s (1988, 492-494) view, the Church is “a bureaucratized mission-clan -
- or even lots of mini-ethnic subclans (and low in technical rationality), but now
deemphasizing bureaucratic control in favor of openness to the market.”
As evidence of its bureaucratic character, Scherer cites the Catholic Church’s hierarchical
leadership, its system of canon law and ecclesiastical courts, its high system awareness and
attention to boundary maintenance (see also Safranski 1985 and McDonough 1997). Clanlike
features include ethnic connections to the Church and transgenerational membership
retention. Mission qualities appear in the Church’s “unapologetic particularism” (its habit of
speaking of itself as “the” Church), its rising emphasis on social action and ecumenism, and
its religious orders, which serve as “task forces for mission.” Finally, market characteristics of
the Church (i.e., emphases on rational, free exchanges between autonomous entities; cf.
Young 1997, Moore 1994, Finke and Stark 1992), while traditionally less recognized as
hallmarks of the Church (Seidler and Meyer 1989, 8), are showing an increased presence, or
at least acknowledgement, in competitive, voluntaristic contexts (Bevvino 1995, Scherer
1988, 489-490; see also Gannon 1988, xi).
Scherer’s contribution lies more with the provision of the classifying types than with his
description of the Church according to type. In my opinion he does right to introduce the clan
type (in addition to the more commonly applied three other types) into discussions of how to
characterize the Church as organization, for this type helps to clarify the highly personal kinds
of attachment (inclusion) and alienation (exclusion) that people feel toward the Church. All
four types, taken together, help us to see how the Church is multifaceted and in some sense
contradictory in its impulses. This depiction of the Church in reference to four organizational
models allows us to see that the Catholic Church is both inwardly and outwardly directed. It is
inwardly directed in its desire to guide members’ behavior and strengthen their ties to the
Church (objectives well suited to the bureaucratic and clan models). It is outwardly directed in
its attention to its environment (market model) and its concentration on a purpose that goes
beyond the survival of the organization itself (mission model). While one should not equate
these objectives exclusively with the models I equate them with here, they are nonetheless
useful lenses through which we can glimpse the big picture of the Church as an organization.
Less helpful is Scherer’s statement that the Church is “deemphasizing bureaucratic control in
favor of openness to the market.” While it does appear that the Church of the modern world is
conscious of a need to compete for “customers” in a social marketplace of beliefs, one
wonders where Scherer sees evidence of bureaucratic control being deemphasized (he does
not elaborate). I would be more inclined to argue the opposite: that bureaucratic control is
being reemphasized to enhance the Church’s position in the marketplace. But that is a topic
for another study. For our purposes here, it is enough to say that each type reveals distinctive
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aspects of the Church’s functioning, and that different types of functioning will be applied
more prominently at different times and in different places and cultures. Thus, I am content
here to describe the Church as a bureaucracy-clan-market-mission organization (the types are
alphabetized) whose dominant operational mode varies. Seen as a whole, the Church operates
as a unique and changeable mix of these types, and organizational tensions may well arise as a
result of mutual incompatibilities between the various modalities.
To take it a step further, this typology of the Church organization is relevant to our
exploration of center-periphery conflict in two ways. First, it provides insight into realities
that are given for members of the hierarchy (given in the sense of being realities already in
place when those members arrive on the scene). That is, the Church is a certain way: it has
elements of and functions as a bureaucracy, a clan, a market and a mission. Second, the
typology provides a set of operational modalities which can be drawn upon for the sake of
advantage. By operating according to one modality versus another, Church leaders help to
determine what can be accomplished, and in what fashion, by the Church organization. In
cases of center-periphery conflict, participant parties may have good reason to choose one
operational modality over another as they pursue interests on behalf of themselves and the
organization.
In the first table below I summarize some of the likely consequences from organizational
operations according to each type. Though I characterize these consequences as advantages or
disadvantages for the Church organization, I realize that this determination can only be made
in a final sense in light of what one’s objectives are. In the second table, I offer a glimpse of
how certain modes of operation may stand in tension with one another.
Consequences of Functioning According to Organizational Type:
Advantages (+) and Disadvantages (-)
Bureaucracy +  Adds rationality, efficiency, fairness, predictability
-  Functions impersonally and indirectly; bureaucracy can become end in itself
Clan +  Fosters strong personal ties within Church, unity, continuity
-  Undervalues contributions of outsiders; exit cost is high; creates suffocating climate
Market +  Church reads environment well; competes well; adapts well
-  May lose sight of identity, mission by catering to “consumers”
Mission +  Focuses and motivates Church membership to pursuit of goals
-  Exacts high cost of participation; organizational zeal is hard to sustain
TABLE 2.1
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Potential Incompatibilities Between Operational Modalities
Bureaucracy versus Clan The rational, impersonal orientation of bureaucracy clashes with the clan’s
preference to make decisions of the basis of personal ties
Bureaucracy versus Market The complex, multi-layered, slow-changing structure of bureaucracy proves a
hindrance to market adaptability and response to potential members or clients
Bureaucracy versus Mission Bureaucracy’s emphasis on rationality, consistency and fairness in the
carrying out of procedures stands in tension with the (ultimate) goal
orientation of those who operate out of a mission perspective
Clan versus Market The clan’s tendency to draw sharp distinctions between those inside and
outside the “family”  interferes with market-directed plans that give priority
to the perspectives (wishes, fears) of potential members / clients
Clan versus Mission The clan’s tendency to protect the “family” above all else challenges a
mission orientation that may posit another organizational goal as higher
Market versus Mission A tendency to cater to the dictates of the marketplace challenges the Church’s
ability to pursue its mission with integrity
TABLE 2.2
Being acquainted with these operational modalities (according to organizational type) can
possibly help us to better understand the dynamics of center-periphery conflict.
To the extent that the Church functions as a bureaucracy it both empowers and constrains the
hierarchy, but we should notice that the forms of empowerment and constraint differ
according to office. In many respects the Pope stands above the Church bureaucracy. Not only
does the Pope possess the highest powers to teach, judge and govern the Church, he also
enjoys the freedom to exercise these powers independently even of the other bishops. (An
example is his power to teach infallibly in matters of faith and morals.) The Pope does not
“answer” to bureaucratic structures in the same way that other bishops and lower-power
parties in the Church do. He can bypass layers of the bureaucracy to resolve individual
problems directly (bypassing a bishop, for example, to rein in a troublesome priest).  This is
not to say that the Pope is not constrained by the bureaucratic machinery of the Church.
Clearly, he is dependent on the bureaucracy to carry out his wishes, and there may be any
number of problems that arise between his decrees and the pastoral implementation thereof.
But he is not constrained to the extent that a local bishop is, who may find himself frustrated
as he awaits a curial or papal decision to resolve some matter that transcends his authority.
(An example is the bishop who must wait patiently for an answer to his request for an
auxiliary bishop, or who receives an unwanted answer.)
We should keep in mind, however, that the bureaucratic machinery of the Church is an asset
to Pope and other bishops alike, serving as a preferred means whereby Church resources may
be organized toward the achievement of Church goals. Contrary to popular stereotypes,
bureaucracies can contribute to organizational effectiveness as well as inhibit it. Well-trained
functionaries, central offices and codified procedures all may serve to enhance efficiency and
productivity. The Pope and other bishops oversee layers of bureaucracy which serve to extend
their personal power.
In cases of conflict involving the Holy See and a local see, we will want to pay attention to
how the bureaucratic power of the Roman curia plays a role, for this layer of bureaucracy
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serves as a complex and ambiguous intervening power between Pope and bishop. Although
the curia does not (on the surface, at least) operate independently of the wishes of the Pope,
the relationship between the will of the Pope and the actions of the curia is never clear. As an
example, curial congregations regularly release teaching documents that are not the work (the
writing) of the Pope himself. While such writings emerge with the Pope’s approval, it is hard
to know what parts of that particular teaching are most important to him and in what matters
he would or would not readily invest his authority and “political capital.” Another example is
provided by occasions when the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith questions the
writings of a particular theologian. When does this initiative come originally from the Pope
and when is it the product of the Congregation? The secrecy which commonly attends curial
functioning prevents our knowing. Because of this secrecy, the Pope has the option of
distancing himself from curial operations when it is advantageous to do so. He can choose to
remain “above the fray” and not directly involve himself in a matter wherein the curia is
taking what appears to be heavy-handed action. In cases of center-periphery conflict, we can
expect that the bureaucratic power contained in the Roman curia will provide the Holy See
with significant advantages over the local see. But curial interventions can have a down-side
as well. In popular consciousness, the curia is often perceived negatively because of its
controlling power and lack of transparency. In democratic-minded contexts, a local bishop
can draw on this perception as a way of shoring up support for his own position.
Besides looking at the involvement of the curia, we should also be prepared to examine the
role played by other bureaucratic resources in cases of intrahierarchical conflict. A local
bishop oversees his own diocesan curia, which provides him with logistical and
communications support. In cases of conflict that involve the local and universal Church,  we
can expect that other layers of the Church bureaucracy will also be a factor: presumably, the
papal nuncio to the local country and the national or regional conference of bishops will
participate in the dialogue.
The challenge for the Church when the Church functions primarily as a bureaucracy is that
bureaucracies have the tendency to get stuck in routine ways of handling problems. This is
acceptable when the problems and their solutions are standard, but less felicitous when
creative solutions are needed to unfamiliar problems. Cases of intrahierarchical conflict may
present the Church with the difficulty of discerning where and when the bureaucratic
machinery is serving the ultimate ends of the Church, and where and when that machinery
needs refinement.
Inasmuch as the Church is a clan, it makes use of family-like bonds and places a premium on
seniority, consensus, loyalty and trust. It can be encouraging for a bishop or Pope to be able to
count on these strong relational supports. Families “look out for their own,” and this can be
reassuring in the face of outside threats. It is not unusual to hear talk of the “fraternity” of
bishops and to hear the phrase “brother bishops” in reference to intrahierarchical relations. In
conflict situations, this notion of familial connection can help to prevent conflicts from
escalating unnecessarily. At the same time, it is clear that conflicts within families can be
among the hardest to resolve because of the intimacy and trust which are placed at risk, and
because of the significance of the relationship as a whole. Sometimes real problems within
families are not addressed out of a desire to protect the family or out of a fear of losing the
relationship altogether. Such ties can be constricting or even suffocating. Members of the
hierarchy are not immune to such pressures as they face one another in conflict.
When members of the hierarchy operate upon the assumption that Church is a social entity in
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competition with other social entities in a pluralistic environment, as in the market model,
they come up against fundamental choices that must be made. One such choice concerns how
costly participation should be for Church members. Making the costs of Church affiliation (in
the form of time, talent and money) high has a tendency to produce fewer but highly-
committed Church members. Making the costs low has a tendency to bring in larger numbers
of less-committed members.
Such decisions relate directly to the hierarchical member’s ecclesiological viewpoint, and
specifically to his view of the extraecclesial world. For those who see the Church as
possessing a monopoly on the truth over and above the unchurched world, competition is
directed toward the goal of dominating the market at the expense of unworthy competitors.
Compromise with “worldly” ways is untenable and acceptable only as an unavoidable fact of
life. Their attitude toward the Catholic flock will be to “set the bar” of belonging to the
Church high, knowing that this may cost the Church some members in the short-run, but
believing this to be the only way for the Church to prevail in the long-run. For those who see
the Church as holding a privileged but not exclusive possession of the truth, competition will
mean seeking advantage for the Church’s position while being open to learning from
competing traditions. Church leaders adhering to this view will not see active interchange
with other belief systems as a danger, but as an opportunity for the Church. Their attitude
toward the flock will be to make room for their freedom and worldly experience, believing
that God is speaking through these encounters as well as through ecclesiastical structures.
Differences of opinion about how the Church should proceed within the competitive
environment that contains it can be a source of intrahierarchical conflict or an aggravating
factor therein. While the portraits of diverging viewpoints I have just drawn are exaggerations
-- at the Second Vatican Council, most bishops showed at least some degree of openness to
the world and none overtly held the position that Church is just one tradition among many --
differences of emphasis in ecclesiological perspective do affect how members of the hierarchy
relate to one another and to those Catholics under their leadership. These difference can
influence the course a conflict takes, but even more importantly relate to the Church’s
organizational continuity and its adaptability to its social environment.
Scherer locates the keys to mission activity in a shared ideology, the power of charisma, and
the recognition of a transcendent call. The Church as mission finds its origin and
empowerment in the charismatic figure of Jesus, his proclamation of the kingdom of God, and
his call to his followers to bring all people to God. The Church leadership understands its own
role (at least in an official way) as one in which this divine call is answered by shared efforts
to proclaim and build this same kingdom of God through the personal commitments and
witness of all believers. The charismatic dimension of this activity did not leave the earth
permanently with Jesus but has been passed on in the Holy Spirit, who empowers the work of
the Church in the world (cf. Suenens 1975, 21-32). For Church leaders in conflict, we can
presume that they will feel encouraged to the extent that they place confidence in this spiritual
empowerment. Church teaching holds that all things are possible with God. Embracing this
belief can enable Church leaders to address all sorts of problems with courage and hope. But
awareness of God’s empowerment can also cloud the judgment of Church leaders. Hubris is
but one danger that comes with the determination that one is an agent of God. Without
humble and clear-sighted discernment, members of the hierarchy may not be able to discern
when their own ego is at the fore rather than the will of God. Moreover, the transcendent
orientation of the Church may invite a neglect of more mundane matters that need attention,
including the earthly problem-solving steps that need to be taken in a conflict. The perspective
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of eternity may cause Church leaders to rule out possibilities of compromise unnecessarily,
and to dominate conflict situations at the expense of the other party.
To sum up the main points of this section: Center-periphery conflict is a problem of
organizational leadership taking place in a particular kind of organization: therefore, we need
to have some sense of what sort of organization we are talking about. Scherer’s typology
helps us to see the Church’s functioning more clearly through descriptions of the Church as a
bureaucracy, a clan, a political-economic market and a mission. At various times the Church
will act more according to one type or another, but all will continue to apply. Each
organizational type comes with its own type of conflict and conflict handling. Within a
bureaucratic mindset, conflicts will be seen as bureaucratic problems lending themselves to
bureaucratic solutions; within a clannish mindset, the implications for the “family” will be
assessed, and a solution will be sought within the family; and so forth. Seeing the Church in
light of these organizational dimensions helps us grasp particular ways that members of the
hierarchy may be empowered and constrained as they manage intrahierarchical conflicts. It
also helps us to locate certain sources of center-periphery conflict, which may be rooted in
internal clashes of organizational culture.
2.4.2 Organizational Goals of the Catholic Church
Organizations do not exist whenever people assemble. Rather, organizations come into being
when people join together to achieve goals they could not achieve individually (Demerath and
Hammond 1969, 173). Typically, an organization has an identifiable reason for existing and
this reason is associated with the accomplishment of particular goals that the organization has
set for itself. Granfield (1987, 58) writes that “the most important element in every institution
is the directing idea of the work to be realized.” When speaking of an organization’s goals, we
can distinguish between ends and means. (A desired end is, of course, a goal, but a means can
be a (short-term) goal as well.) For a car manufacturer, for example, the end may be profits
and the means may be organizational efficiency. Ideally, an organization would enjoy
agreement about what its ends are and what means are needed to secure those ends. But no
actual organization enjoys full agreement about ends and means all the time – and identifying
the alternations of means and ends can be highly confusing. In the case of the Church, goal
setting and goal achievement are problematic, and both may be sources of conflict within the
Church.
The first difficulty is that the Church’s ultimate goals are not self-evident. While one can
formulate the ultimate goals of the Church in ways that will claim widespread agreement (I
will provide an example in the pages that follow), one cannot avoid the fact that these goals
can be formulated in more ways than one, and may be reformulated over time. (Indeed, at the
Second Vatican Council one finds a normative impulse toward reformulation in the concept of
ecclesia semper reformanda.) There is no brief “mission statement” or standardized set of
“core values” that the Church proclaims, in the fashion of modern corporations. In their place
stands a collection of Sacred Scriptures and a two-thousand year tradition of Church teaching,
with neither source of authority lending itself to simple summary. Cheney (1991, 35)
acknowledges this complexity when he observes that the Church is neither monolithic nor
unchanging (see also Nichols 1982). Moreover, the Church may be described as an “omni-
purpose” organization that is concerned with the whole of life (Thung 1976, 123; but see also
Vallier 1969, 149). Thus, while one may speak of the ultimate goal of the Church being to
unite all people with God, or to bring salvation to all, or to fully participate in the
establishment of God’s kingdom on earth -- to name just three possibilities -- it is not clear
whether these are distinct goals, overlapping goals or simply one and the same goal expressed
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in three different ways. Nor is it obvious whether one formulation should be preferred over
another. In short, disagreement may arise within the Church about what the Church’s ultimate
purposes are and / or about how best to express those purposes.
The challenge for the Church is to find good, acceptable procedures to (re)express and
(re)formulate its goals in new contexts. This poses problems for the Church because not only
is it difficult to assess the linkage between immediate or short-term means and ultimate goals,
it is also hard, if not impossible, to know how worldly actions relate to spiritual purposes. In
other word’s, if the Church’s goal is to unite all people to God, how can we know what
concrete actions to take toward that goal, and how can we know if our spiritual and material
efforts harmoniously contribute to reaching the goal (Demerath and Hammond 1969, 174)?
And what is one to do about valid but conflicting goals? Thung (1976, 114-124) treats these
problems in her extended study of Church operations. Following March and Simon (1966),
she distinguishes between operational and non-operational goals that the Church may choose
to pursue. Operational goals lend themselves to rational decisions about whether and to what
extent they are served by a particular course of action. They are short-term, concrete, and
susceptible to realization through calculative action. Non-operational goals, on the contrary,
are abstract and offer an orientation for the long-term, but the means to their achievement is
not made clear by rational calculation.
Because agreement about non-operational and operational goals is not automatic within the
Church, we can expect that this will be a source of conflict within the Church (and not, as one
might hope, a stable frame of reference for resolving conflicts!), especially within the
hierarchy, which bears a unique responsibility to lead the Church and make decisions on its
behalf. Presumably, members of the hierarchy will express a high level of agreement about
the Church’s non-operational goals. This is because the abstractness of non-operational goals
allows divergent interpretations to attach themselves to the same terms, while preserving the
appearance of unity. Hence, members of the hierarchy, who have a clear stake in appearing
unified, may agree about the (non-operational) goal of demonstrating God’s love on the earth,
but quietly disagree about what they mean by that concept more concretely. (When does love
mean tolerance and when does it mean correcting others?) At this level in our analysis of
center-periphery conflict discourse, we will want to pay attention to how non-operational
goals are articulated. Whereas we can expect agreement about the abstract, ultimate goals of
the Church, we may nonetheless find clues about what those goals imply for the daily life of
the Church by looking at the particular terms or images the conflict participants employ.
Does, for example, the bishop or Pope prefer to talk about unity or salvation? If one or more
terms are settled upon by conflict participants (to describe the Church’s ultimate ends), do
they attach divergent associations (connotations or images) to those terms in their exchanges?
And by extension, do these associations clearly suggest operational goals that should be
pursued to the sake of the ultimate organizational purposes?
Within intrahierarchical conflict discourse, we can expect to find more outright disagreement
about means than about (ultimate) ends. Though bishops and the Pope may want to keep both
sorts of disagreement under wraps, it is safer to disagree about the route to the destination
than about the destination itself. Such disagreements are more palatable because they concern
more optional or disposable means rather than ultimate matters of organizational identity and
purpose. (An intriguing problem, one I will not pursue here, concerns the perspective that sees
the journey itself – i.e., the successive choice of means – as the end.) We can expect,
therefore, that in cases of intrahierarchical conflict, there will be more open disagreement
about operational goals than about non-operational goals. At the same time, it will be
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interesting to discern how operational and non-operational goals are identified in the
exchanges and how they appear to relate one to another in the minds of the conflict
participants.
2.4.2.1 The Church’s Ultimate Goal: Uniting All People to God
Having said that (1) the Church, like other organizations, employs various means to achieve
certain designated ends; and that (2) the relationship between means and ends is both subtle
and complex; and that (3) discernments about appropriate means and ends can invite conflict,
I now propose to provide a general overview to help us to see more clearly what is at stake in
cases of center-periphery conflict and how the pursuit of goals relates to conflict behaviors.
After consulting a key work of Church teaching, I offer one possible way of expressing the
Church’s goals that I believe sums up much of what the Church is about. This expression of
the Church’s ultimate purposes contributes to our comprehension of the Church’s direction
and world view.
Though the Church’s goals do not easily reduce to a self-sufficient, simple formula, it is
possible to identify key organizational goals of the Church by consulting multiple, classic
pronouncements the Church itself has offered. But how is one to select from among the two
millennia of Catholic teachings to identify the Church’s core issues of purpose? Fortunately,
the Church itself has already confronted this problem in significant ways. Repeatedly through
its history, the Church has seen a need to reflect on and give new voice to its teaching and its
place in a changing world. In the twentieth century, one can find examples of such ongoing
reflection in papal encyclicals, the documents of pontifical congregations and councils, the
1983 revision of the Code of Canon Law, the 1992 issuance of the Catechism of the Catholic
Church, and most prominently and authoritatively, in the documents of the Second Vatican
Council, 1962-65. Like the First Vatican Council of the previous century, 1869-70, and in the
tradition of the ecumenical councils of the early Church, Vatican II brought the college of
bishops together, under the headship of the pope to make decisions about Church doctrine and
practice binding on the whole Church. Dulles (1988, 135) states that the Second Vatican
Council “provides the most complete discussion of the finality of the church that can be found
anywhere in the official utterances of Roman Catholicism.” In our effort to perceive the
Church’s organizational goals in the modern world, the teachings of Vatican II are a likely
source of illumination.
To be fair, even the Vatican II documents do not lend themselves to simple summaries of
what the Church is about. Nonetheless, two conciliar documents in particular offer insight into
the Church’s understanding of its own internal organization and engagement with the world.
They are, respectively, Lumen Gentium (or, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church) and
Gaudium et Spes (or, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World). In a
forthcoming section I will consult Gaudium et Spes for insight into the Church’s perceptions
of its place in the modern social context, but for now my attention goes to Lumen Gentium,
which lends valuable perspective on the Church’s organizational goals.
While other documents of the Council focus on particular aspects of the life of the Church, or
with particular activities, or with the relation of the Church to outside groups, only Lumen
Gentium takes the whole Church as its principal focus (Dulles 1966, 10). Promulgated in
1964, Lumen Gentium has the status of a Dogmatic Constitution, the most solemn form of
conciliar teaching. Given its subject matter, its authority as an official teaching of the Pope
and bishops in unison, and its impact on the life of the contemporary Church, I believe that
Lumen Gentium provides a worthy resource for illuminating the central goals that the Church
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proposes to pursue.
Admittedly, other sources (some of which I have named above) could be used to
conceptualize the Church’s organizational goals. But I find several advantages in choosing
Lumen Gentium as my primary resource for this task. First, it reflects the direct input (and
agreement) of the entire hierarchy, as opposed to a segment of the hierarchy, as is the case in
papal encyclicals, curial documents, the 1983 Code of Canon Law and the 1992 Catechism of
the Catholic Church. (Dulles 1966, 11 notes that it was approved by 2,151 bishops in
Council, with only 5 opposing, and was immediately promulgated by Pope Paul VI.) Second,
it represents the most recent reflections of the entire hierarchy gathered in Council: thus it has
the advantage over earlier ecumenical councils of being able to take the insights of those
previous councils into account. Third, for my own immediate purposes, documents that post-
date the Hunthausen affair (1983-89), such as the 1992 Catechism, cannot be said to have
informed the handling of that case. Thus, while they may serve to shed light in other ways,
they are less useful for my purposes than other sources.
Dulles (1966, 11) introduces Lumen Gentium by observing that the document “sets forth, with
conciliar authority, the Church’s present understanding of her own nature.” Furthermore, it
describes the Church’s orientation “toward a goal beyond history” -- a goal focused on a
future time when “God will be all in all.” But let us turn now to the document itself. (I will be
consulting the Abbott 1966 English translation. Citations of the document will be indicated by
the abbreviation LG followed by the article number.)
That Lumen Gentium directly addresses the Church’s aspirations becomes clear at the outset
of the document. Article one declares the intention of the Council “to set forth... the nature
and encompassing mission of the Church.” Article two tells us that “at the end of time she
will achieve her glorious fulfillment.”
We are not left to wonder of what that mission consists. Article one states:
By her relationship with Christ, the Church is a kind of sacrament of intimate
union with God, and of the unity of all mankind, that is, she is a sign and an
instrument of such union and unity.
This mission follows from the plan of God himself, who created the world with the intention
of dignifying humankind “with a participation in his own divine life” (LG 2). These
professions deserve elaboration, in the light of our focus on the Church as a unique kind of
organization. My first observation is that the Church here is described as a “sign” and an
“instrument,” which is to say, the Church is not an end in itself. It points to and seeks to bring
about something beyond itself. Secondly, the end that is served by the Church is a twofold
unity wherein “all mankind” is united intimately with God. Finally, the work of the Church is
divinely sponsored. The Church is a “sacrament” by virtue of its relationship with Christ.
Hence, the organizational instrumentality is understood in specifically religious terms. (In the
theology of the Church, a sacrament “effects what it symbolizes.” In this case it signifies and
effects union with God.)
In a further passage, Lumen Gentium presents the mission of the Church in the language of
trinitarian theology.
When Jesus rose up again after suffering death on the cross for mankind, He
42
manifested that He had been appointed Lord, Messiah, and Priest forever (cf.
Acts 2:36; Heb. 5:6; 7:17-21), and He poured out on His disciples the Spirit
promised by the Father (cf. Acts 2:33). The Church, consequently, equipped
with the gifts of her Founder and faithfully guarding his precepts of charity,
humility, and self-sacrifice, receives the mission to proclaim and to establish
among all peoples the kingdom of Christ and of God. She becomes on earth the
initial budding forth of that kingdom. While she slowly grows, the Church
strains toward the consummation of the kingdom and, with all her strength,
hopes and desires to be united in glory with her King. (LG 5, in Abbott 1966,
18.)
Here the Council fathers assert once again that union with God is the ultimate aim of the
Church. In this case, that goal is envisioned according to the metaphor of the building up of
the kingdom of Christ and of God. The Church, empowered by Christ and the Holy Spirit,
becomes the initial budding forth of God’s kingdom. At the consummation of the kingdom,
all of the faithful will be unified among themselves and with God, in accordance with the
Father’s plan. At that time, the Church will shine forth as “a people made one with the unity
of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit” (LG 5).
The image of the “People of God” (LG 9-17), which is central and highly developed in Lumen
Gentium, further expresses the Church’s concern to unite the human family with God.
It has pleased God, however, to make men holy and save them not merely as
individuals without any mutual bonds, but by making them into a single
people, a people which acknowledges Him in truth and serves Him in holiness.
(LG 9)
The People of God is not meant to be composed of a select few. Rather, “All men are called to
belong to the new People of God” (LG 13).
In the light of these declarations, I propose that we see the overarching goal of the Church
organization as a matter of joining all people to God. Clearly, there are other ways that one
can, drawing on Lumen Gentium, formulate the Church’s ultimate goal. Some may, for
example, favor the expression “salvation” (as in, “the Church is called to follow the same path
[of Christ] in communicating to men the fruits of salvation” -- LG 8) over my preferred
“unity.” These and others offer viable alternatives for illuminating the Church’s
organizational activity. I would argue, however, that in many cases the variance in terms has
more to do with angles of viewing than with actual differences in the phenomena viewed. In
other words, I believe “saving souls” and “uniting souls to God” amount to much the same
thing.
My reason for favoring the unity expression over the alternative is that it has certain
advantages for the present study of intrahierarchical conflict. Specifically, I find three
advantages. First, I believe the unity formulation is a legitimate expression of Church teaching
and of a widely-held view within the Church. It provides a credible point of orientation from
which we can make sense of the Church organization. Second, the unity formulation sharpens
our perception of the organizational roles, generally, of the hierarchy itself. Bishops and the
Pope, as we shall see in the forthcoming discussion of their offices, have express
responsibilities to symbolize and establish a unity within the Church that is ultimately directed
toward the achievement of human unity with God. Third, the concept of unity is centrally and
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inescapably relevant to center-periphery conflict. At the heart of center-periphery conflict is
the quality of the relationship that exists -- unified or not? -- between the Pope and local
bishop and between the Church of Rome and the local Church. Hanging in the air of the
conflict is the question of whether, and in what sense, any and all parties are united with God.
Because of its abstractness and quality of ultimacy, the goal of uniting all people (among
themselves and) with God can be understood to be a non-operational goal of the Church. It is
my view that all of the organizational activity of the Church relates to this ultimate goal
(though, at times, only in a superficial way), because this is the Church’s reason to be. As
such, we can expect that Church leaders will make decisions on behalf of the Church which
implicitly and explicitly acknowledge this goal. We can expect, too, that the language used by
Church leaders will acknowledge this goal. In the more specific matter of center-periphery
conflict, we may presume that the Church’s goal to join all people to God will always be in
the background and will often be in the foreground of such conflicts. Even in a case of
conflict that appears to involve only personal issues, bishops and the Pope, by virtue of the
unity their offices symbolize and promote, will have bearing on the Church’s ability to
achieve its professed goals.
How one understands this non-operational goal of unity will inevitably be a source of conflict
within the hierarchy. This is so because unity is open to various interpretations: Is it a matter
of establishing uniformity within the beliefs and practices of the faithful (which are taken to
be outward proofs of oneness), or does unity allow for a bounded form of diversity. In other
words, how much conformity within the community is required for unity to be present?
Individual bishops are likely to differ among themselves in their answer to this question.
Another, related problem is the difficulty of knowing when the unity achieved is truly a unity
with God.
Having introduced the question of the Church organization’s ultimate goal(s), let us now turn
to the matter of operational goals for the sake of that end.
2.4.2.2 Operational Goals for the Sake of the Ultimate Goal: Steps Toward
Humankind’s Union with God
It is impossible to account for all of the objectives that the Church pursues in keeping with its
chief aspiration of uniting humanity with God. More feasible is to point out some of the main
strategies it embraces. As in my analysis of the long-term goal of the Church, I turn to Lumen
Gentium for clarification on this matter.
Some conclusions about these strategies can be drawn on the basis of passages already cited.
We have seen, in a passage quoted from article one, that the Church is to be a “sign” (as well
as an “instrument”) of union and unity with God. I take this to mean that the Church must not
only point the way toward union with God but must also in some sense symbolize or reveal
such a union in the here and now. A further passage makes this explicit.
God has gathered together as one all those who in faith look upon Jesus as the
author of salvation and the source of unity and peace, and has established them
as the Church, that for each and all she may be the visible sacrament of this
saving unity. (LG 10)
The Church, therefore, has the God-given charge of demonstrating and promoting a unity that
is meant for all in its earthly practice. Thus, a first operational goal we can assume the Church
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will pursue is simply to get as many people as possible to affiliate themselves with the Church
and to interrelate in satisfying and harmonious ways within the Church. This is, of course, an
operational goal that is still fairly high on the ladder of abstraction (What does it mean to
“affiliate” with the Church? What does “unity” look like?), but it does put us in touch with
well-known organizational practices, such as making the organization visible and attractive
(marketing), inviting new members (recruiting), finding ways to enhance commitment and
participation once members are in the door (promoting loyalty), and handling dissensus
(conflict management). Though God and not the Church is ultimately the source of saving
unity with God, the Church understands itself to be the supremely privileged, though not the
only, vehicle directed to that end. As such, it believes that growing the Church and
managing it well will be positive short-term steps toward the ultimate goal of bringing all
persons to intimate union with God. Doing so rationally presents no contradiction to the
Church’s mission or beliefs.
Structurally, the implication for the Church is that all local Churches within the Church
should contribute to the unicity of the Church. Lumen Gentium (14) states that within the
universal Church, the particular Churches (local Churches) “hold a rightful place. These
Churches retain their own traditions without in any way lessening the primacy of the Chair of
Peter. This Chair presides over the whole assembly of charity and protects legitimate
differences, while at the same time it sees that such differences do not hinder unity but
rather contribute toward it.” In this vision of participation, unity does not of necessity equal
uniformity.
In virtue of this catholicity each individual part of the Church contributes
through its special gifts to the good of the other parts and of the whole Church.
Thus through the common sharing of gifts and through the common effort to
attain fullness in unity, the whole and each of the parts receive increase. Not
only, then, is the People of God made up of different peoples but even in its
inner structure it is composed of various ranks. This diversity among its
members arises either by reason of their duties... or by reason of their situation
and way of life... (LG 13)
Thus, while trying to bring all people into union and unity with God, the Church, officially at
least, recognizes, values and needs the diversity of its membership. Organizational energy,
according to Lumen Gentium, is to be spent not on fitting all of these different people into the
same mold, but rather on establishing a harmonious whole that benefits both the individual
and the Church entire. The operational challenge for the Church is to find ways of
incorporating diversity on a global scale (consisting of the variety of ways that Catholicism is
understood and practiced in all of the world’s regions) into something that can genuinely be
called a unity.
Two further operational goals related to the building up and unification of the Church are
expressed in the charges to preach the gospel and celebrate the sacraments. Lumen Gentium
17 tells us that the Church has received from the apostles “as a task to be discharged even to
the ends of the earth” a mandate to “proclaim the saving truth.”
Hence she makes the words of the Apostle her own: “Woe to me, if I do not preach the
gospel” (1 Cor. 9:16)… By the proclamation of the gospel, she prepares her hearers to
receive and profess the faith, disposes them for baptism, snatches them from the slavery
of error, and incorporates them into Christ so that through charity they may grow up
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into full maturity in Christ.” (LG 17)
In concrete terms, effectively preaching the gospel involves reading and understanding the
wisdom of the Scriptures and proclaiming the riches found there in a way that can be
appreciated by modern hearers. The sacramental system of the Church (not just the
sacraments themselves, but the whole structure of meaning that contains them) is the
apparatus whereby participation in the Church is most clearly realized. The seven sacraments
of the Church (baptism, confirmation, Eucharist, reconciliation, anointing of the sick, holy
orders, matrimony) are practices wherein, in the eyes of the Church, God’s presence is
manifested and the bonds between human persons and God are strengthened. Article eleven of
Lumen Gentium states that “It is through the sacraments and the exercise of the virtues that
the sacred nature and organic structure of the priestly community is brought into operation.”
At the summit of this sacramental system is the Eucharist. “(I)n the sacrament of the
Eucharistic bread the unity of all believers who form one body in Christ... is both expressed
and brought about” (LG 3). (For a description of the function of each sacrament individually,
see LG 11.) Thus, we can expect that, among its operational goals, the Church will seek to
preach the gospel as persuasively as possible and to safeguard and maximally employ its
sacramental system. By safeguard, I mean that the Church will want to guarantee the
continued use and  integrity of the sacraments. (A potential source of contestation: Of what
does a valid and effective celebration of the sacraments consist?). By maximally employ, I
mean that the Church will want to celebrate the sacraments wherever and whenever
appropriate, extending them to as many people as possible.
Another major operational goal of the Church is to maintain and enhance its forms of social
outreach to all people, regardless of Church membership. Here I mean to call attention to the
practical means the Church employs to reach out to and serve others through the efforts of
Catholic missionaries, social service agencies, educational and health care institutions and
many other operations which bring the Church’s mission and message to the world. These
tools provide explicit and more subtle means of evangelizing those whose connection to the
Church is tenuous or nonexistent. Inasmuch as the Church desires to bring all of humanity
into union with God, it must have such means that enable it to reach out to those outside the
fold and perhaps incorporate them into the life of the Church. The other side of this same goal
derives from the Church’s perception, well articulated at Vatican II, that God is present
outside of the Church as well as within it. The challenge for the Church, then, is not simply to
share its wisdom about God with others, but to continue to go in search of God and to be
prepared to learn from the encounter with God, wherever God may be found.
Though the discussion of operational goals that the Church pursues could continue
indefinitely, I will conclude it now by offering one further observation. Because God is holy,
the approach to union with God is a journey of growth in holiness (cf. LG 11: “the Church,
embracing sinners in her bosom, is at the same time holy and always in need of being
purified, and incessantly pursues the path of penance and renewal”). Church teaching holds
that in order to draw closer to God, one must (through God’s power) draw ever nearer to God
and be continually remade in greater likeness to God. The implication for the effectiveness of
the Church organization is that decision-making on behalf of the Church in the here and
now must show signs of an evolving, intimate relationship with God. In the short run, if
Church leaders are not, or appear not to be, consistently committed to their own growth in
holiness (and admittedly, careful, deep-level discernments are needed to perceive whether this
is in fact the case) and to the Church’s growth in holiness, then the confidence of other
Church members will be tested. Those outside the Church will question the credibility of the
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Church’s message whenever Church members appear to act in ways contrary to the gospel. In
the long run, the ability of the Church to fulfill its ultimate purpose will be threatened.
(Failure on this level is better expressed with the language of theology than of organizational
science.) This is not to suggest that there is no room for error, sin or disunity in the life of the
Church, or that the presence of these shortcomings inevitably precludes the Church’s
realization of its purpose. But it is to say that a credible relationship between short-term
means and long-term ends is essential. In cases of intrahierarchical conflict, this expectation
should have a bearing on participants’ behavior.
More generally, we can expect that the six above-mentioned operational goals of the Church -
- growing and enhancing the Church organization, finding ways to establish unity amid
diversity within the Church membership, effectively preaching the gospel, preserving and
promoting the sacramental system, practicing social outreach, striving for holiness -- will be
relevant in cases of center-periphery conflict. We can suppose that members of the hierarchy
will be pressed in their role as organizational leaders to implicitly or explicitly acknowledge
these operational goals and to take action on behalf of their achievement (or give the
appearance thereof).
We can also suppose that differing opinions about how one should go about pursuing these
operational goals and about how they relate to the ultimate aims of the Church will be a
source of conflict within the hierarchy. We should not expect Church members, in practice, to
pursue these goals in fully committed and uniform fashion. Like other human institutions, the
Church is a collectivity of persons, each of whom has a personal view of his or her role within
the institution and a limited power to affect its course (Lambrecht 1987, 54). Not all Church
members will show an equal readiness to work collaboratively for the achievement of any
given objective of the Church. Some may even work, intentionally or not, in opposition to the
Church’s stated goals (Yinger 1963, 170). But  by focusing on the Church’s clear and
pronounced concern for uniting people to one another and to God, we gain valuable insight
into the Church’s organizational orientation. In cases of center-periphery conflict, we have the
opportunity to observe how the leaders’ actions in such conflicts can promote or hinder the
Church’s progress toward this goal.
2.4.3 Church Resources
Organizations pursue their chosen goals through the employment of human and material
resources. In this section I will consider the human and material resources available to the
Church as it pursues its goals.
2.4.3.1 Human Resources
As the world’s largest religious organization, the Catholic Church is exceedingly rich in
human resources. Counting more than one billion persons as members at the beginning of the
twenty-first century the Church enjoys marvelous opportunities for accomplishing goals of all
kinds. But as with any organization, one should not lose sight of the fact that people do not
stop being fully people when they belong to the Church. That is to say, they do not reduce to
being cogs in an organizational machine once they are members (Morgan 1990, 18).
Motives
Church members (including Church leaders) vary in their life experience, attitudes and
reasons for participating in the Church organization (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi 1975). And
they are susceptible to any number of influences that exist independently of the Church, be
they family, friends, other people, personal desires, economic needs, the media, or countless
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other influences within their total social and cultural environment (Boulding 1962, 110). On
the other hand, Church members also have influence over their environment and can use this
on behalf of or against the wishes of the Church. In short, it is not a simple matter to
coordinate the human resources of the Church for the sake of accomplishing the Church’s
goals. It is more than challenging to enlist people’s involvement so that the Church moves
toward its designated goals and not in some other direction.
Church leaders will be like the leaders of other organizations in showing a fundamental desire
to save face (Brown and Levinson 1987), first for themselves as individuals and then for the
organization as a whole. This desire will consistently inform the decisions Church leaders
make in the course of leading the organization.
Both Fichter (1954) and Ashbrook (1965) provide helpful distinctions which classify the
participation of Church members in the Church according to type, and give us a glimpse of
the mixture of motivations that may lead people to practice as Catholics. Fichter observes that
the membership of Catholics in the Church may be characterized as institutional or personal.
Institutional membership entails participation based on factors such as baptism, place of
residence, race and nationality. Personal membership focuses more on one’s intentions and
the quality of one’s religious practice. Ashbrook also provides a twofold typology of Church
involvement. Participation may be either voluntary expression of personal moral commitment,
or it may be a more burdened kind of participation, undertaken grudgingly or calculatively, as
a way of gaining advantages that accrue from membership in the Church.
While these fairly simple distinctions cannot by themselves account for the complexity and
ambiguity of Church members’ motivations and involvement, they do help us to recognize the
challenges that face Church leaders (whose own participation is ambiguous) who seek to
coordinate and control the human resources of the Church. Though the professed mission of
the Church may be to bring all people, through God’s power, to salvation in God, the Church
itself acknowledges that not all members (Church leaders included) are equally invested in
this mission, and some may even sin against it (Lumen Gentium 8; de Lubac 1963, 170-197).
One temptation facing Church leaders is to promote organizational continuity, and one’s own
retention of authority within the organization, for its own sake, at the expense of the Church’s
mission (Schillebeeckx 1981, 75-76; Yinger 1963, 172; Weber 1958, 228-229).
Space / Means
Thus far I have been making use of a rather general distinction between Church members and
Church leaders (who are also members). At the heart of this distinction, which is not meant to
be a hard and fast distinction in the present usage, is the fact that Church members are not
equal in their power to direct the organizational movement. Though all members have some
power in the Church, this should not divert our attention from the fact that power to guide the
Church is concentrated at the top, in the hierarchy. The portrait of the leadership structure of
the Church already presented gives some sense of who has authority over whom in the
Church.
Authority -- power perceived to be legitimate (Etzioni 1961; Berger 1967) -- is especially
important in the Church because of the Church’s normative orientation (Reese 1989, 54;
Vaillancourt 1980, 4; Szafran 1976, 339; Etzioni 1961). In normative organizations (see also
section 2.4.4), social control is maintained through the manipulation of symbolic and moral
power (Szafran 1976, 339). Vaillancourt (1980, 5) finds that physical compensations and
sanctions are rarely available to religious organizations operating in secular, pluralistic
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contexts: “Consequently, ideological rationalizations and spiritual compensations and
sanctions (i.e. psychic coercion) are more commonly relied upon.”  In sum, those with
authority in the Church will be concerned to manipulate symbolic and moral power so that,
internally, the Church’s resources will be directed to the attainment of the Church’s goals.
Church leaders will also want to be externally focused, using symbolic and moral power to
foster an environment receptive to the Church’s efforts.
We should not go further without acknowledging the profound difficulty that faces Church
leaders as they seek to bring themselves and those they lead -- and ultimately even those
outside of the Church, too -- into union with one another and with God. Such a transcendent
purpose holds promise of realization only in the perspective of the Church’s faith in the Holy
Spirit of God who sustains the Church. And yet, though this confidence in the Holy Spirit is
surely comforting to those who hold authority in the Church, it does not free them from their
responsibility to do their part in bringing about God’s kingdom. Therein lies the challenge.
How do Church leaders know if they are doing what they ought to do to carry out God’s
mission for the Church? And how does one measure the progress (Reese 1989, ix) of these
efforts?
A partial answer to this problem can be found in Church’s leaders’ attention to the extent with
which people identify with the Church. While Church leaders are not in a position to judge the
condition of people’s faith, they can find any number of outward signs of people’s willingness
to affiliate with the Church and its mission. High levels of Church membership (as expressed
in baptism and the reception of other sacraments, parish registration, membership in other
Catholic groups, etc.) and Church commitment (as expressed in financial contributions,
participation in Church ministries, support for Church-backed political positions, etc.) are
reassuring to both “worldly”-type and “spiritual”-type Church leaders. For worldly-type
leaders (that is, those strongly focused on the Church’s effectiveness and success in the
world), these signs of identification with the Church demonstrate the Church’s continuing
importance in the world. This continuing importance may be of interest to them for selfish
reasons (their own prestige and power are enhanced through their connection to the Church)
or selfless reasons (the Church’s worldly advancement puts it in a better position to alleviate
suffering in the world). For spiritual-type Church leaders (that is, those strongly focused on a
salvation experienced on the plane of the spirit rather than on the plane of bodily / earthly
life), high levels of Church membership and commitment can be comforting as well, because
they may be interpreted as outward signs that the Holy Spirit is indeed at work in the Church.
My point in drawing this simple sketch of Church leadership and participation is to introduce
the matter of identification and identity into our discussion of how human resources fit with
the Church’s organizational life. When people choose to identify with the Church, they
increase the sum total of human (and material) resources that the Church can put to the
achievement of its goals. Even more significantly, as I have already noted, in some
(provisional) sense increased membership is itself a reflection of  the goal of the Church,
since the Church’s mission is to bring all of humankind into union with God and the Church
believes itself to be a privileged, unparalleled means by which people come into that union.
Hence, Church leaders clearly have a stake in inducing people to identify with the
organization that is the Church. But this, too, is a complex matter, for as Cheney (1991, 13-
18) observes, people take on shared identities because they have an interest in doing so -- and
as I observed previously, people are mixed in their motivations and interests, and the Church
is a voluntary organization (Reese 1989, 54). The task for Church leaders, then, is to convince
49
people that their interests are best served by participating in the shared identity that is the
Church, and to see that interests contrary to the mission of the Church do not keep the Church
from carrying out its mission.
In Cheney’s (1991, 15) words, “The Roman Catholic Church, as a transnational bureaucratic
organization, has been fundamentally engaged in the management of identities throughout
most of its history... Continually the Church has sought to balance its universal, or catholic,
identity with local and particular concerns while encouraging individuals, the faithful, to
derive a sense of self from allegiance to the Church.” This task of managing identities is
largely a rhetorical enterprise, whereby Church leaders use language to persuade Church
members to make decisions in accord with the leaders’ preferences (Cheney 1991, 8).
As an example, Cheney cites the US bishops’ production of the pastoral letter on nuclear arms
(The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, 1983). That production process
shows the (US) hierarchy managing multiple identities through language for the sake of the
Church’s mission. In the course of composing and disseminating the document,  the bishops
had to balance interests associated with their identities as individual bishops, as members of
the national bishops’ conference, and as members of the worldwide college of bishops. At the
same time they had to speak to and “manage” the identities of others implicated in their
statement, including: American Catholics, the Vatican, the Reagan Administration, nuclear
pacifists, the public at large (Cheney 1991, 10).
Establishing connections with key audiences is especially important in conflict situations.
Gangel and Canine (1992, 215-218), in their study of conflict management in churches,
emphasize the role played by audiences.
The mere presence of an audience (including psychological presence)
motivates bargainers to seek positive, and avoid negative, evaluation --
especially when the audience is important to the bargainers. The external
audience helps to keep the bargaining process honest. The effect of the
negotiator’s behavior before a watching world provides a check-and-balance-
system so that grave injustices are less likely to occur.
     The particular audience we desire to influence plays a large part in what
motivates us.... In many ways, negotiators view themselves as representatives
of a larger body of people. This real or imagined audience serves as a reference
point for what we will use as bargaining chips and how we will engage in this
process.
Having this in mind, it is worth our while to identify key audiences that participants in center-
periphery conflict will want to reach. I have listed the audiences roughly in order of their
potential power to affect the conflict outcome.
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Key Targets of Persuasion in Center-Periphery Conflict
Actor Audiences he will be concerned to persuade
The Pope / His conflictual partner(s) (the local bishop)
Papal Representative Bishops of the local bishop’s country
The apostolic nuncio or delegate in the local bishop’s country
Officers of the Roman curia
Bishops of the world
Catholics in the local bishop’s diocese (especially priests)
Catholics in the local bishop’s country
The local bishop His conflictual partner(s) (the Pope, papal representative)
The apostolic nuncio or delegate in his own country
Officers of the Roman curia
Bishops of his own country
Bishops of the world
Catholics in his diocese (especially priests)
Catholics in his country
TABLE 2.3
A few words of explanation are in order here. Obviously the most important party to reach in
a conflict is the opposition, so there should be no surprise in my placement of the conflictual
party at the top of each list. Thus the Pope has a primary interest in gaining compliance from
the local bishop. The next most important party for the Pope to influence are fellow members
of the episcopacy in the local bishop’s country. Within the universal college of bishops, those
of the periphery party’s own country are among the most likely to support him (the periphery
party), since they share his national identity and, probably, much of his experience. Since the
Pope does not want to see a local conflict turn into a regional conflict, he must make sure that
those other bishops align with his position and not with that of the local bishop. At the same
time, those bishops are likely to be in a good position to persuade the local bishop himself.
Therefore, the Pope can obtain a significant strategic advantage if he can get these bishops to
put pressure on his conflictual partner. A local bishop may show a readiness to listen to his
countrymen when he is not so inclined to listen to Rome.
Probably the Pope will have to do little work, perhaps none at all, to convince his curia and
nuncio to line up with his position in a conflict with a local bishop. But I place these officials
next on the list to be persuaded for the simple fact of their profound influence on the
organizational life of the Church. The Pope’s own effectiveness is enhanced to the extent that
these officials are in tune with his wishes. These highly-placed leaders are also in a position to
interfere significantly (though likely in hidden ways) with his efforts if they become so
inclined. Besides keeping bishops in line in the country in question, the Pope will also want to
keep the rest of the world’s bishops in harmony with his position. This will be especially
necessary if the conflict seems inclined to grow to be a regional rather than a local conflict.
When other bishops of the world show their support for the Pope they remind independence-
oriented bishops of their connection to the universal Church.
Catholics in the local diocese and in the nation in question are in a position to put pressure on
the local bishop. If they line up behind the local bishop, he will surely be encouraged, if not
emboldened. The support of local priests is crucial if a local bishop has any notion to defy
Vatican wishes, because the priests take the bishop’s (or Rome’s) case to the people locally.
For this reason, the Pope will want to remind these Catholics of their “Roman” identity.
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Not listed on my list of audiences for the pope to persuade, but nonetheless highly relevant, is
the news media. The news media is indeed an audience to be persuaded, but it is more
fundamentally significant as an arena of conflict handling. The news media functions as
something of a wild card, by virtue of its power to influence events and shape perceptions
about them – a power that has only increased in recent years as more and more channels of
information processing have opened up. Reports issued through the news media affect not
only the opinions of the public at large (Crowley & Mitchell 1994, 11) -- which in turn put
pressure on the bargaining positions of the parties in conflict -- they also directly affect the
perceptions of the parties themselves in regard to the behavior of the opposing party (Robbins
1992, 178; Salazar 1996; Hubbard 1997). Once a center-periphery conflict becomes public,
the news media will play a crucial role in the conflict handling. Obviously, the Pope prefers to
have media coverage be as favorable as possible. In contrast with the target audiences listed
above, all of whom are Church members that the Pope and other Church leaders prefer to
keep as compliant participants in the life of the Church, members of the media may or may
not be Church members, and may even be hostile to the Church (Quinn 1999, 54). Given the
multiplicity and variety of media venues, managing press messages in regard to a given
conflict is a highly challenging task (Soukup 1996, viii). Nonetheless, in conflict situations
media outlets are valued for their ability to reach a variety of audiences and even a mass
audience quickly.
As for the audiences that the local bishop will be concerned to persuade in center-periphery
conflict, the Pope clearly tops the list. Not only is he, in structural terms, the prime conflictual
partner in center-periphery conflict; he is also the one person who can single-handedly
exercise power to definitively resolve the conflict. In short, if the local bishop can win over
the Pope, he wins the conflict. After the Pope, the local bishop will be most concerned to
persuade those who are in a position to persuade the Pope. The apostolic nuncio or delegate to
the local bishop’s country is the most likely go-between in a conflict situation, and the Pope
can be expected to consult this representative to discern what exactly is at hand in the local
church. Similarly, members of the Roman curia will likely have some say in conflictual
exchange between the Holy See and a local ordinary. Hence, the ordinary will want to seek a
favorable hearing and advocacy from among those who hold high office at the Vatican.
Another possible source of support for the periphery party lies with other bishops outside the
Vatican, especially those who reside in the local bishop’s own country. If the local bishop can
persuade a significant number of his countrymen that he has a legitimate case to make against
Rome, he can gain considerably more leverage in the conflict. In and of itself, a unified
national hierarchy is not guaranteed to prevail against Rome (consider the failure of the Dutch
hierarchy’s resistance to bishop appointments in the early 1970’s; on the other hand, consider
the successful intervention of the Brazilian hierarchy on behalf of theologian Leonardo Boff
in 1986). But a local bishop’s position is much stronger when he has (preferably many) allies
within the hierarchy. In general, one can expect a local bishop to generate at least a certain
amount of support for his cause among his priests and the other people of his diocese. The key
issue here seems to be how great in number and how passionate these supporters are. The risk
for the Vatican in the Lefebvre case was quite evident: if Lefebvre would go, a great many of
his people would follow. (In the end, they did.) A bishop, therefore, who shores up his support
among the local faithful is a more formidable opponent for Rome than is one whose support is
sparse and / or lukewarm. Finally, a local bishop involved in center-periphery conflict will
want to take his case to a broader audience (Catholics elsewhere) and the news media is,
again, a prime vehicle for doing so.
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In the course of my analysis of the Rome-Hunthausen conflict, I will be concerned to identify
which audiences appear to be targeted in particular and which end up playing the most crucial
role in the conflict handling.
To round out this discussion about the hierarchy’s challenge of managing the human
resources of the Church – particularly in conflict situations – I would like to add one final
observation. Bishops, as coordinators of the Church’s human resources, tend to be people “in
the middle” in more senses than one (cf. Reese 1989, 345; Cheney 1991). As leaders of the
local Church and of the Church universal, they must continually address the tensions that exist
between personal and organizational priorities, and between local and global needs. From the
perspective of the total Church organization, the assertion of “local” or subgroup interests can
be threatening because they pose the possibility of the organizational mission and identity
being subverted by a narrow faction (Cheney 1991, 169; Van der Ven 1996, 365; Morgan
1990, 81). Alternatively, however, too much control from a top-down, total organization
perspective endangers the positive results of creativity and organizational dynamism that can
emerge from grass roots efforts. But bishops are also “middlemen” in their capacity as
ambassadors of the Church to the world. In this role they must keep sight of the extra-
organizational constituencies that affect and are affected by the Church, for the Church’s
mission relates to all human persons.
2.4.3.2 Material Resources
As a means to achieve designated objectives, organizations employ not only human resources
but material resources as well. In the legal parlance of the Church, these material resources
are known as “temporal goods” (Canons 1254-1310, Code of Canon Law). Temporal goods
consist in the material means (such as finances, property, etc.) necessary for the Church to
pursue “its proper ends.” Among the ends that are “especially proper” to the Church are “to
order divine worship; to provide decent suport for the clergy and other ministers; to perform
the works of the sacred apostolate and of charity, especially towards the needy” (Canon
1254). In order to obtain necessary funds, local ordinaries have discretionary powers to
impose “a moderate tax” (Canon 1263) and special collections (Canon 1266) on those under
their authority. Additionally, bishops “in view of their bond of unity and charity and in accord
with the resources of their dioceses,” have a responsibility to provide resources of support to
the Apostolic See (Canon 1271). The Pope is considered “the supreme administrator and
steward of all ecclesiastical goods” – i.e., temporal goods (Canon 1273). Diocesan bishops
have a responsibility to “supervise carefully the administration of all the goods which belong
to the public juridic persons” subject to them (Canon 1276).
In short, the Church sees fit to acquire any sort of material resource necessary to carry out its
mission (Galbraith 1986, 215), with due respect for civil law shown in the acquisition and use
of such goods (Canon 22). And indeed, in practice, the Church possesses and employs a range
of material resources so vast that it cannot be fully accounted for. Some of these resources are
more visible than others. For example, it is commonly known that the Church regularly takes
up financial collections, undertakes capital fund drives and owns impressive properties such
as Church buildings, land, office buildings, schools, hospitals, newspapers, radio and TV
stations and works of art. But even these more visible signs of the Church’s wealth as an
organization are only surface markers of extensive resources in the same realms that are not
open to view. Occasionally the financial wherewithal of the Church is underestimated,
perhaps as the result of the Church’s being constituted as a voluntary, religious organization.
As a case in point, after the US Bishops released their 1987 pastoral letter on the economy
(Economic Justice for All), the criticism was heard that the bishops had insufficient
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experience in money matters to speak competently thereof. But in fact, American bishops
oversee multi-million dollar budgets for their dioceses (Reese 1989, 150) and the budget for
the Bishops’ Conference itself runs in the tens of millions of dollars (Reese, 1992, 271).
Budgets managed by the Holy See account for hundreds of millions of dollars (Reese 1996,
202-229).
Without temporal goods, the Church cannot carry out its work. Without money the Church
cannot buy food for the poor or pay for missionaries to preach the Gospel in remote areas.
Even something as simple -- and fundamental -- as regular celebration of the Eucharist comes
with accompanying costs (compensation for priests, maintenance of church buildings,
liturgical supplies, etc.). Thus Church leaders have a vested interest in obtaining funds and
other instruments for the sake of the Church’s mission. At the same time, the need to obtain
temporal goods also places Church leaders in a position of dependence on those who can
supply the necessary resources (Henrici 1994, 53; Bassett 1979, 29; Cereti 1979, 15).
Therefore, the Church is in a position to influence (for example, funding some activities and
not others: cf. Vaillancourt 1980, 267) or be influenced through its reliance on material
resources. On the parish level, pastors are dependent on the contributions of parishioners to
meet operating costs. Within a diocese, the bishop is dependent on parish contributions to the
diocese to meet its costs. And on a global scale, the Holy See is dependent on the
contributions of the world’s dioceses to make ends meet and conduct its pastoral activity.
Bishops and the Pope are best understood to be the guardians and administrators of
ecclesiastical goods (ownership applies only to a limited number of personal possessions),
with canonical expectations (see, for example, Canon 1267.3) about proper stewardship
governing their use of Church goods.
Financial leverage may prove to be a relevant question in cases of center-periphery conflict,
especially where a rich local or national Church is involved. (Reese 1996, 225 reports that in
its 1992 Peter’s Pence collection – an annual discretionary fund assembled for the Pope – the
US donated $23 million of the $67 million total collected, and the top ten nation contributors
gave 78% of the world’s total amount.)  No bishop wants to lose his financial wherewithal in
his own diocese by alienating contributors (thus he will be careful about how he comes across
to his people), and Rome will be reluctant to see dwindling returns from a local Church that is
normally a financial mainstay (thus the Pope will be careful about how he comes across to the
people of the particular churches and their bishops). The desire to preserve or enhance one’s
financial stability is potentially a source of conflict, but also an inducement to the
maintenance of harmony. The command of ample material resources is potentially a strategic
advantage to be employed in center-periphery conflict handling, especially where direct lines
of financial dependence apply.
2.4.4 Means of Coordination and Control
Morgan envisions organizations as entities in which resources are brought together “in a co-
ordinated and controlled mechanism” to achieve desired goals. In this section I will discuss
means by which the Church coordinates and controls its human and physical resources.
Church leaders vary in the degree of their authority (legitimized power) to control and
coordinate Church resources, with members of the hierarchy possessing the highest level of
authority, and the Pope possessing this authority supremely so. Vaillancourt (1980, 264-268),
drawing on Weber, Etzioni, and French and Raven, provides a useful classification of eight
kinds of control exercised by “upper-echelon officials in the Catholic Church.” Vaillancourt’s
eight types of power are described below, together with examples he provides.
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Before confronting the Vaillancourt material, allow me first to interject two prefatory
comments about power itself. First, unless otherwise specified, my use of the term power in
this study is congruent with the classic definition offered by Weber (1959, 180): it is the
ability to realize one’s will, even in the face of resistance. Second, as I stated in chapter one,
my view of power itself is essentially neutral, much in the manner of Yinger (1963, 170), who
wrote that “power is found in all human relations and is per se neither good nor evil.” With
this in mind, let us now turn to Vaillancourt’s scheme for classifying employments of power
by high-level Church leaders.
1. Ecological power, based on the physical control of material environmental conditions.
Examples: use of territory, buildings or real estate to control people through domination of
their environment, as in the case of convent walls or the placement of bureaucratic offices.
2. Remunerative power, based on material or nonmaterial rewards or compensations.
Example: Funding favored activities.
3. Coercive power, based on physical or psychic violence. Examples: burning at the stake,
torture, imprisonment, banishment, blackmail, removal from office, denouncement.
4. Social power, based on the use of structural-organizational or psycho-sociological
mechanisms. Examples: peer-group pressures, rumors, co-optation, social ostracism,
socialization, use of mass media, nepotism, selective recruitment.
5. Legal power, based on juridical, administrative or bureaucratic norms, procedures and
maneuvers. Examples: secrecy rules in hierarchical activities, censorship through the nihil
obstat and the imprimatur.
6. Traditional power, based on the use of traditional symbols, rituals, ideas and sentiments.
Examples: confirming loyalties through liturgies; appeals to practices and documents popular
or prevalent in previous times.
7. Expert power, based on professional, technical, or scientific or purely rational arguments.
Examples: recourse to experts in theology or sociology to bolster one’s position; Church
leaders teaching as experts.
8. Charismatic power, based on exemplary or ethical prophecy. Examples: calls for social
justice and equality, giving away Church possessions for certain causes. Personal charisma
may be replaced by charisma of office or “routinized” (Weber) in other ways. Through
routinization, charismatic power is made more predictable, by linkage with or transformation
into legal, traditional and expert power.
Vaillancourt (p. 268) finds that the types can be organized into more general categories of the
way power is exercised. Types 1-3 exemplify the use of “raw power” or “the carrot-and-stick
approach.” Types 4-8 are more “normative” employments of power, “often referred to as
authority rather than power because of the greater degree of legitimacy which they
connotate.” Finally, the normative group can be further organized. Types 4, 5 and 6
demonstrate a “manipulative” approach, whereas 8 and 9 are more oriented to “persuasion”
and rational-ethical appeals to human intelligence, freedom and initiative. Vaillancourt
concedes that more than one category may aptly describe a given instance of power use by a
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Church leader, but argues that the scheme is nonetheless useful for analysis that goes beyond
concrete historical description.
It is unfortunate that Vaillancourt does not offer us a clear definitional key for distinguishing
between raw and normative uses of power. The heart of the matter, apparently, concerns the
crossing over from applications of power which are grounded in the superior possession of
strength or resources, and which are only minimally dependent on processes of negotiation or
references to external sources of authority for their effectiveness, to applications of power that
are more the product of free choice and rational agreement between the parties involved.
Making distinctions between raw and normative uses of power can be particularly difficult
because the use of raw power (removing a bishop from office, for example) can be fully
“legitimate” (by virtue of being sanctioned by Church law and tradition, for example).
Making distinctions can also be difficult because a given act may demonstrate power of
several kinds at once (e.g., appointing a man bishop demonstrates remunerative power, but it
also draws on social, legal and traditional power). This difficulty of making distinctions will
need to be confronted on a case-by-case basis.
Below is a schematic diagram which helps us to see how Vaillancourt distinguishes between
types of power applied by high-level Church leaders.
Kinds of Control Used by Upper-Echelon Officials in the Catholic Church
(cf. Vaillancourt  1980)
Raw Power Nonargumentative 1. Ecological Power
2. Remunerative Power
3. Coercive Power
Normative Power Manipulation 4. Social Power
5. Legal Power
6. Traditional Power
Persuasion 7. Expert Power
8. Charismatic Power
TABLE 2.4
As Vaillancourt’s typology suggests, the Church’s character as a primarily normative
organization does not prevent it from using forms of power that are “raw” or coercive.
Though uses of this kind of power are more limited and less physically drastic than they once
were (Vaillancourt’s examples of coercive power include types of coercion, such as burning
at the stake, torture, imprisonment, that are not practiced by the Church of the present day), it
is still possible to find the carrot-and-stick approach in acts such as the naming of bishops, the
removal of Church officials from office, excommunication, and public “silencing.” Here the
perspective of Habermas becomes relevant (cf. De Roest 1998, 217). Empirical sanctions
available to organizational leaders stand in the background of collective attempts to determine
organizational goals through a reasoning process that has reference to legitimate
organizational norms.
There are trade-offs for the Church organization when Church leaders choose to employ one
type of power rather than another.
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Generally, in almost any religious organization, attempts to use coercive or
remunerative means of control lead to alienation, aggressiveness, and loss of
commitment on the part of the membership. If purely normative means are
used, especially the nonmanipulative normative means that respect the
members’ freedom, then the officials tend to lose their importance in the
organization, because of the renewed interest in participation this strategy
brings forth. There are then also fewer, but more committed members. For
officials who want to keep their grip over an organization but who cannot
openly use coercion and remuneration to do so, the tendency is to use the more
manipulative of the normative means of control, those which Weber
characterizes as “psychic” or “hierocratic” coercion. (Vaillancourt 1980, 264-
265)
The challenge for Church leaders is to decide when to apply which type of control over
Church resources for the sake of achieving organizational goals (assuming that is what the
leaders want). Members of the hierarchy may use power in a disinterested fashion (for the
sake of the Church itself) or for motives of personal advantage (protecting official privileges,
seeking career advancement, etc.). Presumably, their motives will often be mixed. If
Vaillancourt is correct in the passage quoted above, members of the hierarchy will be careful
about applying power in a “raw” fashion, because this leads to the alienation of other Church
members. (Such an approach would also seem to be in tension with the operative goal of
charitably allowing for legitimate differences within the Church.) At the same time, members
of the hierarchy will also be reluctant about applying nonmanipulative, normative means,
which actually diminish the hierarchy’s control of the Church organization in favor of greater
member freedoms and control. The most likely strategy, then, for members of the hierarchy to
adopt if they wish to retain their own power without alienating other Church members is to
employ manipulative types of normative control which involve the internalization of the
control of Church members. This third option results in Church members being controlled
without perceiving they are being controlled. (Schellenberg 1982, 229, writes: “Coercion can
occur through simple obedience to authority, especially if the persons involved see no other
choice as effectively available.”)
In center-periphery conflict, we are concerned with how certain members of the hierarchy use
means of coordination and control in relation to other members of the hierarchy. Presumably
there will be agreement about maintaining hierarchical privileges in general, but members of
the hierarchy are not equal in their possession of power, and thus we can expect that tensions
will arise (perhaps out of view) around questions of who controls whom (and to what degree),
and the legitimacy of this arrangement. The center party has the possibility of legitimately
using raw power over and against the periphery party and any (intrahierarchical) third parties
because structurally such powers have been entrusted to the center party by Church law and
tradition. Thus, the center party can exercise such powers against lower-power intraecclesial
parties and still be perceived as legitimate in doing so – but damage can come as a result, as in
the form of hindered relations or harms to the appearance of the Church. The opposite – the
periphery party using raw power against the center party -- is a much less real possibility,
because of the potential costs to the peripheral party for doing so. And such use is not
generally perceived as legitimate within the Church. The periphery party, therefore, must seek
to advance its position through applications of manipulative and nonmanipulative normative
power. The center party can also, of course, employ these same types of power in an attempt
to control the periphery party. An interesting dynamic to observe in center-periphery conflict
is how the center and periphery parties employ psychic coercion in relation to one another. Do
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applications thereof differ from how psychic coercion is used to control Catholics who are not
members of the hierarchy?
In order to take this discussion to a more concrete and specific level, let us now turn to the
eight specific types of power which Vaillancourt identifies and consider how each may take
shape within the dynamics of center-periphery conflict.
2.4.4.1 Potential Applications of Distinct Types of Power in Center-Periphery Conflict
Ecological power, in Vaillancourt’s conception, is control manifested directly through
domination of material environmental conditions. He notes, for example, that some branches
of the Roman curia are located at a distance from the Vatican and thus have disadvantages of
proximity and access in their relations with the pope. This example is helpful because it
highlights the importance of the physical distance that lies between Rome and the rest of the
world’s sees. Taking advantage of the fact of separating distance (especially by maintaining
control over one’s own territory) is a likely way for parties to center-periphery conflict to
employ ecological power.
Both the center party and periphery party exercise territorial control. In cases of center-
periphery conflict, we can expect that each party will seek to exploit its territorial advantage
and to minimize the territorial advantage enjoyed by the opposing party. By territorial control
I mean the fullest sense in which a local bishop has control over the material and human
resources of a diocese and the Pope has control over the diocese of Rome and all other
dioceses around the world.
The center party enjoys a high level of control over Church life in the Vatican city state and
the diocese of Rome. It enjoys a lesser but still high level of control over the remainder of the
world’s dioceses. The periphery party enjoys a high level of control over the life of the local
Church in question, but little control elsewhere.
The center party can exploit its territorial advantage (employing ecological power) to keep the
periphery party removed from those who make decisions which directly affect the periphery
party. Most bishops do not have frequent or easy access to the Pope or to the Vatican offices
where key decisions are made. (Papal nuncios and officials of the Roman curia play important
gatekeeper roles.) Invitations from the Vatican and news of its operations are rarely
forthcoming, and the bishop who ventures to Rome under his own volition faces an imposing
architectural setting (Hebblethwaite 1986, 1-11) which houses an equally imposing
bureaucracy. These obstacles must be confronted by a bishop who wants to influence the
decision making there.
On the other hand, a local bishop can employ ecological power by reinforcing his dominance
of his territory – especially by cultivating local loyalties in various ways -- at the expense of
Roman preferences for that local church. Rome can only observe goings-on in the world’s
dioceses from afar (Goddijn 1975, 47). It cannot monitor situations there first-hand and must
rely on local observers (Safranski 1985, 57) and the cooperation of the bishop himself to
remain apprised of local conditions.
Nonetheless, certain general strategies enable the Vatican to counteract the local bishop’s
territorial control. One such strategy is the ad limina visit. By (canonically) requiring local
bishops to journey to Rome once every five years for a visit “to the threshold” of the tombs of
Sts. Peter and Paul, the Vatican temporarily closes the distance between itself and local sees,
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and thus makes the periphery more accountable to the center. During these visits the bishops
provide a comprehensive account of current conditions in the local Church. This obligation to
close the distance between Rome and the local diocese is one-directional. Bishops have a
responsibility to come to the Pope, but papal visits to a bishop’s see are normally portrayed as
an honor that the Pope bestows on the local Church, not as any kind of obligation (cf. May
1987, 254). Papal visits to local sees, however, may also be understood as a strategy whereby
the center asserts control over the local Church. Melady (1999) demonstrates persuasively
how such visits serve to lay claim symbolically to the Pope’s rule over the local church. The
orchestration of such events is an intriguing example of how environmental trappings may
convey and reinforce presumptions of one’s power. Another way for the Pope to “visit” a
local church is to conduct an apostolic visitation of that church. This amounts to an
investigation of conditions in the diocese carried out by a papal representative. This is
typically a means for reining in a bishop or diocese that appears to be getting out of Rome’s
control. (See below under “coercive power.”)
A local bishop has few opportunities to diminish the Pope’s territorial control over the diocese
of Rome or over other dioceses not his own. Therefore, his best option for asserting ecological
power in center-periphery conflict appears to be to take advantage of his control of his own
territory and exploit Vatican fears that many of the faithful of that local church could be lost
to the Church if the local bishop’s wishes are not respected.
Remunerative power is another type of power which can serve strategic purposes in center-
periphery conflict (Henrici 1994, 53-54). This too is a type of power which is more available
to the center party than the periphery party.
The Pope is in a position to reward bishops in various ways. The power of appointment is an
obvious example of this. Bishops hold their office by virtue of a Pope’s having approved their
appointment. (The Pope can also remove bishops from office.) In addition, the Pope has the
power to further advance careers through his right to make bishops into archbishops,
cardinals, papal ambassadors and curial officials. He can also reassign a bishop to lead a more
prominent see.  Thus, career-minded bishops have incentives to please the Pope (and those
bishops and curial members who are close to the Pope). A further power of appointment that
can be employed as a form of remuneration is the Pope’s power to appoint an auxiliary or
coadjutor bishop to assist a bishop his management of a local diocese. It is common for
bishops of larger sees to request this form of assistance because the demands of office are so
great.
The power of appointment is not the only means the Pope has of rewarding bishops. The Pope
also has great power to convey and confer visibility and prestige. He may do so by choosing
to visit a bishop’s diocese, by including the bishop in inner circles of decision-making, by
praising the bishop publicly, or by other means.
Local bishops can also exercise a remunerative power over the Pope, though in a much more
limited way. One means to do so is through financial contributions (Lernoux 1986, 16). The
papacy is dependent on money supplied by the world’s dioceses to do its work. While this
flow of money does not have a measurable impact on the Pope’s own personal financial well-
being, it is something that the Pope must attend to because it directly affects the ability of the
papacy to carry out its leadership role within the Church. Bishops also have the ability to
remunerate the Pope by enhancing his power and prestige locally. This can be done by
frequently citing his teachings, praising him, and working hard to promote causes the Pope
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has embraced.
When analyzing cases of center-periphery conflict, we will want to ask whether either party
appears to have leverage with the other thanks to rewards given in the past, bestowed in the
present, or promised for the future. It is unlikely that this form of power will show itself in a
blatant way, at least not in the public discourse, because of its raw nature. For the most part, a
Pope’s more tangible powers of remuneration (e.g., offering the bishop a prestigious
appointment) and a bishop’s (e.g., through financial contributions or strengthening the Pope’s
control locally) will be reward powers that are taken for granted by the parties involved. They
are long-term rather than immediate in their orientation. The most likely form of remuneration
to appear in conflict discourse may well be expressions of approval and agreement which go
beyond standard politeness conventions. These signs of approval and agreement are
significant because not only do they signal increased possibilities of power, prestige and
future rewards for the one shown approval, but more basically they appeal to the basic human
desire for approval. Such approval is an incentive to compliance. To gain compliance from
the other party is to “win” at least something in the conflict.
Coercive power is another form of power available to the papacy and episcopacy which can
be applied in intrahierarchical conflicts. The 1983 Code of Canon Law states explicitly (canon
1311) that “the Church has an innate and proper right to coerce offending members of the
Christian faithful by means of penal sanctions.” Though the actions are infrequently taken, a
Pope can limit a bishop’s powers, silence him, publicly humiliate him, remove him from
office, move him from one place to another, and excommunicate him from the Church. The
Vatican may also initiate an “apostolic visitation,” essentially an investigation of a local
diocese, which calls into question the condition of the diocese and its leadership (Granfield
1986, 28-30). These types of coercive power are not reciprocal (see also Hoose 2001, 78 and
Gaillardetz 1992, 133 on the use of coercive power by the Holy See over and against local
bishops). An ordinary’s subordinate position does not allow him to impose penalties on the
Roman Pontiff (cf. canon 1333.3.1).
Though the Church’s legal structure does not enable a bishop to sanction the Pope, a bishop
may nonetheless exercise coercive power vis-à-vis the Pope. Perhaps the most obvious, and
significant, potential for this lies in the bishop’s influence over his own diocese. In light of the
Church’s prioritization of universal unity as a goal, Rome has an interest in seeing that no
portion of the Church falls away. A diocesan bishop has the potential to fracture the Church’s
unity -- not only within his own see, but also beyond it -- by challenging directives from
Rome. At the very least this will present an embarrassment to Rome. If Catholics in other
areas perceive that Rome is being heavy-handed in its treatment of a local Church, this may
cause them to re-evaluate their own commitments. Thus an ordinary can coerce the Holy See
by taking advantage of the Pope’s dependence on his own cooperation and that of the people
in the local Church (cf. Granfield 1986, 73-74).
We can expect that when members of the hierarchy employ forms of coercion they will try to
hide their use of this raw form of power. In many cases, merely suggesting (threatening) the
possibility of taking any of the actions listed above can serve as a tactic of coercion. Both the
center and periphery parties are in a position to use coercive power in this way, holding out
the possibility of loss of control for the other. (If you do X, I can no longer guarantee Y.)
Withholding rewards (for example, refusing to make the archbishop of an important see a
cardinal) is another understated way to apply pressure for desired behaviors and punish
undesired behaviors. The Pope, for example, could decide not to make the archbishop of an
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important see a cardinal. Going the other way, a local bishop might raise funds on behalf of
the Holy See in a less than enthusiastic way. Public criticism, too, can be a means to force
desired behaviors, but typically one will have to listen closely to hear these negative words.
Rarely are the pope and bishops critical of one another in the open. More commonly, one
would expect such opinions to be voiced by surrogates (such as curial or diocesan officials),
though occasionally the principals themselves will offer critiques in veiled language. Such
criticism gives permission to other parties to join in the criticism, which can come as an
unwelcome form of public pressure. In center-periphery conflict situations, employing heavy-
handed coercive means may be a way of quickly gaining compliance, but just as likely it will
serve to throw oil on the fire. Especially when the coercion involves a loss of face for one
party at the expense of the other (as for example, in cases where a Pope publicly humiliates a
bishop), the organizational costs may exceed the short-term gains.
Social power, which focuses on personal desires for belonging and acceptance, is also likely
to be applied in center-periphery conflict. Social power within the Church draws on the desire
that people may feel to be accepted within the Church or one of the social circles within the
Church. Church leaders, in view of their responsibility to maintain the identity and boundaries
of the Church, have disproportionate power (relative to other Church members) to determine
who feels welcome and who feels unwelcome in the Church. We can presume that
participants in center-periphery conflict will use their ability to manipulate social power when
it suits their purposes. But we should also keep in mind that members of the hierarchy, while
greatly able to apply social power, are themselves intensely susceptible to social power as
they carry out their duties on behalf of the Church.
Members of the Catholic hierarchy are products of highly intensive processes of
organizational socialization, and their status as bishops (archbishops, cardinals, Pope) reflects
an unusual level of personal commitment to the religious organization, as exemplified in
promises of celibacy and obedience and heavy personal investments in education and training
(Hanson 1987, 356; see also Etzioni 1961, 102-103). I point this out because the pronounced
quality of their organizational affiliation makes them both well-versed in the means of
socialization practiced by the organization (and thus able practitioners of the same), and
unlikely candidates to disaffiliate with the organizational culture. Etzioni (1961, 202),
following Argyris (1957, 94-95) writes: “The higher the rank, the greater we would expect the
average commitment to be.”
To put it another way, bishops are experts in “the Catholic way of doing things” and are
strongly inclined both to do things the Catholic way themselves and to encourage others to do
the same. Granted, it is not a simple matter to characterize this Catholic culture of social
interaction, but some observations can be made.
One observation that is in order is that bishops are not equally “Romanized.” Some bishop are
more Romanized – that is, more attuned to the culture of the center party -- than others, by
virtue of their educational curriculum vitae, their theological-ecclesiological views, their
ecclesiastical ambitions, etc. Although all bishops become bishops by virtue of a Vatican
appointment, bishops’ levels of connectedness to Rome will vary greatly. Some bishops have
established Vatican connections even prior to their consecration as bishops, by having studied
in Rome (Hanson 1987, 171), or by having served as a priest in an administrative or
diplomatic post that has put them in touch with the Holy See. Once a bishop, one may pursue
(or avoid) Vatican ties to a greater or lesser extent, by means of his level of participation in
bishops’ synods, his assumption of national or international leadership roles, his handling of
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his required ad limina visit to Rome every five years, his personal contacts, his promotion of
Roman causes locally, and other means. This can make a difference in cases of center-
periphery conflict because we can expect that bishops with stronger ties to the Vatican will
have more resources to draw on in such conflicts, in the form of personal connections at the
Vatican, greater good will and greater knowledge of Vatican processes of decision making,
than will bishops who have weaker ties to the center. (But NB: The case of Cardinal Alfrink
suggests that strong Roman ties carry a local bishop only so far in a conflict with the Holy
See. Cf. Van Schaik 1997.)
As a general principle, we can expect that all bishops will be conditioned by social power and
will employ social power to keep up the appearance of the Church. In order to maintain the
impression of unity and harmony, certain strategies are likely to be preferred for the handling
of intraorganizational tensions. Among these are (1) the use of  familiar structures of
engagement, (2) the practice of courtesy, and (3) the employment of techniques of
extenuation, particularly silence or secrecy. It should come as no surprise to find any or all of
these strategically applied in center-periphery conflict. Before considering how the center
party and periphery party are likely to use such strategies oppositionally in center-periphery
conflict, I will consider predispositions about the use of these strategies which apply to both
parties.
Like the leaders of other organizations, Church leaders should want to save their own face and
that of the organization by showing that they can manage organizational conflicts
productively. A common strategy for achieving this is the use of “tried and true” methods to
handle internal conflicts. Familiar structures of engagement counteract the unpredictability
and dangerousness of conflicts by placing them in known and limiting contexts. Thus a
conflict becomes managed by means of reference to a chain of command, an existing legal
structure (canon law), and various unwritten protocols of communication  and politeness.
Even more important than the structures themselves is the pre-existing tacit agreement (cf.
Chomsky 1987 on “the manufacture of consent;” see also Lukes 1974, 23) that dictates which
kinds of issues come up for discussion in the first place, and which rules for carrying on
discussions are accepted without question. Organizational standards of thought and conduct
are strongest when they are accepted as “common sense” (Fairclough 1989, 2-4). Thus
Church leaders have a stake in promoting belief in the rightness of the Church’s means and
ends. Much of this will take the form of public relations and communications work. Conflicts
will be most easily dispensed with by not giving them the occasion to arise in the first place
and, when they do, having strong incentives in place to ensure that conflicts are handled in
predictable ways which are known to generate desirable outcomes.
Another way we can expect Church leaders to keep up the appearance of the Church in the
case of high-level conflicts is through the use of courtesy. An absence of critical commentary
and harsh words in hierarchical exchanges suggests that all is well in the governance of the
Church. Fraternal deference expressed within the papal-episcopal ranks shows that the
topmost leadership of the Church is united and harmonious (and therefore stronger) as it takes
up the challenges that the Church faces. Bishops are noted for their demeanor of politeness.
Hanson (1987, 293) has spoken of “the usual (even exaggerated) courtesy that pertains among
episcopal collegiality.” While politeness offers the obvious advantage of keeping
conversations civil and ongoing -- an advantage that should not be taken lightly -- some
commentators have noted that the hierarchy’s persistent desire to appear harmonious and act
nonconfrontationally is problematic. Indirect language, silence or bureaucratic procedural
moves may be used to avoid allowing conflicts to surface or to avoid certain issues altogether
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(see Reese 1996, 248; Quinn 1996, 16; K. Briggs 1992, 93-94; Reese 1992, 178-179; Reese
1989, 358; Bartholomaus 1978, 105). These approaches to the handling of conflict have the
potential to be counterproductive for the Church by inviting the escalation of conflicts whose
real issues have not been addressed early on.
Techniques of extenuation are a third likely means whereby participants will keep up the
appearance of the Church in center-periphery conflict. Church observers frequently comment
on the role that silence and secrecy play in Church governance (Stanley 2000; Melady 1999,
35; Quinn 1999, 56-58; Thomas 1997; Reese 1996, 4; Henrici 1994, 53; Granfield 1987, 93;
Hanson 1987, 70; Hebblethwaite 1986, 128-129; Greeley 1979; McKenzie 1969, 31).
Secrecy, in general, is sometimes viewed with suspicion, since, as Simmel (1950, 331)
concedes, “the immoral hides itself for obvious reasons.” But the use of secrecy is not by
itself cause for alarm, and Bok (1984, 18) notes that it is “indispensable” for human life,
enabling self-protection and autonomy (see also Martinson 1998, 15; Simmel 1950, 330). The
desire for transparency, therefore, is not always ethically preferable (nor is it necessarily
efficacious for all forms of conflict handling), and in some cultures secrecy is much more
usual than in others. The most basic way we can expect secrecy to apply in center-periphery
conflict is in regard to the fact of conflict itself. Conflicts can be, at a minimum, embarrassing
for the Church, and so Church leaders have reason to want to keep leadership conflicts out of
public view altogether. In cases where this is not entirely possible, there may be efforts to
minimize the number of aspects of conflict that are revealed (participants, contested issues,
processes of decision making). Intrahierarchical conflicts may be hidden through various
means, including: closed meetings, non-public correspondence, silence, verbal obfuscation,
secret archives, and the maintenance of policies of institutional exclusivity (priests must be
male and celibate) that, a priori, limit access to institutional realms and conversations.
Thus far I have suggested that members of the hierarchy are heavily invested in and
conditioned by the Church organizational culture. Generally speaking, they will be inclined to
perpetuate the culture that has conditioned and rewarded them, with the implication that in
cases of leadership conflict they will want to save the face of the Church and its hierarchical
structure. I have also pointed to three strategies of conflict handling (the use of familiar
structures of engagement, courtesy and extenuating techniques) through which social power
may be applied to keep up the appearance of the Church and its hierarchy. Having offered
these observations, however, I must note, too, that there are reasons to expect that the center
and periphery parties will not apply these three strategies uniformly in case of center-
periphery conflict. Among the reasons for this are that (1) the use of the strategies benefits the
center party more than the periphery party and (2) both center and periphery party may
occasionally foresee advantages to be reached by forgoing use of these usual approaches to
conflict handling.
As the party of higher power and rank, the center party benefits more from these strategies of
conflict handling, which maintain current distributions of power, than does the periphery
party. The periphery party also benefits (privileges of membership in the hierarchy are
retained), but to a lesser degree. Use of the familiar structures of engagement in conflict
favors the continuance of current arrangements of power which are slanted in favor of the
higher-power center party. Use of courtesy and secrecy keep conflicts from coming into the
open and thereby enlisting the support of influential third parties or of the Church faithful in
general. By controlling the machinery and keeping the machinery out of sight, the higher-
power party is able to reduce the possibility that the machinery will be reconfigured. Hanson
(1987, 44-45) has noted that “the Vatican holds an enormous advantage in any closed
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bureaucratic struggle” with local bishops.
In the same passage, however, Hanson also notes that breaking with expected protocols of
conflict handling can be a source of power to a local bishop who is in the lower-power
position. Providing news “leaks” or making confidential documents available for public
consumption has proven to be an effective means through which opposing bishops have
countered the Vatican’s advantage by gaining public support. A member of the hierarchy
always has, in conflict situations, the possibility of avoiding the preferred organizational ways
of doing things (e.g., by questioning the validity of canonical strictures or undermining the
chain of command). He may also choose not to be courteous (e.g., by failing to observe
diplomatic protocol or by publicly challenging a fellow bishop) or not to maintain ordinary
standards of secrecy. This potential not to save the face of the Church or of the other party is a
considerable means of leverage available to the lower-power party in center-periphery
conflict. (The other side of the coin here is that the periphery party also faces the incursion of
greater costs if it decides to abandon social expectations, and this may make it less likely than
the center to part from the normative conventions. The center can punish and ostracize the
periphery for such activity, but the center needs not fear punishment – or at least, the Pope
himself needs not fear punishment.)
It should not be surprising that the periphery party will be inclined to circumvent
disadvantageous arrangements of power when necessary, but we should not overlook the
likelihood that the center party will also occasionally forgo use of expected protocols for the
sake of realizing specific advantages within the conflict. For example, the Vatican is also in a
position to leak news which damages the opposition party, and it may drop the practice of
courtesy in regard to a bishop who has crossed acceptable lines of behavior. Because the
familiar structures of engagement, courtesy and secrecy generally favor the position of the
center party, however, my expectation is that the periphery party will be more likely to forgo
use of these practices than will the center party.
One can also conceive of occasions in center-periphery conflict when nonstrategic reasons
(that is, reasons which are not about seeking advantage over the opposition party) for breaking
with conflict-handling protocols are put forth. For example, a member of the hierarchy may
break with the standard ways on the grounds of principle or out of the feeling that his own or
others’ use of those ways has betrayed him.
To summarize the contents of this long section succinctly: a member of the hierarchy (himself
the product of intensive social conditioning) may employ social power in center-periphery
conflict either by reinforcing the Church’s prevailing social identity and cohesion, or by
threatening to undermine or acting to undermine the same.
Legal power, like social power, both constrains and empowers the parties to center-periphery
conflict. Within the Church organization, members of the hierarchy possess powers (which
are sanctioned by Church law) to contribute to the making of Church laws and to act as
interpreters and enforcers of Church law. Members of the hierarchy are also subject to the
laws of the Church. At the same time, members of the hierarchy are subject to the laws and
legal culture of society as well (and their immersion in the legal structures of society will
influence the way that they understand and enforce laws of the Church: as in perceptions of
rights, fairness, justice, etc.). In some cases, Church leaders may have control or influence
over the legal structures of society, but this is exceptional rather than usual in modern times.
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In center-periphery conflict we can expect to see participants pursue their own interests by
employing the powers guaranteed them by Church law. We can also expect that they will be
limited by constraints imposed by Church law. But whereas questions of Church law almost
by definition apply in cases of center-periphery conflict, legal power that is based on the laws
of society are more likely to inform such conflict in less transparent ways.
The Pope and other bishops of the Church exercise powers to make laws and govern and
judge the Church in accord with the prescripts of the Code of Canon Law, and they oversee
other administrative agents and tribunals who help them with this work. Canon law itself is
understood to be a means by which the Church carries out its mission (John Paul II 1983, xi).
As should already be obvious, members of the hierarchy are not equal in their possession of
legal power. A Pope, for example, can depose a bishop, but the reverse is not also true.
Moreover, certain judicial decisions made at the level of a local diocese can be appealed to
Rome and may be overturned at that level. The Pope possesses the highest power of judgment
in the Church: There is “neither repeal nor recourse” against his decision or decree (Canon
333). A Pope’s power to make law also goes beyond that of a bishop. An outstanding example
is the recent revision of the Code of Canon Law itself, a work which incorporated the
contributions of bishops (and other theological experts), but which was instigated by decree of
one Pope (John XXIII) and finally approved and promulgated by another (John Paul II). Still,
it is not true to say that the pope is “above the law,” even in regard to Church law. And it
would be a mistake to overlook the legal power that bishops themselves possess, especially in
overseeing the local churches. Granfield (1987) provides a helpful analysis of the legal limits
on primatial power in the Church. While conceding the tremendous official autonomy that
accompanies the papal office, Granfield observes that the Pope is nonetheless constrained by
various forms of natural law, divine law and ecclesiastical law in his leadership of the Church.
The normative character of the Church suggests that members of the hierarchy will want their
actions to be legal in fact, or at least appear to be legal. The Church sets forth its laws as the
product of ongoing discernment in continuity with the divine law of Revelation
communicated through the Old and New Testament traditions (John Paul II 1983, xiii). Thus a
strong presumption prevails which sees a connection between legality and ethical rightness. A
bishop or Pope who acts in agreement with the law can make the case, explicitly or implicitly,
that he is conducting himself in a morally proper way.
We can expect that members of the hierarchy will use their knowledge of the legal structures
of the Church not only to pursue their preferred course of action but to justify it. Presumably,
center-periphery conflict participants will manipulate Church structures and procedures to
advantage and they will also invoke the correctness of their relationship to legal  authorities --
be they impersonal (specific laws or Church teachings) or personal (officers of the Church) –
to justify their actions.
In center-periphery conflict the center party has a clear advantage of ecclesiastical legal power
over the periphery party. To a great extent the periphery party must work within a legal
system that is controlled by the center party. To nullify this advantage and achieve objectives
opposed by the center party, two likely options for the employment of legal power present
themselves to the periphery party. One is to work cleverly within the ecclesiastical legal
system as it exists to make it work in one’s own favor. (I rule out the possibility of trying to
change the controlling system in a short-duration conflict.) This can be done through skillful
bureaucratic maneuvers, tactics of delay, creative interpretations of applicable laws, and most
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especially, perhaps, through appeals to alternative sources of legal authority recognized within
the Church tradition. Another option is to appeal directly to the Pope himself, in order to try to
separate him from a position that members of his curia have taken.
The other general possibility is to appeal to legal standards or powers which lie outside of the
Church organization. This strategy has become more viable since the Second Vatican
Council, when the Church  recognized sources of authority outside of the Church which have
a legitimacy that is independent of the Church. One way this strategy could apply – but this is
in fact more an application of social power than of legal power – is by the periphery party
drawing attention to the contrast between ecclesiastical and societal legal orders. From a
given cultural viewpoint, the Church’s legal order may compare unfavorably with the societal
legal order. Thus, proponents of Western-style democracy, inside the Church and out, have
criticized the Church for non-democratic practices that are written into canon law, such as the
top-down secretive process for naming bishops and the exclusion of women from holy orders.
Conceivably, a local bishop could play off these cultural resentments to heighten his own
popularity while putting pressure on the Vatican. But this is a risky strategy because the
bishop may ultimately lose power within the Church by appearing too closely aligned with
extrecclesial groups.
Traditional power is another means of coordination and control available to Church leaders.
The effectiveness of this type of power rests on the force of habit (Russell 1986, 21). Because
a form of social practice or thought has been consistently embraced over time (within recent
memory, at least), it gains acceptance as a “fact of life,” or as “a given.” The strength of a
position based on tradition is the unlikelihood of its being challenged: the everyday routine
can solidify into “an inviolable norm of conduct” (Weber 1958, 296; see also Weber 1962,
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Church leaders can reinforce established traditions actively by practicing those traditions and
invoking them symbolically, and passively by not challenging the traditions. An emphasis on
tradition as a unifying element – various traditions coalesce in one overriding, consistent
tradition -- is one of the hallmarks of Catholicism. All of the central aspects of Catholicism,
including its sacred documents, its teachings, its patterns of worship and its social
commitments, are the products of tradition(s) and are legitimized by tradition(s). Hence there
is nothing surprising in the fact that members of the hierarchy would apply traditional
resources and make appeals to traditional authorities when leadership decisions are at hand.
Considering the richness and variety of Catholic traditional life, it is also not surprising that
members of the hierarchy sometimes find themselves in disagreement about how the
traditions of Catholicism relate to present circumstances (Congar 1985, 23; Dulles 1985, 86-
87). The pluralism that characterizes the history of Catholic thought and practice invites
parties in conflict to emphasize those traditional concepts and practices which most reflect
their own viewpoint. Indeed, one of the essential tasks of the Catholic hierarchy (itself a
traditional responsibility, and one that involves significant power) is to discern which Church
traditions are most telling for the contemporary Church. I will not here enter into the complex
and contentious question of the “immutability” of certain Church teachings, but will simply
acknowledge that, throughout its history, claims have been made on behalf of the Church that
on essential issues its teaching has remained internally consistent and “unchanging” (cf.
Gaillardetz 1997, 101-128). Within this perspective, new Church teachings never reverse
earlier Church teachings but simply reflect a deeper understanding of the question that the
Church is communicating. For our purposes here, it is only necessary to acknowledge that
66
Church teaching has been formulated in a multitude of ways and has been translated into
practice in even more various ways.)
When analyzing cases of center-periphery conflict, we will want to observe which traditional
resources each party chooses to emphasize (see also the discussion in section 3.2.2, below).
How does a bishop or Pope explain his choices? Does he invoke God? Jesus? The Holy
Spirit? The teaching authority of the Church? Apostolic tradition? Does a bishop make
mention of the current Pope? His fellow bishops? Does the speaker carry on as though his
own authority is self-evident? Another matter to examine, especially in written
communications, is the range of documentary authorities cited. Variances in ecclesiology can
be signalled by a Church leader’s tendency to cite, for example, recent papal encyclicals
rather than the documents of Vatican II, or Canon Law rather than Scripture.
Traditional power can also be called upon and expressed in nonverbal ways (Bartholomaus
1978, 96). Members of the hierarchy may symbolically invoke the traditional power of their
office through things as simple and direct as the clothing (clerical garb varies in its level of
refinement, as does liturgical vesture: cf. Noonan 1996) and jewelry (such as papal and
episcopal rings) they wear. What is important to note is not so much the attire itself, but how
the attire or other marker of traditional power – as in physical posture or gesture (kissing the
Pope’s ring) -- relates to its context. Does it draw attention to distinctions of rank? (For
examples, see Hanson 1987, 95-97 and Bernstein and Politi 1996, 515.) Is it meant to elevate
feeling in a gathering, giving the impression a critical mission is underway? (Melady 1999
depicts John Paul II’s deployment of markers of traditional power, such as the Mass and
established ecclesiological images, in the course of his pastoral visits. Melady also shows that
the traditional markers themselves evolve, as in the case of papal pastoral visits, which John
Paul II has undertaken much more extensively than previous popes.)
Members of the hierarchy may also draw upon the power of tradition by refraining from using
certain elements or by playing off of its symbolic markers. For example, a bishop may present
himself in democratic fashion as a “man of the people” (or as one who possesses the
“common touch” – cf. Bourdieu 1991, 68). This can be achieved in part by wearing simple
clerical clothing or non-clerical attire, not insisting on highly deferential treatment, presiding
at low-key rather than “high Church” liturgies, making frequent visits to the poor and
bereaved, not employing his power in a highly authoritarian fashion, etc. These acts of
forbearance are themselves underwritten by long-standing, active traditions in the Church,
which call for austere living and devotion to those in need (Franciscan spirituality is an
example). While the bishop does not stop being a bishop (member of an elite) when he adopts
this manner of conduct, to many people he will look better for his willingness not to take
advantage of his advantaged position.
In center-periphery conflict we can expect that the center party will have more of a stake in
proclaiming a traditional unicity for the Church (i.e., the idea that one consistent, permanent
tradition guarded by Rome applies in the Church) and that the periphery party will be more
likely to advance a view of tradition that is pluralistic and evolutionary. The reason for this is
that it is easier for the Holy See to preside over the Church if variations of thought and
practice are kept to a minimum. On the other hand, local bishops have an easier time in
leading their own particular churches if they have the freedom to accommodate local
preferences for thought and practice. Presumably both sides will draw on arguments from
within the tradition (magisterial teachings, theological reflections) in order to make their case
with the other. Thus, Rome will find advantage in arguing  that Church tradition, according to
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the traditional understanding (singular) that has been handed down, is one and the periphery
party will have reason to hold that Church tradition (the teachings and practices which have
been handed down over time) have always made room for local variations of thought and
practice, within limits. The critical question, for our own purposes, is how each party invokes
tradition for strategic advantage within the conflict handling.
Expert power is one more type of power available to participants in center-periphery
conflict. Expert power may be utilized when members of the hierarchy act as experts
themselves -- based on their education, experience or practical competence in matters of
Church governance, theology, spirituality, etc. It may also be applied through Church’s
leaders’ command of resources of expertise at their disposal (documentation, advisers, etc.).
Expert power subsists both in the actual possession of expertise and in the  perception that
one is an expert. Recognition as an expert legitimizes one’s judgments. In technical matters,
people normally prefer the judgment of an expert over that of someone less tutored. (Though
we should be careful to notice when being labeled an “expert” becomes a liability, as in cases
of populist backlash against elite parties.) Consequently, members of the hierarchy can
employ expert power by possessing and acting upon education, experience and competence,
and also by taking advantage of the perception that they possess these faculties.
While it is safe to say that every member of the hierarchy will be able to draw on expert
power, it is difficult to generalize about the specific education, experience and competencies
each will possess. Training and experience will vary. All bishops have studied theology and
some are theological experts. But only a small minority have theological expertise comparable
to that of full-time scholars of theology. Canon law is another area in which some bishops
may be considered experts, but again this constitutes only a small portion of the episcopacy.
At best, one might say that all bishops are experts on Catholic life and culture in general, and
the great majority (those who are diocesan bishops) might also be deemed experts on local
Church life and governance. The Pope, and those cardinals and bishops who collaborate with
him in the Vatican, will have an advantage of knowledge over other members of the hierarchy
in regard to the functioning of the topmost layers of the Church bureaucracy, for only they are
privileged to view its workings on a day-to-day basis.
Expert power, by definition, is an elite possession. Experts are set apart as a result of the
perception that they have wisdom and abilities others do not. In regard to the hierarchy, one
must wonder if the fact that they are already set apart from the general populace (through
celibacy, ordination, and the mystique associated with being a “successor to the apostles”)
does not bolster the impression that they are also exceptional in their possession of expertise.
In any case, expert power is always relative to the knowledge possessed by the perceiver.
Expert power (like all power) does not exist if it is not recognized. To the general populace,
bishops may be experts in theology and may draw on the consequently available expert
power. Professors of theology, however, may concede less expert power to the bishops, since
their own theological training is extensive and may exceed that of the bishop in question.
In cases of center-periphery conflict we can expect that participants will take advantage of
expert power when the possibility arises. Thus they will draw on the knowledge resources
(both theoretical and practical) they possess and they will try to gain allies by cultivating the
perception that their knowledge is superior. Since center-periphery conflicts engage matters of
Church teaching and practice, we can expect that there will be competition to provide more
compelling interpretations of what is at stake in the conflict and what authoritative precedents
apply. In the contemporary Church this may take the form of disagreements about the legacy
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of Vatican II or about how Church law relates to the situation at hand.
As I suggested above, there may be other factors (such as inaccessibility) which reinforce
perceptions of one’s expertise. Superior power, for instance, can give the impression of
superior knowledge. One may encounter operative perceptions that the people in charge must
know better because they are in charge. This would seem to be a factor in disputes about
Church governance. One can imagine that the population at large will assume that the Vatican
knows better than local Church officials in debates about which precedents of Church
tradition apply to given circumstances and which possible course of action will be best for the
universal Church. In some cases of conflict with the Vatican, a local bishop may enjoy
expertise advantages of his own. He, and not the Curia, is the expert on the local Church and
local situation. He sees on a daily basis how the people of the local Church think and act and
how they respond to various pastoral initiatives. This can help him to communicate his
viewpoint more convincingly in the local (if not the global) context. (We might speak here of
a clash between theoretical and practical experts.) Since the Vatican has a vested interest in
not alienating the local Church, this presents itself as a significant advantage for the local
bishop. The use of expert power in media exchanges can also influence of the course of
center-periphery conflict.
Apart from demonstrating superior expertise in conflict situations, one may also adopt a
strategy of undermining perceptions of the opposing party’s expertise. Possibilities for
carrying out this strategy include: casting doubt on the opponent’s possession of expertise
(Are his credentials or arguments suspect?) or, contrarily, conceding the opponent’s expert
status while fanning popular sentiments of distrust for experts (by suggesting that it is better
to be good than to be smart).
Charismatic power is the final type of power Vaillancourt identifies in his discussion of how
upper-echelon officials exercise control in the Church. Vaillancourt observes that this kind of
power may emanate directly from a person, in the form of exemplary or ethical prophecy, or
may be routinized in an office (cf. Weber 1959, 297). We can expect that pure charisma will
be more strongly influential than routinized charisma (Etzioni 1961, 204). By linking
charismatic power to, or transforming it into, legal, traditional and expert power, charismatic
power can be made more predictable.
In its most basic form, charismatic power appears in the uniqueness of personality. A person
possesses certain charisms or “gifts,” such as eloquence, boldness, spiritual insight, etc.,
which make him (or her) attractive or persuasive to others. When the power of these gifts is
intensively persuasive, perceivers may come to believe that they are of divine origin. The
notion of priest as alter Christus in the Church offers a dramatic example of how charisma
undergoes routinization in the Church. In this case the uniqueness and unprecedented quality
of Jesus’ last supper with his disciples comes to be replaced by the priest presider’s strict
adherence to repeated patterns in the Eucharistic liturgy. Charismatic power that is attached to
a particular person rather than to an office can be dangerous for the Church because it
displays power that is independent of the Church’s institutional power. A popular bishop in a
conflict with the Vatican has the possibility of taking many of his followers with him out of
the Church if the conflict proves irresolvable. On the other hand, charismatic power in the
hands of one who remains firmly within the institutional Church can be a tremendous
institutional asset. Many commentators have noted how Pope John Paul II has used his
personal charisma in this way (cf., for example, Melady 1999, Hanson 1987). In studies of
center-periphery conflict, we should maintain a distinction between transferable and
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nontransferable forms of charismatic power.
We can expect to find charismatic power in both its nontransferable-personal form and
transferable-routinized form in cases of center-periphery conflict. Participants will differ in
the amount of personal charismatic power they possess, but every bishop will have access to
the routinized charismatic power that comes with his office. A mystique surrounds the
persons holding the highest offices of the Church. Several elements contribute to the public
perception of the specialness of these officials, including: their authority as rulers, teachers
and judges of the Church; the traditional-historical link to Christ’s apostles; and symbolic
enhancements in the form of official promises (celibacy and obedience), formal attire and
ritual (especially liturgical) roles.
Charismatic power of the personal, nontransferable type may function in unforeseeable ways
in center-periphery conflict. Because of its potential to mobilize followers and sway
antagonists, it can trump the use of other, more predictable kinds of power (such as
organizationally-routinized coercive power) by opposing parties. This is especially true when
charismatic power is employed through the mass media. But note too: charismatic power of
the highly personal variety can be fleeting in its persuasiveness – today’s media hero may
well be tomorrow’s has-been – and audience appeal does not always translate into support for
one’s policies, as Greeley (1979, 39) has noted. In cases of center-periphery conflict we will
want to observe the forms of charisma and its applications. What is the source of the
charisma? (Is it a distinctly religious kind of charisma, rooted in perceptions of the
possessor’s closeness to God? Or does it appear grounded in more secular kinds of appeal,
such as personal attractiveness, strength, mysteriousness, etc.?) How does the possessor
convey his charisma? (Through writing? Public speaking? Conversation? Does he use the
mass media?) And, are the ends achieved through charismatic power more beneficial to the
individual or to the organization?
Conclusions
In this section I have described eight types of power whereby members of the hierarchy
coordinate and control the organization that is the Church. I have also pointed out select ways
these powers, given their possibilities and limits, can serve strategic purposes within center-
periphery conflict. By way of a summary, I offer the following table, which shows the types of
power that members of the hierarchy can be expected to employ, certain means by which the
power can be applied, my expectations concerning applications in center-periphery conflict,
and a set of questions to guide the examination of the Rome-Hunthausen case.
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Anticipated Applications of Power in Center-Periphery Conflict
Ty
pe
s
Means of Application in Church Expectations for Application in
Center-Periphery Conflict
What to examine in the Rome-
Hunthausen Case
1.
 E
co
lo
gi
ca
l P
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er
One may employ ecological power
by preserving separating distance
between self and other (by refusing
to offer or accept invitations, by
using bureaucratic rules or officers
as gatekeepers). Another
application of ecological power
involves maintaining control over
one’s own territory (ensuring that
clerical and popular support is
firm). Finally, one may attempt to
establish control over the opposing
party’s territory  (through
surveillance, as in ad limina visits,
appointments of helper bishops and
nuncios, etc., but also through
symbolic assertions of control over
territory, as in papal visits).
Center and periphery are separated
by distance (a fact that offers
advantages to both parties). Rome
has more opportunities for closing
the distance (through papal visits
or requiring the local bishop to
come to Rome). The Vatican has
jurisdiction and control over
diocese of Rome; its jurisdiction
and control apply to other local
churches as well, but to a lesser
extent in practice. The local
bishop strongly controls his own
local church but has little
influence over the other territory
overseen by Rome. The greatest
source of leverage for the local
bishop appears to be the
possession of strong support
within the local church, which
Rome will be reluctant to alienate.
Does Hunthausen go to Rome?
Does the Pope go to Seattle?
What is the role of the papal
nuncio? What if the function of
ad limina visits, if they took
place? What is the function of
helper bishop appointments?
Where there other ways that
Rome was able to monitor
Hunthausen’s leadership in
Seattle? Did Hunthausen find
ways of crossing over into and
having influence within the center
party territory? Were symbolic
means of establishing control
over the other party’s territory
applied on either side? What was
the level of Hunthausen’s support
within his own archdiocese, and
did this prove to be a significant
advantage to him?
2.
 R
em
un
er
at
iv
e 
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The Pope can apply remunerative
power through his power of
appointment (providing bishops
with auxiliary bishops, assigning
bishops to more prestigious sees,
making bishops cardinals, giving
bishops curial assignments).
The Pope can also remunerate by
conferring prestige (by praising a
bishop, visiting his diocese,
including him in inner circles of
decision making).
Local bishops are more limited in
their ability to remunerate the Holy
See (possibilities: financial
contributions, promoting the
prestige of and causes of the
papacy in the local church).
The center’s ability to remunerate
the periphery (especially over the
long run) is an important
advantage in its favor in center-
periphery conflict. A local bishop
will be reluctant to lose favor or
the possibility of future rewards
from Rome. The local bishop’s
ability to reward the Pope is not as
great, but the Pope has incentive
to see that the local bishop
continues to provide financial
contributions and a favorable
picture of Rome in the local
church. This gives the periphery
some influence over the center.
The most likely forms of
remuneration to come from either
side are public expressions of
praise and agreement.
How has Rome remunerated
Hunthausen in the past? Are any
remunerations from Rome to
Hunthausen being applied or in
the offing in the present? Does
Hunthausen appear to have
ambitions for higher office or
closer ties to Rome? How has
Hunthausen remunerated the
Holy See in the past (has Seattle
been a key financial contributor)?
What would Rome like to see
from Hunthausen at the time of
the conflict and in the time
beyond it? To what extent does
Rome confer visibility and
prestige on Hunthausen? To what
extent does Hunthausen praise
and support the Pope and his
causes?
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The Pope can coerce a local bishop
by criticizing him, investigating
him (apostolic visitation), limiting
his powers (taking faculties away),
withholding reward, silencing him,
removing him from office,
reassigning him and
excommunicating him from the
Church. He can also employ
coercion by (explicitly or
implicitly) threatening any of the
above actions.
Local bishops do not enjoy similar,
legally sanctioned means for
penalizing the Pope, but they have
the opportunity to coerce Rome by
taking actions (or threatening to
take actions) that embarrass Rome,
limit its resourcefulness or
jeopardize its relationship to the
local church.
In center-periphery conflict, Rome
is likely to draw on its wide
assortment of coercive powers to
try to bring about compliance
from the periphery party. We
should expect that it will do so,
however, in ways that minimize
the appearance of heavy-
handedness. (In other words,
Rome will want the coercion to
appear legitimate and respectful of
rightful freedoms of the
periphery.)
The local bishop is likely to
employ significantly more limited
tools of coercion, in particular the
threat of non-cooperation and of
bringing embarrassment to Rome.
Coercive kinds of criticism may
be carried out by surrogates
representing both parties to the
conflict.
Did Rome (the Pope) apply
specific kinds of observable
sanctions against Hunthausen,
and if so, which? Did Hunthausen
sanction Rome, and if so, how?
Did the threat of imposing
penalties serve the conflict
handling strategy of either side?
What techniques were used to
make the imposition of penalties
more acceptable to the other party
and to outside observers?
4.
 S
oc
ia
l P
ow
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Social power focuses on needs for
belonging and acceptance. Bishops
are heavily conditioned to feel
attached to and protective of the
Church. Some bishops may be
more oriented toward the center
(“Romanized”) than others. As a
reflection of their socialization, we
can expect bishops to manage
intraecclesial tensions through the
use of familiar structures of
engagement (Church laws, chain of
command, communications
protocols, recognizable forms of
“common sense”), courtesy
(deferential language, indirectness,
euphemisms, etc.) and techniques
of extenuation (silence, secrecy,
limits to access). At times, a party
may find advantage in forgoing
social expectations (by breaking
from politeness or secrecy, for
example).
The existing social conventions in
the Church favor those who have
the most power according to the
conventions. In center-periphery
conflict, this means that the more
powerful center party has a
stronger incentive to maintain the
existing social norms and the
periphery may have more reason
to abandon or challenge such
norms (in order to gain more
power; but NB, such activity
brings great risk for the periphery
party, and so we should not expect
this choice to be made lightly). In
center-periphery conflict, we can
expect, therefore, that both parties
will use familiar structures of
engagement and standard forms of
politeness and will pursue their
disagreements quietly (secretly,
politely) in order to keep up their
own appearance and that of the
Church. Presumably the periphery
party will be the first to break
from the prevailing social
expectations (by offering open
criticism, departures from secrecy,
etc.).
How “Romanized” do each of the
conflict participants appear to be
(by virtue of their education, ties
to the Vatican, theology, etc.),
and does this prove to be an
advantage? Do the center and
periphery parties apply the
expected forms of conflict
handling (familiar structures of
engagement, courtesy techniques
of extenuation), and if so, how
does this advantage or
disadvantage them? Does either
party forgo social expectations in
the conflict handling at any point?
If so, how (who goes first), and
what is the result? Do
membership factions (within or
without the Church) play a role in
the conflict handling, and if so,
how? Are the center or periphery
party able to apply social pressure
by appealing to outside groups?
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The center and periphery parties
can be expected to conform to the
laws of the Church and to apply the
powers legally entrusted to them.
The papacy has legal jurisdiction
over the world’s particular
churches and can force compliance
(through threat or application of
sanctions) as necessary.  . The
periphery party has no recourse of
appeal to a decision of the Holy
See: in Church disputes, the Holy
See legally holds the ultimate
powers of legislation, enforcement
and judgment. The center party can
enhance its advantage in contested
matters by entrusting their
handling to opaque bureaucratic
processes that the center controls.
To advance its own position, the
periphery party can attempt to
work cleverly within the existing
system (through tactics of
argumentation and delay, direct
appeals to the Pope, or appeal to
other legal standards recognized
within the Church), but it is
unlikely to bring change to the
system itself in the short run.
Alternatively, the periphery party
may appeal to legal powers and
traditions existing outside the
Church.
We can expect that the center
party will attempt to handle
center-periphery conflicts quietly
and at low cost, by applying the
legal means at its disposal. This
suggests that it will try to deal
with contested matters behind the
scenes using existing offices and
procedures of the Church
bureaucracy. Presumably the
center party will apply legal
penalties to the periphery party in
an ascending order of severity, as
necessary, to gain compliance. We
can expect that the periphery party
will attempt to work within the
legal structure of the Church to
advance its own position (through
argumentation, recruitment of
well-placed allies, tactics of delay
and bureaucratic manipulation)
before it makes appeal – in the
face of the failure of the above-
named efforts – to extraecclesial
sources of legal authority.
Which legal powers does Rome
apply in its conflict with
Hunthausen (commands,
bureaucratic processes, sanctions,
surveillance, etc.)? Which
representatives of the Holy See
apply these powers, and what is
their legal status (curial officials,
nuncios, appointees)? Does Rome
try to contain the conflict entirely
within its bureaucratic apparatus?
Do applied penalties increase
progressively in accord with a
need to gain compliance? Which
legal powers does Hunthausen
apply? Which forums for legal
contestation apply (courts,
bureaucratic offices, informal
private settings,  public
gatherings)? Which sorts of legal
arguments do both sides advance?
How does Hunthausen attempt to
advance his cause within the
existing legal system? Does he
appeal to extraecclesial sources of
legal authority, and if so, which
and how? Is the expectation of
great legal advantage for the
center-party born out in the
Rome-Hunthausen exchanges?
Why or why not?
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Traditional power has to do with
ingrained habits of thought and
practice. Traditions may be
actively reinforced by symbolic
invocation and applications in
practice. One also finds a passive
form of support for traditions in the
choice not to challenge the
traditions. Members of the
hierarchy have powers which are
bestowed to them through tradition
(they are understood to be
successors to the apostles and to
have standard powers of leadership
that have been recognized over
time). Thus, they have a vested
interest in maintaining certain
traditions. An ongoing tension in
the Church concerns whether the
Church’s “Tradition” is one or
pluralistic. The means for applying
traditional power may be verbal
(preaching, teaching, giving
orders) or nonverbal (as in certain
liturgical acts, choices of setting
and attire, uses of body language,
etc.). Church leaders may resist
certain traditions of thought or
practice for various reasons
(including to increase their own
power), but normally we should
expect them to point to a particular
strand of tradition as justification
for doing so, since respect for
tradition is a central aspect of life
in the Catholic Church.
Tradition favors the primacy of
the papacy in the Catholic Church.
Thus, we should expect to find
strong support within the Holy See
for doing things in the Church as
they have been done in the past.
Local bishops are also well served
by conservatism in Church
matters, so we should expect the
periphery party, too, to challenge
the status quo only reluctantly.
One difference we can anticipate
in center-periphery conflict is a
greater inclination for the center
party to emphasize the unicity of
Church tradition and a greater
inclination for the periphery party
to emphasize notions of plurality
(allowing for diversity and shared
leadership within the Church).
Again, challenges to tradition will
be made on the basis of references
to tradition.
Do representatives of the Holy
See emphasize the unicity of
tradition, and if so, how (words,
actions)? Do any representatives
of the Holy See actively
challenge existing traditions, and
if so, which and how? Does
Hunthausen argue for a pluralistic
view of Church tradition? If so,
does he appeal to traditional
concepts when doing so?
(Which?) In which forums do
communications take place (at the
Vatican, in public or private
meetings, during liturgies, in
correspondence, during ad limina
or pastoral visits, etc.)? How do
the conflict parties position
themselves (their identity, their
relationship to the Church)
through their employment of
religious language (images of
God, references to the Church,
invocations of Church teaching or
theology)?
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Church leaders may apply their
own expertise (grounded in
education, experience or practical
competence) or command
employments of expert power by
others (advisers, theologians,
canon lawyers). The key to the
effectiveness of expert power is
that one be perceived to know
more (be more competent) than
another party. Bishops (and
especially bishops closely
associated with Rome) will be
assumed to be experts on various
aspects of Church life (theology,
Church law, etc.). But the
perception that one is an “expert”
can also have a down side: elitist
connotations associated with
expertise can repel some persons or
groups. Thus, it is possible to paint
one’s opponent as an expert in a
negative way and to argue that it is
better to be good than to be smart.
The center party will
automatically enjoy an advantage
in perceptions of its expertise in
many Church matters (especially
in disputed matters of Church
teaching or canon law). The center
party can also call on a multitude
of highly-placed experts in support
of its positions on matters of
Church teaching or governance.
The local bishop will be presumed
by many to have a superior
knowledge of conditions within
his own local church and will be
assumed to be closer to the people.
In center-periphery conflict we
can expect that the center party
will operate on the assumption of
its superior knowledge in Church
matters, and that the periphery
party will counter by emphasizing
its own superior awareness of
people’s  everyday experience,
especially in the local church in
question (perhaps even to the
point of fostering negative feelings
concerning Vatican “experts”).
Does Rome demonstrate its
expertise in obvious ways? If so,
how and in which domains? Does
Rome call upon experts to help
make the case on its behalf?
(Who and how?) Does
Hunthausen presents himself as
an expert of some kind, and if so,
what kind of expert and how does
he do this? Does Hunthausen
foster feelings of mistrust toward
experts on the center party side?
If so, how does he do this, and to
what effect?
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Charismatic power may emanate
directly from a person or may be
routinized in an office. Bishops, by
virtue of their office, enjoy high
levels of routinized (transferable)
charismatic power (mystique and
authority that come from, among
other things, their traditional link
to the apostles, their right to confer
sacraments, the symbolic trappings
of their office, their powers of
Church governance). Beyond this,
they may also enjoy some level of
personal charisma, which they can
apply to advantage (embodied in
traits such as eloquence, personal
strength, integrity, etc.).
The center party enjoys a higher
level of routinized charismatic
power than does the periphery
party, and this will likely work to
its advantage in center-periphery
conflict. If mystique surrounds the
office of a local bishop, it is much
more so the case of the office of
Pope, who is understood to be the
successor to Peter and able to
speak infallibly on questions of
faith and morals. Moreover, while
there are thousands of bishops
around the world, there is only one
Pope, and he carries out his duties
amid the magnificence of Rome.
In addition the routinized charisma
of the papal office commands
significant levels of respect around
the world, whereas a bishop’s
mystique will know its strongest
effects within the bishop’s own
diocese. An uncertainty in center-
periphery conflict handling is how
much personal (nontransferable)
charisma the party representatives
possess and are willing to apply in
the conflict.  Personal charisma
can carry one a long way in
conflict. If the local bishop is
highly charismatic, this may serve
him well in the conflict handling
(assuming of course his own
personal charisma is not offset by
the Pope’s or that of some other
center party representative).
How do the center and periphery
parties apply the routinized
charisma they possess, and to
what effect? Does Pope John Paul
II employ his own personal
charisma within the conflict, and
if so, how? Do any other Vatican
representatives try to apply their
own personal charisma in the
conflict handling, and if so, how?
How much personal charisma
does Hunthausen show, and how
does this contribute to his conflict
handling?
TABLE 2.5
These descriptions bring to a close my account of key aspects of the internal arrangement of
the Church organization. To review: the chapter survey has included an introduction of roles
within the hierarchy, a definition of organization, a classification of the Church as a type of
organization, a presentation of organizational goals of the Church, a look at Church resources
(both human and material), and an analysis of the means of coordination and control whereby
Church leaders (members of the hierarchy) direct resources toward the achievement of the
designated goals. The purpose of this chapter has been to gain insight into organizational
factors (structures, pressures) that will be relevant to the management of center-periphery
conflict. The discernments articulated here serve to sensitize the reading of the Rome-
Hunthausen, presented hereafter in chapters six to eight.
Before proceeding to the consideration of the case, however, there is more theoretical
(sensitising) ground to be covered. Organizations, and organizational leadership conflicts, do
not function in a vacuum. They must be appreciated in societal context. Therefore I turn now
to an assessment of the societal pressures that have direct bearing on the Church organization
and on Church center-periphery conflicts.
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CHAPTER THREE
CENTER-PERIPHERY CONFLICT IN SOCIETAL CONTEXT
3.1 Points of Orientation
The choice of coping strategies in center-periphery conflict will reflect the societal as well as
the organizational context. Since the Church is a global organization, we need to see it in the
fullness of the context that is the modern world. This is, needless to say, an imposing task.
While it cannot be achieved comprehensively here, it is possible to highlight some especially
relevant aspects of the societal context which are likely to affect how members of the
hierarchy conduct themselves in center-periphery conflict. In this chapter I pursue three main
questions:
(1) What attitudes do the hierarchy bring to worldly engagement?
(2) What characteristics of the modern world are especially relevant for leadership of the
Church?
(3) What do the answers to the two previous questions imply for the handling of center-
periphery conflict?
The answers to these questions should provide us with a fuller sense of how the Church
engages the world and a clearer set of expectations about the conduct of center-periphery
conflict.
I understand organizations to be “open systems” (cf. Weverbergh 1992, Likert 1967) wherein
resources are drawn from the environment and products are released into the environment.
Obviously not all of the goods (“products”) that the Church produces are tangible and
quantifiable, though some are (e.g., Church buildings, schools, hospitals, and services
rendered through these facilities; Christians themselves can also be considered, though the
usage is crude, to be “products” sent forth into the environment). But the open systems lens is
useful for avoiding the temptation to analyze organizations independently of these processes
of environmental interchange.
Parsons, working from this same perspective, helps us to see more clearly the interchange
between an organization and its environment. He perceives organizations to be subsystems of
society that contribute to the functioning of society (Thung 1976, Parsons 1959). Parsons
well-known AGIL typology categorizes organizations according to the functions they carry
out in society. Organizations focused on economic production (e.g., businesses) primarily
fulfill Adaptation functions. Organizations which are oriented to political goals and exercise
power in the political sphere (e.g., governmental organs, credit banks) are especially oriented
toward Goal achievement functions. Organizations that adjust conflicts and facilitate
cooperation for the sake of maintaining institutionalized roles and functioning (e.g., courts,
political parties) primarily serve Integrative functions. Cultural and educational organizations
(e.g., churches and schools) are mostly ordered to the maintenance of patterns of social
interaction. As such they fulfill a Latency function. All organizations carry out all of these
functions in some degree, but the accent varies sharply with organizational type (Thung 1976,
47-48. See Van der Ven’s 1996, 63-83 use of Mintzberg 1979 for a further application (AGIL
/ LIGA) of Parson’s typology to the Church).
78
An important contribution from Parsons’ perspective to our own understanding is that the
exchange between Church and society is not simply a one-way exchange, wherein the Church
seeks to manipulate its social environment for the sake of furthering its own ends. Society,
too, (if I may speak of the social environment as a single entity; perhaps it is better to speak of
other groups and individuals within society) engages the Church and draws benefits from the
Church’s presence, while feeling the effects of the Church’s activity in myriad ways. In
Parsons’ (stability oriented) scheme, the Church serves as a source of social stability and
meaning-provision within the world. This role gives the Church influence even with those
who stand outside its membership. But the Church is only one organizational system among
others in the social environment. These other systems may have interests that are either
compatible or in competition with those of the Church (Thung 1976, 113). Only in the context
of this total, dynamic interplay can we properly discern the opportunities and challenges that
spur the Church as it pursues its mission. I will now consider a range of attitudes which have
informed the hierarchy’s management of the Church’s progress within its social environment.
Thereafter I will offer some commentary on the type of environment wherein the Church
finds itself.
3.2 The Hierarchy’s Attitudes Toward Worldly Engagement
Like other organizations, the Church is influenced by its environment, but also has influence
on its environment (McGuire 1997, 160; Thung 1976, 111-114; Safranski 1985, 1-2).
Analyzing these patterns of interaction is complicated because the Church is a complex entity
changing over time, and its social context is still larger, more complex, and also changing.
Thus far we have accumulated data revealing aspects of the Church’s internal functioning.
Now we direct our attention to the ways the Church engages the human culture that contains
it. Considering the diversity of cultures within which the Church functions, this is no easy
task. But we can at least depict the modern societal context in broad strokes, and see the
Church’s engagement of human society in an ongoing diachronic perspective.
Historically, the Church has perceived its engagement with “this world” (Robinson 1977, 13-
29) with marked ambivalence. Citing the creation account of Genesis 1:1-2:3, the Church has
understood the world to be God’s creation which he saw to be “good.” But scripture also
describes the “fall” (Genesis 3), a term that through subsequent theological development has
come to signify the world’s estrangement from God. According to Church teaching, Christ’s
intervention in the world (symbolized by his cross and resurrection) overcomes this
estrangement. Through Christ the world is restored to rightful relationship to God.
Nonetheless, until final establishment of  “a new heaven and new earth,” the world remains a
sinful and dangerous place. Hence, while affirming that “God so loved the world that he gave
his only Son” (John 3:16), the New Testament also offers warnings about the world (“Do not
love the world” -- 1 John 2:15; “The whole world is under the power of the evil one” -- 1 John
5:19; cf. Robinson 1977, 22). Taking up Jesus’ charge to “make disciples of all nations”
(Matthew 28:19) and to be his witnesses “to the ends of the earth” (Acts 1:8), the Church has
conceived itself to be, simultaneously, of the world, in opposition to the world and sent to the
world. More recently, especially since the Second Vatican Council, it has also understood the
world to be the place where God’s presence is active even outside of the Church (cf. the
doctrine of Missio Dei).
In practice, the Church has sought to make use of the potentiality it has found in its social
environment. Thus it has proclaimed its gospel message to Christians and non-Christians
alike, employing existing languages and techniques of persuasion, prevailing organizational
strategies and other material and non-material resources. It has done so from positions of
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social advantage and disadvantage, with neither stance proving unproblematic for the
Church’s mission. As the Church has sought to bring all people into the fullness of union with
God, it has at times found itself in social contexts that have opposed the Church organization
(as in the Church’s early struggle with the Jewish leadership and the Roman government in
Palestine) and at other times in social contexts that have actively promoted the Church
organization (as in the centuries of Christendom). (Thung 1976, 111, following Thompson
and McEwen 1958, envisions a continuum along which the Church dominates or is dominated
by its environment.) Cultural resistance has often, paradoxically, served to enhance the
Church’s “mission effectiveness.” In the old saying, the blood of martyrs is the seed of the
Church. Courage demonstrated by Church participants in times of persecution has proven to
be a compelling example for those inside and outside the Church: impressed by the heroic
witness, many have been drawn to the Church and established deep(er) commitments to it. In
reverse fashion, and also paradoxically, cultural endorsements of the Church, while normally
welcomed by the Church leadership (and membership) have increased Church membership
over the centuries, but sometimes at the expense of deep internal commitments. When many
cultural advantages accompany Church membership, it is not surprising that some will join
the Church for the sake of realizing social (rather than expressly religious) goals. Possessing
the power to dominate the social environment has also brought temptations of complacency
and malfeasance to the Church at times (as in the Inquisition, the pre-Reformation selling of
indulgences, evangelization by force in Latin America, etc.).
These historical examples demonstrate that the Church’s effort to achieve its organizational
goals (see sections 2.4.2, 2.4.2.1 and 2.4.2.2, above) has manifested a variety of stances
toward the world it finds itself in, and in particular toward persons, practices and beliefs
standing outside the Church. In order to clarify the range of possible stances Church members
may adopt in regard to perspectives arising independently of the Church (“worldly”
perspectives), I present the following scheme of ideal types, sketched for this occasion. This
scheme distinguishes a set of options available to members of the hierarchy as they guide the
Church in its worldly context.
Stances of Openness to Church and World:
A Range of Positions Available to the Hierarchy
Change Church according to world Change world according to Church
   -2 -1 0 +1 +2
Radical Liberal Centrist       Conservative    Reactionary
    (Radical)
Openness to Openness to Openness to       Openness to     Openness to
world always world often world sometimes       world rarely     world never
improves improves improves        improves      improves
Church (makes Church Church        Church      Church
Church redundant)
Action: Action: Action:         Action :      Action :
Flee Church; Reform Church Dialogue         Reform world      Flee world;
Overcome Church      Overcome
     world
FIGURE 3.1
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By “world” in this scheme, I mean realities of earthly life which the Church does not control.
This draws on the old pejorative meaning of world, whereby Church and world stand
opposed, but I make use of this meaning for clarity of contrast only. I do not hold the view
that the Church and its worldly context can in fact be distinguished in a tidy way.  The
essential question here is, How open are members of the hierarchy to systems of thought and
practice which contrast with the usual systems of thought and practice of the Church, and
how is their level of openness manifested in their own leadership? The positions I identify are
placed along a spectrum. As one moves to the left, non-Catholic thought and practice is
increasingly appreciated and the willingness to change the Church is increasingly plausible.
As one moves to the right, non-Catholic thought is increasingly perceived as threatening and
the openness to changing the Church is ever smaller. A description of each position on the
spectrum follows. (Note: the terms used to identify the five positions on the spectrum above --
radical, liberal, centrist, conservative and reactionary -- appear commonly in discussions of
Church and secular politics, and their meanings vary with context. I wish to signify with these
terms only the ideas expressed in the diagram above and in the descriptions below, and
nothing further. They are, for my own purposes, primarily handy markers for distinction. The
term “radical,” as commonly used, could fit at both ends of the spectrum I have constructed.
For the sake of clarity, I assign it to the left end, as distinct from “reactionary” on the right.)
The radical position bespeaks a deep distrust of the Church and a fully committed openness
to the extraecclesial world. According to this stance, secular wisdom normally surpasses that
possessed by the Church. This is in fact an exit position from the Church organization or a
position of very marginal membership. It may also be the position of those who wish to
undertake revolution in regard to the Church, or pursue its abolition. It is not a position we
can expect to find among members of the hierarchy.
The liberal position characterizes those who stand committed to the Church organization
while training their gaze beyond it in search of insights that can improve the Church. Persons
adopting this stance believe that the extraecclesial world has much to offer the Church.
Though they show little inclination to leave the Church, they are prepared to admit the
Church’s shortcomings and to substantially remake the Church in light of “worldly”
discoveries. One can find members of the hierarchy who hold this viewpoint, but they are
rare.
The centrist position describes Church members who are decisively committed to the Church
but are open to dialogue with the world. Such persons operate from an assumption of the
Church’s correctness but are willing to concede that occasionally the Church falters and at
times wisdom drawn from outside the Church can benefit the Church. Statements of principle
are more likely to emerge from this position than concrete actions undertaken to transform the
Church, but concrete change is not ruled out. It is likely that many bishops will fall in this
category.
The conservative position foresees little chance that the incorporation of extraecclesial
perspectives will benefit the Church. Persons operating from this position are reluctant to
search out and apply to the Church insights not traditionally accepted by the Church: on the
contrary, insights not traditional to the Church are typically perceived to pose a threat to the
Church. Thus, in general (some exceptions may be allowed), changing the Church according
to the wisdom of the (extraecclesial) world is not acceptable. Many bishops will fall in this
category.
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The reactionary position is the position of those who find the Church to be fully self-
sufficient (a societas perfecta) and the extraecclesial world to be wholly insufficient. For
these persons, the separation between the Church and the world outside its borders must be
maintained at all costs. Contact with non-Catholic viewpoints is conscientiously avoided. The
only options for the Church are combat against the world (overcoming it through material or
spiritual efforts) or total disengagement from (flight from) the extraecclesial world. Because
of the extremity of this position and its impracticality, we can expect it to be only very rarely
adopted by bishops.
Having envisioned a range of options for Church member openness and responsiveness to
Church and world, the question remains, What is the hierarchy’s official perspective
(position) on this matter? Though this question cannot be answered definitively, I do believe
that Church teaching articulated at the Second Vatican Council goes a long way toward
providing an answer.
3.2.1 Gaudium et Spes Reveals Operative Attitudes Toward Worldly Engagement
In my earlier discussion of the organizational structure of the Church, I consulted the Vatican
II document Lumen Gentium, which sheds light on how the hierarchy understands the
Church’s internal functioning. I now turn to another document of the Council, Gaudium et
Spes (otherwise known as the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World), for
its valuable articulation of how the hierarchy views the Church’s functioning in relation its
global social context. This document, promulgated in 1965, has been exceptionally influential
in the thinking of the post-Vatican II Church as the result of its timeliness, its authoritative
status (it is a teaching of the entire college of bishops in union with the Pope), and its
comprehensive treatment of a topic that had not previously been addressed in a separate
document at a prior Ecumenical Council (Campion 1966, 183-184).
Gaudium et Spes, as much as or more than any other document, expresses the official stance
of the conciliar / post-conciliar Church in regard to the modern world. It is not the only or
most recent authoritative statement which applies (subsequent papal encyclicals, curial
documents, bishops’ conference letters, and the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1992)
have also taken up this topic, often with apparently less openness to the world), and many
positions taken in Gaudium et Spes were contested both during and after the Council. But
Gaudium et Spes does reflect attitudes toward worldly engagement which have remained
relevant and officially sanctioned within the Church throughout the post-conciliar era.
Examination of the document gives  us a glimpse of how positions associated with the ideal
types identified above are conceptualized and, at the same time, embraced or rejected in
hierarchical discourse. Moreover, the document provides justification for the view that the
hierarchy’s attitudes toward worldly engagement tend to fall within the centrist or
conservative positions, and occasionally within the liberal position, but rarely within the
radical or reactionary positions.
On the whole, Gaudium et Spes reveals a centrist stance toward extraecclesial thought and
practice. The emphasis in the text on openness to the world (“earthly matters and the concerns
of faith derive from the same God” (36)) is persistently coupled with a presumption of the
Church’s own privileged insightfulness. Thus, while God is acknowledged to be present in the
fullness of human activity (and not simply in the witness of the Church), and while the
obligation to delve into worldly affairs and to engage contrary viewpoints (92) is affirmed, the
Church retains the authority and responsibility to distinguish “earthly progress” from “the
growth of God’s kingdom” (39).
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At times, the document’s prioritization of reading the “signs of the times” gives the document
a liberal cast – as in the observation that the Church seeks “to uncover, cherish, and ennoble
all that is true, good, and beautiful in the human community” (76). But I would argue that the
document only leans in this direction, while remaining firmly in the centrist, and occasionally
in the conservative, position. The outward gaze is ordinarily justified by the intention to learn
how the Church can better serve humanity, but not vice-versa. The possibility of restructuring
Church thought and practice according to extraecclesial perspectives is not really considered.
Hence, the document discusses the Church’s role to serve the human community by:
witnessing to the truth (3); offering assistance in fostering brotherhood (3); responding to
perennial questions about this life and the life to come (4); offering recommendations for
building up human society (11); helping the human community to form a correct conscience
(16); and promoting the pursuit of authentic freedom (17). But contrary examples are rare.
Worth noting are the document’s recognition that misconceptions and sinfulness exist within
the ranks of the Church (19, 43); its acknowledgement that the Church depends on forms of
expertise arising outside of the Church as it seeks to penetrate the truth (44); and its
declaration that the Church’s conversational partners should include all persons, holding all
manner of divergent viewpoints (92).
In one sense, evidence of conservative positioning can be found throughout Gaudium et Spes,
especially in its presumption that the Church understands those outside the Church better than
they do themselves, and in its express intention to reform the world according to Churchly
understandings. The secular world, for all of its knowledge and resourcefulness, will never
obtain a truly coherent, comprehensive and deep insight into reality so long as it excludes
Christ from its comprehending. Modern technologies and institutions will always be lacking
so long as they fail to perceive that reality itself is God’s ongoing act of creation and that
humanity finds its dignity and fulfillment through its being created in the image of God. In
keeping with this viewpoint, Gaudium et Spes again and again makes distinctions between
concepts that are partially grasped within a secular framework and more perfectly grasped
within a Catholic framework. One sees this sort of distinction at work when the Council
fathers write that the Church depicts “man’s true situation” (12) and “directs the mind to
solutions that are fully human” (11) (my emphasis). In other words, Gaudium et Spes
frequently mixes signs of its attentiveness to secular developments with (polite) expressions
of disapproval.
But to truly embody the conservative position as I have defined it above, the document would
need to show a decided wariness of the extraecclesial world: the world outside the Church
would need to be presented as more threatening and less promising. That simply is not the
case in Gaudium et Spes. The concern here lies with threats to humankind -- war, slavery,
hunger, poverty, illiteracy, social strife (4) -- which the Church can help to address, not with
threats posed to the Church by engagement with the world.
For the same reason, Gaudium et Spes cannot be said to articulate a reactionary viewpoint.
The reactionary intention to disengage from the (extraecclesial) world is expressly rejected.
(See, for example, articles 34, 39, 40, 43, 62, 93.) On the contrary, Christians are “stringently
bound” to attend to this world and the welfare of their fellows persons (34).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the option of radical openness to the world is also
rejected. No inclination to flee the Church in search of a better world shows itself, nor are
there any outright admissions that superior forms of thought and practice drawn from outside
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the Church should be used to remake the Church.
In my opinion, the range of attitudes toward worldly engagement discernible in Gaudium et
Spes reflects a range of attitudes acceptable within the hierarchy in the conciliar and post-
conciliar periods. I take the document to be a form of empirical evidence of the hierarchy’s
way of thinking at a particular time (over 85% of the world’s bishops approved its
promulgation in 1965) and a statement of norms intended to inform post-conciliar decision-
making. As such, it provides a general indicator of attitudes likely to be operable in center-
periphery conflict in the decades immediately following the Council (at least through the time
of the Hunthausen case, I would hold, since Hunthausen, Cardinal Ratzinger and Pope John
Paul II were all present at the Council). Admittedly, positions taken during the Council have
been contested in the post-conciliar years (see Kasper 1989, 166-167; Dulles 1988, 19), but
attitudes expressed within this contestation have tended to remain within the range of
acceptable attitudes toward worldly engagement (that is, according to the centrist,
conservative or liberal positions, but not the radical or reactionary positions) suggested by
Gaudium et Spes. (The Lefebvre case may be the exception which proves the rule. Arguably,
Lefebvre’s attempts to reverse teachings of the Council can be seen as an example of adoption
of the reactionary position. His effort was rejected by the papacy and received little support
from the rest of the hierarchy.) To sum up, then: it is my expectation that, in cases of center-
periphery in the years since the Council, one is likely to find bishops holding centrist,
conservative and, more rarely, liberal positions regarding worldly engagement, but
significantly less likely to find bishops (openly, at least) holding radical or reactionary
positions, because the Council did not endorse these latter positions.
3.2.2 Openness to the World and the Invocation of Authority
The attitudes toward worldly engagement held by participants in center-periphery conflict will
be relevant to the handling of such conflicts in several ways. Most essentially, participants’
attitudes toward the Church-world encounter will determine which sources of authority can be
called upon and which kinds of argument can be advanced in center-periphery conflict. In
conflict, it is advantageous to be able to call on sources of authority which are closer to
oneself than to the opposing party (in other words, sources of authority which one controls
and / or which are associated with one’s own position of authority). This is an important issue,
because the sources of authority which apply in center-periphery conflict are “given” only in a
limited sense (cf. Gaillardetz 1997, 26-28): to a large extent they are contested in the course
of the conflict itself. Moreover, the number of potentially relevant sources of authority
increases dramatically when the door is opened to consideration of extraecclesial sources of
authority.
Authority is largely a question of point of view. Even when agreement exists about which
authorities should be recognized (e.g., the hierarchy agrees that God’s authority is supreme),
understanding of the nature of this authority typically is pluriform (thus, one bishop sees the
God of justice, while another sees the God of mercy and forgiveness). So we are left with
certain questions. Which sources of authority will be invoked when? How will they be
invoked? And how will these invocations be received by the opposing party?
What is crucial in the perspective of Vatican II as articulated in Gaudium et Spes is the
openness to the possibility of recognizing extraecclesial sources of authority. By suggesting
that the Church can learn from experience taking place outside its walls, the hierarchy has
conceded the relevance of extraecclesial points of reference: other systems of thought and
practice (science and technology, other religions, cultural systems, etc.) have something to
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offer the Church. Though the door to this possibility is opened cautiously, it is nonetheless
opened: one would be hard pressed to interpret Gaudium et Spes otherwise.
The implication for the handling of intrahierarchical conflicts is that a range of intraecclesial
and extraecclesial concepts of authority can be drawn upon to support one’s position. Even
two parties referring to the same object and using only descriptors endorsed by the Church
will not necessarily characterize the object in the same way. Hence: God may be invoked as
sovereign (“Almighty God,” “the Lord”) but also as suffering servant; the Church may be
described as a “fortress” or as “a pilgrim people;” and the world may be presented in terms of
praise or rejection.
In regard to center-periphery conflict handling, we can expect to find struggles over
definition. It is highly likely, in the first place, that both parties to center-periphery conflict
will attempt to justify their position in the conflict with reference to sources of authority
traditionally recognized in the Church (God, the Bible, Church teaching, etc.). Second, given
the multiple sources of authority (recognized by the Church) that can be invoked, and the
various ways each of these sources of authority can be called upon, we can expect that such
invocations will be put to strategic use in center-periphery conflict and will be matters under
contestation. Third, we should also not be surprised to see the invocation of extraecclesial
sources of authority, especially when one party (most likely the periphery party) is having
difficulty advancing its position with more usual kinds of Church-recognized authority. (In
other words, if a party is losing the conflict debate when it is limited to an ecclesiastical
reference frame, it can attempt to expand the reference frame to include secular perspectives
that may be more advantageous to its position.) I see greater likelihood for the periphery party
to look for extraecclesial authoritative supports simply because the center party has a
significant advantage when it comes to calling upon sources of authority that are strongly
associated with the Church. The center party normally (formally) gets the last word on how
God, the Bible, Church teaching, etc. are to be understood by Catholics. Given an
unpromising outcome in such an exchange, the periphery party may well find reason to look
for other grounds on which to make its case.
3.3 Characteristics of the Modern World Pertinent to Church Leadership
The Church hierarchy leads the Church organization in the societal context which is the
modern world. Having identified a possible range of stances toward the “world” that we can
expect members of the hierarchy to adopt, we are left with the question: What sort of world is
it that Church leaders and the Church itself encounter empirically? My assumption is that the
handling of center-periphery conflict is conditioned by the societal as well as the
organizational culture. Therefore, it is necessary to spend time considering which aspects of
the societal culture appear to be especially pertinent to the handling of center-periphery
conflicts.
Gaudium et Spes itself, of course, highlights certain characteristics of the modern world. The
list of characteristics below is culled from the document. It provides an introduction to aspects
of modernity which the Church hierarchy has found to be relevant to its own mission. (Article
numbers appear in parentheses.)
Characteristics of the Modern World Noted in Gaudium et Spes
1. Profound and rapid change in the world of human experience (4, 5)
2. The extension of human power through scientific advances and technology (4, 33)
3. A newfound abundance of wealth, resources and economic power (4) (coupled with the
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persistence of hunger, poverty, illiteracy)
4. An unprecedented awareness of freedom (4)
5. New forms of social and psychological slavery (4)
6. A vivid sense of global human interdependence (4, 23, 33, 84)
7. Continuing political, social, economic, racial and ideological disputes (4)
8. The threat of totally-destructive war (4, 79, 80); dependence on arms stockpiling for war
deterrence (81)
9. A growing exchange of ideas among peoples (4, 54) alongside problems of communication
(4)
10. A search for human betterment that excludes spiritual concerns from the process (4);
“spiritual agitation” (4-5)
11. A failure to adjust permanent values to new situations (4)
12. Uneasiness as people are buffeted between hope and anxiety (4)
13. A scientific and technological orientation (5)
14. The extension of human self-knowledge through history, biology, psychology, social
sciences (5)
15. The replacement of a “rather static” concept of reality with a “more dynamic,
evolutionary” one (5)
16. Changes in traditional local communities such as families, clans, tribes, villages (6)
17. Spreading industrialization (6, 54) causing changes in economic and social conditions
18. Urbanization (6, 54)
19. New and more efficient media of social communication (6)
20. Migration leading to social change (6)
21. Social ties that fail to produce positive personal and social developments (6)
22. The growing social influence of young people (7)
23. Dissatisfaction with existing institutions, laws and modes of thinking (7)
24. Newly critical religious thinking leading to the rejection of magical or superstitious
practices (7)
25. The abandonment of religious practice by growing numbers of people (7)
26. An inability to synthesize modern practical thought -- a loss of a comprehensive view of
reality (8)
27. A concern for practicality and efficiency at the expense of moral demands (8)
28. Conflicts resulting from social, racial, economic inequalities (8)
29. A universal moral belief that cultural benefits can and should be extended to all (9)
30. An ever-increasing number of people raising questions about the meaning of human life
(10)
31. Widespread atheism (“among the most serious problems of this age”) (19) often in
systematic forms (20, 34)
32. New forms of (mass-) culture (20, 54); widely uniform customs and usages (54)
33. Progress in the methods of production and in the exchange of goods and services (63)
34. A growing divide between economically advantaged and disadvantaged countries (63, 66)
35. Increasing diversification of forms of private ownership and dominion over material goods
(71)
36. Advocacy for protection of personal rights through political-juridical order (73)
37. Problems stemming from rapid population growth (87).
BOX 3.2
These characteristics of the modern world identified in Gaudium et Spes can be organized
according to four main themes. First, there is an unprecedented quality to life in the modern
world: the extent and rapidity of scientific, social, economic, political and cultural change
makes this age different from those that have preceded it. Second, secular scientific thinking
and techniques have been especially important contributors to the modern world’s wondrous
advantages (increased knowledge, resources, power and communications capacities; more
egalitarian and participative social-political structures) and dangers (the threat of totally-
destructive war, new forms of social and psychological slavery, rapid population growth,
social unrest, moral-spiritual dislocation). Third, the development of the human person and
human social groups through secular scientific thought and techniques (we understand
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people better through biology, psychology, sociology, etc.; we encounter one another socially
in new ways through industrialization, urbanization, migration, new communications media,
etc.) – a positive development – has sometimes come without equally intense and rapid forms
of moral and spiritual development. Fourth, as a result, a spiritual agitation characterizes
the modern age, a situation of opportunity and danger. Amid the turbulent change (old ways
of doing things no longer apply, traditional communities dissolve, trusted institutions are
displaced) humanity has lost its moorings and gives expression to its lostness in disaffection,
atheism and failures of hope.
At times, there is tension between the viewpoints expressed in Gaudium et Spes. Thus, for
example, the document speaks of the loss of a comprehensive view of reality (see no. 26
above) and of a societal concern for practicality and efficiency coming at the expense of
moral considerations (no. 27) while commending society’s advocacy of the extension of
cultural benefits to all (no. 29). It is hard to know whether this contradiction lies with the
world perceived or with the perceiver. In either case, the document reflects a recurrent tension
between the impulse to appreciate and more negatively evaluate modern conditions.
And what is the Church’s empirical response to this modern world to be? According to
Gaudium et Spes, it is to carry out the Church’s mission (Lumen Gentium’s description of the
Church as “a sacramental sign and an instrument of intimate union with God, and of the unity
of all mankind” is explicitly invoked: see article 42, but also my own discussion of the
Church’s goals in chapter two), informed by an open but critical attentiveness to what is
transpiring within the world.
3.3.1 Elaboration of the Description of the Modern World
Before considering how the handling of center-periphery conflict relates in specific ways to
the Church’s societal context, it is to our advantage to further specify that context. I have
already summarized certain themes in the Church’s perception of the modern world. These
themes can be pursued fruitfully by consulting writings of the sociologist Anthony Giddens.
Giddens’ perspective both confirms and challenges concepts of the modern world put forth by
the Church.
In works such as The Consequences of Modernity (1990) and Modernity and Self-Identity
(1991), Giddens probes the nature of modernity and its consequences for social life. For
Giddens (1991, 14-15), “modernity” refers very generally to “the institutions and modes of
behaviour established first of all in post-feudal Europe, but which in the twentieth century
increasingly have become world-historical in their impact. ‘Modernity’ can be understood as
roughly equivalent to ‘the industrialised world’, so long as it be recognised that industrialism
is not its only institutional dimension.”
Giddens is but one among several writers of recent decades who have illuminated major
aspects of modernity, and who might well serve our purpose of clarifying the empirical
societal context that contains the Church. (C. Taylor and J. Habermas present themselves as
likely alternatives.) But I am impressed by the fact that Giddens is at once influential (his
work has at times been ground-breaking) and representative in his thinking (if one compares
the overview of thinking about modernity in Van der Loo and Van Reijen 1997, one finds that
much of Giddens’ thought resonates with generally accepted findings). Moreover, Giddens is
articulate on themes that appear highly relevant to my own study, such as the modern world’s
loss of confidence in providential reason and the modern organization’s need to engage in
reflexive monitoring.
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If we take in turn each of the four themes I highlighted from Gaudium et Spes, we find that
Giddens speaks to each of those themes in his own work. (Though Giddens writes at a later
date – the two works I cite were published twenty-five years after Vatican II – his concern
with the period of modernity as a whole takes in and remains relevant to center-periphery
conflict handling in the postconciliar period.) Giddens comments on the pace, scope and
profoundness of the changes that mark the modern world (1990, 6; 1991, 16) and points to the
role of scientific thought and technology in creating this “runaway world.” Giddens also
echoes the views that science and technology have set before humanity great benefits and
great dangers (1990, 7-10) and have transformed the way people live, interact socially and
understand their humanness (1990, 112-124). Finally, Giddens shares the view that modern
people suffer from various forms of “existential anxiety” (1991, 35-69) and that traditional
communal networks and institutions which once would have helped people to manage this
anxiety have been replaced or are being replaced (cf. his concept of “disembedded relations”).
But there are differences, too, between Gidden’s account of life in the modern world and that
given by the Catholic hierarchy at Vatican II. From his later vantage point, Giddens seems to
be even more impressed by the rate and scope of change in modern life, and this is
understandable because he has had more time to observe how computer technology and other
scientific developments have revolutionized the contemporary world. Giddens is also in a
position to see better how scientific advances have created new benefits (e.g., global
information systems networks) and dangers (e.g., foreseeable ecological disasters) not
discussed in the conciliar document. In regard to the third and fourth themes, Giddens does
not make a case, as the Church does, for addressing the crises of modern life in a specifically
spiritual or religious way, but he does acknowledge that people’s loss of their bearings in
matters of faith and life philosophy amounts to a moral problem.
Additionally, there are other perspectives that emerge in Giddens’ study of modernity that do
not appear in the Vatican II account. In Gaudium et Spes one finds a healthy respect for what
Giddens refers to as “providential reason.” Providential reason is the faith, associated with the
Enlightenment period, that reason enables humankind to gain increasing knowledge and
control over its worldly environment, to the increasing benefit of humanity. The conciliar
document proposes, of course, that such reasoning will go astray to the extent that it is not
open to the wisdom that comes through faith in God. Nonetheless, the optimism concerning
the world and the potential for continuing human progress (despite the seeming disproof
offered by the two world wars) is a remarkable feature of Gaudium et Spes. Knowledge in this
context continues to function as a manageable tool. The tool may be misused, but knowledge
can potentially be harnessed for human purposes. Giddens (1991, 27), on the contrary, finds
that confidence in providential reason has been undermined and totally mistaken (following
Beck 1986). Not only is there much evidence to show that knowing more does not necessarily
make people better (more “enlightened”), but new knowledge (cf. chaos theory in physics and
deconstruction in linguistics) also has the potential to undermine the foundations on which
current knowledge is based (or even to question the possibility of “knowledge” altogether).
Thus, while language is a stabilizing force, permitting the reenactment of social practices
across generations (1991, 23), it can also be a source of fragmentation and destabilization.
For an organization such as the Church, which places a premium on the authority of tradition,
the challenges posed by these aspects of modernity are clear. At the time of the Council, the
Church saw itself as a centrally relevant institution whose language and practice needed to be
updated and aired out --  for the sake of organizational effectiveness, but also for the sake of
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faithfulness to its own tradition. Certain important aspects of tradition had come to be
neglected (e.g., episcopal collegiality, the role of the community in the celebration of the
Eucharist, the role of the laity). The Council expressed the Church leadership’s belief that
these traditional elements needed to be polished and brought into the light. But even more
fundamentally, the Council expressed the conviction that Church tradition, and the Church
itself, is a living thing in the world, and not something closed, static or already completed.
What did not seem to be up for grabs at the time of the Council was the authority of tradition
itself. Though authority was being questioned in highly public ways by the time the Council
closed -- in the form of war protests, civil rights protests, insurrections against colonial
governments, student rebellions of various kinds -- the thrust of much of this discussion
favored replacing existing orders with more just and accountable orders. As such, they may be
seen as further expressions of confidence in providential reason. But anti-institutionalism
itself (an attack on tradition-oriented bearers of authority per se) was limited to the social
fringe and had not yet found mainstream expression (as it would in the 1970’s-’80’s-’90’s
preoccupation with New Age religions that promoted spiritual searching outside of
institutions). And members of the intellectual elite had not yet been captivated by
deconstructionist theory, which holds (somewhat disingenuously) that language does not ever
truly cohere, since signs cannot be fixed to meanings. Similarly, public confidence in the
steady advance and manageability of science had not yet faced the Pandora’s box posed by
biomedical advances (consider the challenges posed by cloning, in vitro fertilization, genetic
engineering, etc).
I do not want to exaggerate the extent to which public confidence in science, reason, tradition
(even religious tradition) and institutions has been corroded. People continue to put faith in
reason, institutions and God, and to believe that human progress is possible. But we should
not overlook significant ways that the social climate has changed in the period that concerns
us in this study. Giddens is right to point out that in modernity one chooses between “possible
worlds” (1991, 29) in a non-authoritarian way (“bricolage” as task), and this has never been
more true than in recent decades. The separation of time and space (through maps and clocks
synchronized globally) and the disembedding of social institutions (lifting social relations out
of local contexts through mechanisms such as symbolic tokens -- e.g., money, diplomas,
credentials -- and expert systems) has placed modern persons in a social setting that is much
global as local. Giddens describes an ongoing “dialectic of the local and global” (1991, 22). In
premodern times one had a much easier time accepting local realities as fixed and stable
reflections of the way things are. But modern technology, communications, economic
possibilities, travel and processes of cultural mutuality and democratization have confronted
modern peoples with, quite literally, “a world of possibilities” and tremendous pressure to
consume. For much of the world’s population, personal identity is less inevitable and more a
product of choice than it ever has been. Knowing more about other cultures, religions, ways
of thought and practice, modern peoples have to consciously discern which aspects of their
own cultural-personal identity they will retain and nurture. All the while, of course, one
encounters the threat of finding no sure footing at all. It is this public that the Church has
sought to embrace and serve in its recent history. The challenge for Church leaders is
imposing. How does the Church successfully enter into this dialectic of the local and global?
How does it offer a sure place to stand for modern people without becoming fixed (calcified)
and irrelevant as an institution? How does it address the “paradox” of modern benefits which
are intrinsically and tensely related to accompanying dangers? (cf. Van der Loo and Van
Reijen 1997, 48). And how does it promote confidence in a given religious tradition when one
has a world of belief systems to choose from (including the possibility of not “believing” in
anything)?
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Before leaving Giddens, I want to call attention to one more aspect of his thought that is
especially instructive for our purposes here. Giddens perceives four institutional dimensions
of modernity: industrialism, capitalism, surveillance and the industrialization of war. Of these
four, I will comment on his notion of surveillance (cf. Foucault 1977), because it has an
especially direct bearing on Catholic intrahierarchical conflict. In Giddens view, reflexive
monitoring is constitutive of modern social life. Ours is a “risk society” (1991, 28; cf. Beck
1986), because all activities are subject to contingent happenings and entail risk (some with
potentially disastrous consequences). Science and technology have provided ever more means
for monitoring risk but this ability to monitor conditions and calculate risks has also created
an ever-more-anxious focus on risks. Modern life has come to be characterized by a
“calculative attitude,” wherein we constantly evaluate the risks associated with the open
courses of thought and action available to us. Constant informational inputs make us aware of
risks we might otherwise have ignored (in a less “wired” world). And tools for monitoring can
pose threats in and of themselves. For example, the internet that lets us better keep track of the
world also lets the world keep better track of us.
The difference between pre-modern and modern practices of human reflexivity is that “in pre-
modern civilizations reflexivity is still largely limited to the reinterpretation and clarification
of tradition” (1990, 37), but in the context of modernity this reflexivity
is introduced into the very basis of system reproduction, such that thought and
action are constantly refracted back upon one another. The routinisation of
daily life has no intrinsic connections with the past at all, save in so far as what
“was done before” happens to coincide with what can be defended in a
principled way in the light of incoming knowledge. To sanction a practice
because it is traditional will not do; tradition can be justified, but only in the
light of knowledge which is not itself authenticated by tradition. (1990, 38)
It is not just individuals who demonstrate this calculative attitude. Organizations, too, practice
reflexive monitoring and must continually face the possibility of radical doubt concerning the
organization’s choice of direction and reason to be. Giddens (1991, 16) notes that
organizations, a prototypically modern social form, are distinctive not primarily for their size
or bureaucratic character but for the reflexive monitoring that marks their awareness of
contingency. Management science is a contemporary phenomenon, whereby organizational
leaders attempt to rationally anticipate and manage risk to the advantage of the organization
(and themselves within it). This sort of monitoring includes attention to the micro-, meso- and
macro-level dynamics of the organization. Organizational leaders want to know what is
happening in individual-level exchanges that involve organizational members, but they also
want to be able to see how the organization functions internally as an organizational whole
and externally in relation to its environment. Gaining this total perspective requires constant
information gathering and assessment and a readiness to integrate useful findings into the
organization’s operations. Church leaders are no less susceptible to this tendency of
organizational reflexivity than are leaders of any other organization. It is simply the way
organizations function and survive in modern times.
To sum up, Giddens introduces several concepts which enhance our understanding of the
modern societal context which contains the Church. His heightened emphasis on the rate,
scope and profundity of change in modernity and on the social volatility following from
scientific and technical developments lends depth of perspective to the Church’s more
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confident, optimistic assessment of the modern context. His assertion that trust in providential
reason has been undermined and mistaken, leaving social fragmentation and destabilization in
its wake, sharpens our sense of the difficulty facing the Church as it carries out its mission in
the world. The authority of a tradition-based organization faces serious challenges when
tradition itself is suspect. Giddens’ commentary on the “dialectic of the local and global”
points to the need for a paradigmatic shift in thinking in the Church (which may or may not be
underway). Whereas previously the task for Rome was to link and establish a high level of
uniformity within clearly-distinct, locally-grounded local churches (this task being an
operational approach to the attainment of “unity”), now these local units are no longer local in
the sense they once were. The rest of the world intrudes upon local settings (in the form of
ideas, consumer goods, media products, travelers, immigrants, etc.) and the multitude of
localities presses upon the world (local ideas, goods, persons do not stay local: they circulate
globally). Church members’ ties to specific localities are increasingly tenuous, and an
awareness of pluriformity in the Church and in the world suffuses the Church. It is not clear
how the post-conciliar Church intends to address these problematic realities. Finally, Giddens
points to the strategy of “surveillance” practiced by organizations in modern times.
Organizations monitor conditions and calculate risks in order to survive and thrive in their
social environment. This approach serves a pressing need in the absence of confidence in
providential reason. On the one hand, the Church itself remains a standard bearer in the cause
of providential reason. Essentially its position is that, while secular forms of providential
reason (faith in humanity, faith in science) have been unmasked, the one true form of
providential reason – personal participation in the divine plan for the world – remains. So let
us get back to it. But the question remains: to what extent is this even possible (and what
shape should it take) in the modern world? This is a real question because the loss of faith in
providential reason is alive within the Church as well as outside it. Techniques of
surveillance, long practiced by Church leaders, offer options for maintaining the Church
organization as such (one can make rational calculations directed toward the perseverance and
growth of the Church), but how does this calculative attitude fit with the abandonment to God
proper to faith? Do the premises which inform the practice of surveillance contradict the
Church’s professed confidence in God’s good care of the world?
3.4 Attitude Toward Worldly Engagement As an Influence on Conflict Handling
Center-periphery conflicts are ecclesiastical events and worldly events at the same time. As
such, we can expect the choice of coping strategies in these conflicts will have much to do
with the way participants view the Church-world encounter. In section 3.2 I discussed a range
of attitudes which can serve to characterize the hierarchy’s approach to extraecclesial thought
and practice in the conciliar and post-conciliar era. Subsequently, with reference to Church
teaching promulgated at Vatican II (section 3.2.1-3.3), I stated that centrist and conservative
attitudes are most likely to be operative in center-periphery conflicts, with liberal attitudes
appearing rarely, and radical and reactionary positions appearing very rarely (since these
positions stand in tension with the officially adopted stance of a guarded openness to the
world that privileges the position of the Church). Finally, having thereafter identified some of
the characteristic features of life in the modern world, I would now like to invite consideration
of how the adoption of the above-named attitudes is likely to play into the handling of center-
periphery conflict.
3.4.1 The Radical Stance in Center-Periphery Conflict
The radical stance favors the full reconciliation of the Church to the world, or the abolition of
the Church altogether. The Church possesses truth only to the extent that it correctly
understands and correctly acts within the world. Thus the Church is to be judged according to
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worldly understandings and not the other way around. From this viewpoint the Church is not
the only or even the most highly privileged vehicle of salvation (whatever salvation means
from a worldly perspective). Rather, the Church is one system of thought and practice
(perhaps an especially compelling or helpful system) among many. The radical is constantly
faced with a need to justify his continued participation in the Church, since it is one among a
multitude of legitimate options for living a meaningful, satisfying life. Because this is by
definition a fringe position in regard to the Church, and an uncertain one in regard to
continued participation, one is unlikely to find a bishop holding this position. However, were
a bishop to in fact hold this attitude, one could easily imagine that he would soon find himself
in conflict with Rome and with others in the  Church, because this viewpoint is dangerous for
the perseverance of the institutional Church.
In center-periphery conflict, a bishop holding radical views could be expected to invoke
extraecclesial forms of authority at the expense of intraecclesial forms of authority and to
suggest that the Church’s mission must also be justifiable according to extraecclesial
standards. Because this perspective is not widely shared in the hierarchy, the radical bishop
would likely have difficulty mustering the support of other bishops. Also, the official ideology
and legal structure of the Church does not recognize this perspective. As a result, he would
have little opportunity to exercise intraecclesial forms of coercive power.
One advantage to the radical position in center-periphery conflict is that, when such views are
genuinely held, one has little to fear from the possibility of being put out of office or out of
the Church, since one recognizes other options for living a satisfying life. Thus, one can
approach the handling of the conflict fearlessly. Another advantage to the radical position is
that it will find much support from persons and groups outside the Church. This can put
pressure on the Church (and one’s opponents in particular) from without. Unfortunately for
the radical who would hope to prevail in such a conflict, it appears that extraecclesial support
does not matter nearly so much as intraecclesial support in center-periphery conflict.
Typically, the only outcome we should expect from a center-periphery conflict involving a
bishop who holds the radical viewpoint is that the bishop will be removed from the Church, or
at least removed from significant leadership responsibilities. The most interesting test case
would involve a radical Pope, since he would challenge accepted standards of thought and
practice from the position of highest power. It is hard to know what the outcome of such a
case would be.
3.4.2 The Liberal Stance in Center-Periphery Conflict
The liberal stance inclines toward modernization of the Church according to the best insights
of the world. Though an assumption of the Church’s privileged status underwrites this
position (the Church is to be preferred to other ways to God), notions that the Church is the
exclusive bearer of truth or the possibility of salvation are rejected. Moreover, the
interconnectedness of the world makes it obligatory to attend to and make use of perspectives
arising outside the Church.
The liberal’s openness to extraecclesial perspectives means that certain aspects of modernity
which could be perceived as threatening are not necessarily perceived in that way. Hence, the
global pluriformity in systems of thought and practice is likely to be viewed positively, as
more an opportunity than a danger. Similarly, uncertainties surrounding issues of authority
(What authority do traditional institutions, traditional beliefs, traditional ways of doing things
have in modern time? What new sources of authority have emerged?) can be welcomed as
promising occasions from which improved systems of thought and practice can develop. Even
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social fragmentation can be optimistically assessed as an early stage in the construction of
new social configurations, wherein local ties and territorial concerns are no longer obstacles
to cross-cultural, transglobal interconnectedness. And the progress of scientific knowledge
can be taken to be one more means through which humanity deepens its awareness of God’s
presence.
It is important to remember, however, that the liberal stance, for all its openness to other
perspectives, privileges the viewpoint of the Church. Therefore, the aspects of modernity cited
above are interpreted according to concepts familiar within Catholic tradition and they are
applied to the Church in ways designed to benefit the Church. The liberal desires the
perseverance of the Church and sees realization of that goal as dependent on the Church’s
ability to adapt to changing times. From the liberal viewpoint, change in the Church is a
necessary strategy for survival and the successful accomplishment of the Church’s goals.
Change is to be embraced purposefully and related to Catholic tradition, which is understood
to be both pluralistic and evolving.
In center-periphery conflict a strength of the liberal position is its possibility of appealing to
constituencies inside and outside the Church, because it makes use of intraecclesial and
extraecclesial perspectives. The position attracts those inside and outside the Church who
place a premium on the relevance and viability of the Church in its societal context. The
liberal stance’s openness to extraecclesial sources of authority can be both an advantage and a
disadvantage. It can be an advantage by its possibility of appeal to a wider range of sources of
authority, but it can be a disadvantage by exposing one to the criticism from within the
Church that one is not being faithful to the Church’s traditional understandings. Because the
liberal view advocates changing the Church, it appeals to those who desire change and
inspires resistance in those who fear change.
3.4.3 The Centrist Stance in Center-Periphery Conflict
The centrist stance presumes the privileged status of the Church in the world but
acknowledges that the Church must pay close attention to developments outside its own walls.
What distinguishes the centrist position from the liberal and conservative positions is that
while the liberal position argues for changing the Church according to worldly knowledge and
the conservative position argues for changing the world in accord with standards determined
by the Church, the centrist position recognizes the reasonableness of both of these options and
tries to hold them in fruitful tension. Ideally, the centrist position is bipartisan, drawing on the
best insights of the liberal and conservative stances and uniting members of those camps, but
it has also has the possibility of being bipolar (counterproductively directed to two
incompatible positions at once). Because the centrist position is not decisively oriented toward
change in one direction or the other, it tends to favor strategies of reflection, dialogue,
discernment and incremental action for change.
The centrist position is skeptical toward all “extremism” inside and outside the Church.
Centrists are more mistrustful of extraecclesial thought and practice than liberals, but are less
confident of the self-sufficiency of the Church than conservatives. So centrists look for a
golden mean balancing traditional ways of doing things in the Church with a readiness to
change the Church as necessary (implementing the right changes at the right times). Because
they make a point of conceding the legitimacy of a wide range of viewpoints, centrists have
the possibility of forging alliances and drawing support from many different camps inside and
outside the Church. That is, they are “consensus” oriented. This same centrism can be a
liability, in that the commitments made, insofar as they are ideological in nature, are seen to
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be weak commitments, and they draw weak commitments in return. Thus, centrists are in a
better position to avoid making enemies than to garner support based on commonly held
ideological positions.
In center-periphery conflict centrists are likely to recognize the legitimacy of various
competing viewpoints and to employ the strategies of reflection, dialogue and discernment in
conflict handling. Centrism may also translate into strategies of avoidance or indifference,
pluralism or integralism, depending on the circumstances of the conflict handling. Centrists
will emphasize organizational continuity, with change being an option only if preceded by
much aforethought and implemented cautiously. In conflicts between liberal and conservative
parties, centrists are well placed to serve as intermediaries.
3.4.4 The Conservative Stance in Center-Periphery Conflict
The conservative stance presumes the superiority of the Church’s system of thought and
practice over other systems of thought and practice. Accordingly, it advocates bringing other
systems in line with the Church’s through domination (actively seeking to conform the world
to the Church) or resistance (avoiding the negative influence of extraecclesial perspectives).
Though God’s activity outside the Church may be conceded in principle, only the Church,
from the conservative viewpoint, is capable of correctly reading the signs of God’s presence.
Moreover, there is no question of the Church being one among many ways to God. If not the
only way to God, then the Church is the most perfect way.
The conservative stance does not recognize extraecclesial sources of authority. Church
tradition is authoritative by virtue of its being uniquely so endowed by God, and it is
understood to be constant, coherent and transparent. Church tradition provides a rock of
certainty within a modern world that has lost its bearings by placing hope and trust in
ideologies that are unworthy of such confidence (secular humanism, scientific progress, non-
Catholic religions and spiritualities). Just as threatening are “nihilistic” (“postmodernist”)
perspectives which emphasize the ambiguity and uncertainty of existence and which refuse to
accept the concept of objective truth and the possibility of privileging one viewpoint above
others. The task of the Church begins with the need to maintain the strength of the Church
organization against threats from the outside. A premium is placed on demonstrations of
Church loyalty and the employment of tried and true ideas and practices in carrying out the
mission of the Church. Because external elements are perceived as threatening, there is a
tendency to establish clearly-marked borders between the Church within and the Church
without. To outsiders, what is appealing about a conservatively-disposed Church is the
prospect of finding a safe haven from the turbulence and dangers of the world. What is less
appealing is the potential constriction – the loss of freedom -- which is the price of belonging
to such a Church.
In center-periphery conflict we can expect that a strength of the conservative stance will be its
appearance of being unquestionably Catholic. This encourages a bold and active approach to
conflict handling. Because conservatives draw on clearly-recognizable forms of Church-based
authority, their loyalty is unlikely to be questioned, whereas the stance of those who suggest
the relevance of extraecclesial sources of authority will be suspect by comparison. We can
expect that conservatives will seek advantage over and against opponents in center-periphery
conflict by drawing on established forms of power within the Church which tend to maintain
the current order. These include Church law, bureaucratic procedures and the system of
hierarchical rank. Keeping up the appearance of the Church as self-possessed, certain in its
mission, and unfazed by internal or external threats will be a priority for conservatives in
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conflict situations. We can expect to see strong emphasis on maintaining the appearance of
harmony and of peaceable acceptance of the prevailing distribution of power. A disadvantage
to the conservative stance in center-periphery conflict is the vulnerability to the attack from
centrists or liberals that one is out of touch with the times and operating from a cloistered
perspective. The conservative view of the Church’s encounter with the world is difficult for
many outside the Church to accept because the outsider’s own view is not seen as credible by
the conservative. For this reason, centrists and liberals are better placed to summon
extraecclesial support.
3.4.5 The Reactionary Stance in Center-Periphery Conflict
The reactionary stance values the wisdom and experience of the Church alone: it does not
recognize the legitimacy of viewpoints not traditional to the Church. The Church is
understood to be entirely self-sufficient. There is no need to change it. From the reactionary
standpoint the Church is the only way to God and all other ways are false. These false
alternatives are to be walled off from the Church. The only options for the Church in regard to
extraecclesial thought and practice are combat or flight. As I have already noted, the
extremity of this position puts adherents at odds with the teaching of the Second Vatican
Council, which stressed the need for the Church to bring a critical openness to the modern
world. The extremity of the position also makes its pastoral implementation more than
challenging. Thus Rome has reason to want to avoid naming bishops who incline toward
reactionary opinions. My presupposition is that only a small portion of the hierarchy operates
according to the reactionary stance.
In center-periphery conflict a reactionary can be expected to claim that only his viewpoint is
legitimate. All other visions of Church and world (from within the Church and from without)
are faulty and therefore dangerous. We can expect this single-mindedness because
extraecclesial perspectives are automatically dismissed and, since in the reactionary’s view
the Church can only be one way, clearly knowable, for all time, Church-based world views
other than his own are also ruled out. This single-mindedness is likely to be disadvantageous
in center-periphery conflict. Though such certainty and strength of conviction can be
attractive to others, the inflexibility of the reactionary position makes it difficult to draw in
those holding opposing viewpoints and to maintain ties for long periods of time with those
who have similar convictions. The reactionary’s extreme, inflexible position also makes him
susceptible to attacks which paint him as a representative of the lunatic fringe. One advantage
to the reactionary position in center-periphery conflict is that the reactionary can claim he is
more truly adherent to Catholic tradition (which is thought to be constant and not pluralistic)
than anyone else, because he makes no room for anything other than (his version of) Catholic
tradition.
3.5 Summary of Expectations for the Handling of Center-Periphery Conflict
At the beginning of chapter two I suggested that examination of the organizational and
societal context of center-periphery conflict could illuminate participant approaches to the
handling of such conflicts. Consequently, in chapters two and three I have worked through a
process of theoretical sensitization in regard to those contexts. I am now prepared to articulate
a set of conflict-handling expectations for center-periphery conflict. The expectations are the
outcome of the theoretical sensitization. The expectations will orient our approach to the
empirical example soon to be considered, the Rome-Hunthausen conflict.
I will now summarize the main assumptions I have drawn through this process of reflection.
The assumptions are expressed in terms of a general stance toward conflict handling, a
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perspective on the use of power and a list of particular coping strategies that I consider
highly likely to be applied in cases of center-periphery conflict. An elaboration follows.
3.5.1 The General Stance toward Conflict Handling
My expectation is that all members of the hierarchy participating in center-periphery
conflict will strive to save the face of and enhance the power of the Church organization
and themselves. Admittedly, this is a complex formulation, since it involves two tasks
(saving face and enhancing power) and two objects (the Church and oneself), which I choose
not to separate out. My reason for not separating out these distinct dimensions of the
expectation is that I believe them normally to be intertwined and frequently indistinguishable,
not only for an outside observer but also for the conflict participant himself. Saving face is
closely related to the acquisition and maintenance of power, whether one is talking about an
organization or an individual. And in the case of bishops, I believe that, in general, they will
be so strongly conditioned to identify with the Church organization that they will ordinarily
associate the organization’s appearance and power with their own. This is not to say that
individual bishops will never pursue power at the expense of the Church organization or
attempt to look good without concern for how the Church looks, but it is to say that –
especially in cases of center-periphery conflict, where their relationship to the Church is in
question – they will normally be inclined to pursue both sets of objectives at the same time.
As justification for formulating my expectation about the general stance toward conflict
handling in this way, I would refer to the findings I have already presented in chapters two
and three. From chapter two, I would point in particular to my descriptions of: (1) the
privileges and powers that accompany membership in the hierarchy (sections 2.3-2.3.3), those
being personal advantages accruing from their organizational role that we can expect bishops
to want to preserve; (2) the intensive process of socialization bishops undergo on the way to
assumption of their office (see the discussion of social power in section 2.4.4), a factor
producing a strong tendency to identify with and protect the Church organization; (3) the
mixture of motivations that all Church members, including bishops, show in their affiliation
with the Church (sections 2.4.1.1 and 2.4.3.1), with the consequence that their participation
shows ambivalence and varying degrees of egocentrism and selflessness; (4) the clannish side
of Church life (2.4.1.2), and of clerical life in particular, which positively reinforces
faithfulness to the Church “family” and punishes betrayals thereof; (5) the pressure to meet
the (non-operational) organizational goal of uniting all people to God (2.4.2.1) through the
operational means of growing the Church (2.4.2.2) and marketing it effectively (2.4.1.2); and
finally, (6) the enticement of reward for bishops who strengthen the Church and give it an
attractive appearance (see the discussion of remunerative power in section 2.4.4); (7) the
threat of sanction that exists for bishops who fail or refuse to save face for the Church or work
for the enhancement of its power (see “coercive power” in section 2.4.4).
From chapter three I would highlight my observations that: (1) bishops are much more likely
to privilege the perspective of the Church over the perspective of the “world” (3.2.1) and will
show a natural tendency to protect the Church organization (its power and appearance); and
(2) bishops will attempt to defend and advance the Church’s position within society through
by means of “reflexive monitoring” (3.3.1), a process that attends directly to the Church’s
organization’s power and appearance.
All of these factors, taken together, lead me to believe that bishops involved in center-
periphery conflict – a situation where the appearance and power of organization and
individual are at stake – will be strongly predisposed to attend to the Church’s appearance and
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power and their own appearance and power.
3.5.2 Perspective on the Use of Power
Bishops have access to multiple kinds of power as they carry out their role of coordinating
and controlling the Church. In section 2.4.4, I discussed how distinct kinds of power can be
applied, in ordinary tasks of governance and in the context of center-periphery conflict. My
assumption is that certain strategies for employing power (strategies for coping with the
conflict) are especially likely to come to the fore in center-periphery conflict handling. I
discuss these strategies in the next section (3.5.3). Before doing so, I see the necessity of
offering a number of observations that articulate my expectations for how power, in general,
will be applied in center-periphery conflict. These observations follow.
Primarily, my expectation concerning the use of power in center-periphery conflict is that the
use will reflect the general stance toward conflict handling I have just discussed (in section
3.5.1), and much of the same reasoning applies (bishops will want to protect their own power
and prestige, which is closely associated with the power and appearance of the Church
organization; they are strongly conditioned to act in this way; potential rewards and
punishments apply; etc.)  Simply put, my expectation for the use of power in center-periphery
conflict is that members of the hierarchy will strive for (the appearance of) legitimacy in
their employments of power. This concern for legitimacy flows from the general concern for
the appearance of the Church and is the natural byproduct of leadership of an organization
whose ordinary means for generating member compliance are normative rather than raw. In a
normative organization, power acquisition and power maintenance are dependent on
perceptions of legitimacy. Thus the concern for legitimacy also serves the interest of
enhancing the Church’s and one’s own power. By having their applications of power look
“good” (at a minimum, legal according to ecclesiastical and civil standards; but preferably
also fair, just, charitable), members of the hierarchy heighten the likelihood of preserving and
increasing power for themselves and the Church.
In section 2.4.4 I noted (following Vaillancourt 1980) the balancing act that faces bishops
when applying power in their organizational leadership role: applying power in too “raw” a
fashion (forcing compliance) has the tendency to alienate Church members because it appears
out of step with Church ideals, such as respecting legitimate diversity while pursuing unity
(2.4.2.2); but applying normative power in a fashion that is highly respectful of members’
ability to decide for themselves carries the risk that the role of the hierarchy itself will become
irrelevant. Accordingly, members of the hierarchy will typically opt to employ power in ways
that are in some fashion normative but still strongly controlling (drawing on social pressures,
traditional habits for practice, legal guidelines that the hierarchy itself has established, etc.).
This essentially is what I am getting at when I assert that members of the hierarchy will strive
for the (appearance of) legitimacy when applying power in center-periphery conflict. The
power employment needs to be strong enough to work (gain the desired compliance), but it
should look legitimate so as to go unchallenged. Strategically, as far as the bishops’ own
interests are concerned, there is reason to have the use of power look as legitimate as possible
– that is, as I suggested above, not simply legal, but ideally, even charitable.
My expectation, as articulated in detail in section 2.4.4, is that members of the hierarchy will
apply multiple kinds of power in center-periphery conflict (any and / or all of the somewhat
artificially distinguished types discussed in that section) and that these employments of power
will be intertwined in complex ways. As for how, specifically, we can anticipate the various
types of power being applied empirically, I would refer one to the observations offered in
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2.4.4 and to the discussion of coping strategies in the next section). Before taking up that task,
I will introduce one final assertion into this perspective on the use of power. My intuition is
that the degree of  “rawness” of the  power applied in the conflict handling is likely to
increase in the face of resistance from the other party. To put it another way, I would expect
the see the first attempts to generate compliance be made through normative approaches that
are respectful of the other’s freedom (and which have a greater appearance of legitimacy to
Church members), and more coercive approaches applied when desired ends are not achieved
through normative means. A further exploration of this view is forthcoming, in my
introduction of a particular theory of conflict handling in chapter four.
3.5.3 Likely Coping Strategies
Conflict within the Church hierarchy sets before those involved an assortment of dangers and
opportunities. The risks at hand apply to both the conflict participants and the organization
itself. Therefore we can expect that the participants, being organizational leaders and persons
concerned for their own well-being, will have a natural inclination to want to employ the
powers available to them to achieve satisfying outcomes from the conflict. My assumption is
that this attempt to move from the current position, A, to the desired position, B, will to some
degree involve rational planning (a bishop decides how he wants to approach the other party
and the conflict realities), but will also be reflective of social conditioning that is not
necessarily in the foreground of one’s thinking when the plan is made (a bishop chooses a
particular approach out of habit or unacknowledged desires or fears).
I believe that the term “coping strategy” captures certain distinct operative means whereby
participants in center-periphery conflict attempt to manage (calculatedly and intentionally, but
also according to subconscious influences and impulses) the conflict productively. The word
“strategy” implies that the approach to (or avoidance of) the people and problems is
orchestrated, in the sense that it takes into account the actions and reactions of allies and
adversaries insofar as they relate to the desired outcomes. (Here I draw on the definition of
strategy offered by Tropman and Ehrlich 1997, 280.) In other words, bishops will reflexively
choose from among various powers available to them which powers they will apply and in
which forms, factoring in what the effects of their own actions will be (and making
adjustments over time), for the sake of emerging as advantageously as possible from the
conflict situation.
At the same time, there will also be a sense in which their conflict handling is not orchestrated
(by themselves at least): realities beyond their control, and perhaps not to their liking, will be
imposed upon them, and they will be left to come to grips with these realities. Drawing on
their own resources and shortcomings and conditioned ways of thinking and acting, they must
deal with or “cope with” the challenges at hand. Qualifying the word strategy with “coping”
reminds us that conflicts tend to be difficult (center-periphery conflicts are, in any case), may
even be irresolvable, and may be “managed” by means of conflict participant behaviors that
are as much impulsive re-actions as they are thoughtfully chosen actions.
Incorporating the concepts I have just specified, I define a coping strategy as an orchestrated
attempt to manage conflict as advantageously as possible.
Based on arguments I have already presented in preceding chapters, I believe that a number of
specific coping strategies likely to be employed in center-periphery conflict can be identified.
In general, my reasons for anticipating the use of these particular coping strategies are that:
(1) they draw on powers members of the hierarchy have available to them; (2) bishops are
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conditioned to use the strategies; and (3) personal advantages are likely accrue from doing so.
I will now describe seven coping strategies that I consider especially likely to find application
in center-periphery conflict.
1. Show deference to the structural order and mindset of the Church
Bishops directly benefit from current norms of thought and practice in the Church
organization. A local bishop may not benefit nearly so much as the Pope does by this
arrangement, but he benefits greatly nonetheless. For this reason, we can expect members of
the hierarchy to be strongly disposed toward maintenance of the prevailing norms. By
maintaining these norms, bishops guarantee the continuance of their own power and prestige:
they protect present rewards (social approval and perquisites of office) and possible future
rewards (higher appointment), avoid potential punishments (loss of power, ostracization), and
honor the process of education and socialization that has shaped them and to which they have
made considerable personal investments (belief, time, obedience, celibacy). Since bishops
will be disinclined to alienate themselves from the organization which has so amply rewarded
them, my expectation is that in center-periphery conflict participants will tread softly where
the Church itself is concerned. At a minimum, they will be respectful of the Church’s thought
and practice in their words and deeds, and this with an almost inviolable consistency. (NB: I
use the expression “structural order and mindset of the Church” above as a kind of catch-all.
My intention is not to argue that there is one single order and mindset which can be specified,
but that rather, one can linguistically suppose / propose that there is, and use this supposition
to advantage.) Very commonly, bishops will speak highly of the Church as a whole, of what
the Church has to offer the world, and of other Church leaders (especially those superior in
rank). Essentially, this can be thought of as a strategy of reassurance. In center-periphery
conflict it amounts to one member of the hierarchy conveying to another his trustworthiness: I
am not a radical (or reactionary); I am not a threat to the continuance of the Church or of the
hierarchy. This is not to say that criticisms of the Church or proposals for reform are ruled out
altogether, but it is to say that such challenges will be voiced with justifying references to
existing Church traditions and beliefs.
In terms of concrete tactics, one might find this strategy applied in any or all of the following
ways in center-periphery conflict: by refraining from criticism of Church thought and practice
and of its leaders; by using euphemisms to describe problems in the Church; by consistently
invoking familiar ecclesiastical terminology (jargon, official titles, theological words) and
thought (Church doctrines); by praising the Church and its leaders; and (perhaps above all) by
obeying one’s superiors. This last item, obedience, is perhaps the one key difference we can
expect to find in applications of the strategy between the center and periphery parties.
Ultimately, the periphery must answer to the center, but the reverse is true in only a very
limited (and perhaps in only a theoretical) sense. The Pope is the local bishop’s superior.
Thus, there will be deference shown mutually between center and periphery – an honoring of
the concept of shared power (“collegiality”) within the hierarchy – but the periphery will need
to bow much more deeply.
Before moving on, I should say a word about the distinction between strategies and tactics. In
common parlance, tactics are the concrete means for carrying out a strategy. I retain that
distinction here (cf. Pruitt and Rubin 1986, 3).
2. Associate one’s own efforts with the best interest of the Church
My justification for anticipating use of this strategy closely follows the reasoning for
anticipating the use of the Church deference strategy, described above. In center-periphery
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conflict, the Church itself is a mandatory reference point. As the most prominent leaders of
the Church, members of the hierarchy are widely expected to be its foremost defenders, and
they experience strong social incentives to meet this expectation. Therefore, it is in their
interest to claim that the actions they take, in conflict situations but also more generally, are
oriented toward the good of the Church. By adopting this strategy in center-periphery conflict,
they legitimize their own actions and, at the same time, deflect suspicions that they may be
putting their own interest ahead of all else. The latter is especially important because, given
the Church’s normative character, its proclaimed ideals must be honored in Church discourse.
All members of the hierarchy participating in center-periphery conflict can be expected to
employ this strategy to some degree. What is interesting about this strategy is that it can be
used to defend contrary viewpoints and in association with divergent traditions within the
Church. The center and periphery are both likely to say that they are acting for the good of the
Church, even while advocating very different courses of action.
Potential tactics for carrying out this strategy include: making frequent reference to the
Church, refraining from criticizing the Church (through silence, the use of euphemisms,
indirect language, etc.), and especially, expressly linking oneself to the effort to achieve
recognized goals of the Church.
3. Minimize the appearance of conflict
I have characterized the ultimate goal of the Church, following one pronounced tradition
within its own teaching, as a matter of bringing about humankind’s unity with God. The
presence of conflict in the Church is a sign that the achievement of this goal is not at hand.
One can argue, of course, that conflict is a necessary step on the way to resolution in unity,
but still, I would hold that for most observers the presence of conflict in the Church negatively
contrasts with their impression of how the Church is supposed to be (what it is supposed to be
about). Therefore, my expectation is that bishops will want to avoid giving the impression that
the Church is unhappily divided within itself (this to save face for the Church organization).
In particular, bishops will want to convey the impression that the hierarchy itself is
functioning harmoniously, not only for the sake of the appearance of the Church as a whole,
but as a means for preserving the power of the hierarchy itself, which will seem stronger if it
is not beset with internal contestation.
Primarily, this strategy is a public relations strategy meant for outsiders. The point of it is not
that there be no conflict within the hierarchy – I consider conflict to be an unavoidable feature
of organizational leadership – but rather that outsiders be given limited access to the center-
periphery conflict handling and that, on the whole, they receive the impression that the
conflict poses no great threat to the Church organization or to the strength of the hierarchy.
My assumption is that an unspoken pact will be operative between members of the hierarchy,
whereby contention is allowed but ordinarily only in private. When public revelations of the
conflict are unavoidable, these will, as much as possible downplay the extent and seriousness
of the conflict and will emphasize the solidarity existing between the members of the
hierarchy involved.
Though here I speak of an implicit agreement that applies between all members of the
hierarchy participating in the conflict, I anticipate too that this strategy will at times serve one
party at the expense of another. Since the center party benefits the most from the appearance
of unity – the sight of one local church going its own way might inspire others to do the same
-- it will be especially strongly disposed to keep the conflict handling out of view. Conflict
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handling in private limits the periphery’s power to call on public support for its position and
to recruit allies from within the hierarchy itself. On the other hand, the periphery party has
incentive to minimize the appearance of conflict in its desire to protect its own reputation.
Being openly in conflict with Rome is likely to be an embarrassment for a local bishop.
Keeping the conflict out of sight does not necessarily produce an advantage for him in the
process of conflict negotiation, but it does bring security to his position by maintaining the
appearance of loyalty, thus increasing the likelihood of his not losing power.
Tactics serving the strategy of minimizing the appearance of conflict may well include:
conducting conflict negotiations in secret; refusing to publicly acknowledge the existence of
conflict (silence, denial); and using euphemisms to improve the appearance of one’s relations
with other parties, understate the gravity of the problems, or overstate the degree of harmony
or prospects for resolution.
4. Show fraternity
The Catholic hierarchy often refers to itself as a brotherhood of bishops. Individual bishops,
beyond having much in common with one another by virtue of the office they hold -- with its
distinctive mystique (divine sanction), powers, obligations and involved preparation process -
- also share responsibility for leading the Church. By their office and their shared
responsibility for governance, bishops are bonded together and set apart from the rest of the
Church. They are separated to a lesser extent from clerics, who typically enjoy significant
powers of governance at the parish level and who share in the mystique of ordination, and to a
greater extent from those who are not ordained and not canonically commissioned to govern.
The notion of brotherhood, or “fraternity,” suggests that the bond between bishops is a
familial one: in other words, it goes deeper than rationally chosen, voluntary association. It is
not simply something that one just happens to enter into or abandon. To stay within the
metaphor, it is a matter of blood.
This way of conceiving of itself shapes the way members of the hierarchy interact with one
another and it also shapes the way the hierarchy as a whole relates to the rest of the Church
and world. The implication for center-periphery conflict handling is that bishops involved in
such conflicts will show fraternity, which is to say that they will implicitly and explicitly
acknowledge their bond to fellow bishops, a bond that will both empower and constrain them.
The phrase “show fraternity” suggests a number of conflict handling tendencies at once, some
of them competing. I choose this somewhat ambiguous expression advisedly. The verb
“show” has multiple meanings. I want to highlight two of those meanings at once in my usage
here: to point out and to reveal. My expectation for center-periphery conflict is that bishops
will almost always make a show of their relationship of fraternity: that is, they will point out
or point to, for all interested parties, the fact that they are “brothers” (doing so because they
are conditioned to, because they want to keep up appearances, because there are social
advantages to be gained, etc.). They will call one another “brother bishop(s),” they will
invoke the concept of episcopal fraternity (and the related concept of collegiality), they will
show a pronounced level of graciousness and respect toward one another in public, and so on.
At the same time, they will also unavoidably reveal the bond that episcopal fraternity implies.
With this I mean they will take advantage of their insider status to assume privileges not
available to outsiders, but they will also at times struggle within the suffocating confines of
the brotherhood. Among the advantages to belonging to the fraternity are rewards, protections
and the loyal support and understanding of fellow bishops (so long as one does, oneself, show
loyalty to the Church and to the hierarchy). The disadvantages of belonging include
restrictions on freedom – of thought, speech, action –  which follow from the expectation to
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guard the interests of the “family” (see my discussion of clannishness in section 2.4.1.2).
My expectation is that the center party, having more say over the management of “family
matters” will emphasize the bond of fraternity in order to remind the periphery of its duty of
loyalty (which serves the center party’s interest). The periphery party, on the other hand, will
show fraternity as a means of retaining privileges and avoiding ostracization. The risk both
sides face is that betrayal of the brotherhood is always possible, if unlikely, and betrayal by an
insider can do great damage to the culture of the closed off realm. The threat of betrayal has
the potential of being employed to gain concessions from an opposing party.
A variety of tactics, some already suggested, could be employed to carry out the strategy of
demonstrating fraternity. These include: referring to other bishops as “brother bishops” in
public; invoking the concept of episcopal fraternity (and related concepts such as bondedness,
collegiality, etc.); showing a heightened level of graciousness and deference toward other
bishops (in comparison with what is shown toward those who do not belong to the hierarchy);
showing what appears to be genuine kinds of trust and friendship toward other bishops;
conducting substantial intrahierarchical exchanges in private; symbolically drawing
distinctions (through attire, use of technical language, liturgical action, closed meetings, etc.)
between the knowledge and experience of the bishops and the knowledge and experience of
others; indicating (one bishop to another) what the limits of acceptable thought or action are.
5. Practice courtesy
The use of courtesy, beyond being serviceable as a tactic in other strategies, can also serve as
a strategy in its own right (see, especially, the discussion that has preceded in section 2.4.4).
That is, courtesy may be employed in orchestrated fashion for the sake of achieving
designated conflict goals. Courtesy is to be expected in intrahierarchical communications in
general. Bishops are strongly conditioned to use various forms of politeness to save face for
the Church and the hierarchy. Courteous discourse creates the impression for outside
observers that harmony reigns within the hierarchy (a condition conducive to the achievement
of greater kinds of unity). Courtesy also acknowledges and reinforces hierarchical roles and
distinctions of power. At a minimum, the use of courtesy prevents the giving of offense. In
more targeted applications it may serve as a tool for ingratiating oneself with or restricting the
movement of the other party. (Note: under most circumstances, given the purposes of this
study, I feel free to use the terms politeness and courtesy interchangeably, as synonyms.
Courtesy, however, is my preferred term because it carries a stronger connotation of
outreaching graciousness that I believe is relevant to relations between bishops.)
As I have just suggested, in center-periphery conflict we can expect to find courtesy applied
on two levels. The first level is the level of courtesy as a given (courtesy applied habitually):
the use of politeness that is simply expected from any member of the hierarchy, by means of
which one symbolically (primarily linguistically, but in other ways too) demonstrates respect
for the Church and acknowledges one’s own place in the Church’s social order. On this level,
the strategy is defensive in nature, and will find application in almost any public exchange
between members of the hierarchy. One shows courtesy in this sense because one is socially
conditioned to do so, the use of courtesy demonstrates one’s mastery of (mostly unwritten)
Church rules, and not employing courtesy will probably lead to penalizing repercussions.
Tactics functional on this level include: avoiding criticism of the Church and Church leaders;
using honorary titles (thus maintaining established social boundaries); showing respect for
and carrying out the wishes of superiors; honoring formality rules; and using euphemisms and
other forms of indirect language to give an untroubled appearance to troubled situations.
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But one can also expect to see more premeditated applications of courtesy in center-periphery
conflict as well. Such applications will go beyond matter-of-course adherence to politeness
rules, by consciously attempting to manipulate courtesy for gain. One likely possibility is the
use of courtesy to create a climate of good will (through tactics of ingratiation, praise, self-
diminishment, shows of common feeling, etc.), wherein concessions or cooperation can be
achieved. Another likely possibility is the employment of courtesy as means of putting up a
good appearance for outsiders (courteous behavior suggests a party is reasonable and
charitable). Finally, one can also expect to see courtesy employed as a means of reducing
conflict tensions (euphemisms and indirect language can save face for the other party).
6. Employ secrecy
Secrecy (cf. section 2.4.4.1) is a strategy that we can expect members of the hierarchy to
employ as a matter of course in specific operational domains (which may apply in center-
periphery conflict situations). But, as with courtesy and fraternity, we can also expect that
they will employ secrecy in a more intentional fashion for the sake of advantage. Secrecy is a
strategy of restriction. It is a primary means whereby members of the hierarchy limit access to
designated sources of  information, decision makers and decision making forums. Secrecy can
be used by the hierarchy in relation those outside the hierarchy (in a circle-the-wagons
approach), but it can also be used by one bishop or group of bishops in relation to another.
There are numerous operational domains within the hierarchy where secrecy is the norm: in
the matter of bishop appointments, for example, or in deliberations of the Roman curia. In
center-periphery conflict bishops will ordinarily adhere to the standard secrecy rules and
protocols that apply. Thus, sensitive, high-level organizational matters will be handled in
private (through personal meetings and confidential correspondence), in keeping with the
charge to protect the appearance of the Church and to minimize the appearance of conflict;
internal documents will be archived; restrictions will be placed on press communications; and
so forth. Bishops will conform to such expectations out of habit (one tends not to question –
or even notice – social processes that are always handled in the same way) and a
responsiveness to social pressure. They will also do so out of a desire to protect privileges and
the possibility of future awards, and avoid potential punishments.
Conflict within the hierarchy poses a challenge to the maintenance of the usual secrecy
standards, because it is likely that one party will have a greater stake in the use of secrecy than
the other. Often, the party benefiting the most from secrecy is the center party, which holds
the balance of decision making power. In general, we can expect that both parties will be
prepared to uphold the usual standards of secrecy so long as it does not disadvantage them to
do so. Once secrecy places a party at a disadvantage (the periphery party sooner than the
center party?), however, we should expect that it will show resistance to the use of secrecy.
The extent to which a party might actually forgo the use of secrecy is unclear.
Tactical applications of the strategy of secrecy might well include: refusing to acknowledge
that a conflict exists; minimizing (even insider) access to the conflict handling; keeping the
conflict handling out of sight (by keeping silent about it and limiting its handling to private
meetings, private correspondence, phone calls); hiding the identity of conflict participants
(through silence or linguistic techniques that hide agency); lying; limiting press contacts
(refusing interviews, offering minimal press conferences, providing little information in
writing); and archiving sensitive documents.
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7. Recruit allies
The concept of alliance, in and of itself, suggests a lack of self-sufficiency. The value of allies
is the possibility they offer of enabling one to achieve what could not be achieved
independently. In center-periphery conflict, it may be possible to accomplish one’s objectives
without the support or cooperation of others (this is especially true where the Pope is
concerned), but ordinarily we can expect that formal and informal types of alliance will
contribute to the conflict handling and resolution. We can also expect that a party will be
more strongly inclined to construct alliances when the conflict handling is proceeding
disadvantageously for the party in question.
In center-periphery conflict, the most powerful ally one can have is the Pope, since the Pope
always has the possibility of overruling other participants in intraecclesial matters. Beyond the
Pope, one finds powerful allies in the persons of other bishops. Presumably, the more that the
Pope and (ideally many) other bishops are on one’s side, the stronger one’s position will be in
center-periphery conflict. A conflict participant’s position within the hierarchy will greatly
determine the degree of support he can give. Officials of the Roman curia have the advantage
of being on the inside of top-level discussions and decision making processes, and they also
have a level of access to the Pope that most of the world’s bishops do not enjoy. On the other
hand, curial officials (as a whole) are commonly viewed with suspicion by local bishops
because they exercise power in non-transparent ways that have decided consequences for
local bishops. Thus there are certain kinds of power, rooted in popular appeal, that Roman
curial officials do not automatically command. Leading bishops within the national hierarchy
can serve as important allies in center-periphery conflict, as can the membership and leaders
of national and regional bishops’ conferences. This kind of support can be especially
important for defending the position of a local bishop.
In my discussion of center-periphery conflict I will limit use of the term “allies” to members
of the hierarchy, but of course there are other parties who can play an influential role in the
conflict handling (2.3.3). Third parties who may help shape the course the conflict takes
include: the news media (which may help create popular support for a cause, which in turn
puts pressure on the members of the hierarchy participating); members of a bishop’s staff; the
local clergy, religious and laity. Primarily, my expectation for center-periphery conflict
handling is that participants will first attempt to handle the conflict successfully without
recruiting allies. (Conflicts have the appearance of being more manageable when fewer
participants are involved.) When seemingly insurmountable difficulties are encountered, then
a party will show more readiness to recruit allies from within the hierarchy. Bishops can be
expected to recruit allies by means of direct personal contact with other bishops and the
cultivation of popular support which strengthens the appearance of his own position.
On a tactical level, we can anticipate seeing any or all of the following expedients applied:
consulting with and drawing on the support of friends within the hierarchy; looking for
agreeable intermediary contacts within the hierarchy who are well positioned to influence a
targeted party; using persuasive argumentation to win potential allies; appealing for support
by going directly to the people (of one’s own diocese, the broader Church); appealing for
support through the news media.
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Summary Table of Strategies Likely to Be Applied in Center-Periphery Conflict
Strategy Expectations Possible Tactics
1. Show deference to the
structural order and mindset of
the Church
Both the center and periphery
parties will be strongly disposed
to defer to existing
organizational structures and
norms.
Even when resisting existing
structures or norms, parties will
want to give the appearance of
deference at least.
This is a strategy of
reassurance, a means for
demonstrating trustworthiness.
Refraining from criticism of Church
thought and practice and of its leaders;
using euphemisms to describe
problems in the Church; invoking
familiar ecclesiastical terminology
(jargon, official titles, theological
words) and thought (Church
doctrines); praising the Church and its
leaders; obeying one’s superiors.
2. Associate one’s own efforts
with the best interest of the
Church
All participant in center-
periphery conflict are likely to
use this strategy, but perhaps in
defense of competing
viewpoints.
Making frequent reference to the
Church; refraining from criticizing the
Church (through silence, the use of
euphemisms, indirect language, etc.);
expressly linking oneself to the effort
to achieve recognized goals of the
Church.
3. Minimize the appearance of
conflict
In keeping with the
organizational goal of unity, the
hierarchy will strive to avoid
appearing divided to outsiders.
Members of the hierarchy will
conduct conflict handling, as
much as possible, in private,
and may choose to avoid
conflict issues altogether; when
conflict discussions must come
into the open, bishops will put
the best face they can on the
conflict.
The center party will have a
stronger incentive to minimize
the appearance of conflict
because it benefits the most
from the appearance of unity.
The periphery party will
minimize the appearance of
conflict primarily to prove its
loyalty.
Conducting conflict negotiations in
secret; refusing to publicly
acknowledge the existence, relevance
and / or importance of conflict
(silence, denial); using euphemisms to
improve the appearance of one’s
relations with other parties, understate
the gravity of the problems, or
overstate the degree of harmony or
prospects for resolution.
4. Show fraternity Membership in the brotherhood
of bishops will bring privileges
(of inclusion) and restrictions of
movement (following from the
fear of exclusion).
The center party will emphasize
the concept of fraternity in
order to secure the continuing
loyalty of the periphery.
The periphery will demonstrate
fraternity as a means of
retaining privileges and
avoiding punishments.
The threat of betrayal can be
used by either party to
advantage.
Referring to other bishops as “brother
bishops” in public; invoking the
concept of episcopal fraternity (and
related concepts such as bondedness,
collegiality, etc.); showing a
heightened level of graciousness and
deference toward other bishops (in
comparison with what is shown toward
those who do not belong to the
hierarchy); showing what appears to
be genuine kinds of trust and
friendship toward other bishops;
conducting substantial
intrahierarchical exchanges in private;
symbolically drawing distinctions
(through attire, use of technical
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language, liturgical action, closed
meetings, etc.) between the knowledge
and experience of the bishops and the
knowledge and experience of others;
indicating (one bishop to another)
what the limits of acceptable thought
or action are.
5. Practice courtesy We can expect to find bishops
apply courtesy on the habitual
level but also in more
premeditated fashion for gain.
The use of courtesy signals a
bishops acknowledgment of his
place in the Church social order,
but it can also be used in
conscious strategic fashion: to
ingratiate oneself with the other
part, give a good appearance to
outsiders or to reduce conflict
tensions.
Matter-of-course (defensive) courtesy:
avoiding criticism of the Church and
Church leaders; using honorary titles;
showing respect for and carrying out
the wishes of superiors; honoring
formality rules; and using euphemisms
and other forms of indirect language to
give a positive appearance to
problematic situations; diminishing
oneself.
Tactics seeking advantage: using
praise, shows of common feeling, etc.
to create a climate of goodwill, thereby
inducing concessions or cooperation;
demonstrating politeness to give a
good appearance (of reasonableness,
charity) to outsiders; using
euphemisms, indirect language, etc. to
reduce conflict tensions.
6. Employ secrecy Secrecy is an ordinary practice
in specified domains of Church
operations. Bishops can be
expected to adhere to
conventions of secrecy (as in
bishop appointments and curial
deliberations).
In center-periphery conflict we
can expect that bishops will
embrace secrecy conditionally.
We can expect that members of
the hierarchy will abandon
secrecy or resist it when it
places them at a disadvantage.
How far they will go in their
abandonment of secrecy is
unclear.
Refusing to acknowledge that a
conflict exists; minimizing even
insider access to the conflict handling;
keeping the conflict handling out of
sight (by keeping silent about it and
limiting its handling to private
meetings, private correspondence,
phone calls); hiding the identity of
conflict participants (through silence
or linguistic techniques that hide
agency); lying; limiting press contacts
(refusing interviews, offering minimal
press conferences, providing little
information in writing); and archiving
sensitive documents.
7. Recruit allies The Pope has the possibility of
having his way by acting
unilaterally in center-periphery
conflict, but the same is not true
of other participants (including
those others on the center side),
thus we can expect that the
formation of alliances will be a
key component of the conflict
handling and its resolution.
The Pope is the most valuable
person to have as an ally. Other
desirable allies include Roman
curial officials and leaders of
episcopal conferences. Though
the primary focus here is on
allies within the hierarchy, other
Consulting with and drawing on the
support of friends within the hierarchy;
looking for agreeable intermediary
contacts within the hierarchy who are
well positioned to influence a targeted
party; using persuasive argumentation
to win potential allies; appealing for
support by going directly to the people
(of one’s own diocese, the broader
Church); appealing for support
through the news media
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allies can also play an important
role in the conflict handling,
including the media, leaders of
the local Church and the mass
membership of the local /
national / international Church.
Bishops are likely to first try to
manage conflicts successfully
by themselves before turning to
others for help.
TABLE 3.3
The foregoing presentation of strategies that we are likely to encounter in center-periphery
conflict handling is not meant to be exhaustive. The list, rather, specifies strategies that, in my
view, have a high probability of application because bishops are conditioned to use them (a
conditioning that is reinforced through potential rewards and punishments).
An important matter for our consideration – and this can perhaps best be pursued in the
confrontation of the empirical example itself – is the possibility of foregoing or resisting any
of the above-named coping strategies as a means for handling the conflict advantageously. I
do not anticipate that participants in center-periphery conflict will see advantage in foregoing
or resisting strategies one (show deference to the structural order and mindset of the Church),
two (associate one’s own efforts with the best interest of the Church) or four (show
fraternity), because this would seem to create a dangerous cleavage between the bishop’s
personal identity and the organization that guarantees his position of power. But I can well
imagine that there will be occasions wherein participants foresee and pursue advantage by
renouncing, or threatening to renounce, strategies three (minimize the appearance of conflict),
five (practice courtesy) or six (employ secrecy). Any of these strategies can work to the direct
disadvantage of a party – providing an incentive for resistance -- but adherence to the
strategies themselves is not self-evidently required (perhaps we can say it is very strongly
recommended?) for one who wishes to remain in good standing as a member of the hierarchy.
Thus far we have considered organizational and societal pressures on center-periphery
conflict handling, a process that has led to the formulation of a number of coping strategies
we are likely to find applied in center-periphery conflict. Of necessity, this discussion has
taken place on a general level. But we should not lose sight of the fact that center-periphery
conflicts are highly specific events which, while likely conforming to a limited number of
general patterns, will also be uniquely shaped by the personalities and configuration of
developments that comprise the particularity of the conflict. Ideally, to understand choices
made in conflict situations, we would have access to the personal history of the conflict
participants. In the limits of the presents study, it is not possible to produce this sort of
comprehensive analysis. But we should at least be conscious that the absence of such
information will likely cause some interpretations to be less than fully accurate or complete.
Apart from being conditioned by society, their role within the Church organization, their
personal history and physiological / psychological makeup, participants in center-periphery
conflict will also be shaped in their decision-making by the immediate situational context of
the conflict itself. One party may choose coping strategy X because it seems a rational
response to the opposing party’s choice of coping strategy Y. For this reason we need a
theoretical framework to help us interpret the dynamics of conflict negotiation in
organizations. The following chapter provides such a framework.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PERSPECTIVES FROM CONFLICT THEORY
4.1 Search for an Applicable Theory
In order to recognize and understand the coping strategies applied in center-periphery conflict,
we need an operative idea of conflict itself and of what typically makes up a conflict.
Although conflicts are natural and normal developments within organizations, they are not
everyday events – at least, Church center-periphery conflicts are not. Within the Catholic
Church, manifest conflict at the topmost level diverges from what is ordinarily a more placid
experience of leadership and decision making. The dynamics of conflict situations can be
distinguished, in their intensity and in the opportunities and dangers they bring to light, from
the pattern of day-to-day leadership situations. Thus far I have presented a picture of the
Church’s usual situation as a specific kind of organization pursuing its goals in the context of
modernity. In this chapter I will present a descriptive theory of social conflict that enables us
to see conflicts (as integrated wholes) in terms of the strategic activity that comprises them.
My search for a theory that would serve the purpose just specified has brought me into contact
with a wide variety of studies of social conflict. Especially helpful by way of their provision
of a composite overview of the field have been Pruitt and Carnevale 1993, Gangel and Canine
1992, Rahim 1992, Väyrynen 1991, Rahim 1990, Dahrendorf 1988, Shawchuck 1986b, Fraser
and Hipel 1984, Schellenberg 1982, Tjosvold and Johnson 1983, Himes 1980, Schelling
1980, Zartman 1978, Snyder and Diesing 1977, Filley 1975, Mack and Snyder 1973, Patchen
1969, Fink 1968, Gamson 1968, Iklé 1968, Simmel 1966, Coser 1964, Boulding 1962, and
The Journal of Conflict Resolution (1956-present). Consultation of these and other works has
shown that not all theoretical approaches to the handling of conflict suit the purposes at hand
equally well. Among the reasons for not choosing certain approaches: some rely on
mathematical models that are not easily transferable, e.g., Schelling 1980, Zwartman 1978,
Patchen 1969; some offer conflict models that are more static than dynamic, e.g., Rahim
1992; some are focused exclusively on nation states and not organizations, e.g., Iklé 1968 and
Snyder and Diesing 1977; some are grounded in problematic ideological standpoints, e.g.
Dahrendorf 1988; some are more prescriptive than descriptive, e.g. Shawchuck 1986b.
In particular, I have found myself in need of a descriptive perspective that not only specifies
how conflicts hold together (preferably employing terminology and models that are standard
enough to allow for cross comparisons within the field of conflict theory), but also gives
special attention to the concept of strategy and to the role (motivations, actions) of individual
participants in the conflict. Since I am attempting to identify coping strategies applied in
center-periphery conflict and to integrate these into a coherent account of the conflict as a
whole, I have sought a conflict theory that relates the picture of the entire conflict to the
choices of opposed decision makers who, in more or less intentional fashion, attempt to
achieve designated goals while taking into account the conditions of the decision making
environment, and especially the actions and reactions of other conflict participants. In the
work of Pruitt and Rubin (1986: Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement) I
have found such a perspective.
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4.2 Pruitt and Rubin on Conflict Handling
Pruitt and Rubin’s theory satisfies the needs identified above by providing an integrated
picture of conflict handling in general (it “transcends the various levels and arenas of society”
– p. 187) that is focused on the role of strategic choice. Their descriptive, social psychological
approach is built around a few basic observations. Actors act according to personal “interests”
(feelings about what is basically desirable), translating their interests into “aspirations”
(actions toward a goal). Those aspirations at times clash with the aspirations of others. The
handling of this clash (which strategies of conflict management are adopted) depends largely
on the relative levels of concern for one another’s outcomes and the perceived feasibility of
success in obtaining desired outcomes. And finally, conflicts tend to play out in stages of
escalation, stalemate and settlement.
For the purposes of our own study, Pruitt and Rubin’s perspective offers the following
advantages: 1) it focuses on individual behavior (which fits with my attention to the behavior
of individual bishops); 2) it foregrounds the concept of strategy (in a way compatible with my
own understanding, as articulated in section 3.5.3); 3) it identifies possible tactics that may
serve given strategies; 4) it helps us to associate strategies with distinct stages of conflict; 5) it
descriptively accounts for the whole of the conflict experience; and 6) it offers insight into the
role of third parties. In short, it supplies us with a necessary referential framework (based on
studies of how parties commonly behave in conflict), by means of which we can better grasp
our chosen case. Just as importantly, Pruitt and Rubin supply these advantages in a
straightforward and highly accessible presentation. Complexities are honored without being
allowed to overwhelm the interpretive process. Though all of the conflict writings mentioned
in the previous section offer valuable reflections (models, theories, insights, etc.) in their own
right -- with many employing terms and ideas that are functionally equivalent to (or viable
alternatives to) those offered by Pruitt and Rubin -- I have decided that more coherence can be
brought to my own work by concentrating on the single approach I have found to be most
advantageous. Given that Pruitt and Rubin’s theory is in fact well within the mainstream (like
countless others, for example, they draw heavily on Blake and Mouton’s (1964) “managerial
grid”), I trust that this decision will not lead me toward idiosyncratic conclusions.
Practically speaking, I will use their theory as follows. In this chapter I will summarize their
theory and highlight aspects that may prove especially relevant to our study of center-
periphery conflict. It is fair to say that this chapter continues the process of theoretical
sensitization carried out in chapters two and three, in that it supplies orientating concepts for
our confrontation of the empirical example. After having confronted the Rome-Hunthausen
case, I will revisit Pruitt and Rubin’s theory to see how the theory and the empirical example
shed light on one another.
But first, a general overview of Pruitt and Rubin’s approach.
4.2.1 Sources of Conflict
Conflict, according to Pruitt and Rubin, is found in almost every realm of human interaction,
but not all interaction necessarily involves conflict (p. 6). Thus there is no surprise that
conflict should arise in the context of decision making on behalf of the Church.
The results of conflict can be positive or negative. Among the positive functions of conflict
identified by Pruitt and Rubin are (1) its role in nourishing social change; (2) its ability to
(creatively) reconcile people’s legitimate interests; and, by virtue of the first two functions,
(3) its power to foster group unity. (The potential for conflict to serve the purposes of group
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unity is, of course, highly pertinent to our study of Church center-periphery conflict.) Along
this same line, Coser (1956, 31), following Simmel (1955), observes that conflict facilitates
socialization by helping to establish and maintain group boundaries, by allowing for the
ventilation of hostilities, and by establishing and maintaining the balance of power. Robbins
(1992, 182-183) notes that conflict can improve organizational performance (see also
Tjosvold & Johnson 1983, 8-9). And Janis (1982) asserts that it counteracts “groupthink” and
the too-ready acceptance of decisions based on weak assumptions. The negative functions of
conflict, however, are also familiar. Pruitt and Rubin point out that conflict is fully capable of
“wreaking havoc on society” (p. 7). Within organizations, Rahim (1992) has asserted that
conflict can damage communication, create distrust and suspicion, and diminish levels of
organizational loyalty and performance. In short, organizations, the Church included, have
strong reason to want to manage conflicts so that functional outcomes emerge to the exclusion
of dysfunctional outcomes.
Pruitt and Rubin understand conflict to be “perceived divergence of interest.” “Interests” are
“people’s feelings about what is basically desirable” and they “tend to be central to people’s
thinking and action, forming the core of many of their attitudes, goals and intentions” (p. 10).
Interests translate into “aspirations.” One aspires toward a particular “goal,” which is “the
more or less precise end toward which one is striving.” At the same time, knowing that not all
goals are fully achievable, one envisions a minimally acceptable level of achievement – a
“standard” in regard to the goal. Achievement below the standard is considered inadequate by
the aspiring party. Conflict arises when one party perceives that satisfaction of its aspirations
precludes satisfaction of the other party’s aspirations, and vice-versa.
For Pruitt and Rubin, three elements converge to produce conflict: “Party’s level of aspiration,
Party’s perception of Other’s level of aspiration, and the apparent lack of integrative
alternatives” (p. 13). All three elements must be present for conflict to arise.
Determinants of Party’s level of aspiration (based on realistic or idealistic considerations)
include: Party’s past achievements (raising aspirations); Party’s perception of own advantage
in strength (raising aspirations); normative justification (underwriting Party’s aspirations in
the face of incompatible aspirations by Other); invidious comparisons (leading to a rise in
aspirations); formation of struggle groups (bringing a rise in aspirations).
When Other’s aspirations are low or flexible they do not threaten Party, thus precluding
conflict. But Party may perceive that Other’s objectives are too high to be compatible with his
own, with conflict as a result. Among the circumstances that may invite Party to perceive that
Other’s aspirations are incompatibly high are hard experience with frustration at the hands of
Other and distrust of Other’s motives based on other knowledge.
Pruitt and Rubin call alternatives satisfying both parties’ aspirations “integrative solutions” (p.
18). The perception that such alternatives are not at hand is the third element that must be
present for conflict to develop. The perception that such integrative solutions are not available
may be rooted in a realistic assessment (mutually-desired resources may in fact be scarce), but
it may also be the product of a negative view of the other party which makes one reluctant to
investigate solutions creatively.
4.2.2 Strategic Choice
When faced with perceived divergence of interest, a party must decide how it will proceed.
Party has a high aspiration, so does Other, and the two appear to be incompatible. What now?
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Pruitt and Rubin, building on the work of Blake and Mouton (1964, 1979) and others (see p.
28) posit five strategic options:
1. Contending: Trying to prevail; pursuing one’s own aspirations without regard to
opposing party’s aspirations.
2. Problem solving: Trying to satisfy own and other party’s aspirations. Agreements
reached through problem solving may take the form of an integrative solution or a
compromise.
3. Yielding: Lowering one’s own aspirations as a form of concession.
4. Inaction: Doing nothing; temporarily withdrawing from the efforts to resolve the
controversy.
5. Withdrawal: Removing oneself permanently from the conflict handling process.
Pruitt and Rubin call the first three strategies “coping strategies” (p. 3) because they involve
“some relatively consistent, coherent effort to settle conflict.” These contrast with inaction
and withdrawal, which are not considered to be coping strategies because they are approaches
of pause or abandonment. Note that Pruitt and Rubin’s definition of “coping strategy” differs
from my own, stated earlier in section 3.5.3. By my definition, all five of the above-named
strategies have the possibility of being coping strategies, since each can serve as an
orchestrated attempt to manage conflict advantageously. From this point forward in the study,
I will not retain Pruitt and Rubin’s concept of coping strategy but will stay with my own.
One should also note that the five general strategies identified by Pruitt and Rubin function on
a lower conceptual level than the context-specific strategies I identified at the end of chapter
three. Whereas the five strategies listed above can account for activity in any social conflict,
my effort in this study is to identify coping strategies that are highly specific to Church
center-periphery conflict. Therefore, at a later point in this presentation (see section 5.4), I
will distinguish between the five general coping strategies and more specific kinds of coping
strategies that in some sense reflect the more general strategies.
Most conflict situations call forth a combination of the above-named strategies. The authors
propose two theoretical notions which help us to understand why a given strategy is adopted.
The first is summarized in a dual concern model (pp. 28-35). The second is conceptualized as
the perceived feasibility perspective (pp. 35-41). The two theoretical notions focus on distinct
and separate determinants of strategic choice. An explanation of each follows.
The dual concern model (see figure below) recognizes two types of concerns: concern about
one’s own outcome (abscissa) and concern about other’s outcome (ordinate). These concerns
range from indifference (the zero point of the coordinate) to very great concern.
The two concerns in this model are defined as follows: Concern about own outcomes
means placing importance on one’s own interests – one’s needs and values – in the
realm of the dispute. People with a strong concern about their own outcomes are highly
resistant to yielding; in other words, their aspirations tend to be rigid and high. Concern
about the other’s outcomes implies placing importance on the others’ interests – feeling
responsible for the quality of the other’s outcomes. This concern is sometimes genuine,
involving an intrinsic interest in the other’s welfare. However, it is more often
instrumental, being aimed at helping the other in order to advance one’s own interests.
(p. 28)
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The Dual Concern Model
(Pruitt and Rubin, 1986)
       +
         +
FIGURE 4.1
The dual concern model holds that:  problem solving is encouraged when there is a strong
concern about both own and other’s outcomes; yielding is encouraged by a strong concern
about only the other’s outcomes; contending is encouraged by a strong concern about only
one’s own outcomes; inaction is encouraged when concern about both parties’ outcomes is
weak. The model makes no prediction about when withdrawing is embraced as a strategy.
Pruitt and Rubin believe that compromising need not be seen as a separate strategy. They
understand it to be the product of less-than-robust problem solving or of simple yielding by
both sides. (Variants on the dual concern model have been applied to the study of Church-
based conflicts. See, e.g., Van der Ven 1996 and Gangel & Canine 1996.)
The strength of concern for one’s own outcome varies with the person and situation, but
certain determinants can be identified (pp. 29-31). These include: the importance of values
affected by the outcomes; the relative importance of other outcomes pursued at the same time;
one’s own fear(lessness) regarding conflict itself. Concern for the outcome for one’s group
(and not just for oneself) is also a significant determinant of the strength of one’s own
concern.
Determinants of concern for the other party’s outcomes include: existing interpersonal bonds,
kinship, group identity; and one’s having acted altruistically in the recent past. These
determinants tend to foster genuine concern. Instrumental concern for the other’s outcomes is
fostered by the perception that one is dependent on the other party (the other is seen as
capable of delivering rewards or punishments). The authors note that while personal bonds
and dependencies usually foster concern for the other’s outcome, they can also, under certain
conditions produce antagonisms that reduce this concern.
One’s decision about whether to problem solve, contend, yield, do nothing or withdraw in a
conflict situation is determined not only by the level of concern for oneself and the other
party. It is also determined by perceptions of cost and benefit related to the implementation of
a particular strategy. This is where the perceived feasibility perspective proves helpful.
YIELDING PROBLEM
SOLVING
INACTION CONTENDING
CONCERN ABOUT OWN OUTCOMES
CONCERN ABOUT
OTHER’S OUTCOMES
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For a strategy to be adopted, it must be perceived as minimally feasible. (In regard to center-
periphery conflict, socially-conditioned organizational roles and perceptions about what the
Church and societal culture allow are likely to be important influences on feasibility
conceptions.) If a strategy appears to have no or little chance of success, another will likely be
chosen. Pruitt and Rubin focus on the perceived feasibility of three strategies in particular:
problem solving, contending and inaction.
Pruitt and Rubin (p. 36):
Problem solving seems more feasible the greater the perceived common ground (PCG). PCG is a party’s
assessment of the likelihood of finding an alternative that satisfies both parties’ aspirations. The more
likely it seems that such an alternative can be found, the more feasible problem solving appears to be.
PCG is greater (1) the lower Party’s own aspirations, (2) the lower Other’s aspirations as perceived by
Party, and the (3) the greater the perceived integrative potential (PIP) – that is, Party’s faith that
alternatives favorable to both parties exist or can be devised.
At a given point of negotiation, the existence of some strategic alternatives is known and the
availability of others is suspected. The perceived integrative potential is high when there are
known alternatives that provide high benefit to both parties. It is moderately high when the
prospect of developing such alternatives is likely. It is low when one sees little chance of
coming to mutually beneficial alternatives. As conditions contributing to PIP, the authors
identify: (1) faith in own problem-solving ability; (2) momentum – i.e., prior success at
reaching agreement in the current controversy; (3) availability of a mediator; (4) other’s
perceived readiness for problem solving – which is sometimes a function of trust.
Contending seems more feasible when the Other’s resistance to yielding appears low.
Contentious behavior is invited when the Other appears to be easy to dislodge. The feasibility
of contending also hinges on Party’s apparent capacity to employ contentious tactics and of
Other’s apparent capacity to resist (power versus counterpower). “In a stable long-term
relationship, each party’s capacity to employ contentious tactics tends to be matched by the
other’s level of resistance, so that there is relatively little advantage to either party in
employing contentious tactics” (p. 40).
Potential costs of contending – including the instigation of a conflict spiral and the alienation
of the other party – act as deterrents against the choice of contentious action.
Time pressure is the key to the feasibility of adopting the strategy of inaction. As time
pressure increases, the feasibility of inaction decreases. In the face of time pressure, yielding,
which is the fastest means to move to agreement, appears to be the most commonly adopted
strategy (p. 41; cf. Pruitt and Drews 1969.) Normally, contending and problem solving are
adopted in situations of time pressure only when there is heavy resistance to yielding.
Pruitt and Rubin concede that the dual concern model and perceived feasibility perspective do
not go far in explaining why people choose to withdraw from a conflict, but they do observe
that people, apparently, withdraw from conflict handling when the benefit they expect to
receive falls below their minimal aspiration.
4.2.3 Applications of Strategy
Pruitt and Rubin identify a variety of ways that parties carry out the strategies of contending
(pp. 44-61) and problem solving (pp. 139-164).
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Among the lighter tactics of contending are ingratiation, gamesmanship, persuasive
arguments and promises. (NB: Where Pruitt and Rubin speak of “tactics,” I prefer to speak of
specific coping strategies that can be distinguished from the more general classification of five
strategies presented above. I reserve the term tactic for micro-level techniques of social
interchange, as in elements of text construction, symbolic acts, nonverbal gestures, etc. See
sections 5.4 and 5.5.) Ingratiation involves the use of guile to soften up the opposing party for
later concessions. It may be carried out by means of flattery, opinion conformity, granting
favors, or self-presentation (showing one’s positive side). Gamesmanship seeks to “ruffle the
feathers” of the opposing party, thereby lowering the opponent’s resistance to yielding. The
authors offer the example of taking time when the opponent is in a hurry, and observe that the
key to the success of gamesmanship is not raising the suspicion of one’s own deviousness.
Persuasive arguments attempt to win cooperation by reasoning. One may, for example,
persuade the other party that one has a legitimate right to a favorable outcome. Promises offer
reward in return for compliance.
Heavier means of contention include threats and irrevocable commitments. Threats send a
message that one will punish noncompliance. Pruitt and Rubin cite studies (p. 53)
demonstrating that threats are more likely than promises to elicit compliance. Irrevocable
commitments are threats that assume the following form: “I have started doing something that
requires adjustment from you and will continue doing it despite your best efforts to stop me.”
As in the game of “Chicken,” one enters into a test of will with the other party, with the loser
being the first party to change course. If neither party gives in, both lose. One of the
interesting features of irrevocable commitments is the attempt to place the locus of control for
avoiding a negative outcome squarely on the shoulders of the other (as has been seen in
classic examples nonviolent resistance).
In contrast with the strategy of contention, which seeks one’s own advantage without regard
to the wishes of the other, problem solving seeks to address the concerns of both parties.
Getting started with problem solving may be difficult because showing one’s interest in this
strategy may telegraph weakness. At the heart of the strategy is the effort to identify and
discuss the true issues dividing the parties. Creatively envisioning alternatives may enable
parties to identify conflict solutions that bridge their opposing interests. Though problem
solving has the best chance of success when both parties apply the strategy, a single party may
apply the strategy individually, and it is also possible for a third party to do the problem
solving.
Since all of the above-named forms of contending and problem solving are common to the
handling of social conflict in general, we can expect that they may also turn up (in context-
specified ways) in Church center-periphery conflict. Though none of the strategies stand out
as being inevitably relevant to intrahierarchical conflict handling, one can imagine that the
strategy of ingratiation may in some ways play into bishops’ (presumed) orientation toward
courtesy, that persuasive argumentation is likely to fit well with the normative-rational aspect
of the Church organization, and that promises and threats relate to bishops’ powers of
remuneration and coercion.
The strategies of contending, problem solving and yielding may be practiced more or less
“vigorously” (p. 42). Contending is more vigorous as heavier actions are taken. Problem
solving is more vigorous as the investment of creativity rises. Yielding is more vigorous as
one drops one’s aspirations further and further. The vigorousness of strategic action has much
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to do with the level of concern for one’s own and the other party’s outcome. High concern for
both party’s outcomes makes problem solving more vigorous. High concern only for one’s
own outcome leads to vigorous contending. If concern for one’s own outcome is weak, higher
concern for the other party’s outcome leads to more vigorous yielding. Typically, parties who
have adopted a coping strategy begin by applying the strategy less vigorously. They gradually
apply the strategy with greater vigor if earlier efforts have not achieved agreement. This
“gradualism” ensures that a greater price than necessary will not be paid to reach designated
goals.
4.2.4 Conflict Stages: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement
Pruitt and Rubin invoke various metaphors to clarify the way social conflicts tend to hold
together in sequence (pp. 183-184). One metaphor is that of the three-act play. In the first act
(Escalation) conflict builds. In the second act (Stalemate) the conflict gets to the point where
it seems unwise to escalate further and a stage of transition is reached. In the third act
(Settlement) one finds the denouement, the resolution to the conflict. This metaphor, they
note, fits many conflicts but also tends to oversimplify. As an example, the symmetry of the
three-act play metaphor neglects the fact that it is much easier to move up the escalation
ladder than to move back down. This is because people are more prone to retaliate when
challenged than to reciprocate when they are treated well. Thus, conflict spirals are more
readily achieved than benevolent circles that relieve escalation.
It might be better, the authors propose, to employ the image of a valley or canyon to speak of
conflict. One descends into conflict (analogous to escalation), crosses to the other side
(stalemate), and makes the effort of climbing up the other side. This image allows for the fact
that it is often easier to get into conflict (gravity helps us to descend into the valley) than to
get out of it. This image works better for the visualization of conflict if one envisions a rather
expansive valley, with intermittent ascents and descents before emerging on the other side –
since conflicts tend to vary in their levels of intensity and contention over time, rarely
following a simple line of descent-ascent.
Another helpful image sees the conflict sequence as a tree of many branches. Here the
changes that occur in conflict – visualized in the progression from trunk to branch to sprig to
leaf – are accounted for in an image that captures something of the complexity of turns a
conflict can take.
I call forth these metaphors because they illuminate our own task of determining how center-
periphery conflicts hold together, but to do so in a way that does not overlook important
elements of the experience. I will now discuss what, according to Pruitt and Rubin, the stages
of escalation, stalemate and settlement look like and what sorts of coping strategies and tactics
we can expect to find applied in each stage.
During conflict escalation, certain incremental transformations take place which tend to be
mirrored by the two parties (pp. 64-65). As a result of these transformations, the conflict is
intensified in ways that persist and are often difficult to undo. Pruitt and Rubin identify five
types of transformation that typically occur during conflict escalation.
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Transformations That Occur During Escalation
1. LightÆHeavy. Gentle tactics are supplanted by heavier counterparts.
2. SmallÆLarge. Issues proliferate and there is a tendency for parties to become more and more absorbed
in the struggle and to commit ever-increasing resources in order to prevail.
3. SpecificÆGeneral. Specific issues tend to give way to general issues and there is deterioration in the
relationship between the parties.
4. Doing wellÆWinningÆHurting the other. Interest in doing well is replaced by decidedly competitive
objective and, finally, after continued escalation, by the objective of hurting the other.
5. FewÆMany. Conflicts that begin with a small number of participants often grow, as collective efforts
arise at the prospect of one party’s failure.
A conflict can be said to escalate when any or all of these five transformations takes place.
(But NB: the transformations are often subtle and hard to notice.) Conflicts which have
escalated tend to stay escalated, at least for a time, because, as has been noted, it is harder to
de-escalate conflict than to escalate it.
It is possible to specify conditions that increase or reduce the likelihood of conflict escalation.
The likelihood of escalation is increased by high perceived power, low perceived
integrative potential, and high aspirations, particularly if these conditions exist on both
sides. The likelihood of escalation is reduced (and hence the situation tends toward
stability) in the presence of conflict-limiting norms and institutions, fear of escalation,
bonds between potential antagonists, and bonds to third and fourth parties who can be
expected to oppose the conflict. (p. 86)
Pruitt and Rubin draw our attention to three models (pp. 89-6) that clarify why conflicts
escalate. The aggressor-defender model distinguishes between an “aggressor” party who has
one or more goals that place it in conflict with a “defender” party. The aggressor ordinarily
starts with lighter tactics but moves to heavier tactics if these do not work. The defender
merely reacts, escalating his response in line with the aggressor’s escalation. Escalation
continues until the aggressor wins or gives up trying. The conflict spiral model holds that
escalation results from a vicious circle of action and reaction: one contentious act begets
another, in back-and-forth fashion. The structural change model holds that the use of conflict
tactics leads to changes (psychological changes, changes in groups and collectives) in the
parties and the communities that contain them. These changes invite the continuation and
escalation of the conflict.
Though not all conflicts escalate over an extended period of time, we can explain why some
conflicts do (pp. 111-125). One reason for this is that during intensifying conflict, the
relationship between the two parties may pass a psychological or collective threshold beyond
which return to the original state of relationship appears to be impossible. Moreover, negative
attitudes and perceptions toward opposing parties tend to endure, aided by processes of
selective perception (one sees only what fits a need or preconception), by self-fulfilling
prophecies (one’s expectation of the other party’s behavior invites that behavior) and by the
emergence of autistic hostility (one stops communicating or interacting with a disliked party).
Another reason for the perpetuation of conflicts is the vested interest that some may have in
continuing it. Participation in conflict provides social benefits (e.g., newfound status or a
sense of purpose) that some may be reluctant to relinquish. Finally, one may become
overcommitted to and entrapped in a given conflict. This occurs when parties invest more
resources in waging the conflict than seems reasonable by external standards. Being hesitant
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or unwilling to concede this overinvestment, one persists in the escalation with the hope of
still winning and thereby saving face.
Stalemate in conflict (pp. 126-138) comes when neither party can or will escalate the conflict
further (the point of maximum conflict intensity has been reached), nor will either party take
steps toward agreement. One may still see contentious activity during the period of stalemate,
but this does not contribute to escalation and it is less significant than the change in the
parties’ outlook that is at hand. Pruitt and Rubin recognize four major reasons for the
emergence of stalemate: the failure of contentious tactics, the exhaustion of necessary
resources, the loss of social support and unacceptable costs.
Since contention as a means of resolution is ruled out at the point of stalemate, the parties are
left with four ways out of the conflict. Inaction offers little promise because the parties are
already at an uncomfortable impasse and prefer to move beyond it. Yielding offers the
potential for a quick resolution, but one or both parties may not be in a position to yield
because they are entrapped by their commitment of resources and / or a need to save face.
(Pruitt and Rubin point out, p. 30, that representatives are usually more reluctant to yield than
are individuals bargaining on their own behalf, because representatives want to please their
constituents. This finding may be relevant the choices bishops’ make in center-periphery
conflict.) If both parties yield and come to agreement by this means, we call it a
“compromise.” Withdrawal entails a reversion to the status quo. Depending on whether the
status quo is advantageous or disadvantageous to a given party, such a solution may be
considered a form of victory or defeat in the conflict. Lastly, the strategy of problem solving
holds out the possibility of yet obtaining a resolution that is beneficial to both parties. Power
equality between the parties and the apparent chance of success are factors favoring the
adopting of problem solving methods at this point. The presence of an influential third party
may also encourage the decision to engage in problem solving. Trust in a third party mediator
can substitute for trust between the parties.
Settlement is the stage of actively taking steps toward resolution. It is characterized by the
use of problem solving and often involves third-party intervention (p. v). Three broad classes
of outcomes result from successful problem solving: compromise, agreement on a procedure
for deciding who will win (such as voting, or submitting to a judge or arbitrator’s decision)
and integrative solutions.
Types of integrative solutions include: expanding the pie (increasing the available resources);
non-specific compensation (Party gets what it wants, Other is repaid in an unrelated coin);
logrolling (each party concedes on issues that are of low priority to itself and high priority to
the other party); cost cutting (Party gets what it wants, Other’s costs are reduced or
eliminated); bridging (neither party achieves its initial demands, but a new option is devised
that satisfies the most important underlying interests of those demands). There are distinct
advantages to the achievement of integrative solutions. Specifically, integrative solutions lead
to more stable relationships between the parties in the long run and the broader communities
containing the conflictual parties are benefited as well by this stability.
The authors point out that parties do not always understand the nature of the interests
underlying their own preferences. Hence, the clarification of applicable interests is seen as an
important step in integrative problem solving.
Third parties (pp. 165-182) may be instrumental in the process of settling the conflict. A
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third party is “an individual or collective that is external to a dispute between two or more
others and that tries to help the disputants reach agreement.” Pruitt and Rubin note that the
mere presence of a third party is likely to change the relationship between the disputant
parties and, in many cases, to benefit that relationship by diverting energies otherwise given
over to escalation. At other times, however, a third party may disturb the progress toward
agreement. Thus third-party intervention is not a panacea in conflict resolution. Third parties
may take on formal or informal roles, individual or representative roles, invited or uninvited
roles, impartial or partial roles, advisory or directive roles, interpersonal or intergroup roles,
and content- or process-oriented roles. Effective third-party intervention can take the form of
modifying the physical and social structure of the dispute, altering the issue structure of the
dispute, and increasing the parties’ motivation to work energetically for resolution.
When assessing center-periphery conflict outcomes, we will want to look not only at type of
outcome and the consequences for the parties themselves – did both parties “win” in the form
of an integrative solution, did one party win at the expense of the other, did both yield to
reach a compromise, did both lose – but also, and more importantly, at the consequences for
the organization. Is the Church better or worse off for the way the conflict was handled? What
are the long-term effects of such an approach likely to be?
4.3 Use of the Conflict Theory to Illuminate the Case
This chapter has supplied us with an integrated way of thinking about social conflicts and
their management. My purpose in discussing the work of Pruitt and Rubin has been to
sensitize myself -- and the reader -- in preparation for the confrontation of the evidence from
the case, as presented in chapters six to eight.
Since I am in search of coping strategies that characterize the handling of center-periphery
conflict, I am indebted to Pruitt and Rubin for their provision of a way of thinking about the
role of strategic choice in conflict handling and their identification of a number of specific
strategies that may be employed. When we turn to consider the empirical example, we will
want to keep the concepts and strategies identified in this chapter in mind along with the
strategies and expectations summarized at the end of chapter three. In chapters six-eight I
draw specific connections between the case materials and the theoretical resources previously
provided, commenting on the “conflict functionality” of participants’ words and actions.
In chapter nine I will revisit Pruitt and Rubin’s theory in more cohesive fashion, using their
framework in support of my own understanding of how the conflict in its entirety holds
together.
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CHAPTER FIVE
METHODOLOGY FOR THE CONFRONTATION OF DATA
5.1 Overview
There are three main components to this research. The first component is a process of
theoretical sensitization that generates expectations for what we may find (which coping
strategies we will find applied) in Church center-periphery conflict. The second component is
the confrontation of the theory-based expectations with the empirical data (the evidence from
the case itself). The third and final component is the process of drawing and reflecting on
conclusions emerging from this confrontation. The purpose of the present chapter is to
complete the work of theoretical sensitization (with reference to the concepts and methods of
critical discourse analysis) and to offer a nuts-and-bolts description of how I have carried out
the analytical tasks associated with confronting the empirical data and drawing and assessing
conclusions.
5.2 Application of Case Study Method
My understanding of what a case study is follows the two-part technical definition of Yin
(1994, 13), which is reproduced below.
1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.
2. The case study inquiry
• copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more
variables of interest than data points, and as one result
• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating
fashion, and as another result
• benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection
and analysis.
Yin’s definition helps us to see when the case study approach is appropriate and what it looks
like in practice. For the sake of tying the current study to this definition, one will note that this
is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (center-periphery
conflict management) within its real-life context (immediate, organizational and societal). The
boundaries between the conflict handling phenomenon and the multiple layers of context are
often ambiguous. There are countless variables of interest (factors influencing the conflict
handling) but relatively few data points available for study (cases of center-periphery conflict
which can readily be analyzed). The research relies on multiple sources of evidence (original
documents; newspaper, magazine and scholarly journal accounts; other publications; the
personal archive of one close to the conflict, which includes documents and ephemera; and an
informational / validational interview), which converge in triangulating fashion. Finally, the
research benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions (see chapters two-
four), which have served to guide the data collection and analysis.
5.2.1 Selection, Delimitation and Demarcation of the Case
The Rome-Hunthausen conflict is the primary unit of analysis in this case study. The conflict
is an actual instance of the phenomenon of concern here, center-periphery conflict. I have
120
selected the Hunthausen case with the understanding that it is a rare, contemporary example
of a local bishop openly in conflict with the Holy See. Because of the large number of
members of the hierarchy who participated in the controversy publicly, its recent occurrence,
extended duration, and the high level of media attention it received, it is a case of center-
periphery conflict that is especially accessible to research.
The Hunthausen case also offers the advantage of being one that is personally familiar to the
researcher. Though I possessed no noteworthy insider information at the time the conflict was
underway, I did enter the priestly formation program of the Seattle Archdiocese in 1987, the
year in which the recommendations of the apostolic commission were accepted and
implemented. Thereafter I was in a position to observe some of the lasting effects of the
conflict as a seminarian (1987-1990) and as a lay ecclesial minister in the archdiocese (1994-
2001). I was personally acquainted with Archbishop Hunthausen, much better acquainted with
Archbishop Murphy (who oversaw the seminary program during my time), and have enjoyed
friendships with many priests and other pastoral leaders of the archdiocese. Though it is
common to think of personal familiarity and attachments as inducing bias, I think one can also
rightly argue that a close-up view enables one to come to levels of understanding that are not
obtainable from afar. Though I have not been privileged to see the workings of the Vatican in
this same close-up way, I am happy to benefit from the writings of other researchers who
have.
In chapter two I defined center-periphery conflict as conflict taking place within the Church
hierarchy between the central leadership position (Rome, the papacy) and one or more
peripheral leadership positions (the local churches, the other bishops). I noted along with my
provision of the definition that my attention would be limited exclusively to how members of
the Roman Catholic hierarchy engage in such conflict.
The Hunthausen case is the primary unit of  analysis of this investigation in the sense that it
conforms to this definition and can be judiciously compared with other phenomena that also
conform to this definition. In the Hunthausen case, Hunthausen, as ordinary of a local church,
occupies the peripheral position. The main actors in the center position are Pope John Paul II,
Cardinal Ratzinger, Cardinal Gantin, Archbishop Laghi and Archbishop Hickey (see sections
5.2.1.2 and 5.2.1.3). Disagreement is clearly manifest between the center and periphery
positions in the case.
5.2.1.1 Use of a Composite Source as an External Reference Point
Prior to undertaking an extensive study oneself, it is difficult to know where a case of conflict
begins and ends and of what it consists. In my confrontation of the Hunthausen case I have
benefited – especially early on -- from three descriptions of the affair that supplied key points
of orientation by focusing my attention on matters I might otherwise have overlooked. These
descriptions also acted as a check on my own judgments. Each of these sources discusses the
case from a distinct vantage point and according to a specific explanatory purpose. Here
below I identify and characterize these three sources. Thereafter I explain how I have
employed them as a composite source that has helped me to delimit and demarcate the case.
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The Composite Source
• Kenneth A. Briggs, Holy Siege: The Year That Shook Catholic America (San
Francisco: Harper, 1992).
• Thomas J. Reese, Archbishop: Inside the Power Structure of the American
Catholic Church (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989).
• Patrick Granfield, The Limits of the Papacy: Authority and Autonomy in the
Church (New York: Crossroad, 1987).
BOX 5.1
Briggs 1992 is a journalistic account that places the case in the context of contemporaneous
events in the American Church. Reese 1989 discusses the Hunthausen affair in the course of
his sociological study of the office of archbishop in the American Church. Granfield 1987
takes up the case in a theological look at limits on the power of the papacy. In the absence of
any single, “definitive” version of the Hunthausen case that could serve as a point of
reference, the composite source provides us with a body of information that includes
contextualized descriptions of participants, events and interactions.
My use of the composite source respects the distinctiveness of the three accounts it contains.
Thus I do not attempt to harmonize the three accounts. Instead I use the composite as a
general information source, drawing on the total pool of data provided by the three works
taken together. For this purpose, the works are, in a sense, placed end to end as I consider the
information they contain. I also use the composite source as an indicator of key participants,
the (observable) starting and ending points, critical turning points, and crucial documents
emerging within the context of the conflict. To make these discernments, I treat the three
works as roughly parallel accounts, looking for points of agreement and disagreement
between them. Using the composite in this way has provided a way of getting a handle on the
case initially and has given some direction to my approach to the data.
5.2.1.2 Identification of Key Participants in the Case
In this study I am concerned to identify those members of the hierarchy who participated in
the Hunthausen case in a direct and consequential way. The composite source has been
helpful for focusing attention on a limited number of members of the hierarchy who appear to
have been directly involved. In certain respects, the identification of key participants is
straightforward. The Pope, John Paul II, and the local (arch)bishop, Raymond Hunthausen,
automatically qualify as key participants in this study, being the focal points of the center and
periphery parties. The  sources making up the composite source also show a high level of
agreement about a number of other members of the hierarchy who played a significant role in
the conflict. One finds below a list of the persons cited in the accounts of the composite
source.
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Members of the Hierarchy Participating, As Identified by the Composite Source
Member of the Hierarchy Participating Identified in: Briggs  Reese Granfield
Raymond Hunthausen, Archbishop of Seattle x x x
Donald Wuerl, Auxiliary Bishop of Seattle x x x
Bernardin Gantin, Cardinal Prefect of the x
Congregation for Bishops
James Malone, Bishop of Youngstown, Ohio; x x x
NCCB President, 1983-1986
Pio Laghi, Archbishop, Papal Pro-Nuncio x x x
to the United States
James Hickey, Archbishop of Washington, D.C.; x x x
Apostolic Visitator
Thomas Murphy, Bishop of Great Falls- Billings, x x x
Montana; named Coadjutor Archbishop of Seattle, 1987
John O’Connor, Cardinal Archbishop of New York, x x x
Commission member
John Quinn, Archbishop of San Francisco, x x x
Commission member
Joseph Bernardin, Cardinal Archbishop of Chicago, x x x
Commission member
Pope John Paul II x x x
Joseph Ratzinger, Cardinal Prefect of the Congregation x x
for the Doctrine of the Faith
TABLE 5.2
Of the twelve persons just named, ten are cited by all three accounts within the composite
source as having played a significant role in the Hunthausen affair. The two exceptions are
Cardinal Ratzinger, who is mentioned by name in two of the three accounts (Briggs, Reese)
and Cardinal Gantin, who is mentioned in just one account (Briggs). (Cardinal Ratzinger’s
participation in the conflict is further evidenced by two letters he sent to Hunthausen during
the conflict, both of which have been made public. Gantin’s participation is chiefly associated
with the letter he wrote to Hunthausen confirming the Vatican’s intention for Hunthausen to
provide Wuerl with special faculties, but see also the report of other involvement in the
9.19.86 National Catholic Reporter.)
At a minimum, all of the above-named bishops have been counted as “persons of interest” in
my inquiry into the Rome-Hunthausen affair. Thus I have sought, using all of the evidence
available to me, to determine the role they played in the conflict’s unfolding and any apparent
strategies they employed to cope with the reality of conflict.
5.2.1.3 Participants Identified by Other Sources
Beyond these members of the hierarchy recognized by the composite source, certain others
who participated more or less directly in the affair can also be identified. In interviews given
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on May 11 and May 18, 2001, Fr. Michael G. Ryan (see sections 9.7-9.7.4) noted that
Archbishop Francis Hurley (Anchorage, Alaska) served as a close adviser to Archbishop
Hunthausen during much of the conflict period.
Another person who advised Hunthausen, according to Hunthausen himself (cf. Hunthausen's
address to the NCCB, November 11, 1986) was Archbishop John Roach of Minneapolis-St.
Paul. After Hunthausen was approached by the Pro-Nuncio about the possibility of
conducting a Visitation, Hunthausen called then (outgoing) NCCB President Roach for
advice. Roach suggested that Hunthausen demand a “Bill of Particulars” from the Holy See to
clarify what the visitation was about.
Ryan also called attention to the fact that Hunthausen kept the bishops of Region XII
(Northwestern United States) apprised of developments along the way and consulted with
them. Perhaps the most direct involvement of the bishops (eight of the twelve) occurred when
they were interviewed by the assessment commission in Menlo Park, California on March 6-
7, 1987. The bishops interviewed at that time were: Archbishop William Levada (Portland,
Oregon), Archbishop Cornelius Power (retired, Portland), Bishop Thomas Connolly
(Baker, Oregon), Bishop Sylvester Treinen (Boise, Idaho), Bishop Elden Curtiss (Helena,
Montana), Bishop Thomas Murphy (Great Falls-Billings, Montana), Bishop Eldon
Schuster (retired, Great Falls-Billings, Montana), Bishop William Skylstad (Spokane).
One other member of the hierarchy who played a peripheral role in the affair was Bishop
Nicholas Walsh, Bishop Emeritus of Yakima, Washington and a former Auxiliary Bishop of
Seattle. In October of 1986, Walsh made a trip to Rome of his own volition to offer his
assistance in resolving the conflict.
Lastly, in a broader sense, one might consider any of those who participated in the floor
debates of the November 1986 National Bishops’ Conference meeting (see, e.g., those cited in
the case narrative, but one could also identify other bishop commentators from newspaper
accounts at the time). These interventions are perhaps best described as tangential forms of
participation. In my examination of the case I have paid attention to the participation of all of
the above-named bishops.
5.2.1.4 Alignments of Participants
Within the framework of my concept of center-periphery conflict, the identified participants
can be associated with the center party, periphery party or third party positions. I envision the
following set of alignments.
Center Party: Pope John Paul II, Cardinal Ratzinger, the Papal Pro-Nuncio (Laghi), the Apostolic
Visitator (Hickey), Cardinal Gantin, other bishops supporting the Vatican’s position
Periphery Party: Archbishop Hunthausen, other bishops actively supporting Hunthausen’s position (e.g.,
Hurley)
Third Party: Bishop Wuerl, Bishop Malone (and the US Bishops’ Conference, including the Bishops of
Region XII), the assessment commission (Bernardin, O’Connor, Quinn), Bishop Murphy, Bishop Walsh
The first criterion I have applied in determining the alignments is office. Clearly there is no
room for disputing the placement of Pope John Paul II (as Pope, he is the representative of the
center par excellence) or of Hunthausen (as the local bishop in question, he is the standard
bearer for the periphery position). Cardinals Ratzinger and Gantin, as prefects of Roman
curial congregations, are also decidedly within the center party camp by virtue of their office.
There is also little reason to hesitate about Archbishop Laghi’s placement. As papal pro-
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nuncio, he represents the Holy See in the land of his assignment. Though he represents the
bishops of that country to the Pope at the same time, it is clear that his primary accountability
is to the Pope.
Other placements are slightly less clear-cut. I have Cardinal Hickey, the Apostolic Visitator,
in the center party position, but he might also be considered a third party. Is his office in this
case his temporary appointment as Visitator or his more usual service the leader of a local
church (Archbishop of Washington, D.C.)? Given this ambiguity, I have turned to a second
criterion for determining alignments, which I will call functional affiliation. I have applied
this criterion by asking two questions, side by side: (1) Can one identify strong reasons why a
party might want to side with center over periphery, or vice-versa? And (2) does the party in
practice appear to strongly favor one position over the other?
At the heart of this criterion is the question of (in)dependence. A true third party, as I
understand it (see section 4.2.4), has the possibility of siding with either the center or
periphery party, or remaining neutral or uninvolved. (Within limits, of course: no bishop can
simply turn his back on the Holy See without consequence.) Those associated with the center
and periphery positions, however, are clearly beholden to those positions for one reason or
another, be it fear of sanction, hope for reward, social pressure, personal convictions, personal
ties, or some other reason. Their being beholden will be reflected functionally, in their
actions. On the basis of this second criterion, I place Hickey with the center party. His
assignment originated in Rome and entailed investigating, in Rome’s name, an archbishop
and archdiocese that Rome was concerned about. Even if he had wanted to exercise a high
degree of independence (whether he did or not, I cannot say), he would have been hemmed in
by the fact that Rome expected his loyalty, he was but one person (in contrast, the later
assessment commission consisted of three persons), his role was intended to be fully secret
(even, to a large degree, with reference to Hunthausen himself), and he did not have the
advantage of NCCB backing that encouraged the independence of later bishop participants (as
the commission did).
Hunthausen, in my scheme, is essentially alone in his occupation of the periphery party
position. Other bishops, representing their own local churches to some extent, but also coming
forth as friends or admirers of Hunthausen or defenders of principle, did rally to his side, but
this was rare and often took place in private. Most notably, one can point to the role of
supporter and adviser taken up by Hunthausen’s friend, Archbishop Hurley of Anchorage, and
certain other bishops of the Northwest region.
I have identified a number of third parties above, some of whom were very directly involved
in the conflict (Wuerl, Bernardin, O’Connor, Quinn, Murphy, Malone) and others who were
tangential in their participation (the Northwest bishops and other members of the US bishops’
conference). One might be tempted to place Wuerl in the center party position, since he was
Rome’s choice to fill the auxiliary bishop position (over local candidates that were proposed),
was himself a Roman insider (after years of curial service), and received special powers of
governance at Rome’s directive, over and against Hunthausen’s wishes. Certainly, Wuerl was
viewed by many Hunthausen loyalists during and after the conflict years as a man of the
center and not of the periphery. Nonetheless, I have categorized Wuerl as a third party. In
terms of the criteria I have presented, his office in and of itself associates him with the local
church. There is some ambiguity here because of the circumstances of his appointment (his
appointment was tied to the visitation, he was ordained in Rome and not Seattle, etc.), but his
day-to-day official responsibility after the fact of his appointment was to the local church and
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to his superior, the Archbishop, and was carried out within the social environment (with its
own conditioning pressures) of the local church. Applying my second criterion, I would argue
that while Wuerl might have had reason to feel a strong loyalty to Rome, he showed himself
in practice to be sensitive to his responsibility to the local church. He never once openly
opposed Hunthausen, he immersed himself in the life of the local church, and he wrestled (by
his own account and by that of others) with the questions of loyalty that were placed before
him. On this basis, then, I prefer to see him as a third party and not simply as one doing the
bidding of the Holy See in Seattle.
Coadjutor Archbishop Murphy can also be treated as a third party. Like Wuerl, his
appointment was marked by a decisive and unusual Roman intervention, but unlike Wuerl,
Murphy had few obvious ties to Rome and he himself was already a bishop of the Northwest
region. Thus, he was already in some sense acculturated to the local church and, if anything,
he appeared to be more a man of the periphery than of the center. Murphy was in a sensitive
position, since his appointment came with heightened expectations that his presence in Seattle
would improve local conditions in accord with Rome’s wishes. But as with Wuerl, Murphy
seemed able to balance center and periphery concerns and work with both sides.
The apostolic commission of Bernardin, O’Connor and Quinn also finds placement in my
scheme as a third party. In contrast with Hickey’s appointment as Visitator, the commission’s
appointment came when there was social pressure to meet the needs of both the center and
periphery parties. Though, like Hickey, the commission had a central role in the conflict as
the result of a Vatican directive, its participation was also largely the result of the intervention
of the NCCB on behalf of Hunthausen. As such, it had an informal mandate to represent the
position of the local churches (local bishops) in America as well. In practice the commission
showed itself to be ultimately accountable to Rome but also willing to defend certain interests
of the periphery. The same might be said of the NCCB itself and of its president, Bishop
Malone. The Northwest bishops (including Bishop Walsh) are understood here to be third
party, tangential participants who balanced their obligations to Rome with feelings of loyalty
to Hunthausen and to their own local churches.
5.2.1.5 Demarcations and Stages of the Conflict
As I have already pointed out, in order to carry out a case study, we need some idea of where
the case begins and end. It is also helpful to have a skeletal description of the case to structure
our approach to the case materials. My own reading of the case, which corroborates and is
corroborated by the composite source, suggests that the case may be demarcated at eight
critical points, each of which is signalled by a public pronouncement by a member of the
hierarchy participating directly in the conflict. These eight points mark where the case enters
and leaves public consciousness and six internal junctures -- key turning points initiating a
marked rise or decline in the level of (observable) conflict intensity. Below is a description of
each of the eight critical points of demarcation.
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Main Demarcations of the Rome-Hunthausen Conflict
1. October 26, 1983: Archbishop Hickey announces forthcoming Visitation of Seattle. Case enters
public awareness. Prior to this date the conflict may be considered to be latent and perhaps incipient since
the year 1978, when a low-key exchange between Rome and Hunthausen first began (cf. Vatican
Chronology).
2. December 3, 1985: Archbishop Laghi announces Vatican appointment of Donald Wuerl to serve as
Auxiliary Bishop of Seattle. Speculation arises concerning the relationship of Wuerl’s appointment to the
visitation but this is not made clear by Rome or Hunthausen.
3. September 4, 1986: Archbishop Hunthausen publicly declares Wuerl’s possession of  special
faculties. Beginning of period of high level of open conflict.
4. October 24, 1986: Laghi releases Vatican Chronology of recent events in Seattle. The report
escalates conflict tensions.
5. November 11, 1986: Hunthausen addresses the National Conference of Catholic Bishops.
Beginning of period of highest level of open conflict. NCCB meeting includes an extended discussion of
the case and leads to the release of a neutral statement by conference president Malone. Period of
stalemate follows the NCCB gathering.
6. February 9, 1987: Laghi issues brief written statement announcing formation of apostolic
assessment commission.  Settlement stage begins. Conflict handling takes place primarily in
Hunthausen’s exchanges with assessment commission. Tensions rise sharply shortly prior to resolution.
7. May 27, 1987: Assessment commission releases its report. Hunthausen announces appointment of
Murphy as Coadjutor Archbishop. Beginning of period of steady decline in level of open conflict and
level of public awareness of the conflict.
8. April 11, 1989: Archbishop Laghi announces that the commission’s review of the situation in
Seattle is concluded. Latency of conflict resumes.
BOX 5.3
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Stages of the Rome-Hunthausen Case
(Preliminary Assessment Incorporating Numbered Demarcations)
Conflict
Intensity
Very High  5
High             4       6                         
Medium          3                7
Low   2
Very Low       1                                                      8
Latent
       [-------Early Stage----] [Middle Stage] [------Late Stage--------]
Time 1978… 1983 1985 1987 1989
Key:   1 = Hickey and Hunthausen announce visitation
2 = Laghi announces Wuerl appointment
3 = Hunthausen announces Wuerl’s possession of faculties
4 = Laghi releases Vatican chronology
5 = Hunthausen addresses NCCB
6 = Laghi announces formation of assessment commission
7 = Commission releases its report
8 = Commission’s oversight of situation in Seattle ends
FIGURE 5.4
The demarcations and stages presented above are open for discussion. But this scheme, based
on my extensive reading of the case materials (texts produced by insiders and outside
observers as well), serves a useful function by drawing our attention to the fact that the
Hunthausen case evolves over time and varies in its intensity along the way. It also highlights
the fact that there are concrete turning points and distinguishable periods (stages) of conflict
handling. To gain an in-depth perspective on the reasoning justifying the selection / depiction
above, I refer readers to the case narrative and analysis presented in chapters six-eight.
One matter of judgment concerns the latency and manifestness of conflict. How do we
determine when a conflict has risen to the surface – and to whom is it perceptible? Primarily
here I am concerned with public consciousness of the conflict. I presume that Hunthausen and
his Roman counterparts felt themselves to be in tension sometime before the October, 1983
announcement of the visitation, and perhaps as early as 1978 (when, according to the Vatican
chronology, Rome first started discussing its concerns with Hunthausen). Surely by May
1983, when Laghi approached Hunthausen about the Vatican’s wish to have a visitation, or
shortly thereafter, there must have been some felt tension, perceptible to the insiders but not to
the public at large. For all practical purposes, the conflict left public consciousness (returned
to latency) shortly after the release of the assessment commission report and the simultaneous
implementation of its recommended solution (the reassignment of Wuerl and the instalment of
Murphy, with an extended period of oversight by the commission itself). Little national
attention went to the disbanding of the commission in April of 1989, and only a limited
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amount of attention in the Seattle archdiocese itself. By that time, it appears, most considered
the matter long since resolved. For the principals themselves, however, and certainly for
Hunthausen in particular, it is likely that tensions associated with the conflict have lingered
ever since. Hunthausen’s career had been on the line over a period of years. That is not
something one walks away from easily.
As for the judgments of conflict intensity indicated in the descriptions of the points of
demarcation and subsequently plotted on the graph: these refer to the conflict theory of Pruitt
and Rubin (1986), and especially to their discussion of escalation and de-escalation. Pruitt and
Rubin identify five transformations that occur during escalation (heavy tactics supplanting
lighter tactics; the proliferation of issues; specific issues giving way to general issues; a shift
from wanting to do well to wanting to hurt the other; an increase in the number of
participants: see section 4.2.4, above). I have used these transformations as benchmarks for
identifying periods of escalation in the Rome-Hunthausen case. All five of these
transformations can be observed in what I have marked as the middle stage on the graph, the
stage when the conflict reaches its highest level of intensity.
Note that I have graphed two peaks of conflict intensity: one in the middle stage (point 5) and
one near the beginning of the late stage (the sharp rise and fall between points 6 and 7). The
peak at point 5 signals the very public, heated confrontation which took place at the
November 1986 U.S. bishops’ meeting, where the Vatican and Hunthausen positions were
debated. This is the occasion of greatest conflict intensity shown, more or less, openly. The
second peak signals the intensity of conflict handling carried out in private, when Hunthausen
and the assessment commission struggled to come to agreement.
One should note that the stages presented on the graph are labeled early-middle-late, rather
than escalation-stalemate-settlement. I do this in order to roughly distinguish the periods of
high and low conflict (rising-high-descending). In my reading of the case, the stages of
escalation, stalemate and settlement cannot be broken out quite so neatly (as is seen by the
brief but sharp rise in conflict intensity early in the settlement stage) and can better be
accounted for in my detailed description and analysis of the case in the chapters ahead. The
early-middle-late scheme gives us an oversimplified overview for the sake of introductory
familiarity with the case. It also provides a helpful way of dividing up the long case narrative.
5.2.1.6 Selection of Documents for Analysis
Documents produced by members of the hierarchy participating in the Rome-Hunthausen
conflict serve as an “embedded” unit of analysis (Yin 1994, 41-42) in the case study. Thus,
while the case of conflict as a whole remains the primary unit of analysis, selected case
documents provide us with an internal unit that can be assessed to determine which coping
strategies have been employed empirically.
My rationale for choosing documents as an embedded unit of analysis is both theoretical and
practical. In theoretical terms, I operate from the assumption that organizational conflicts are
typically made manifest in language use. Language use is at the heart of our ability to interact
as persons, and as such, it is also an inescapable dimension of conflict experience (C. L.
Briggs 1996, 3; Jandt 1973, 2). One cannot wage conflict, or resolve it, or understand it,
without being able to send messages, and receive and interpret them. Moreover, written texts
serve to negotiate sociocultural contradictions and differences between groups (Fairclough
1995, 7). Language (written or spoken) is not the only medium of conflict conduct: behaviors
other than speaking and writing also determine the course of a dispute. But by studying texts
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produced in conflict situations one may gain much insight into the nature of the conflict and
the techniques employed in its management. In regard to center-periphery conflict, it is my
view that close attention to the language used by Church leaders in conflict situations reveals
much about what interests are at stake for these leaders (and for the Church as an institution)
and what means they consider appropriate to secure those interests.
In a more strictly practical respect, my choice to focus on case documents as an embedded
unit of analysis has to do with the relative availability of documents in comparison with other
information sources. Factors of distance, cost and inaccessibility led me to rule out the
possibility of basing my analyses on interviews with principal participants from the case. And
other communications media (television, radio) were not employed as primary means for
conducting the exchanges between the parties, so analysis of broadcast tapes did not appear to
be a fruitful possibility. (Among the rare instances of the use of television by principals in the
affair were the November 1986 NCCB press statement; the Hunthausen-Murphy press
conference in June of 1987; and a September 14, 1986 broadcast of an interview with
Hunthausen and Wuerl on the KOMO-TV program “Real to Reel,” a program produced by
the Seattle archdiocese. Real to Reel showed on Sunday mornings and typically had low
viewership.) In contrast, public documents issued in the name of principal participants in the
conflict offer the advantage of representing a range of positions in the conflict, as articulated
by the hierarchy over time. Such documents, it seemed to me, offered the best opportunity to
glimpse the case in its breadth and its depth. As such, I have tried to ensure that the
documents selected for analysis be representative of the case as a whole. By representative, I
mean that the selection of documents should reveal – to the fullest extent possible, given
practical constraints – coping strategies employed by the center, periphery and third parties
through the duration of the conflict.
Before selecting documents for analysis, one must become acquainted with the “archive” of
documents relevant to the case that could conceivably be obtained (Fairclough 1992, 227). It
is common for a researcher to find that many documents that could prove beneficial for a
study are not within reach. There may simply be too many to collect, or documents may have
disappeared or been destroyed, or perhaps they are being kept private by one party or another.
(Thomas 1997, 235 points to the research difficulty created by “the inaccessibility of pertinent
archival collections dealing with Vatican-American hierarchical relations after 1965.”) Thus,
an important step is to determine which documents are within reach. From these, then, a
selection of documents can be made for analysis.
In regard to the Hunthausen case, I quickly determined that several documents of interest
which are known to exist are not available for public consumption. An example is Cardinal
Hickey’s visitation report, which apparently even Hunthausen himself has never had the
opportunity to read. Nonetheless, plenty of documents are available for our examination. I
have identified the available archive of documents through consultation of the composite
source, personal inquiries, and further reading of a wide range of sources including, in
particular, the Seattle Archdiocesan newspaper (The Progress) and the national Catholic
documentary resource Origins. This archive of documents potentially available for analysis is
specified in Appendix 2.
In my initial selection of documents for analysis, I have chosen those documents identified as
important to the case by two or more of the sources in the composite source. There are ten
documents which meet this criterion. Hickey’s visitation report is named in this list but must
be omitted because it is not available for analysis. This leaves us with nine key documents.
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My intention has been to read these documents, listed below, closely for signs of how
participants have strategically engaged the conflict situation.
Primary Documents for Analysis
Document Identified in: Briggs Reese Granfield
Early Stage
1. Ratzinger, Letter to Hunthausen with Visitation findings, x x
dated September 30, 1985
2. Laghi, Letter to Hunthausen with Visitation findings, x x x
dated November 14, 1985
Middle Stage
3. Hunthausen, Public announcement of  Wuerl's faculties, x x x
released September 4, 1986
4. Laghi, Vatican Chronology, x x x
released October 24, 1986
5. Hunthausen, Response to Vatican Chronology, x x x
released November 12, 1986
6. Hunthausen, Address to NCCB, x x x
released November 12, 1986
7. Malone, Statement at NCCB meeting, x x
released November 12, 1986
8. Laghi, Announcement of Commission appointment, x x
released February 9, 1987
Late Stage
9. Commission, Assessment Report, x x x
released May 27, 1987
TABLE 5.5
I believe this selection of documents provides us with a rich source of information regarding
the ways center, periphery and third party participants approached the conflict as it unfolded.
My own reading of the case confirms the judgment of the composite source that these
documents are critical for an understanding of the case. Each one of them is associated with a
key turning point in the case. (Fairclough 1992, 230 notes the advantage of choosing for
analysis texts that emerge out of “moments of crisis,” since these have an especially strong
potential for revealing aspects of social practice that are under contestation.) Also arguing in
favor of the above-named selection of documents is its representation of all three stages of the
conflict and participants from each position (center, periphery, third).
5.2.1.7 Accounting for Intervening Developments
In the construction of this case study it has been necessary to use other materials beyond the
nine texts identified above to draw up a picture of the conflict handling. While the documents
themselves are highly revealing when analyzed closely, the success of this analysis depends
on proper contextualization. Without a clear idea of the activity (including nondiscursive
forms of strategic coping) and discourse that surround the select documents, we are likely to
misread them and the conflict itself. For this reason, my presentation of the case narrative and
analysis in chapters six-eight includes descriptions of the conflict developments prior and
subsequent to the distribution of each document.
Producing these descriptions of conflict developments has presented a methodological
challenge. Specifically, I have faced a two-part problem of selecting and interpreting evidence
in order to accurately reproduce relevant events and exchanges from the conflict. The primary
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materials I was able to track down in support of this undertaking were other documents from
the case produced by conflict participants, newspaper accounts from the time and
miscellaneous other sources (magazine and journal articles, letters, internal memoranda, etc.).
Having gathered together a rather substantial collection of such materials, I then set aside a
limited number of documents (not the primary documents) produced by the conflict
participants for use in a later control analysis of my findings from the discourse analysis of
the nine documents already selected (see my discussion of this process later in this chapter
and the control analysis itself in chapter nine). The remaining materials provided a fairly
comprehensive information source about the case, which I used to reconstruct the case
history. The single best source for following the history of the case proved to be the
newspaper of the Seattle Archdiocese, The Progress. The Catholic documentary resource
Origins was helpful for providing the integral text of a number of documents and for
supplying other pieces of information as well. Among secular newspapers, the Seattle Post-
Intelligencer offered the fullest and most detailed coverage of the case. Among national
Catholic publications, the National Catholic Reporter offered the most comprehensive
coverage of the case from beginning to end, and was invaluable in its provision of insider
accounts of negotiations within the hierarchy. Numerous other publications also made
valuable contributions to my ability to (re)tell this story, including the Seattle Times, the New
York Times, the Seattle Weekly, the Washington Post, the National Catholic Register, the
Wanderer and the Catholic journals of opinion America and Commonweal. I have already
mentioned (in chapter one) the “time capsule” of materials I received from Ms. Janice
Wasden Price, a chancery employee during the entire period of the conflict. Ms. Wasden
Price’s box of materials contained numbered and dated scrapbooks full of article clippings
(many from the above named sources), photos, letters, campaign-style Hunthausen buttons,
internal memoranda and more, which she assembled as the conflict progressed. Beyond filling
in information gaps about the principal participants, this time capsule also offered an
acquaintanceship with the ways that peripheral participants came to participate in the affair.
Ms. Wasden Price, interestingly enough, tracked not only the activity of Hunthausen
supporters (she herself was one) but also of Hunthausen opponents. As a result, she has left a
highly informative, multi-dimensional record of the conflict. My own research has
substantially benefited from her earlier efforts.
Securing a deep and broad base of evidence from the case was only the first step in the effort
to characterize the events contextualizing the selected documents. The next step was to decide
how to distill these materials. Which events, which quotations were to be singled out as
especially revealing of how the conflict moved forward? What was worthy of mention in my
conflict narrative apart from the findings from my analysis of the nine documents?
I made my selections according to three priorities. The first priority was to ensure that key
developments and issues mentioned in the composite source were addressed in some fashion.
The second priority was to account for the full range of participants and debated questions
highlighted in the other information sources, even if these achieved only a singular
appearance. (There were practical limits to how far I could apply this standard.) The third
priority was to mention words or deeds that appeared especially instrumental or influential
within the conflict handling. (According to a cross-referencing reading of the conflict as a
whole, did the words or deeds generate direct responses, open up new issues, or serve as some
sort of crystalization of, or turning point within, the conflict as a whole?)
5.2.1.8 Construction of the Narrative
In chapters six-eight I present a narrative of the case that is based on my findings from the
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selected documents and the wide-ranging assortment of other materials. I am conscious of the
fact that this narrative is already one level of interpretation: it is one way of telling the story
out of countless other possibilities (based on one particular selection of evidence and one way
of understanding the evidence). I do not apologize for this fact, since I see no way around the
need for making some sort of coherent whole out of the jumble of possibilities, but I do
believe it is important to acknowledge this reality. As a means for allowing other observers to
judge the quality of my interpretation, and draw their own conclusions as necessary, I have
tried to be as transparent as possible in my presentation of the narrative. Therefore, I have
consistently identified the sources of quotations and I have tried to limit descriptions of
actions to empirically verifiable dimensions. As much as possible, I have tried to save more
“subjective” observations for the sections that are specifically focused on analysis (of the
conflict functionality of words and deeds).
Any story teller will at times be tempted to include items that are interesting rather than
(apparently) directly pertinent. I confess to have – hope to have – given in to this temptation
on one or more occasions.
5.3 Discourse Analysis of the Selected Documents
Texts – and here I refer specifically to the selected documents, but also to the other written
sources I have drawn on in constructing my own narrative account of the conflict – provide us
with traces of the conflict we are studying, but no more than that. They cannot perfectly
reproduce the fullness, ambiguity, dynamism and human complexity of actual conflict
exchanges. We need to keep in mind that a given text takes shape in the process of its
production, distribution and consumption, and realizes it full meaning within the contexts of
an immediate interchange and broader organizational and societal frameworks. What is really
of interest in this investigation are not the texts themselves but the social dynamics (the
thought and practice) that the texts represent and carry out.
Practically speaking, in this research we require a method that allows us to move from textual
evidence to the recognition of conflict coping strategies. The most central and crucial form of
evidence drawn on here is the selection of documents produced by conflict participants
themselves. Thus, for these documents, we need an analytical method that relates text
constructions to social conflict. Critical discourse analysis is such a method. I will now offer a
description of this method and my application thereof in this research. (Later in the chapter I
will describe the method I have employed to analyze the conflict functionality of
nondiscursive strategic developments and of other discursive developments not accounted for
by the selected documents.)
I believe that the method of discourse analysis advanced by Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995)
serves our purposes well. I have employed Fairclough’s method extensively in this study,
using it as the intermediate step toward the identification of conflict coping strategies applied
in the case. Fairclough’s is one among several approaches to discourse analysis that offer
viable application to the study at hand. These approaches are not mutually exclusive: some
among them can be used in complementary fashion. A likely alternative and / or complement
to the work of Fairclough is the well-developed approach of Van Dijk (1998, 1997a, 1997b,
1985). (But see also the range of other possibilities identified in Fairclough and Wodak 1997,
262-268.) Though my own work is much informed by the writings of Van Dijk, I take
Fairclough as my starting point and general frame of reference. I became acquainted with
Fairclough’s perspective early in this investigation: the questions he raises (about how people
acquire, maintain and employ power through discourse) and his suggestions for looking into
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those questions have shaped this research from the beginning. In a concise, compact
presentation, Fairclough points to practical applications whereby one may relate particular
texts to prevailing currents of social practice, and his focus on how power is applied
discursively in social struggle fits well with my primary interest. (Fairclough, like Van Dijk
but unlike certain other practitioners, emphasizes that the analysis of texts should not be
isolated from the analysis of the institutional and discursive practices within which they are
embedded. See Fairclough 1995, 9.) Thus, I take my lead from Fairclough, but supplement
use of his method, as necessary, with the perspective of others (Van Dijk, but also, e.g.,
Brown and Levinson 1987, Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard 1986, Brown and Yule 1983).
5.3.1 An Overview of Fairclough’s Approach
 “Discourse,” in Fairclough’s view, “is use of language seen as a form of social practice.”
“Critical discourse analysis” (CDA) is his method for analyzing how texts work within
sociocultural practice (Fairclough 1995, 7). In the following passage, Fairclough provides a
succinct description of  his approach:
[Critical discourse analysis] sees discourse -- language use in speech and
writing -- as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice
implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the
situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it. A dialectical
relationship is a two-way relationship: the discursive event is shaped by
situations, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them. To put the
same point in a different way, discourse is socially constitutive as well as
socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social
identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is
constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social
status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since
discourse is so socially influential, it gives rise to important issues of power.
Discursive practices may have major ideological effects: that is, they can help
produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social
classes, women and men, and ethnic / cultural majorities and minorities
through the ways in which they represent things and position people. So
discourse may, for example, be racist, or sexist, and try to pass off assumptions
(often falsifying ones) about any aspect of social life as mere common sense.
Both the ideological loading of particular ways of using language and the
relations of power which underlie them are often unclear to people. CDA aims
to make more visible these opaque aspects of discourse. (Fairclough and
Wodak 1997, 258)
In the current study my aim is to supply a description of how power was applied strategically,
through language use, to manage a case of center-periphery conflict. As such, I aspire, in
conformity with the agenda of Fairclough, to “make more visible” the discursive applications
of power in that conflict that may be opaque. With Fairclough, I believe discursive events
(such as the production, distribution and consumption of a text within an intrahierarchical
conflict) dialectically engage conventions of language use on the institutional and societal
level. Within that engagement, the discursive event shapes the institutional and societal
context, but it is also shaped by the same. The challenge for the discourse analyst is to look at
a particular discursive event and accurately account for how this mutual transformation takes
place. Central to this challenge is the analyst’s dependence on fixed or “frozen” reference
points (a particular version of a particular text) to reveal social exchanges that are highly
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complex and constantly shifting (the situation, organization and society changes in its
particulars from moment to moment). While no text can perfectly reveal the variety of social
forces that are in play, astute, multifaceted analyses of discourse samples can provide valuable
insight into the social forces that apply.
A key idea in Fairclough’s approach holds that conceptions of “common sense” (cf. Gramsi
1971) are crucial to the maintenance of existing power arrangements. If groups in power can
convince others that there is an inevitability or obvious rightness to the way things are, then
less-powerful groups are not likely to act to change the prevailing arrangement. To put it
another way, powerful groups remain in power to a large extent thanks to the fact that others
take for granted their belonging there. As part of their taking for granted the power
arrangement, less-powerful groups buy into ways of thinking and communicating that overtly
and covertly reinforce the established social order. (See the discussion of traditional power in
section 2.4.4.1 and my reference to “psychic” or “hierocratic” coercion in 2.4.4.) At the same
time, there may be multiple ways in which lower-power parties do not take for granted their
position of lower power and may actively seek to change their situation by challenging the
existing patterns of thought, communication and action. What CDA tries to do is lay bare how
such struggles show up in language events. (Note that key parts of Fairclough’s work – see,
e.g., Fairclough 1995, 91-92 – develop “within the framework of a Gramscian theory of
power in modern capitalist societies as ‘hegemony.’” While I acknowledge that this
theoretical background is of interest, I choose not to explore it here, since Fairclough’s
primary value to this study is his identification of micro-level linguistic techniques used in
applications of power. I believe that this practical benefit can be drawn from Fairclough’s
work without necessarily adopting, in its entirety, the view of society and history that he
advances.)
Fairclough provides questions and organizing perspectives that help us to recognize traces of
social contestation that show up in given texts. I will now discuss these questions and
perspectives and describe my own employment of them in the consideration of the Rome-
Hunthausen case.
5.3.2 Application of Discourse Analysis Within the Current Study
Before proceeding, I should add a word of caution. Discourse analysis is in some ways as
much art as science. It is essentially of a form of literary criticism that relates given linguistic
constructions to social practice. In order to build accountability into the process of analysis, I
identify the text source, the specific questions put to each text, and the evidence used to
justify particular assessments. Obviously, too, the quality of the analysis will depend on one’s
familiarity with the societal and institutional cultures (norms, practices, etc.) that apply. That
is one reason for having spent so much time on these matters in chapters two and three.
My application of Fairclough’s method involved a number of steps: (1) immersing myself in
Fairclough’s writings on discourse analysis; (2) reading, in survey fashion, all available
materials concerning the Hunthausen case; (3) reading, in close fashion (highlighting, adding
margin notes, etc.), all available documents produced by the conflict principals, except for
those set aside for the control analysis; (4) summarizing in narrative and table form the results
of the close reading of the nine selected documents (see chapter 9 and appendix v); (5)
digitally producing readable versions of the selected documents with margin notes indicating
identified strategies; (6) summarizing the strategies and tactics identified in the nine control
documents.
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Listed below are the analytical topics, suggested by Fairclough, that I have used to organize
my ground-level consideration of each of the documents. The topics draw on Fairclough’s
approach, but they do not come from him as-is. Instead, they represent my distillation of key
findings he offers. I use the topics as points of entry into each document and as a means to
gain a coherent sense of the efficacy of its construction. With each document I describe those
dimensions of the text indicated by the topic, with the help of a set of leading questions that
relates to the topic. More than description, this is already a level of interpretation, wherein I
identify elements in the construction of the document which appear be tactics within a broader
strategy for coping with the realities of the conflict. Following the list of topics below is a
description of what goes into each topical inquiry.
General Points of Inquiry Into Each Document
• Production
• Distribution
• Consumption
• Text Type
• Diction
• Usage
• Substructures of the Text
• Intertextuality
BOX 5.6
In the matter of production, Fairclough (1992, 78) notes that the position of “text producer”
is less straightforward than it might seem to be. He invokes Goffman’s (1981, 144) distinction
between “animator” (the person who actually makes the marks on paper), “author” (the one
who puts the words together) and “principal” (the one whose position is represented by the
words) as a case in point. Consequently, when considering documents issued in the name of
members of the hierarchy, we need to realize that ghost writers, editors or other
commentators, and secretaries may all have shaped the text product that is eventually
consumed. Other dimensions of production that we should be conscious of are the social
constraints on production. Production is constrained by the available members’ resources and
by the governing social practice which determines how the members’ resources are drawn
upon. A member of the hierarchy will only produce the sort of text that he can conceive, and
his conception of possibility will be shaped by the social world of which he is a part. It is
worth our while to explore the constraints on production that apply. We should also keep in
mind that text production is normally carried out with awareness that the text will be
distributed, transformed and consumed in particular ways. “Producers within sophisticated
organizations… produce texts in ways which anticipate their distribution, transformation, and
consumption, and have multiple audiences built in to them” (Fairclough 1992, 79). A bishop,
for example, who wants to pass on a particular message may choose certain phrases to appeal
to certain audiences, avoid others because of their potential of being taken out of context (in
the form of an undesirable sound bite), and authorize the formatting of his text into a press
release for ease of handling by media outlets. To the extent that I can, with each document I
delineate aspects of the document’s production that are factors in the conflict handling.
Production
a. Who is the principal?
b. Who is the author?
c. Who is the animator?
d. Did any other persons influence the production process? Who, and how?
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e. Are earlier drafts of the document known to exist? Specify.
f. Which constraints on production can be identified?
How is the production process relevant to the conflict experience?
The distribution of texts may be simple, as in the mailing of a single letter, or vastly more
complex, as when a political leader’s speech passes through multiple governmental and news
media domains (television, radio, newspaper, internet) on the way to its consumption by
various audiences (Fairclough 1992, 79). En route to its receivers, a text will make its way
through “more or less settled chains of discursive practices” (Fairclough 1995, 13). It can be
illuminating to observe what these chains are and how they shape the text in question. One
should not overlook the fact that production and consumption processes also occur within the
processes of distribution. The intermediaries who pass on texts from producers to consumers
are themselves producers and consumers. They are producers in the sense that they re-produce
the text they have received into some new arrangement and they are consumers in that they
consume what they have received. The intermediaries of distribution will have their own
unique interests to pursue as they pass on the texts they have received. Thus, the newspaper
editor who receives a press release from a bishop may be more inclined to give the statement
prominent coverage if the subject matter seems appealing for his paper’s readership. The
same text will be greeted differently by the editor of a diocesan newspaper who is dependent
upon the bishop for his job. In my assessment of each document I note traces of the
distribution process that appear in the documents themselves and which can be identified by
reference to other sources. I also point out any transformations of the text that I am aware of
which took place during the process of distribution. Beyond this, I reflect on how the text
distribution process (so far as it is known: I consult available external sources) impinges upon
the reception of the text at hand and the text producer’s participation in the conflict.
Distribution
a. What are the known steps in the distribution process?
b. Who is involved in distribution of (various versions of) the text?
c. How does passage through the distribution process shape the text?
How is the distribution process relevant to the conflict experience?
Text consumption is a dialectical process that engages properties of the text itself and
interpretive resources brought to bear by the one confronting the text (Fairclough 1995, 9).
We should, therefore, be prepared to discern how elements of the text invite certain types of
reception and how the (socially conditioned) personal resources of the text consumer
predispose him or her to respond to the text in particular ways. Various factors independent of
the text itself shape the reader’s reception of the text. These include the social context in
which the text is consumed (Private or public? Tightly or loosely controlled? Etc.) and the
sort of reading of the text that is undertaken (Individual or collective? Perusal or close
reading? Well-informed regarding the subject matter or not? Etc.). While one cannot know
with certainty what goes on inside readers as they encounter the text, it is sometimes possible
to gain insight in this matter by querying  readers through surveys or interviews.
Unfortunately, in the present study I am only able to do this in a limited way (as in the
interview with Fr. Ryan). Still, it is possible to get some sense of responses that were desired
(by looking at cues present in the text) and actual responses (by looking at texts written in
response to the given text or by consulting other written sources which document responses).
Specifying the social conditions of consumption is another challenging task, especially when
one is talking about multiple (and even unknown) receiving parties and environments of
reception. But we can at least suggest audiences who are likely targets for reception and those
who are likely overhearers, and make observations about social factors that are likely to guide
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their consumption of the text. Because we are concerned with how members of the hierarchy
employ language in the selected documents to cope with conflict, we will want to discern not
only how texts appear to be received but also how they appear to be constructed for the sake
of gaining particular sorts of reception which are advantageous for their position within the
conflict.
Consumption
a. Who were the intended consumers of the text?
b. Who were the actual consumers of the text?
c. In which text formats (personal letter, newspaper, etc.) was the text consumed?
d. In which social environments was the text typically consumed?
e. Which social constraints on consumption can be identified?
How is the experience of consumption relevant to the conflict experience?
Fairclough’s (1995, 13-15) use of the term text type stands in relation to his concept of genre.
Whereas a genre, for Fairclough, is “a socially ratified way of using language in connection
with a particular type of social activity (e.g. interview, narrative, exposition),” which exists on
a rather abstract level, a text type is a configuration of genre(s) which instantiates the genre in
a more situationally and historically specific, text-bound way. (In the background of
Fairclough’s view of genre is the informing contribution of Bakhtin 1986.) As an example,
correspondent to the interview genre, one might find the following text types (ordered from
most to least abstract): news interview, TV news interview, Channel 4 news interview. Text
types and genres are ideal types – reference concepts against which actual texts can be
compared – which stand in relation to societal and institutional orders of discourse. Flexibility
is required when making use of these terms since no fixed, widely-agreed-upon list of genres
or text types is available. (Fairclough himself provides no canon of text types.) In general, I
will make use of the notion of text type as a tool for making comparisons with other texts. A
producer’s choice of a given text type signals a willingness or unwillingness to accommodate
certain social expectations (politicians normally issue press releases, not internal memoranda).
Departures from the expected approach (which can crop up internally within a given text as
well) can hint of social arrangements under contestation. Thus my intention is to characterize
the text type of the document with a single descriptive term or phrase, but also, when possible,
to go beyond this to comment on ways the actual text is conventional or creative in regard to
the text type that is invoked, and to suggest how the choice of text type fits within the conflict
discourse that is underway.
Text Type
a. What name best characterizes the text type?
b. Which text properties invite this designation of text type?  (These are conventional aspects of text type.)
c. Which properties of the text are creative (unconventional) in regard to the text type?
How is the application of text type relevant to the conflict?
Diction is a term I use in preference to Fairclough’s “vocabulary.” Though for the most part I
employ it in the same way he does vocabulary, I prefer diction because it focuses on word
choice (the act of selection), rather than on the full array of words one’s personal knowledge
makes available for use. This topic means to draw our attention to specific words which serve
strategic purposes within the documents themselves and more broadly within the conflictual
engagement. Not all words, of course, will be chosen with the same degree of intentionality.
Whereas a text producer may introduce certain words within a text consciously for a decided
purpose, the majority of assembled words will likely be there as the result of unreflective
habits of text construction. These (apparently) unreflective inclusions are worthy of our notice
because they reveal structures of thought that the text producer takes for granted – though
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caution is in order when we read motives into word choices.
Fairclough raises many pertinent questions about the wording of a text. Are the word choices
in line with what one would expect, considering the text type, social situation, institutional
domain, etc.? Do certain words stand out by virtue of being unusual, repeated, or centrally
important to the discourse as a whole? What experiential values do words have? (What
knowledge and beliefs do they convey? What classification schemes and vocabulary domains
are drawn upon? How are ideological differences coded into the vocabulary? Do the meanings
of certain words appear to be under contestation? Are there examples of “overwording” (an
abundance of synonyms placed in proximity, perhaps indicating a preoccupation with some
specific aspect of reality) or “rewording” (the systematic replacement of one word or set of
words with another) (Fairclough 1989, 113-115)? Do certain words tend to collocate?) What
relational values do the words have? (Do the word choices invite the reader into relationship?
Are they distancing? Do euphemisms smooth over threats to relationship? Is the diction
formal or informal?) What expressive values are communicated by the word choices? (How is
social identity communicated through word choice?) Do any words have a particular
functionality in relation to the (conflict) business at hand? What role do metaphors play, if
any? These are the kinds of concerns which inform my study of the documents at the level of
word choice. Keeping this range of questions in mind, I relate the document’s diction to the
conflictual context.
Diction
a. Which words stand out from the text, and why? (Possible reasons: repetition, unusual in context,
ideologically contested, code word, metaphor, euphemism, crudity, eloquence, highly technical,
jargon.)
b. From which social-discursive (sub-)domain(s) do the words in the text appear predominantly to be
drawn? (Examples of domains: domestic life, work, recreation, church, politics, academics, etc.
Examples of sub-domains of social discourse within the church could include liturgical prayer, private
informal prayer, parish gossip, theological language (in its multitude of forms), church organizational
language, canon law, etc.)
c. Which words are especially instrumental in the assignment of social identities?
d. Which words work to improve / maintain / detract from the quality of relationship between the parties
to the communication?
e. Which words appear intended to manage certain issues of the conflict? How do these function?
How does the diction as a whole in the document relate strategically to the conflict?
Usage is a term I use (much in the way that Fairclough uses “grammar”) to discuss how the
text producer puts words together -- with implicit reference to grammatical rules -- to make
sentences and join sentences in the document. In his method of critical discourse analysis,
Fairclough gives substantial attention to how text construction on the grammatical level of the
sentence serves social goals pursued by means of the text. There are myriad ways in which
this can take place. Fairclough (1989, 111, 120-132)  invites us to consider some possibilities
through questions he raises, among which are the following. What experiential values do
grammatical features have? (Does the construction of the sentence make agency unclear? Do
the use of nominalizations – nouns or multi-word compound nouns which stand in for
sentences articulating process – hide dimensions of causality? Are sentences active or
passive?) What relational values do grammatical features have? (Which grammatical modes
are employed – declarative, grammatical question, imperative? Are there important features of
relational modality, expressing the authority of one participant in relation to another? (Here
one gives special attention to modal auxiliary verbs, adverbs and tense.) Are the pronouns we
and you used, and if so, how?) What expressive values do grammatical features have? (How is
the writer’s authority with respect to the truth communicated? (Again the use of modal
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auxiliaries, or the absence thereof, is often revealing.)
Fairclough (1992, 77; following Halliday and Hassan 1976, and Halliday 1985) uses the term
“cohesion” to refer generally to ways that clauses are linked together into sentences, and
sentences are linked together to form larger units in texts. Linkage may be achieved in various
ways, including through the use of repeated words, near synonyms, words drawn from the
same semantic field; through referring and substituting devices (pronouns, definite articles,
demonstratives, ellipsis of repeated words, etc.); and through conjunctive words. Another
aspect of cohesion worth considering is whether the linkage of clauses and sentences shows
coordination or subordination.
For each document, I will note under the heading Usage constructive techniques, such as
those identified above, which appear to carry out the document’s social functionality.
Usage
a. Are agency (who acted?) and causality (which x caused effect y?) clarified, made ambiguous or hidden
through sentence constructions? Which techniques of sentence construction (and/or sentence linkage)
achieve this?
b. How are identities articulated through grammatical forms?
c. How are relational values signalled and pursued through elements of usage?
d. What expressive values do grammatical features have?
How does the usage function strategically within the conflict?
Beyond the level of the sentence we find larger substructures of the text which help to make
up the structure of the text as a whole. This concept has reference to the text type and genre
that the document instantiates. Certain expectations accompany the association of a document
with a particular text type: we will expect to see familiar elements of text in a familiar
arrangement. For example, when reading a newspaper article, we may well expect to see a
headline, followed by identification of the author, and then the body of the article, divided
into paragraphs. If it is a straight news story (as opposed, say, to a work of editorial
comment), we may then anticipate finding key points of information in the first few
paragraphs (answers to the questions who, what, where, when, how?), followed by subsequent
paragraphs which take up the secondary topics or the main topics in greater detail. The
expected elements will vary according to the text type. When familiar elements appear as
expected, broader social understandings implied by the text type are drawn upon and
reinforced. The inclusion of unexpected elements or the arrangement of text elements in
unexpected ways may serve to challenge the presumed social order. The invocation of an
alternate source of authority into the text at hand may produce a similar effect.
Fairclough’s concepts of intertextuality and interdiscursivity are relevant here. One may find
subsections of a given text which stand out because they refer to other texts or incorporate
portions of the same. Or one may come upon the mingling of discourse types within a given
text, as when a rather formal lecture begins with a humorous preamble. There is no fixed set
of categories for distinguishing the sorts of substructures that may cohere in a single text, but
by dialectically inquiring into the relations between the parts and the whole one can gain a
more sophisticated sense of how the text functions within its social context.
Substructures of the Text
a. Which substructures of text organization can be identified?
b. How do these substructures relate to the structure of the text as a whole?
How do the identified substructures serve a strategic purpose, if any, within the conflict?
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Having raised the question of intertextuality, let us consider further how that concept may
come into play in our analysis of documents. I have already made a point of giving
preferential treatment in my selection of documents to those documents that stand in manifest
intertextual relationship to other documents. When such relationships are transparent, we have
a ready opportunity to observe how the texts respond to and anticipate one another. The
manner of this interchange says much about the social prerogatives which are operative within
the conflict. My intention, however, is not to consider only manifest kinds of intertextuality,
but also more implicit forms of the same. Fairclough (1992, 102) holds with Bakhtin (1986)
that all texts are inherently intertextual. That is, a text marks a turn in a continual turn-taking
of speakers (writers). It is made up of words others have used and has direct and indirect
bearing on instances of future word use by others. By and large, intertextuality is implicit
rather than explicit. When possible in this study, I will also consider instances of
intertextuality that, while notable, are perhaps less than obvious. An important assignment in
the study of intertextuality is to sort out the more prominent voices that speak in a text. We
will want to attend to how the text producer incorporates these other voices (In a detached
way? Ironically? Reverentially?). Intertextuality can be a source of ambivalence (Fairclough
1992, 105), since it may be difficult to know which voice is holding forth at any given point.
In the course of my analysis, I draw attention to various elements of the selected texts that
seem to indicate relationship with other texts (be they included in my document selection or
not). In each case I will say something about what the nature of that relationship appears to be
and how the interconnectedness factors into the total discourse of the conflict.
Intertextuality
a. Which external texts are explicitly invoked?
b. Which external texts are implicitly invoked?
How does the observable intertextuality function strategically in regard to the conflict?
Taken together, the reflections shared above serve both to sensitize our consideration of case
materials and to provide us with methodological tools of discernment. They paint a picture of
how power functions discursively and remind us that power cannot be studied independently
of its applications.
5.4 Identification of Coping Strategies on the Basis of Documentary Evidence
Careful consideration of the select documents in light of the eight discursive-analytic topics
helped me to come to a multi-dimensional view of how each document functioned within the
conflict. (See the detailed presentation of findings in appendix v.) On this basis, I was able to
think more clearly about how the texts served strategic purposes.
The most pertinent challenge was to discern, on the basis of the documentary evidence, which
coping strategies were being applied by means of the text. In chapter three (3.5.3) I defined a
coping strategy as an orchestrated attempt to manage conflict as advantageously as possible.
I then went on to identify a set of expectations for the conflict handling. To refresh our
memory, these were:
The General Stance toward Conflict Handling:
All members of the hierarchy participating in center-periphery conflict will strive to
save the face of and enhance the power of the Church organization and themselves.
Perspective on the Use of Power:
Members of the hierarchy will strive for (the appearance of) legitimacy in their
employments of power.
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Likely Coping Strategies:
1. Show deference to the structural order and mindset of the Church
2. Associate one’s own efforts with the best interest of the Church
3. Minimize the appearance of conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies.
This set of expectations needs refinement in light of the findings from the encounter with
Pruitt and Rubin’s conflict theory (chapter four). In section 4.2.3 I specified a number of
possible strategies of contending highlighted in that theory. Though I do not accord these a
status in my reflections that is equal to the expectations just listed (since they are not
grounded in an in-depth reflection on the Church organization and culture), I do want to call
attention to them once more, since they have served as a set of second-tier or background
expectations. And indeed, as we will see in the confrontation of the empirical example, certain
of these strategies cited by Pruitt and Rubin do prove relevant to the handling of center-
periphery conflict.
Other Strategies (of Contending) That May Apply (Identified by Pruitt and Rubin):
1. Ingratiation
2. Gamesmanship
3. Persuasive Argumentation
4. Promises
5. Threats
6. Irrevocable Commitments
Pruitt and Rubin also identified certain techniques of getting to problem solving (section
4.2.3) that, while not construed as strategies per se, may prove relevant to center-periphery
conflict management.
In the confrontation of evidence from the Rome-Hunthausen case, the following questions
stand central. Did the expected strategies show up? If so, which tactics carried them out?
Which, if any, other coping strategies were applied (by means of which tactics)? And how did
application of the strategies relate to the question of power?
My initial assessments were written up as notes and rough checklists. These tracked my
observations about the strategies and tactics that seemed to apply, along with my reasons for
thinking so. The results of these assessments turn up in progressively refined form in the case
narrative that follows and in the analyses subsequent to it. A fundamental problem concerns
the decision to declare a loose set of discursive moves a strategy. How do we know that one
supposed tactic relates to another in “orchestrated” fashion? (Each could simply be the
product of habit, or the two could be coincidentally joined.) Strategy implies intentionality
(though I lessen this a degree with the qualifier “coping”): How do we know when a party is
really intending to move in certain direction as opposed to being carried along by events? And
finally, when does a tactic become a strategy in its own right? (In practice I found it
sometimes difficult to separate out uses of silence, for example, from uses of secrecy. Should
silence be considered a strategy rather than a tactic?) There are no easy answers to these
questions. In general, I have tried to stay close to the definition of coping strategy that I have
offered and to explain my judgments as clearly as possible along the way. I have reserved use
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of the term strategy for what strike me as more pronounced approaches to conflict handling.
Thus, not for one-time occurrences or for techniques applied in minor matters, but rather for
repeated patterns (identifiable across time and in multiple documents) wherein several tactics
appear to be directed, in converging fashion, toward the same chosen end. A further reason
for applying the label coping strategy came when conflict moves could be tied to a party’s
explicitly stated value judgments and intentions. (Sometimes parties state clearly the goals
they are pursuing and the means they have chosen to get there.) At this juncture I should
stress that I have not sought to identify every single strategy applied in the conflict. Instead I
have concentrated on locating those strategies that stand out because: (1) they are applied
repeatedly (by more than one party on more than one occasion); (2) they appear strongly
related to the “culture” of the Church organization (its prevailing ways of thinking and
acting, especially inasmuch as these distinguish the Church from other organizations); and (3)
they appear decisively instrumental in the conflict handling and resolution itself (i.e., I am
particularly interested in strategies that seem to “make a difference” in how the conflict
shapes up and is resolved). More minor applications of strategies do not necessarily show up
in my narrative or analysis of the case.
In my analysis of the Rome-Hunthausen case documents, I distinguish between the objective
apparently pursued by a conflict participant through general and more specific (coping)
strategies, which are carried out on the level of the text by means of certain text construction
tactics. The objective is the specific goal within the conflict context to be achieved by the
issuance of the text: e.g., responding to an earlier attack made by the opponent. The general
coping strategy is the overall conflict handling approach evidenced by the text as a whole,
with the designation limited to a choice from among the five general strategies named by
Pruitt and Rubin (see section 4.2.2). The specific coping strategies are the distinctive
approaches that work within the general strategy: e.g., recruiting allies may be a specific
strategy within the more general strategy of contending.
One will notice, when reading through the conflict analysis sections of chapters six-eight
(both the document and intervening development sections), that the descriptions of strategic
applications tend to be more condensed the further one goes. This is primarily a reflection of
the learning process that is underway and my own desire to avoid redundancy. Thus, typically
when a strategy is encountered for the first time in practice, I describe its use in detail. But
later identifications of use, for the most part, call attention to the use without elaborating,
unless new dimensions of potential in the strategy are revealed by that particular use. In such
cases, I do offer a more detailed description. In general, however, I try to avoid what seems
rather obvious and to avoid repeating lessons that have already been learned. When there are
questions about whether a strategy has or has not been recognized in a particular section, the
readers should consult the appropriate table in appendix v.
To sum up: for each of the selected documents I have identified the following elements. This
information is presented in appendix v and  in the case narrative and analysis of chapters six-
eight.
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Organizational Scheme for the Naming of Strategies and Tactics, Per Document
A. The main tactics of text construction, which realize the specific coping strategies
identified. The techniques of critical discourse analysis are applied to identify these
tactics. For each tactic identified I offer examples of constructions contained in the
text that embody the tactic.
B. The specific coping strategies which contribute to the overall coping strategy in
evidence in the document. Rather than noting all coping strategies in evidence, I
typically highlight the strategies that appear to be most prominently applied.
C. The general coping strategy (one or more) applied through the production,
distribution and consumption of the document. This designation is limited to a choice
from among five options: contending, yielding, problem solving, inaction and
withdrawal. NB: the focus here is on the strategy actualized through the composition
and public release of the document itself, not on other strategies that may be evidenced
by the document but not in fact applied through it.
D. The objective apparently pursued through issuance of the document. This is a brief
summary statement that characterizes what the document is intended to achieve within
the conflict context.
BOX 5.7
5.5 Assessment of the Conflict Functionality of Other Developments
Accounting for the strategic dimensions of other developments in the conflict – that is, for the
rest of the conflict story, the parts not revealed by analysis of the selected documents –
required the employment of another kind of assessment process. In chapters six-eight, one
sees that extensive descriptions “flesh out” the skeletal description of the conflict provided by
the findings from the documents. After writing these descriptions, it became clear that it was
also necessary to say something about the conflict functionality of these prior, intervening and
subsequent conflict developments. And obviously, since these descriptions were composite
constructions based on other conflict documents, outside-observer descriptions, ephemeral
materials, etc., they did not lend themselves to analysis according to precisely the same
method I applied to the selected individual documents.
Most important, in my view, was the need to say something about how these other
developments fit into the conflict picture as a whole. It would also be interesting to draw on
these materials (as they cohered in the narrative description), to identify, as fully as possible,
conflict tactics, specific coping strategies, general coping strategies and objectives, much as
was done in the discourse analysis of the documents. The question was how to conduct such
an analysis.
My answer to this challenge was to develop a two-pronged approach. First, I focused on the
empirical referents that could be isolated in the narrative material. What actually happened,
what actually was said? Identifying the empirical referents was never a straightforward
matter, since newspaper accounts, for example, always offer interpretive descriptions of
events, not the events themselves. The same is true of reproduced speech. (Is the quotation
accurate? Is it the full text given? What was the context?) Nonetheless, plumbing the variety
of information sources available to me, I was able to cross-reference my determinations about
empirical referents discernible in the descriptions and thus render my judgments with greater
confidence. Second, to interpret the strategic significance of the identified referents, I drew on
the discussions of strategic negotiation in Pruitt and Rubin 1986. Taken together, these works
144
provided a frame of reference that allowed me to characterize the conflict functionality of the
contextualizing developments.
One finds in chapters six-eight, at the end of each description of intervening developments, a
brief narrative description of the conflict functionality of those developments. A more detailed
breakdown of my findings concerning those developments appears, in tabular form, in
appendix v.
5.6 Cross-Site Analysis of Strategy Applications
After identifying conflict tactics, specific coping strategies, general coping strategies and
objectives, as revealed by the selected documents and the analysis of the intervening
developments, I prepared a table summarizing the findings (section 9.4). This table shows
which strategies were applied by which parties at which stages of the conflict, allowing for
various kinds of comparison and summation. It provides a first “complete” answer to the
question, Which coping strategies are observable in center-periphery conflict discourse?
Following the presentation of the table, I offer a detailed breakdown of the findings it
represents, considering in turn each of the conflict expectations I had before confronting the
empirical data from the conflict (re. general stance toward conflict handling, perspective on
power, strategies to be applied), and what actually turned up, based on the evidence examined
(including perspectives and strategies that were not anticipated).
5.7 Further Integration With Reference to Conflict Theory
Upon completing the description of the pool of strategic elements making up the conflict
experience, I turned to the theory of conflict handling presented earlier (in chapter four) for
help with the task of ordering the elements into an organized whole. In chapter ten I offer a
reading of the Rome-Hunthausen case that relates the case events to the conflict theory
concepts. Thus I have specified the interests that appear to have been at stake for each of the
participants and the goals and standards governing their choice of conflict moves. There I
have also characterized the participants’ apparent level of concern for one another and the
operative perceptions of feasibility informing the conflict moves.
The major part of the conflict theory reflection goes to a chronological description of the
coping strategies applied (divided into stages) and to a qualitative account of strategy use. My
analysis focuses on party preferences for the use of a particular strategy (Were there
unbroken commitments to the use of a given strategy? Were there notable departures from a
strategy one appeared committed to?), on linkages between strategies (e.g., Does use of one
particular strategy generate the use of another particular strategy in response?) and on
strategies used in desperation. I also assess the vigorousness of strategy applications and the
range of tactics associated with each strategy.
Finally, the conflict theory reflection considers the case in terms of its stages, identifying
signs of escalation, stalemate and problem solving, offering reasons for why the parties chose
the conflict handling approaches they did when they did, and it presents an assessment of
outcomes.
5.8 Ascertaining the Validity of the Findings
After viewing the case through the lens of conflict theory, we are left with a still more
complete and coherent picture of what the conflict was about, how it took shape and which
strategic means parties employed in pursuit of their own interests. But the question arises,
How trustworthy are these findings? As tests of their validity, I have employed two
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techniques of control. One is a document-based control and the other is an informant-based
control.
5.8.1 Use of Control Documents
To my mind, the most persuasive evidence that certain identified strategies were applied to
manage the Rome-Hunthausen conflict comes from analysis of the documents issued by the
participant parties themselves. Carefully attending to such documents reveals much about
what was at stake for the participants and how they sought to secure their own interests. But
the possibility exists that I have missed important findings by selecting documents that are
nonrepresentative or by selecting too few documents, with the result that we have a too
limited view of the coping strategies applied discursively. To guard against that form of
misreading of the case, I have introduced a method for validating the findings from the
document analysis.
The control method I have used is rather simple. At an intermediate point in the research
process I set aside a number of documents produced by conflict participants for subsequent
use for comparative purposes. These were documents I had looked over in my general reading
for overview of the case, but which I had not exposed to any systematic close reading (of the
kind that was being done with the nine selected documents). My intention for the documents
was to read them at a later time in light of my findings from the discourse analysis of the
selected documents to see how they corroborated, expanded upon or challenged the findings
from the nine documents previously considered.
As much as possible, I wanted the selection of control documents to be representative of the
case as a whole (all parties, all stages) and a random selection. These became my two criteria
for selection of the control documents. First, I sought to have one document each representing
each of the three parties in each of the three stages of the conflict (that is, nine in total). This
proved not to be possible in every instance, since the center-party documents for the middle
stage for the middle stage were either already analyzed (as part of the earlier selection of nine)
or not available for analysis (not made public). Consequently, I analyzed a total of eight, and
not nine, control documents. My second aspiration was to have my choices be random: i.e., as
much as possible, undetermined by my own biases. For this reason, whenever possible
(whenever more than one choice presented itself to represent a party and stage) I used a
technique of random selection to make the choice of control documents.
My comparative analysis of the control documents was not a ground-up analysis, as was
conducted with the original selection of nine documents. Instead, I conducted two semi-closed
readings of the documents, focused on two sets of expectations, one positive and one
negative. These expectations expressed, in specific formulations for each of my main
findings, what I fully expected to encounter in the control documents and what I did not at all
expect to find there. If my own findings were valid, I should find more of the same in the
control documents and should not find anything that would seem to disprove my own view
outright.
As it turned out, my findings were largely confirmed through the control analysis, but there
were some obvious points of tension that led me to modify my conclusions. This analytical
process and the presentation of its conclusions is set forth in chapter nine.
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5.8.2 Use of the Fr. Ryan Interview for Validation Purposes
The second technique of control I applied to test my findings from the case was an interview
with someone who directly participated in the affair. (Fairclough 1992, 238 suggests this as a
possible technique of validation for findings derived from discourse analysis.) Thus, late in
the research process, I asked Fr. Michael G. Ryan to sit for an interview organized into three
components: an open-ended component, which invited him (see appendix vi for the question I
posed) to give his own account of the affair as a whole (with rare inquiries for clarification); a
semi-open component, wherein I asked specific informational questions to fill in gaps in my
own knowledge; and a closed component, wherein I offered the questions and specified a
range of potential answers. Though the third component in particular was designed for
validational purposes – I asked Fr. Ryan to judge the credibility of certain conclusions I had
come to in the research process (which at that point was three-quarters complete) –
eventually, I was able to draw on all three components as checks on my own findings.
In chapter nine I present the results of the Ryan interview in the following order: first, I
summarize the new information about the conflict gathered from the interview (i.e.,
information I did not find available in other sources); second, I describe the confirmations and
disconfirmations of my own findings that the interview brought to the surface; third and
lastly, I consider a possible additional coping strategy (one I had not earlier considered) that
Ryan identified.
5.9 Conclusion and Evaluation
Chapter ten brings this investigation to a close. It presents my summary of findings from the
Rome-Hunthausen case, offering my final answer to the question, What coping strategies are
observable in center-periphery conflict? Answering this question of necessity entails a
reflection on the generalizability of my findings, a matter that I pursue in chapter ten as well.
Included, too, is an evaluation of the strength and weaknesses of this research project, and in
particular of the suitability of the methods chosen to answer the central question. Finally, I
briefly consider the relevance of my findings and the implications for the Church
organization.
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CHAPTER SIX
NARRATIVE AND ANALYSIS OF THE ROME-HUNTHAUSEN CASE: THE
EARLY STAGE (1978-SEPTEMBER 1986)
A. Early Developments in the Hunthausen Case (1978-September 1985)
According to the Vatican (see Archbishop Laghi’s “Vatican chronology,” document 4,
below), one can trace the beginning of the Hunthausen case to 1978. From that year forward,
“the Holy See, through the then Apostolic Delegation, … corresponded with Archbishop
Hunthausen on matters related to pastoral practices and the presentation of the Church’s
teachings. Through this exchange the Holy See sought the assistance of the Archbishop of
Seattle in responding to the high volume of complaints that were sent to Rome by priests,
Religious and faithful in the archdiocese.”
In his response to the Vatican chronology (see document 5, below), Archbishop Hunthausen
writes that “if there were substantial complaints I was never told who made them or who
substantiated them and on what basis. Nor was I told till considerably after the Visitation was
decided upon and announced to me … what some of those complaints were.”
These competing statements, and the absence of alternate sources of verification, leave us
with uncertainty about when the Hunthausen case actually began as a case of perceptible
conflict. When did Vatican representatives first become displeased with Hunthausen? When
did Hunthausen first feel this displeasure (and perhaps return the feeling)? When did each
party first consider itself to be in conflict with the other? These are important questions, but
ones I cannot answer.
Certain early exchanges, which took place behind the scenes, have been publicly
acknowledged by one or more parties, but contents of these exchanges remain mostly hidden.
Hunthausen himself apparently first became aware of the Vatican’s interest in conducting a
visitation of Seattle in May of 1983, when the Papal Pro-Nuncio to the United States,
Archbishop Pio Laghi, approached him about this at a meeting of the American bishops in
Chicago. Hunthausen agreed at that time that a visitation could be undertaken with his
support. Shortly after learning of the Vatican’s wish to have a visitation, Hunthausen
consulted with then president of the national bishops’ conference John Roach, Archbishop of
Minneapolis-St. Paul, who advised Hunthausen to request a “Bill of Particulars” specifying
the reasons for the visitation (cf. Hunthausen’s 11.12.86 address to the bishops’ conference,
document 6, below). Hunthausen reports that this request was refused. (He does not say by
whom.) In July of that same year, Washington, D.C., Archbishop James Hickey was
appointed Apostolic Visitator (cf. the Vatican chronology). It is also known that Hunthausen
discussed the forthcoming visitation with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Prefect of the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, during Hunthausen’s ad limina visit to Rome in
September of 1983 (cf. Hunthausen response to Vatican chronology, document 5, below). No
detailed descriptions of any of the events just cited is available for public inspection, though
Hunthausen has said on the record that during the ad limina visit he expressed to Ratzinger
his opposition to conducting the visitation in secrecy, and he also offered to invite Ratzinger
or a designee to come to Seattle to inspect conditions for himself. “But my invitation and my
point of view were not accepted.” Finally, Ratzinger mentions (in his 9.30.85 letter to
Hunthausen) and quotes from a 10.4.83 letter that the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
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Faith sent to Hunthausen concerning the forthcoming visitation. This letter, too, has never
been made public.
The first clear signal to the public that something was amiss in Archbishop Hunthausen’s
relationship with the Vatican was Hunthausen’s joint announcement with Archbishop James
Hickey of Washington, D.C. (on 10.26.83) that Hickey would be “visiting” the Archdiocese
of Seattle, November 2-8, 1983 (The Progress, 10.27.83). This announcement was made
necessary when word of the impending visitation leaked to the news media. (Hunthausen, by
his own account, argued ahead of time against keeping the visitation secret. See his response
to the Vatican chronology, document 5, below.) The news leak came to the attention of
Hickey, who first consulted with Archbishop Laghi and then contacted Hunthausen about the
need to make a public announcement. The origin of the leak is unknown. Hunthausen insisted
that the leak came from the East Coast and not from Seattle (cf. Hunthausen’s response to
Vatican Chronology).
In his brief press statement Hickey said that he came “at the request of the Holy See and with
the gracious welcome of Archbishop Hunthausen.” Noting that “from time to time,
Archbishop Hunthausen has suffered criticism regarding his pastoral ministry in Seattle,”
Hickey stated that the purpose of the visit was to “explore the views and opinions of informed
members of the clergy, religious and laity so that [the Holy See] may evaluate the criticisms
and support the Archbishop in his ministry.” Hickey concluded his statement, saying:
I go as a brother bishop to observe the situation at first hand and to offer appropriate fraternal assistance
and support. I look forward to my days in the Northwest and a visit with my colleague, Archbishop
Hunthausen.
Hunthausen’s accompanying statement (The Progress, 10.27.83, p. 5) offered the following
commentary:
For my part, I must say that I welcome Archbishop Hickey’s visit. As he indicated in his statement,
many bishops these days are in the position of receiving criticism of the sort that calls into question the
direction of their pastoral ministry and, in some cases, actually hinders that ministry.
Recent articles in the national Catholic press have pointed to the fact that much of this criticism has
come from reactionary elements within the church which seem bent on undoing the renewal begun in our
church in the Second Vatican Council.
Because my faith tells me that this renewal in the Church is the work of the Holy Spirit, and because
I am convinced that our efforts here in this archdiocese are in keeping with the spirit and intent of the
Council, I do welcome Archbishop Hickey’s visit here. I believe it will help bring into focus both our
strengths and our weaknesses in carrying out the renewal and, in so doing, that it will be of benefit not
only to this archdiocese but to the church in the country and beyond as it seeks to renew itself.
I ask your prayers for the continued guidance of the Holy Spirit now and in the days to come.
Early media speculation about the reason for the visitation focused on Archbishop
Hunthausen’s well-known opposition to the build-up of nuclear arms. Hunthausen had
participated in highly public protests at the Bangor, Washington military base housing Trident
nuclear submarines and was known for having labeled the base “the Auschwitz of Puget
Sound.” As an act of civil disobedience, Hunthausen had also taken the step, in 1982, of
refusing to pay half of his income tax, the portion of the tax that would otherwise go for
military spending. In subsequent years Hunthausen continued to withhold a portion of his
taxes as a form of witness. In response, the government, with Hunthausen’s cooperation,
garnisheed that portion of his wages which had not been paid. This brand of activism had
earned him many admirers and many detractors as well. Perhaps his controversial stance
somehow had something to do with the visitation? Upon his arrival in Seattle, reporters put
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this question to Archbishop Hickey. But Hickey said the visit was not prompted by
Hunthausen’s stand on nuclear arms. When asked  which areas were of concern, Hickey
refused to elaborate. “Sometimes you do things in a quiet way,” he said (The Progress,
11.10.83).
Hickey conducted the visitation assisted by Fr. William Coyle of Fargo, North Dakota.
Together they interviewed, in private, more than 70 members of the clergy religious and laity
(cf. Laghi letter of 11.14.85, document 2, below) at the chancery of the Archdiocese of
Seattle. Hunthausen himself sat for an interview which lasted more than four hours. The
interview was taped and later transcribed and submitted to Hunthausen for a review of its
accuracy.
At the conclusion of the visitation, Hickey issued a press statement in which he said:
I came as brother-bishop to brother-bishop to assist in reviewing the pastoral life of this important
archdiocese. The Holy See asked me to come for a short time, to gather information and thus assist the
Holy Father in his on-going evaluation and support of bishops throughout the world.
I have observed the progress made in the Archdiocese of Seattle, and have gained, I believe, an
insight into a range of viewpoints. I heard from so many who expressed admiration for Archbishop
Hunthausen as a man of Gospel values, a bishop deeply committed to Christ and to the church. Concerns
and criticisms expressed to me have been discussed with the archbishop. We are confident that these can
be resolved in a spirit of mutual understanding and in harmony with the teaching and direction of the
church.
Shortly before Christmas of 1983, Hunthausen received a letter from Cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger, Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, dated 12.12.83.
Ratzinger’s letter informed Hunthausen that the Holy See had received Archbishop Hickey’s
report of his findings from the visitation. Ratzinger complimented Hickey for conducting the
visitation “with exemplary objectivity and thoroughness and with a characteristically fraternal
spirit” and he thanked Hunthausen for his “complete cooperation in this understandably
difficult project.” As for the contents of the visitation report itself, Ratzinger was not
forthcoming but he pledged to give the report “the attentive study which [it] deserves, and
which will obviously be necessary to overcome the specific problems which have been
encountered.” The visitation report has never been made public, and, according to his own
testimony (cf. Hunthausen’s 11.12.86 address to the U.S. bishops, document 6, below),
Hunthausen himself has never seen the report.
Hunthausen published the Ratzinger letter in the January 26, 1984 issue of The Progress, the
official newspaper of the Seattle Archdiocese (now known as The Catholic Northwest
Progress), together with his own cover letter. Hunthausen wrote that he was publishing the
letter, addressed to “My Dear People,” “[I]n the interest of keeping you informed.”
Hunthausen closed the brief cover letter expressing “commendation and gratitude to
Archbishop James Hickey for the wonderfully sensitive manner in which he carried out his
difficult assignment.”
Following publication of this letter from Cardinal Ratzinger, little stands on the public record
to account for the exchanges between Hunthausen and the Holy See during the twenty-month
period beginning in January, 1984 and ending in September, 1985. Ratzinger (in his letter of
9.30.85) mentions a 3.14.84 letter from Hunthausen to the Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith, wherein Hunthausen discusses steps taken to correct the practice of contraceptive
sterilization in local Catholic hospitals (one of the visitation issues). This Hunthausen letter
has never been made public. Archbishop Laghi (in the Vatican chronology) mentions another
150
letter, dated 9.11.85, from Hunthausen to Laghi, that discussed the visitation findings and the
possible appointment of a helper bishop in Seattle to assist in problematic areas of
archdiocesan life. This letter, too, has never been made public.
The official announcement of the visitation findings came to Hunthausen in the form of a
9.30.85 letter from Cardinal Ratzinger (see document 1, below). The Ratzinger letter closed
the visitation process and identified a set of problems in the archdiocese that Hunthausen was
expected to address. Hunthausen had received a preliminary briefing on the investigation
findings from Laghi sometime before September 11 (cf. the Vatican chronology). A summary
and analysis of the Ratzinger letter follows, in section 6.1. But first I will consider the conflict
functionality of the developments just described.
A.a. Conflict Functionality of the Early Developments (1978-September 1985)
A critical question for our understanding of the conflict is what happened in the center and
periphery party exchanges between 1978 and early 1983. During a later, more openly
contentious, stage of the conflict, Laghi looks back and states that the Holy See had been
trying for years (since 1978) to gain Hunthausen’s cooperation in addressing the problems
that were now being discussed in the open (cf. the Vatican chronology). Hunthausen
challenges this claim (in his response to the chronology), saying that he had been ill informed
of the nature of the complaints made against him and of the sources of the complaints. Since
these prior exchanges took place in private forums (meetings, correspondence), there is no
public build-up to the imposition of the visitation. To the outside observer, the visitation
comes “out of the blue.” By all accounts I have seen, this is how Hunthausen experienced it,
too. In light of my expectation that parties will employ lighter means of inducing cooperation
early in a conflict and will only use heavier tactics in the face of resistance, it is puzzling to
see this conflict – in its public appearance, at least – beginning with the rather heavy sanction
of a visitation (i.e., an investigation that serves as a means of territorial control). But if, say,
Hunthausen had been intransigent for years, out of view, it might be easier to understand. Or
perhaps Hunthausen simply did not understand what the Vatican wanted, or he found the
requests to be out of line? Then again, maybe the action was about something else altogether
(Hunthausen’s nuclear arms stance?) and the prior history between the two parties had little to
do with it. If we had more information about the earlier private exchanges, we could get a
better handle on these questions. (A last possibility to consider is that the conflict theory is
wrong, and we need not expect a build up to heavier tactics. Conceivably, the Vatican started
with a heavy tactic because it did not want to waste time with lesser tactics.)
Once the problem between the two parties comes into the open, we see a number of strategies
applied. The center party places a premium on secrecy. The Apostolic Visitator, Archbishop
Hickey insists on conducting the visitation in secret and he publicly defends the use of
secrecy. Even when the fact of the visitation is forced into the open by a news leak, the
process itself is a secretive one, wherein the interviewees meet privately with the visitation
team. The Holy See does at no point allow Hunthausen to see the visitation report that Hickey
files. Hickey also stresses that this is a fraternal action. He comes as a “brother bishop” to
support Hunthausen (in keeping with the strategy of minimizing the appearance of conflict;
see also Hickey’s comment about a “spirit of mutual understanding”). Hickey shows courtesy
by using euphemisms to downplay the seriousness of the matter at hand and by praising
Hunthausen. Finally, Hickey associates his own efforts with the good of the Church, saying
that his purpose is “to assist the Holy Father in his on-going evaluation and support of bishops
throughout the world.” After Hickey files his report, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith conducts its own internal process of assessment and response, to which Hunthausen has
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no access (another example of the strategy of secrecy). One should not overlook the length of
time that Hunthausen was made to wait (delay) for a response: this was surely an unsettling
experience. More unsettling still would have been the prospect of a helper bishop (auxiliary or
coadjutor) appointment that would be tied to the visitation findings (a potential application of
coercive power; cf. the Vatican chronology’s reference to a 9.11.85 Hunthausen letter
discussing this possibility).
The periphery party applies many of the same strategies but in different ways. Hunthausen
claims to have resisted the Vatican’s preference for secrecy in regard to the visitation (and
Rome does not deny this claim) but he also cooperates in the use of secrecy (showing
deference to the hierarchical order), much as he did in the exchanges prior to 1983.
Hunthausen seeks fraternal support by consulting Archbishop Roach and he demonstrates
fraternity in another way when he welcomes Hickey into his archdiocese (this is a sign of
courtesy as well). By seeking out Roach, Hunthausen shows himself prepared to enlist
powerful allies. Hunthausen’s inclination to go public with news about the visitation also
shows his readiness to seek out the support of others.
One strategy we see Hunthausen apply here is one not identified in my list of expected
strategies: the use of persuasive argumentation. There is, of course, something rather self-
evident in the thought that conflict participants would attempt to persuade one another with
argumentation. Presumably this took place in the negotiations between Hunthausen and the
Holy See prior to 1983, though we have no firm evidence that it did. Thus far in the case
developments, the Vatican has shown little inclination to offer rational justifications for its
positions in public. Hunthausen, on the other hand, uses persuasive argumentation to
challenge the supposition that he has done something wrong. Many bishops are being
criticized these days, he argues, and much of this criticism comes from “reactionary elements
within the church.” In defense of his own position, Hunthausen asserts that he has acted in
keeping with the spirit and intent of the Second Vatican Council and in support of the project
of “renewal” that is its heritage. In his argumentation, Hunthausen presents himself as one
acting on behalf of the Church, whose well-being he equates with the concepts of renewal,
Vatican II and the work of the Holy Spirit.
Key third parties at this stage of the affair are Roach, who advises Hunthausen in private, and
the news media. Interestingly enough, Roach suggests that Hunthausen demand a “Bill of
Particulars,” something which does not exist within the Church’s legal system. Such a concept
only applies with reference to extraecclesial legal frames. This is an early marker in the
conflict of how certain Church and societal perspectives stand in tension. Most notable in the
media’s involvement early on is the speculation about a possible relationship between
Hunthausen’s controversial political stance on nuclear arms and his trouble with the Vatican.
Hickey quickly denies that the two matters have anything to do with one another. It is not
surprising that the media would pick up on this theme. Certainly to the secular media, and to
many Catholics as well, Hunthausen was best known for his political views, and the
possibility of a story linking Roman intervention to Washington political intrigue offered a
much more enticing than an account of intrachurch discipline matters. The question that
remained was whether there was any truth to the conjecture.
In these early developments we find both the center and periphery parties working to save
face for themselves, one another, and the Church organization. Rome wants to keep the
conflict out of sight and to minimize its seriousness when public discussions are necessary
(the strategy of minimizing the appearance of conflict). This is also an ideal way for it to have
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its own way in the conflict handling: thus, the policy of saving face by covering up the matter
also serves its own possession of power. Hunthausen is in a more difficult position. Saving
face by not having the visitation come into the open carries the risk of diminishing his power
if he loses a hidden confrontation (where no allies are available to support him). Instead
Hunthausen opts to push for public revelation of the investigation. Once it is in the open, he
tries to put the best spin on it he can (he is being targeted by reactionaries). More innocent
readings of the same developments, as offered by the principals themselves, have Rome
wanting to keep the visitation secret in order to preserve Hunthausen’s reputation (cf. the
Vatican chronology) and Hunthausen wanting to go public in order to spare the Holy See
from public criticism and as a matter of principle (cf. his address to the NCCB).
Rome’s apparent objective in undertaking the visitation is to correct problems in a local
church that are perceived to be a threat to that church and to the Church Universal. Toward
that end it exercises territorial control (ecological power) and coercive power in the form of a
visitation. Rome legitimizes this local intervention by first asking Hunthausen’s “permission”
and by publicly understating the seriousness of the situation with the help of euphemisms (the
action is pursued to “support” Hunthausen). The technical means of a visitation is itself
legitimized by Canon Law. Hickey also emphasizes the fairness of the process: a “range of
viewpoints” was taken into account, many of which offered praise for Hunthausen.
In response, Hunthausen, too, exercises territorial control. He shores up his support locally by
sharing his version of the matter through the press. Hunthausen’s objective appears to be
minimize his own loss of power and prestige.
One more unanswered question related to the early developments is who leaked the news of
the impending visitation. Those opposed to Hunthausen might have had reason to do it
because it reveals the shaming fact that he is being investigated. Those favoring Hunthausen
(including Hunthausen himself) might have done it because it makes the conflict handling
more transparent, diminishing the Vatican advantage of secrecy.
6.1 Document Number: 1
Ratzinger Letter Summarizing Visitation Findings (dated 9.30.85)
Source: Origins, 6/4/87, p. 41; The Progress, 5/28/87, p. 5
6.1.1 Summary of Contents:
After nearly two years of waiting to learn the outcome of the visitation conducted by
Archbishop Hickey, Archbishop Hickey finally received his response, in a letter from
Cardinal Ratzinger dated September 30, 1985. The express purpose of the letter, which bears
the greeting “Your Excellency,” is both performative and informative. The performative
dimension is revealed in the first sentence:
I am writing to bring to a close the Apostolic Visitation process, which was assisted by the
visit of Archbishop James Hickey of Washington, D.C., to the Archdiocese of Seattle from
November 2-8, 1983.
The rest of the letter is primarily informative, especially in regard to the findings which have
emerged from the visitation. Ratzinger briefly describes the visitation process that has taken
place, states that “this Congregation” has carefully reviewed the visitation materials, presents
the findings, and commends them to Hunthausen for pastoral application. Ratzinger concludes
by praising Hunthausen’s patience and kindness during the visitation and by extending best
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wishes to him.
The bulk of the letter is taken up with fourteen numbered paragraphs of “observations” made
by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “which we hope will be received by you in
the spirit in which they are offered and will be of assistance to you as Archbishop of Seattle.”
A summary of these observations follows. (I follow the numbering and lettering of paragraphs
as they appear in the letter.
1. Ratzinger praises Hunthausen for his loyalty and conscientious efforts as a bishop. He notes the
praise that others have offered about Hunthausen, describing him as “a man of Gospel values.”
2. Ratzinger concedes that Hunthausen has “suffered from exaggerated criticism and routine
misunderstandings.” The Vatican assessment has sought to keep the criticisms and misunderstandings in
perspective. The observations offered in this letter are meant to support Hunthausen’s efforts to “promote
the renewal of the Church in Seattle and to point out, at the same time, areas we consider are in need of
correction and improvement.”
3. A single-sentence transitional paragraph in which Ratzinger acknowledges Hunthausen’s
“commitment to the real service of the Lord and... His people. “It is with this background,” Ratzinger
writes, “that this Congregation wishes to outline these problems and to enlist your cooperation in
resolving them.”
4. This section is the first to discuss a specific problem identified: “the rather widespread practice of
admitting divorced persons to a subsequent Church marriage without prior review by your
Tribunal, or even after they have received a negative sentence.” Ratzinger states that “such a practice
lacks foundation in the Church’s clear teaching.” He urges Hunthausen to see that future teaching and
practice in this matter conform to the prescriptions of Canon Law.
5. This section identifies other “basic doctrinal problems.” Ratzinger uses lettered subpoints to list these
problems:
a. “Clear and firm guidance” must be given to those in the Archdiocese who are reluctant to accept the
Magisterium’s legitimate teaching authority in matters of faith and morals.
b. The nature and mission of the Church should be taught in its entirety, showing it to be more than a
“merely social entity, governed chiefly by psychological, sociological and political processes.”
c. Hunthausen must work to ensure that “faulty Christologies” not be embraced within the Archdiocese.
d. Hunthausen must strive to achieve a “correct appreciation of the sacramental structure of the
Church, especially as it provides for sacred ministry in the Sacrament of Holy Orders” by the priests,
religious and laity of the Archdiocese.
e. Pastoral initiatives should be informed by an adequate anthropology.
f. Misunderstandings exist concerning the role conscience plays in moral decision-making. Hunthausen
should collaborate with theologians and other advisers to determine how best to correct these
misunderstandings within the local Church, but he should not hesitate to overrule unorthodox advisers.
6. This section addresses the problem of contraceptive sterilizations performed in local Catholic
hospitals.
7. Church teaching holds that first Confession should precede first Communion. Hunthausen needs to
put a stop to variations on this order within the Archdiocese.
8. The use of general Absolution within the Archdiocese must also be brought into conformity with
Magisterial teaching.
9. “Routine intercommunion” is a problem in the local Church that needs correction.
10. A “carefully trained priest” should be appointed “to aid in the supervision of sacramental and
liturgical discipline.”
11. Hunthausen should show concern for priests who have left the ministry, but he should do so without
allowing them to take on illegitimate ministerial roles. There are also restrictions on the ministerial
involvements of their civilly married wives that apply and need to be addressed.
12. This section raises concerns about questionnaires distributed by the Archdiocese in 1976 and 1979.
Ratzinger finds fault with the questionnaires for giving respondents the impression the process was “a
kind of voting process on doctrinal and moral teachings.”
13. Hunthausen’s teaching within the Archdiocese should emphasize the “God-given dignity” of women
without casting doubt on Church teaching excluding women from Sacred Orders.
14. In a final word about pastoral practice, Ratzinger writes: “The Archdiocese should withdraw all
support from any group which does not unequivocally accept the teaching of the Magisterium concerning
the intrinsic evil of homosexual activity.” Ratzinger cites several documents setting forth this teaching
and then chastises Hunthausen for a specific abuse: “The ill-advised welcome of a pro-homosexual group
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to your cathedral... served to make the Church’s position appear to be ambiguous on this delicate but
important issue.” Hunthausen is to proclaim the Church’s teaching “clearly.”
The first of the three short paragraphs concluding the letter reminds Hunthausen that the
purpose of bringing the above points to his attention is to assist him in his office as
Archbishop. The penultimate paragraph of the letter asks “the Holy Spirit of Christ” to be
with Hunthausen and with the people he serves. The final paragraph of the letter offers
personal best wishes from Ratzinger to Hunthausen.
6.1.2 Conflict Functionality of the 9.30.85 Ratzinger Letter
Though shortly prior to receiving this letter, Hunthausen had been briefed by the pro-nuncio
on what the visitation conclusions were, he was no doubt anxious to inspect this official report
from Rome.
Ratzinger pursues several objectives at once with the letter. He marks formal closure of the
visitation process; announces what the visitation has revealed; assures Hunthausen that the
Holy See has been conscientious and fair in its assessment; and enlists Hunthausen’s
cooperation in solving the identified problems.
The letter, written under the letterhead of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, is
businesslike in structure and tone, and even its more personal touches have a formal,
perfunctory feeling to them. Thus Ratzinger addresses Hunthausen as “Your Excellency” (a
politeness convention) and his words of praise for Hunthausen are often indirect, coming forth
as opinions voiced by others: “Numerous people spoke of your laudable and conscientious
efforts to involve the laity in the work of the Church… You have been repeatedly described as
a man of Gospel values…”
The letter is unfailingly polite (strategy of courtesy). Not once does Ratzinger criticize
Hunthausen directly. This is something of a feat, because the letter is full of bad news for
Hunthausen (an abundance of problems in the archdiocese are identified), and that bad news
amounts to a thoroughgoing critique of the pastoral ministry he has overseen. Ratzinger’s
politeness strategy involves first providing a cushioning layer of introductory comments
which make a case for the Vatican’s rationality and fairness (many were consulted, the
information was carefully assessed, “extremist” opinions were dismissed out of hand), then
praising Hunthausen (“There are many indications that you have striven with heart and mind
to be a good bishop…”), and finally smoothing out the critique with euphemisms (“visit” /
“visitation” for investigation; “it has been our purpose to assist you” – emphasis mine) and
sentence constructions that avoid the assignment of culpability (“It is important that the nature
and mission of the Church be taught in their entirety” – who has failed to do this?). A notable
disjuncture in the letter lies in the fact that what praise there is goes to Hunthausen personally
(with no direct blame), whereas the assessment of the archdiocese itself contains only
criticism (and no praise).
Informing Ratzinger’s letter is a vision of the Church which he expresses explicitly and
repeatedly. This is an extended piece of rational (persuasive) argumentation, a demonstration
of Ratzinger’s personal possession of expert power. According to this vision, there is a clear,
consistent and true teaching of the Church which can be known and passed on (the authentic
tradition is singular). The duty of the hierarchy in relationship to this teaching is to defend it
and pass it on untainted with error. (Contrast this with Hunthausen’s emphasis on renewal,
Vatican II and the “guidance of the Holy Spirit.”) This is where Hunthausen has fallen short.
As Ratzinger sees it, confusion and a lack of clarity about where the Church stands have been
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allowed to settle into many aspects of archdiocesan pastoral practice. Though Ratzinger is
careful never to say that Hunthausen himself is directly responsible for these conditions, he is
plain in his meaning that Hunthausen is responsible for “correction and improvement” in
these areas. Whether the issues identified in this letter were what prompted the visitation in
the first place and whether these are in fact the essential issues for the Vatican in pursuing this
action (are there deeper, underlying reasons operative?) remains unknown at this point. What
is known is that Ratzinger has set these problems forth as the relevant questions for the
Vatican. This, Ratzinger proposes, is the business at hand, the set of issues which Hunthausen
is to address in his leadership of the archdiocese and in his exchanges with the Holy See
(Rome controls the agenda).
Notably, an issue that Ratzinger does not mention is Hunthausen’s controversial stand on
nuclear weapons. The only statement that approaches this matter at all is the apparently
benign observation that Hunthausen’s “concern for justice and peace is well known,” a
remark that comes in the middle of the one paragraph devoted to praise of Hunthausen. Is this
evidence that the nuclear arms issue was indeed not of concern to Rome?
Despite Ratzinger’s invocation of the Second Vatican Council, he acknowledges here no
earthly forms of authority arising outside of the Church. On the contrary, extraecclesial
sources of knowledge are depicted here as posing a threat to the proper catechesis and pastoral
service of the faithful: “The Church should be understood as more than a merely social entity,
governed chiefly by psychological, sociological and political processes,” Ratzinger writes.
“An anthropology which is dominated by the tentative conclusions of the human sciences
could well undermine many pastoral initiatives, however well intentioned.” Juxtaposed with
the remarks about the limits of the “human sciences” is a catalogue of references to teachings
of the magisterium, which offer the kind of sure teaching absent in the extraecclesial
disciplines. Thus, if Hunthausen is unclear himself about the way forward, he is invited to
have reference to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s 1976 Declaration on Sexual
Ethics, the documents of the U.S. Bishops’ Conference, the revised Code of Canon Law, the
Congregation’s 1975 Instruction, Inter Insigniores, etc. (These documents signal the Holy
See’s possession of superior legal and expert power.) The technical nature of this presentation
highlights the fact that this is a communication between one bishop and another. It also
underscores Ratzinger’s view that this is an intraecclesial matter that Hunthausen is expected
to address with intraecclesial resources.
With this letter the responsibility for further initiative is turned over to Hunthausen. Ratzinger
speaks of his Congregation’s involvement in the present-perfect tense (“In bringing all the
above points to your attention, it has been our purpose to assist you as effectively as
possible…”). Its present intervention is complete. Though no future involvement is mentioned
explicitly, the possibility thereof is indicated when Ratzinger writes: “we hope [the
observations] will be received by you in the spirit in which they are offered…”
Significantly, this communication to Hunthausen is carried out privately (the strategy of
secrecy). The public is not privileged to know the contents of this exchange or the fact that it
is taking place. Certain other matters are also kept quiet. Ratzinger refers to Archbishop
Hickey’s report, but, as Hunthausen himself will later point out, the contents of this report are
kept even from Hunthausen. In addition, Ratzinger attributes agency in the affair to “the Holy
See” (which has undertaken the visitation project) and “this Congregation” (which has
reviewed the Visitation report): these collective terms allow Ratzinger to avoid naming the
specific people involved in the decision making process (a linguistic tactic of secrecy). The
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Pope’s own role in the affair is left to speculation. Finally, we should also note Ratzinger’s
silence regarding the imminent appointment of an auxiliary bishop. Though this discussion
was already underway between Hunthausen and Rome (cf. the Vatican chronology),
Ratzinger makes no mention of such a possibility here.
B. Intervening Developments (October-November 1985)
Hunthausen requested that he be allowed to make the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter public, but the
Holy See refused this request (cf. The Progress, 5.15.86). Twenty months later, on May 27,
1987, the Holy See finally did release the letter, in conjunction with distribution of the
assessment commission report (see document 9, below).
On October 9-10, 1985, Hunthausen and Laghi met at the apostolic nunciature in Washington,
D.C. (cf. the Vatican chronology). According to Laghi, though Hunthausen was not allowed
to see the Hickey report at this time, he was given the opportunity to respond to the visitation
findings and seek clarification. Because Hunthausen continued to insist on having some way
of publicly sharing the contents of the Ratzinger letter, the Apostolic Nunciature was
commissioned by the Vatican to produce an alternate version of the Ratzinger letter, which
Laghi would send to Hunthausen (see document 2, below). Hunthausen would be permitted to
release this letter publicly. The Laghi letter is dated November, 14, 1985, six weeks later than
the Ratzinger letter.
B.b. Conflict Functionality of the Intervening Developments (October-November 1985)
The preceding description accounts for the events that took place between Hunthausen’s
receipt of the Ratzinger letter (sometime before October 9, 1985) and Laghi’s composition of
a new letter (November 14, 1985), which recapitulates the Ratzinger letter and packages its
message for public consumption. Little stands on the public record to inform us about the
actual conflict handling that took place during this period of approximately five weeks, but we
can make a few observations.
First, it is clear that the center party remains with its strategic preference for keeping the
conflict handling out of public view (minimize the appearance of conflict, practice secrecy).
There are two levels to this secrecy: the secrecy that the Vatican practices over and against
Hunthausen and the level that the Vatican and Hunthausen together practice over and against
others. The Vatican practices secrecy over and against Hunthausen by continuing to refuse his
requests to see the Hickey report. The Vatican and Hunthausen practice secrecy together by
carrying out their negotiations in private (the Ratzinger letter, the one-to-one exchange
between Laghi and Hunthausen) and by not sharing the substance of the conflict (i.e., the
specific issues identified by Ratzinger).
Hunthausen cooperates with the Holy See’s requirements for secrecy, but he also engages in a
strategy of resistance. His cooperation is a sign of his deference for the order and mindset of
the Church (he respects his superior’s wishes). At the same time, it is apparent that the
Vatican’s use of secrecy works against him, since he can hardly refute charges he does not
know. My presumption is that he used persuasive argumentation to try to obtain a copy of the
Hickey report. This effort failed. He definitely used persuasive argumentation to convince the
Vatican to provide him with a visitation findings summation that he could make public.
Hunthausen presses the Vatican (the general strategy of contending) and the Vatican yields.
What is unclear is why Rome does not want the Ratzinger letter released (especially since, at
a later date, it does agree to release the letter) and why it subsequently gives in to
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Hunthausen’s request to be supplied with some alternative statement for public release.
Evidently, the Vatican’s commitment to secrecy was not unconditional, and it did not need to
have its way on every issue. It would appear that maintaining a hermetical seal of secrecy was
less important than warding off the possibility of increased resistance from Hunthausen. My
guess is that this minor concession was made with an eye to avoiding unnecessary friction on
the eve of the appointment of Donald Wuerl as auxiliary bishop.
The center party applies ecological power in its assertions of territorial control. The
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith does not let Hunthausen see the Hickey report and
it does not allow Hunthausen to publish the Ratzinger letter. Laghi functions as a gatekeeper
between Hunthausen and Rome, and Hunthausen apparently has very limited access to the
inner workings of the Congregation that is addressing his case. In the concession to provide
Hunthausen with a visitation report for publication, one can recognize a minor employment of
remunerative power. Hunthausen’s use of power is harder to characterize, since we do not
know the nature of the arguments he employs to persuade the Holy See to provide the report
for publication. To some extent, he applies social power by showing that he is willing to abide
by Church rules (adhere to the chain of command, limit the appearance of conflict): does his
loyalty function as an investment with expected return, or as a bargaining chip?
6.2 Document Number: 2
Laghi Letter  Summarizing Visitation Findings (11.14.85)
Source: The Progress, 11/28/85, p. 3; Origins, 12/26/85, pp. 458-459.
6.2.1 Summary of Contents
Laghi’s letter begins with an announcement of the official closure of the Visitation. He
reviews the Visitation process in language that is very close (there are many word-for-word
agreements) to Ratzinger’s description of the process. (An example of matching language:
Laghi exactly reproduces Ratzinger’s sentence, “In addition, he [Hickey] examined many
pertinent documents, statements issued by the Archdiocese and letters.”) But Laghi also
departs from the content of the Ratzinger source letter, adding lines and omitting others. Thus,
Laghi mentions a September 15, 1983 meeting between Hunthausen and the Visitator, but he
does not mention the correspondence between Ratzinger and Hunthausen that Ratzinger cited
in his own letter. (Indeed neither Ratzinger nor the Congregation for the Doctrine of the faith
is named in this letter from Laghi to Hunthausen.)
Laghi then brings to Hunthausen’s attention a set of “observations,” which are arranged into
four numbered sections. The first section offers praise for Hunthausen. Closely following
Ratzinger’s language, Laghi writes: “There are many indications that you have striven with
heart and mind to be a dedicated bishop of the Church, eager to implement the renewal called
for in the Documents of the Second Vatican Council.” The section goes on to name positive
examples of Hunthausen’s leadership: his establishment of consultative bodies, his attention
to the Council of Priests and Archdiocesan Pastoral Council (not mentioned in the Ratzinger
letter), his accessibility, his evident embrace of Gospel values, his concern for “the suffering
and aggrieved,” his apostolic zeal and concern for peace and justice, and his loyalty to the
Church and devotion to the Holy Father.
A second section of praise follows, the contents of which did not appear in the Ratzinger
letter. This paragraph focuses on the time Hunthausen has given to fostering the morale of his
priests and religious, on his development of local lay leadership, and on his attention to the
matters of prayer and preaching.
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Section number three declares that Hunthausen has suffered exaggerated criticisms and
declares, as did the Ratzinger letter, that the observations to follow are not based on the
testimony of “strident critics” or “obviously biased” publications. Nor are they meant to
encourage “extreme” groups (Ratzinger referred to “extremist” groups) seeking to undermine
Hunthausen’s authority.
Section four, finally, presents the Vatican’s “concerns” (Ratzinger spoke of “problems” at a
comparable point in his own letter). Laghi structures this section with an introductory
sentence that asks Hunthausen’s assistance in addressing the concerns “in a way that will
contribute to the spiritual well-being of the Archdiocese of Seattle.” The concerns are listed in
five lettered subsections. Rather than attempting to summarize what is itself a rather concise
summary, I will reproduce this list here.
a. The need to bring into clear focus – working together with priests, religious and theologians -- certain
teachings of the Church and their implications for the pastoral practice of the Archdiocese. These
include the role of the conscience in making moral decisions, the role of the Magisterium in giving
definitive guidance in matters of faith and morals; the nature and mission of the Church, together with
its sacramental and hierarchical structure; an anthropology which provides an authentic understanding
of the dignity of the human person; and a Christology which correctly reflects our Catholic faith
concerning Christ’s divinity, His humanity, His salvific mission, and His inseparable union from the
Church.
b. In particular, the need to present more clearly the Church’s teaching concerning the permanence and
indissolubility of marriage and to ensure that the Archdiocesan Tribunal, both its constitution and
practice, conforms with all the prescriptions of the revised Code of Canon Law.
c. Greater vigilance in upholding the Church’s teaching, especially with regard to contraceptive
sterilization and homosexuality.
d. The need to ensure that pastoral practice regarding the liturgical and sacramental ministry of the
Archdiocese is in accord with the Church’s universal norms, especially in the celebration of the
Eucharist. This includes, for instance, routine intercommunion on the occasion of weddings or funerals.
Such a need also involves the Sacrament of Reconciliation, mentioning particularly the proper sequence
of first confession / first communion and regulations regarding general absolution.
e. The need to review the ongoing education of the clergy and the selection and formation of candidates
for the priesthood, and to be clear that laicized priests are excluded from certain roles in accord with the
rescripts of their laicization.
This group of lettered subpoints recapitulates numbered sections 4-14 in the Ratzinger letter.
Laghi closes by commending Hunthausen for his “loyal cooperation and kindness” during the
visitation and during the month’s since, while the Holy See reviewed the visitation materials.
He acknowledges Hunthausen’s “continuous efforts to promote genuine growth and renewal”
in the archdiocese and thanks Hunthausen on behalf of “the Church” for what he has
accomplished. He expresses his confidence that Hunthausen “will be able to address
effectively” the concerns articulated in the letter and he offers his own assistance and support
toward that end.
6.2.2 Conflict Functionality of the 11.14.85 Laghi Letter
The fact that this letter was produced at all represents a concession by Rome to Hunthausen’s
wishes, though only a partial concession, since Hunthausen was not was not allowed to
release the Ratzinger letter itself.
A close comparison of the two letters offers a rare opportunity to discern Vatican priorities
when tailoring a message for public consumption. Here we have a glimpse of how the Vatican
addresses the same issues in separate private and public forums. Revealing, too, is the
intermediary role played by the pro-nuncio, who effectively “translates” the message for the
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local culture and public at large.
In my summary of the contents of the Laghi letter, above, I have already noted some key
differences from the  Ratzinger letter that preceded it. The Laghi letter is shorter (about half
as long as the Ratzinger letter); warmer in tone (Laghi greets Hunthausen with “Archbishop
Hunthausen,” instead of the officious-sounding “Your Excellency,” and he changes
Ratzinger’s list of “problems” into a list of “concerns”); more generous with praise (Laghi
adds several passages of praise, including an entirely new paragraph); more sparing of
criticism (Laghi condenses Ratzinger’s detailed discussion of problems, with examples, into a
list of thumbnail descriptions); and more plain-spoken (Laghi minimizes the use of Church
jargon and technical terms; e.g., all names of curial documents are omitted). My impression of
these changes is that they are designed to make the message friendlier and easier to
understand, and thus more palatable to the average American Catholic.
When comparing the experience of reading the Ratzinger letter with the experience of reading
the Laghi letter, one gets the sense from the former that Hunthausen is being “called on the
carpet” for problems stemming from his leadership, whereas the latter depicts Hunthausen as
a well-regarded and trusted collaborator who the Holy See is actively engaged in supporting.
In other words, it is one thing for the Holy See to challenge the competence of one of its own
bishops in private, but another thing to do so in front of the bishop’s own people and in front
of other bishops who might fear being subjected to the same.
I have already noted certain ways that the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter was secretive (being a
private correspondence; refusing to name decision makers). This letter from Laghi, though
purportedly meant to be revealing, is, ironically, more secretive than the Ratzinger letter in an
absolute sense. For one thing, as I have already pointed out, it hides crucial details of the
Vatican’s complaints against Hunthausen. For another, it hides the involvement of the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, which is never mentioned. Laghi refers only to the
activity of  “the Holy See.” This term is highly ambiguous. An apostolic visitation can only be
undertaken on the Pope’s order, but the precise role of the Pope and members of key
congregations remains unclear. And despite the fact that the appointment of an auxiliary
bishop would follow this letter by just two weeks, no mention of that prospect appears here.
Apparently, at this point in the exchanges between Rome and Seattle, Rome remains firmly
committed to its policy of conducting its business in Seattle in a quiet way. Hunthausen, for
his part, has cooperated with the use of secrecy but has also resisted its use at least twice: first,
in regard to the conduct of the visitation itself and, second, in regard to distribution of the
visitation findings. The provision of the Laghi letter for public consumption appears to be an
attempt by the Holy See to appease Hunthausen and enlist his further cooperation. Thus far,
Hunthausen has offered no public challenge to or criticism of the Vatican. But surely the
Vatican could conceive of that possibility.
C. Intervening Developments (November 1985-September 1986)
Hunthausen released the Laghi letter to the press on November 27, 1985 and published it
himself in the 11.28.85 issue of The Progress, together with his own cover letter (dated
11.26.85) introducing the Laghi letter. In his cover letter Hunthausen thanked Laghi for the
letter, which afforded “the opportunity to share with you [the letter is addressed to “Dear
Friends in Christ”] the results of what was a highly-publicized event in the life of our
Church.” Hunthausen said he had looked forward to having such an opportunity for a long
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time. Hunthausen also thanked the Pro-Nuncio and the Holy See for having supported and
affirmed his ministry in the archdiocese. Hunthausen noted that areas of his ministry had been
singled out for affirmation, but that “areas of concern” had been identified as well. The
concerns had been presented to him in a “fraternal and constructive spirit,” Hunthausen said,
and he accepted them in the same spirit. (Perhaps an oblique answer to Ratzinger’s request
that Hunthausen receive the observations in the spirit in which they were offered?)
Hunthausen pledged to deal with all of the concerns and observed that in some cases he had
already taken “appropriate action.” In the remainder of his letter Hunthausen made a plea to
all the people of the archdiocese to cooperate with him in this effort, acknowledging his own
limitations and admitting his dependence on the people of the archdiocese. Hunthausen
brought his plea to conclusion with an extended metaphor built on images of family and
pilgrimage.
In closing, I want to say several things. First, I wish to acknowledge my own limitations as a person
and as an archbishop. Because of this, I am particularly dependent on your prayers, your support, your
advice, and your constructive criticism. At the same time, for the sake of the unity and well-being of the
Church, I call those of you who have supported me and those who have stridently criticized me to join
together to build up this Church. To the extent we fail to do this, we wound and, in many cases, do
serious harm to our unity in Christ.
Lastly, as the Second Vatican Council so aptly acknowledged, we are a pilgrim people. We are on a
journey. In some cases, we are, as a human family and a Christian family, facing difficulties and
challenges that have never been faced before. For this reason, I need to remind myself as I remind all of
you of the reassuring words of our God that are found time and time again throughout the pages of
Scripture: “Do not be afraid.” We need not be afraid because the Lord is with us on each step of our
journey. Knowing that, and knowing, too, of your deep faith and loving support, I take courage for the
future and look forward to the journey we will continue together.
On December 3, 1985, Archbishop Laghi announced that Pope John Paul II had appointed Fr.
Donald Wuerl, a priest of the Diocese of Pittsburgh, auxiliary bishop of Seattle. (Wuerl, at the
time of his appointment, was serving as executive secretary to the papal representative for the
study of seminaries in the United States. Prior to that, from 1969 to 1979, he had served in
Rome as secretary to the late Cardinal John Wright, prefect of the Vatican Congregation for
the Clergy.) Immediately following this announcement, Hunthausen and Wuerl issued their
own statements acknowledging the appointment (The Progress, 12.5.85, p.3). Hunthausen
declared that the news brought “joy” to him personally and he expressed his assuredness that
it would do the same “to the entire church in Western Washington.” He also professed his
gratitude “in a special way … to our Holy Father, Pope John Paul II, for his response to my
request for assistance in carrying out my pastoral ministry as archbishop of this large and
growing church.” Hunthausen’s praised Wuerl’s background and credentials (“He has served
the church with distinction both within his own diocese of Pittsburgh and at the international
level, as evidenced by his 10 years as an official of the Congregation for the Clergy in
Rome”) and he expressed own certainty that Wuerl would “bring many blessings to the
church here in Western Washington.” In his own statement, Wuerl described the experience
of being named auxiliary bishop as “joyful and humbling... an honor and a privilege…”
I am very happy to be called to serve such a distinguished archbishop and so vibrant a church. The
Archdiocese of Seattle is a fruitful and vigorous part of Christ’s vineyard and I eagerly look forward to
the challenge of this new pastoral assignment as well as the opportunity to work with so many clergy,
Religious and laity who so deeply love Christ and his church.
….
From a loving heart I respectfully express my affectionate gratitude to our Holy Father for this sign of his
confidence. I beg the prayers of the bishops, priests, deacons, Religious and laity of both Seattle and
Pittsburgh that God will bless and prosper my efforts. And I enthusiastically pledge to the holy church of
Seattle whatever gifts with which I have been graced by the Holy Spirit, but most of all, my faith, my
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hope, and my love.
The same issue of The Progress (12.5.85) that carried the statements regarding Wuerl’s
appointment also offered a Progress interview with Hunthausen (pp. 4-5). Therein
Hunthausen answered questions about the Laghi letter and Wuerl’s appointment.
Archbishop, what is your reaction to Archbishop Laghi’s letter?
I would have to say that my overall reaction is one of gratitude. I indicated this in a letter I sent to
our people last week. The reason I say this is that Archbishop Laghi’s letter was something that I
personally asked for. It was sent in response to my own request, and not for any other reason.
Most often in situations of this sort, as I understand it, the bishop is the only one to receive
information regarding the findings of a visitation. I do not think that this approach would be appropriate
for our archdiocese and so, from the very beginning – from the time I first learned of Archbishop
Hickey’s visitation and up to the present moment – I have always maintained that it would be terribly
important for me to be able to share with all our people as fully as possible the results of Archbishop
Hickey’s evaluation. I felt that I owed this to our people since I knew that the results of this visitation,
whatever they were, would involve all of us because it is together that we are church…
Do you regard the letter as a fair analysis of the condition of the church here in the archdiocese and
of your own ministry as archbishop?
I don’t believe that’s what it was intended to be. The visitation was undertaken in order “to evaluate
certain allegations” regarding my pastoral ministry, to borrow Archbishop Laghi’s words. In view of that,
I don’t believe it would be fair to expect his letter to be a thorough or comprehensive analysis of the
conditions of the church here or of my own ministry as chief pastor, for that matter. The visitation had a
limited purpose and, for that reason, so does the letter concluding it. When I say “limited,” however, I do
not mean for a minute to imply unimportant. Obviously, the areas listed by Archbishop Laghi are of very
real importance.
….
Archbishop, the appointment of Father Wuerl as auxiliary bishop comes right on the heels of the
closing of the visitation. Is there a connection?
To answer that, I first need to say that for several years now – ever since Bishop Nicholas Walsh
was forced to retire for reasons of health – I have been asking the Holy See for an auxiliary bishop. For
that matter, the Holy See recognized such a need in this archdiocese long ago when, back in 1956, Bishop
Thomas Gill was appointed to serve as the first auxiliary bishop of this archdiocese. Since that time, of
course, the archdiocese has grown by leaps and bounds and the demands placed on me, both with regard
to pastoral ministry and archdiocesan administration, have increased immeasurably. So there is no
question about our need for an auxiliary bishop.
Having said that, I think it is only fair for me to say further that the delay we experienced before an
auxiliary bishop was appointed had to do with the decision which was made to undertake a visitation here
in this archdiocese. It doesn’t seem surprising that the Holy See would wait for that visitation to be
concluded before making its choice of a suitable candidate to serve here as auxiliary bishop. And I would
judge that the Holy See’s choice of Father Donald Wuerl was certainly guided by some of those things
that were learned during the process of the visitation.
Could you say something about the responsibilities of an auxiliary bishop?
An auxiliary bishop serves as a helper to the Ordinary in the carrying out of his pastoral ministry.
Frequently, this involves such things as the celebration of the sacrament of Confirmation and the making
of parish visitations. There are a number of other areas in which the auxiliary bishop can be of assistance,
too – for example in the administration of the archdiocese.
….
How will Bishop-elect Wuerl assist you, Archbishop?
I have already spoken of some of the ways he will be able to help me in my pastoral and sacramental
duties. In addition, I look forward to drawing on his valuable experience as we address those areas of
concern outlined in Archbishop Laghi’s letter. Obviously, these matters will continue to constitute a
significant part of our agenda as church, and I am pleased to know that Bishop-elect Wuerl’s background
and training will suit him especially well to help us deal with them.
Pope John Paul II ordained Wuerl a bishop in Rome on January 6, 1986. The 2.6.86 Progress
shows a picture of the Pope, Hunthausen and Wuerl together in Rome and reports that they
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met on January 7. No further information regarding the meeting is offered. Wuerl arrived in
Seattle and assumed his duties on January 26.
Before Wuerl’s arrival in Seattle, Hunthausen read the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter with the
visitation findings to his presbyteral council (sometime late in 1985) and to the priests of the
archdiocese (January 23, 1986). According to one priest present at the January gathering, the
purpose of the meeting itself was for the clergy “to hear the letter and get out their anger and
frustration” prior to Wuerl’s arrival (Source: National Catholic News Service story, printed in
the 5.15.86 Progress.) The same priest said that clergy reaction at the meeting was one of
“great anger at the process.”
Wuerl celebrated his first Mass in the Archdiocese on January 30. At the start of that liturgy,
Fr. Michael G. Ryan, archdiocesan vicar general and chancellor, read the letter from Pope
John Paul II appointing Wuerl.
The letter explained that “our brother bishops who share with us the responsibility of governing the
Church of God are frequently burdened by many and serious matters in the carrying out of their ministry,
so they seek assistance from this Apostolic See in order that they might more freely exercise their offices
and attain the greater good of the souls whom they govern.”
The pope’s letter continued, “we have willingly heard the request of our venerable brother,
Raymond Hunthausen, Archbishop of Seattle, and grant him an auxiliary bishop.”
“There is one pastor of the Christian flock, Jesus Christ,” the letter said. “Therefore, beloved
brother, be at one with the Archbishop for the good of the sheep so that this sign of unity might remain
untarnished and so that through it, all might recognize that the flock is one and that all are called to be
members of this flock.” (The Progress, 2.6.86)
Wuerl’s appointment came as the result of an extended behind-the-scenes discussion between
Hunthausen and the Holy See (represented by Laghi: other participants are unknown) about
appointing a bishop to serve in Seattle who would have special powers to address the problem
areas of the archdiocese identified in the visitation report. Apart from a few excerpts, the
contents of these exchanges have not been revealed. We do know that Wuerl was not a
candidate Hunthausen himself recommended, since Wuerl was essentially unknown to
Hunthausen when he was named. The Vatican chronology (document 4, below) reports that at
least three options of appointment were considered: the appointment of a coadjutor with full
power, the temporary appointment of an administrator, and the appointment of an auxiliary
with special faculties from the Holy See. Both the Vatican chronology and Hunthausen’s
response to the chronology make reference to a letter, dated 12.2.85, which Hunthausen sent
to Laghi. According to both accounts, this letter was pivotal in that it conveyed Hunthausen’s
acceptance of a plan whereby Wuerl would come to Seattle as an auxiliary bishop with special
powers of oversight in regard to the problem areas. (I will come back to this in a moment.)
Two months after the implementation of this arrangement, in March of 1986, it became
apparent that  Hunthausen and the Holy See had different ideas of what Hunthausen had
agreed to in that letter. Whereas the Holy See understood Hunthausen to have agreed to its
intention for him to grant final power in the designated areas to Wuerl (as opposed to the
faculties being granted by Rome), Hunthausen argued (in his response to the Vatican
Chronology) that he had “agreed to give substantive authority without, however, relinquishing
my ultimate authority.” In other words, Hunthausen understood that he would be
commissioning Wuerl to oversee handling of the areas of concern, but he himself would retain
final decision-making power in those areas.
Wuerl understood his role in the same way that the Holy See did. At first, however, according
to the accounts of both Hunthausen and Wuerl (see their joint interview in The Progress,
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9.11.86), the discrepancy in their understandings did not come to light and the two worked
together compatibly. The public record offers no reports of personal friction between the two,
either early on or later, during the most intense phase of the conflict. On the contrary, both
normally went out of their way to show politeness and respect to one another. What finally
did bring the discrepancy to light was a disagreement that arose between Hunthausen and
Wuerl, in March of that year, about the position the archdiocese should take in regard to a
proposed ordinance being considered by a local county board (National Catholic Reporter,
9.19.86). Hunthausen decided he would support the proposal, which sought to uphold job
rights for minority groups, including homosexuals. Wuerl voiced his opposition to taking such
a stand and asserted that the nature of the question put it within those areas where he had final
say. At this point it became clear that Hunthausen and Wuerl understood Wuerl’s role in
Seattle differently. Both proceeded to seek clarification from the Holy See.
Six months later, after Hunthausen and Wuerl had sought and received clarification from the
pro-nuncio and from the Vatican about what powers Wuerl was in fact to have, and after news
of Wuerl’s special faculties was made public, Hunthausen was asked how he could have been
mistaken in such a consequential matter. He replied:
My conversations with Archbishop Laghi about the visitation and how it might be concluded and
what some of the consequences of that would be engaged us in the possibility of an auxiliary bishop with
special faculties. That was always presented as one of the possibilities that we might try to work with.
I resisted that, quite frankly, because I felt it was fraught with real difficulties. It would create, as it
has created in the minds of many people, a sense of division in the authority of the church and I wondered
whether it was workable. I seriously wondered whether it was workable and I felt that it would be better if
we avoided it.
And so when Bishop Wuerl’s appointment was determined, I had come to believe from my
conversations with Archbishop Laghi, that his appointment would be as auxiliary bishop. Of course I was
aware of the concerns in these special areas and I indicated that I was open to, clearly, not only his
involvement in these special areas, but in the whole governance of the archdiocese.
But I was also absolutely convinced that I was to retain final authority in all aspects of the
governance of the archdiocese. I felt that was our understanding. I honestly and truly felt that was our
understanding. (The Progress, 9.11.86, p. 3)
On a still later occasion (in his response to the Vatican chronology, to which I have already
alluded), Hunthausen elaborated and offered further support for his contention that this was a
case of honest misunderstanding. He cited an epistolary exchange with Archbishop Laghi,
which took place just prior to the announcement of Wuerl’s appointment.
In a crucial letter dated December 2, 1985, which I wrote to Archbishop Laghi, I agreed to give
substantive authority without, however, relinquishing my ultimate authority. These are the words I used:
“(this arrangement) will not impinge upon my ultimate authority as Ordinary of this archdiocese.” I went
on to quote the Code of Canon Law to make the matter unmistakably clear. Archbishop Laghi’s response
stated: “While this does not lessen your authority as the local Bishop, it is understood that this action is
being taken at the specific instruction of the Holy See.” For this reason, it troubles me greatly not only
that a great misunderstanding could have later ensued, one that in the end I was informed was mine, but
also that it would later be suggested publicly that I might have acted in bad faith. I did not.
Laghi has never challenged Hunthausen’s assertion that this exchange took place, nor has he
challenged the accuracy of the quotations. But the complete texts of these two letters have
never been made public.
Hunthausen and Wuerl’s requests for clarification from the Holy See were pursued through
letters which Hunthausen and Wuerl wrote separately to the pro-nuncio, and through a
meeting both had with Laghi during a June gathering of the U.S. bishops, in Collegeville,
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Minnesota. The contacts with Laghi and a later letter received (on July 1, 1986) from Cardinal
Bernard Gantin, head of the Congregation of Bishops (National Catholic Reporter, 9.19.86),
confirmed that Hunthausen was to have given Wuerl final say in the areas of concern.
Once no room for doubt remained, Hunthausen granted the faculties to Wuerl, effective
August 1. On September 3, 1986, Hunthausen and Wuerl held a press conference to
announce Wuerl’s possession of faculties in the designated areas.
C.c. Conflict Functionality of the Intervening Developments (November 1985-September
1986)
The full implications of the apostolic visitation, whose conclusions are first communicated
openly with the release of the 11.14.85 Laghi letter, do not become clear to the public until
the announcement of Wuerl’s possession of special faculties the following September.
Apparently, even Hunthausen himself only gradually comes to understand the visitation’s full
cost to himself. As far as the public’s involvement in the controversy goes, this period
amounts to the calm before the storm. Though press accounts voiced suspicions about the
relationship between the visitation and Wuerl’s appointment at the time of his appointment,
both Hunthausen and Wuerl explicitly sought to allay fears that Wuerl’s appointment posed
any kind of threat to Hunthausen’s authority.
At the time he releases the Laghi letter, Hunthausen knows that the appointment of a bishop to
Seattle is imminent and he knows that this bishop is supposed to help him address the
visitation issues. Based on the later reports of Laghi and Hunthausen, it is clear that the nature
of the appointee’s power is under contestation. All of the options under consideration by the
Vatican (as cited in the Vatican chronology) have Hunthausen turning over some degree of
authority to make binding decisions. Hunthausen, on the other hand, says he is ready to
commission the auxiliary with special powers of oversight but not with any form of final say
in archdiocesan matters. Hunthausen and Laghi carry out this negotiation (persuasive
argumentation) in secret. At the time of Wuerl’s appointment, Hunthausen and Laghi believe
they have an agreement both can live with, but with time this proves an illusion.
Though the appointment of an auxiliary bishop is often a form of remuneration practiced by
Rome, providing local ordinaries with valued assistants, in this case the appointment is
coercive in two ways. First, it involves a loss of power by Hunthausen; and second, it takes
the public appearance of a second symbolic intervention by Rome (after the visitation).
Hunthausen is to relinquish power to one who, by all appearances, is a Roman insider and, at
the very least, is a Seattle outsider and not one of Hunthausen’s own choices for the post.
Wuerl had been a seminarian in Rome; he had served most of his years of priesthood in
Roman curial posts; and, in a somewhat exceptional move, the Pope called him to Rome for
his ordination. Symbolically, Rome asserts territorial control over Seattle by having the Pope
ordain Wuerl instead of Hunthausen and then sending Wuerl to serve in Seattle on the heels of
the visitation.
Hunthausen, up until the time that he makes Wuerl’s faculties known, adopts a two-front
approach to the conflict handling. In public he shows a respectful conformity to Rome’s
wishes, but in private he shows a willingness, as necessary, to resist the Roman agenda. His
challenge to the Vatican’s intention for Wuerl to have special faculties is the third prominent
example we have seen of this (if we can trust Hunthausen’s own reports), after resisting
Vatican preferences of secrecy regarding the visitation process and the visitation findings.
Notably, Hunthausen attempts to make Canon Law work in his favor (legal power; strategy of
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persuasive argumentation) by specifying a particular canon that should not apply in his case,
thereby protecting himself against an undesirable arrangement. In public, at the time, we hear
nothing of these negotiations. Hunthausen releases the Laghi letter summarizing the visitation
findings, thanks the pro-nuncio and the Holy See (in his cover letter) for having supported and
affirmed his ministry (strategy of courtesy), and refers to the “fraternal and constructive
spirit” at work (fraternity).
This same cover letter from Hunthausen includes a notable employment of God talk. Earlier
texts from the conflict have been, for the most part, perfunctory in their use of language that
refers specifically to (Catholic) Christian beliefs. Most commonly we have seen what I would
call pious interjections: that is, conventional, predictable invocations of God’s name(s) or
requests for God’s blessing, often appearing at the end of statements or letters. These can be
thought of as forms of simple reassurance, whereby the speaker proves that he belongs to the
Catholic community and knows what is expected of him as a leader of that community. My
point here is not to discount the sincerity of the pronouncements, necessarily, but to note that
habit and the need to signal belonging are among the reasons for their use. (We can think of
pious interjections as a minor employment of traditional power.)
In the case of this open letter from Hunthausen to the people of his archdiocese, however, we
see Hunthausen engaging in a form of God talk that is rather involved and, apparently,
conscientiously applied for a strategic purpose (strategic God talk). The passage quoted in
the narrative above presents the final paragraph of Hunthausen’s letter, wherein he refers to a
specific doctrinal reference frame (the Second Vatican Council), invokes two specific
conceptions of God (the God who speaks through Scripture and the Lord who is with us on
our journey), and offers two images for God’s people (they are a “pilgrim people” and a
human and Christian “family”). This passage accomplishes several things at once. Most
crucially, it elevates the experience at hand (ultimately, what is at stake is the “unity and well-
being” of the Church itself) and invites the people of the archdiocese to join with Hunthausen
in facing the difficulties that lie ahead. Rather than being a power struggle within the confines
of the hierarchy, which parishioners can conveniently ignore, the present conflict becomes
here an unprecedented challenge that all of us are facing together – a journey, a pilgrimage,
where the Lord himself is our companion. By means of this rhetorical device, Hunthausen has
greater stature, so too do the people, and the people have an incentive for supporting the
Archbishop in the future. Note the presumptions undergirding the passage: there is something
to fear (disunity perhaps?) but we need not be afraid; we are already on the journey together
(“knowing… your deep faith and loving support, I… look forward to the journey we will
continue together”); and the Lord is with us. As much as an invitation to join in the cause, this
is praise (flattery) for having already so nobly committed oneself.
Hunthausen’s reinforces the strength of the message with a self-deprecating presentation of
self. He acknowledges his limitations as a person and as an archbishop. This discursive
approach, as we will see in later statements, is typical of Hunthausen. He shows a strong
tendency to personalize his message by foregrounding his own identity (I call this strategy
assertion of personal identity), even when the content of his words purports to self-
effacement. On a tactical level this shows up in his preference for use of the first person, his
readiness to share personal thoughts and feelings, and his habit of calling upon his own
experience as a framework for the discussion of conflict issues. Hunthausen’s use of this
strategy stands out when we compare it with the Ratzinger and Laghi letters summarizing the
visitation findings. In those texts we gain little sense of who the letter writers are, or of how
the conflict affects them on a personal level.
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It is striking to compare the foreboding that marks the Hunthausen letter of 11.26.85 with the
statements he and Wuerl issue just a week later, which acknowledge Wuerl’s appointment as
auxiliary bishop. Both speak of their joy at the news and both employ effusive words of praise
and gratitude (show deference to the order and mindset of the Church; minimize the
appearance of conflict; act fraternally; practice courtesy). Hunthausen’s statement is more
restrained than Wuerl’s, but it has its own moments of pietistic hyperbole, as when
Hunthausen writes that Wuerl’s appointment “brings joy to me personally as I am sure it will
to the entire church in Western Washington.” Wuerl’s statement brims with ameliorating
modifiers (“I am very happy to be called to serve such a distinguished archbishop and so
vibrant a church” – emphasis mine) and expressions of gratitude and self-effacement. When
Wuerl describes the Archdiocese of Seattle as “a fruitful and vigorous part of Christ’s
vineyard,” with “so many clergy, Religious and laity who so deeply love Christ and his
church,” one can only assume that Wuerl has a personal knowledge of Seattle that Cardinal
Ratzinger lacks!
In the same issue of the Progress (12.5.85) where the Hunthausen and Wuerl statements
convey unreserved approval of Wuerl’s appointment, one finds the interview with
Hunthausen that addresses the matter of a possible connection between Wuerl’s appointment
and the visitation. It is unclear why Hunthausen decides to release this interview. Perhaps he
had concluded that speculation about the relationship between Wuerl’s appointment and the
visitation was inevitable and he would be better off if he confronted that question directly.
(Hunthausen says as much at a later date: cf. The Progress, 9.11.86.) Two interesting features
of the interview are Hunthausen’s statement that the visitation itself and the Laghi summary
serve a “limited purpose” (addressing “certain allegations,” but not giving a complete picture
of the archdiocese or of Hunthausen’s leadership) and his declaration that Wuerl’s
responsibilities are confined to offering various kinds of assistance (pastoral, sacramental,
administrative) to Hunthausen. Thus, Hunthausen relativizes the visitation and its findings
(they do not tell the whole story) and he denies that Wuerl’s appointment comes at a cost to
himself (persuasive argumentation; secrecy).
Obviously, Hunthausen does not tell as much as he knows about Wuerl’s role at this point.
Nine months later, Hunthausen admits this and offers a justification for not having been more
forthcoming.
[Bishop Wuerl’s] appointment here shortly after the formal conclusion of the Apostolic Visitation made it
inevitable that people would wonder whether, in appointing him as my auxiliary, the Holy See had not
also intended for him to have some specific additional responsibilities with reference to the findings and
conclusions of the visitation. As a matter of fact, it did, but at the time of his appointment, both Bishop
Wuerl and I, along with the Apostolic Pro-Nuncio, judged it best to make no public announcement to that
effect. The importance of making Bishop Wuerl’s transition to the archdiocese as smooth as possible and
of assuring him of the best possible climate for beginning his ministry among us seemed to outweigh any
possible good that might have been realized by giving a full public acknowledgment of all of the
specifications surrounding his appointment as auxiliary bishop. (The Progress, 9.11.86)
Clearly, there is a dividedness at work in Hunthausen’s approach to secrecy. On the one hand
he argues against the use of secrecy and resists it. (In his interview comments Hunthausen
states explicitly that he pushed to have the visitation findings brought into the open.) But on
the other hand, he cooperates with Vatican directives for its use and also employs it of his
own volition (rationalizing his decision to do so).
Shortly prior to Wuerl’s arrival in Seattle, Hunthausen further demonstrates the ambivalence
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in his approach to secrecy when he reads the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter, with its summary of
visitation findings, to the priests of the archdiocese in a closed session. (Did Hunthausen have
permission from Ratzinger or Laghi to do this? It is possible, but doubtful.) A later account of
this meeting (The Progress, 5.15.86) says it was marked by anger and frustration, which
priests directed toward the visitation process and its conclusions. In actuality, if not in
intention, this meeting seems to have betrayed the objective of “making Bishop Wuerl’s
transition to the archdiocese as smooth as possible.” Over time, Wuerl would be confronted
with suspicion and, in some cases, outright hostility.
During Bishop Wuerl’s first liturgy in Seattle, we encounter a rare discursive intervention
from the Pope himself during the affair. It is interesting to see what the Pope says in this
statement commissioning Wuerl and what he does not say. At most, one finds an oblique
mention of the visitation and hint of the intention for Wuerl to have special powers. The Pope
speaks of bishops being “burdened by many and serious matters in carrying out their ministry
so that [emphasis mine] they seek assistance from this Apostolic See…” This could refer to
the problems identified in the visitation and consequent need for special help, or, more
neutrally, it could refer to the ordinary ministerial overload that bishops encounter and the
way that auxiliaries help them to handle this workload. In any case, the purpose of Wuerl’s
being there is to allow Hunthausen to “more freely exercise” his office and “attain the greater
good of the souls” he governs. Thus does the Pope associate (persuasive argumentation) his
act of appointment with the best interest of the Church.
The language of the statement as a whole is highly abstract, which fits its intended liturgical
context of reception (a bishop’s inaugural Mass is no place for polemics) and which allows
the Pope to signal meanings without spelling them out (strategies: courtesy; minimize the
appearance of conflict). The Pope places a premium on unity in his statement. He counsels
Wuerl to “be at one with the Archbishop” so that “this sign of unity” (the episcopal office)
might remain untarnished and the unity of the flock will not be jeopardized. The message to
Wuerl seems to be to tread carefully in managing his relationship with Hunthausen. The
message to both bishops together seems to be to guard the unity in the Church.
Hunthausen and Wuerl themselves, in the time that they worked together, consistently showed
deference to one another and gave the appearance of personal compatibility, even after they
declared their power-sharing arrangement unworkable. Once it became clear they were at
odds in their understanding of who was to have final say in the areas identified by the
visitation, they pursued clarification quietly and according to the hierarchical chain of
command (deference to the order and mindset of the Church). When word came back from
Rome – the Congregation for Bishops had jurisdiction at this point, not the Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith – Hunthausen submitted (yielded) and granted the faculties to Wuerl.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
NARRATIVE AND ANALYSIS OF THE ROME-HUNTHAUSEN CASE: THE
MIDDLE STAGE (SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1986)
7.1 Document Number: 3
Hunthausen 9.3.86 Press Statement Announcing Wuerl’s Special Faculties
Source: Origins, 9/18/86, pp. 250-251.
7.1.1 Summary of Contents:
Rather than summarize Hunthausen’s brief statement, I will reproduce it in full:
I am aware that for quite some time speculation has taken place, both in printed form and in less
formal ways, regarding the roles and responsibilities of Bishop Donald Wuerl. His appointment here
shortly after the formal conclusion of the apostolic visitation made it inevitable that people would wonder
whether, in appointing him as my auxiliary, the Holy See had not also intended for him to have some
specific additional responsibilities with reference to the findings and conclusions of the visitation. As a
matter of fact, it did; but at the time of his appointment both Bishop Wuerl and I, along with the apostolic
pro-nuncio, judged it best to make no public announcement to that effect. The importance of making
Bishop Wuerl’s transition to the archdiocese as smooth as possible and of assuring him of the best
possible climate for beginning this ministry among us seemed to outweigh any possible good that might
have been realized by giving a full public acknowledgement of all the specifications surrounding his
appointment as auxiliary bishop.
However, at the time of his appointment, I did not understand the nature and extent of Bishop
Wuerl’s role. After considerable discussion with the Holy See, it was confirmed that it was the
understanding of the Holy See in December 1985 when appointing Bishop Wuerl that he not only assist
me by assuming a general oversight and responsibility for these five areas (identified in the apostolic
visitation), but that he actually be delegated by me to have complete and final decision-making power
over them. The clarification of this decision took place in June at the Collegeville (Minn.) meeting of
bishops, where I met with the apostolic pro-nuncio. It was subsequently confirmed to me in a letter dated
July 1, 1986.
Once I received this clarification, I not only took steps to carry out the wishes of the Holy See, but
also arrived at the conclusion that it was important to share these matters with my close collaborators in
the ministry and administration of the archdiocese.
7.1.2 Conflict Functionality of the 9.3.86 Hunthausen Press Statement
Laghi (in the Vatican chronology, see document 4, below) would later characterize this press
statement from Hunthausen as a “surprise announcement,” but Hunthausen contested that
description (in his response to the Vatican chronology, document 5). Hunthausen:
The record will show… that I repeatedly made the point in my conversations and exchanges with
Archbishop Laghi at Collegeville this past summer, that, in the then unlikely event that I would agree to
accept the special faculties arrangement according to the manner in which they were being understood by
the Holy See, I would have no choice but to make this matter known to all my priests and close
collaborators since it would be absolutely essential for them to know to whom they were accountable and
from whom they would receive orders and directives. I never left the slightest doubt about this matter
since I knew that to have acted in any other way would have resulted in a chaotic situation with regard to
the governance of the Archdiocese.
Whether the announcement indeed came as a “surprise” to the Holy See is perhaps a moot
point. More obvious and pertinent is Rome’s displeasure that Hunthausen has again resisted
the policy of secrecy. But one should be careful not to categorically associate the Vatican with
the practice of secrecy and Hunthausen with the practice of openness. As is apparent from the
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contents of this statement, Hunthausen, too, could find reason for actively practicing secrecy.
Hunthausen counts himself among those (the others being Wuerl and Laghi) who “judged it
best to make no public announcement” regarding “all the specifications surrounding [Wuerl’s]
appointment as auxiliary bishop.” Moreover, Hunthausen’s word choices are, willingly or not
(perhaps it’s the product of unconscious episcopal habit?), complicit in the persistent refusal
to name Vatican agents. Four times Hunthausen refers to “the Holy See,” but not once does he
say whom exactly he means with this (The Pope? Ratzinger? Gantin? Others?). Indeed, the
pronoun he uses to refer to the Holy See is “it” – the Holy See is not people acting, but
something more akin to an impersonal force.
Interestingly, this communication is brief, matter-of-fact, and – on the surface, at least – non-
contentious. The contents can be boiled down to: I misunderstood; now I understand, and I am
making corrections accordingly. Hunthausen articulates no protest here (though no profession
of loyalty appears either) and presents his own involvement in the affair up to this point as
having been thoroughly cooperative (show deference to the order and mindset of the Church;
minimize the appearance of conflict). Hunthausen also makes no attempt to tell his side of the
story in regard to the visitation and Wuerl’s appointment. But there is a subtext, which I have
already noted: by making a public statement (“I… arrived at the conclusion that it was
important for me to share these matters…”), Hunthausen chooses to go his own way, rather
than hold with Vatican preferences. Thus, the text seems to speak at one time of Hunthausen’s
loyalty and obedience and of his willingness, if necessary, to challenge the Holy See.
Hunthausen makes a strong argument when he points out that it would be administratively
dysfunctional for priests not to know whom they were accountable to. (How exactly did the
Vatican envision this working?) Hunthausen says he shared this view with the Vatican and
made clear that, if a division of power were imposed, he would have to make the details of the
new arrangement known to his priests. Thus, his stated justification for making this
announcement. At the same time, however, Hunthausen must have been aware that sharing
this news would cause an uproar. Apparently, either Hunthausen saw some advantage in the
instigation of controversy or he tolerated it as a necessary side effect of meeting his
communicative objective.
Perhaps the most striking absence in the statement is anger. Hunthausen here announces that
the Vatican has taken power from him in five key areas of oversight – in other words, he is on
the receiving end of a humiliating disciplinary measure (coercive power) -- but Hunthausen
presents this in neutral language as a misunderstanding that, thanks to Vatican “clarification”
is now clarified. Surely Hunthausen felt anger. The question is how the anger was channeled,
at the time and thereafter.
D. Intervening Developments (September-October 1986)
It did not take Hunthausen long to begin to share his version of recent events in detail.
Simultaneous with or shortly following the release of the 9.3.86 press statement, Hunthausen
circulated at least five other texts that commented on Wuerl’s faculties and the past and
present situation in the archdiocese. These texts were a chronology of recent events
(accompanying the press statement announcing Wuerl’s faculties), three explanatory letters of
like content (directed to the chancery staff, the priests of the archdiocese and the people of the
archdiocese) and an interview conducted with Hunthausen and Wuerl (published in the
Progress).
The chronology (hereafter referred to as the Seattle chronology, to distinguish it from the
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better-known Vatican chronology) was published under the title “Chronology” (cf. The
Progress, 9.11.86 and Origins, 9.18.86) but its full title in the original press release was
“Chronology of Events Related to Apostolic Visitation and Appointment of Auxiliary Bishop
Donald W. Wuerl to the Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle.” The text is structured around five
dates and presents no introductory or concluding commentary. The five focal points are the
announcement of the visitation, the visitation itself, Hunthausen’s announcement of the
visitation findings, Hunthausen’s announcement of Wuerl’s appointment, and Wuerl’s
ordination. These events are described in the third person in a matter-of-fact tone and with
little elaboration.
The Seattle chronology precedes the better-known Vatican chronology (see below, document
4) in time. One has to wonder whether the Apostolic Nunciature’s decision to release a
chronology of its own was inspired by the archdiocese’s issuance of a text of this genre. On
the surface, the Seattle chronology is a benign document. It offers no information that was not
previously available and little in the way of argumentation. The thumbnail sketch of the
visitation and post-visitation events in language avoids criticism of Hunthausen or the Holy
See. The chronology was released as an informational “backgrounder” to the press, providing
a context for interpreting the accompanying press statement. The Vatican chronology,
distributed seven weeks later, does not appear to offer direct counterpoint to the Seattle
chronology. The Vatican chronology is a much more lengthy and contentious document,
which responds to the whole of the case that Hunthausen was making publicly at the time.
In contrast with the terse, muted quality of Hunthausen’s announcement of the faculties and
the neutral language of the Vatican chronology, the letters Hunthausen released shortly after
his press statement regarding Wuerl’s faculties are full of feeling and include an impassioned
plea to his readers. The following passage appeared (with minor amendments) in all three
versions of the letter:
In writing to you about these matters, critical as they are for all of us, I feel it is important for me to tell
you that I continue to feel honored and deeply privileged to be able to serve this Church as its Archbishop
and to be able to do so in close collaboration with Bishop Wuerl and with each of you. Our relationship,
which has come to mean so very much to me personally, will, I know, continue to grow stronger and
closer as the days unfold. More than ever I will depend upon your close collaboration and prayers.
Among the duties that are mine as your Archbishop, none are more important or more sacred than the
preaching and teaching of the saving Gospel of Jesus Christ and of witnessing to that Gospel, to the very
best of my ability, by all I say and do. I am firmly committed to doing this, but I cannot do it alone. None
of us can. We can only do it with the strength that comes from God’s grace. We can only do it in union
with each other and with the Church Universal.
Here Hunthausen enlists the personal support of the people of his archdiocese, in language
that is explicitly religious. Other notable features common to Hunthausen’s letters include: an
argument in favor of open disclosure (“Not to have [publicly disclosed Wuerl’s faculties]
would have deprived all the key people within our organization of the most vital sort of
information imaginable”); a declaration that Wuerl possessed uncontested authority in the
designated areas (“Bishop Wuerl now enjoys complete and final authority… for each of the
five areas”); and their inclusion of Hunthausen’s acknowledgment of his own personal
suffering (“the long days and complex events which have brought us to this particular
moment as a church have been extremely trying and agonizing ones for me”). What comes to
the fore is Hunthausen’s humanity and vulnerability.
The letters are not the only example of Hunthausen’s readiness to take his case to the public.
The same issue of The Progress containing his open letter to the people of the archdiocese
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(9.11.86) also carries an interview that Hunthausen and Wuerl gave to Progress editor Bill
Dodds. In the interview the bishops explain how they came to realize the divergence in their
understanding of Wuerl’s role and how they intend to proceed in light of the clarification now
received. Both emphasize that the misunderstanding had been genuine and that they acted “in
good faith.” Hunthausen extended that characterization of good faith to others involved in the
visitation, but noted at the same time that he had questioned the process.
We hear the expression all of this has been very “unjust.” I don’t know whether I’d use the word. I can’t
tell people what word to use.
I think it’s important for me to say that from the very outset I have been aware that at each step
along the way the individuals who have been involved have been doing what they felt they were charged
to do. And I feel that they have done that with a sense of responsibility, a sense of fidelity to the church.
I’ve questioned the process. Methods that somehow seem to be in place to get at concerns in the
church or dioceses. I’ve seriously wondered whether there has to be something better.
I feel that even with the best of intentions there’s such a potential for hurting people and bringing
about divisiveness.
Wuerl, for his part, explicitly challenged those who would claim the process was unjust, but
he agreed with Hunthausen’s suggestion that the process was a painful one.
We can disagree with how things turned out. We can disagree even with some of the process along the
way, but I think it’s important for the good of the church, as the unity we are and for what we understand
the church to be, to always say this is not an injustice, not an evil thing, not a denial of basic human
rights.
Those are really strong words and very strong judgments on the character of the people involved. I
wouldn’t get into that type of judgment.
I certainly would support the archbishop that the process as it was carried out turned out to be very
painful. I would associate myself completely with the archbishop in attempting to address any future use
of this specific process.
The public reaction to Hunthausen’s announcement was swift and pronounced. On September
7, the Seattle Times described responses of support, opposition and bafflement among local
Catholics. The September 8 Seattle Post-Intelligencer said, “Western Washington Catholics
remained confused and uncertain about a power shift in their archdiocese…” One week after
Hunthausen’s announcement (9.12.86), the National Catholic Reporter wrote, hyperbolically,
that news of the power-sharing arrangement had “rocked Northwest Catholics, triggering a
burst of outrage from clergy, religious and laity alike.” In its issued dated September 20, the
Jesuit journal America observed “the clergy and lay leadership in Seattle are angry and
confused at what has been done to their archbishop.”
Though apparently in the majority among Catholics locally and media writers nationally,
supporters of Hunthausen were not the only ones to speak out. Many persons – in the Seattle
archdiocese and around the country -- sent letters to newspapers expressing approval for the
Vatican’s disciplinary action against Hunthausen. Some of these letters enumerated his
failings. And conservative Catholic publications such as The Wanderer consistently
challenged the positions of Hunthausen and his advocates.
Activists mobilized quickly on Hunthausen’s behalf. Briggs (1992, 17) speaks of “a torrent of
protest by the most active elements in the Seattle church…” A Seattle group calling itself
Concerned Catholics organized a petition drive with the intention of gaining 25,000 signatures
in favor of the restoration of full authority to Archbishop Hunthausen. (The September 25,
1986 issue of The Wanderer characterized the actions of Hunthausen’s supporters as “a
campaign of resistance to the Vatican’s action.”) Throughout the archdiocese (and shortly
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thereafter in places beyond the archdiocese), supporters held rallies, organized prayer
meetings and discussion forums, and initiated letter-writing campaigns on behalf of the
archbishop.
Members of the hierarchy were less quick to speak out on the affair or to take sides publicly.
On September 22, the bishops of the Northwestern US issued a two-sentence statement saying
that they unanimously supported “the efforts of Archbishop Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl in
their process to deal with the present situation in Seattle, to help the church in Seattle to move
beyond this moment and to continue to build up the unity of the church – a unity within the
local church in Seattle and with the Universal Church” (The Progress, 9.25.86). Some
cautious expressions emerged from a gathering of bishops in Portland, Oregon (where new
archbishop William Levada was installed on September 22). Spokane, Washington Bishop
Lawrence Walsh commented that “the fact that [we bishops are] not doing all kinds of things
[publicly in regard to the situation] is not an indication of a lack of concern.” Portland’s
outgoing archbishop, Cornelius Power said, “I think what you want to ask me about, I don’t
want to  talk about.” And Cardinal Bernard Law, while describing the Vatican’s involvement
as “legitimate,” expressed his hope that pain would give way to unity in the case.
The apostolic pro-nuncio was present at the same gathering. The Oregonian newspaper
(9.24.86) quoted Archbishop Laghi as saying that the Vatican’s reassignment of powers in
Seattle was “not to be interpreted as a slap in the face.” Laghi went on to say, “The
Archdiocese of Seattle has done many things very well. But we have to contain all those
energies in a straight line. We are not a uniform church, but we are one church.” Another
report (The Seattle Times, 9.23.86) quoted Laghi as saying: “We admit diversity. But what we
don’t admit, though, is isolation, or particularly we don’t admit, I would say, a kind of
separation.” Hunthausen and Wuerl were also present but did not speak to the press. (At
approximately the same time – see the 9.19.86 National Catholic Reporter – two Vatican
officials shared their views. Monsignor Marcello Costalunga, under secretary of the
Congregation for Bishops, called the removal of Hunthausen’s powers a “disciplinary” action,
and one that was not necessarily permanent. Vatican spokesman Joaquin Navarro-Valls
characterized the Holy See’s action as a “regular” procedure according to canon law. He held
out the possibility of the action being reversed, “if discipline is restored in the archdiocese.”
Perhaps the most significant and, by various accounts (see the 9.26.86 and 10.10.86 issues of
the National Catholic Reporter and the 9.18.86 issue of The Progress), intense exchange of
views to take place in the first weeks after Hunthausen’s announcement of Wuerl’s faculties
occurred during two meetings (Sept. 12 and 26) of Hunthausen and Wuerl with 250 priests of
the archdiocese in a closed session. (According to the National Catholic Reporter article, a
videotape of this meeting was made of the first meeting for the archdiocesan archives, but the
current chancellor of the archdiocese reported on 11.2.01, in answer to my request, that no
such videotape is in the archives currently.) Among the discussion points at the first meeting
was whether the Vatican action against Hunthausen could be considered just. Many priests in
attendance expressed the view that the action was “unjust.” One week later Bishop Wuerl
wrote a letter to the priests of the archdiocese (which he released for publication in the
9.25.86 Progress; see also Origins, 10.9.86), responding again to that specific charge (see his
9.11.86 Progress interview statement above) and reflecting more generally on the recent
developments.
In his letter, Wuerl writes:
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[….] When I view the visitation and its results it is clear to me that the person of the archbishop and the
sincerity of his ministry were never challenged, much less attacked. The letter bringing closure to the
visitation speaks of the archbishop in high praise, noting that he has “striven with heart and mind to be a
good bishop of the church.” This I know you believe and I can affirm from my own experience to be true.
Nor at issue, Wuerl continues, “Are the many good and positive things happening in the
archdiocese.” What is at issue are “certain practices and aspects of the archdiocesan
administration that the Holy See indicated need attention.” Wuerl’s recommendation to the
priests was to “move forward to address the concerns that prompted the faculties in the first
place.”
Any timeline for the continuance of the faculties is intrinsically tied to our success in addressing the
concerns of the visitation. The purpose of these faculties is to help the archbishop. Once the reason for the
faculties no longer exists, it seems to me neither does the need for the faculties.
As for the justness of the visitation process, Wuerl writes:
You may recall that I was asked repeatedly at the Friday meeting to denounce the visitation process as
“unjust.” This, as I said, I cannot do. The fact that the process indicated in the September 30, 1985, letter
of Cardinal Ratzinger is a process with which we Americans may be unfamiliar or uncomfortable does
not of itself make the process “unjust.”
Before closing, Wuerl declares the intention that he and Hunthausen had reached jointly to go
to Rome “for a forthright discussion with the proper authorities on the issues, process of the
visitation, and the reaction in the archdiocese.” (This suggestion had been made to
Hunthausen and Wuerl at their gathering with the archdiocesan presbyterate on 9.12.86.) He
also offers a brief theological reflection that holds out hope for finding “a redemptive aspect
to our sorrow, humiliation and pain.”
One week after Wuerl wrote his letter, and two weeks after the archbishop and auxiliary met
with the priests of the archdiocese, the presbyterate met again with the bishops (on 9.26.86).
The archdiocesan pastoral and finance councils were also present for this meeting, as were the
chancery department heads. In the course of this meeting some especially heated exchanges
between Wuerl and others in attendance took place. According to a (10.10.86) National
Catholic Reporter account, Wuerl accused some priests of “fomenting a divisive current
against the process he and Hunthausen were trying to follow to resolve the conflict,” a
challenge that some priests interpreted to be a threat. At this meeting Hunthausen and Wuerl
formulated more concretely their plan to go to Rome, though no date was set for the trip. (In
fact, such a trip would never materialize.)
A key question Wuerl raised in his letter to the priests -- one that tended to be underplayed in
secular and liberal Catholic press coverage at the time (which focused on the “justice” of the
visitation process) – concerned the practical progress toward addressing the concerns
identified by the visitation. For some months, at least since April of 1986, Wuerl had served
with Chancellor (Very Rev. Michael G.) Ryan and Director of Administration (Rev. Michael
J.) McDermott on a committee that Hunthausen had established to review the 9.30.85
Ratzinger letter and find concrete ways of responding within the archdiocese. A major focus
of the committee’s work was identifying the parties with responsibility in the areas of concern
and engaging them in a discussion of how to approach specific problems. In an internal
memorandum to “Designated Leaders in the Archdiocese of Seattle” (exact recipients
unknown), dated September 29, 1986, Hunthausen reported on the work of this committee
and passed on a copy of an assessment the committee had submitted to him on April 29, 1986.
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(Copies of both of these documents are available in the Wasden Price collection.) In that same
document, Hunthausen made clear that oversight of the process of addressing the visitation
concerns was now entrusted almost entirely to Wuerl. (The public record is only minimally
revealing of Hunthausen’s effort to address Rome’s specific pastoral concerns prior to
Wuerl’s arrival, but see Ratzinger’s reference, in his 9.30.85 letter, to a 3.14.84 Hunthausen
letter – never made public -- wherein Hunthausen discusses the steps he has taken to correct
the practice of contraceptive sterilization in local Catholic hospitals.)
On October 1, the group calling itself Concerned Catholics met with Hunthausen and Wuerl
and presented to Wuerl 13,500 signatures it had collected calling for the restoration of full
power to Hunthausen. The petitions were given to Wuerl and not sent directly to Rome
(Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 10.2.86) because the group believed that Rome would listen only
to Wuerl’s voice in this matter. Participants in this meeting said that, while the meeting itself
was cordial, Wuerl shared his view that press coverage had been detrimental in the Seattle
situation thus far and that, unless the “decibel level is lowered” in Seattle, the Vatican might
yet take sterner action against Hunthausen.
By the middle of October, commentators nationally were speculating that the controversy
would command center stage at the November meeting of the national bishops’ conference
(cf. National Catholic Reporter, 10.17.86). Since the Laghi letter of the previous November,
which had summarized the visitation findings, no official pronouncements on behalf of the
Holy See had been issued to clarify Rome’s position. According to the National Catholic
Reporter (10.31.86), Laghi came under increasing pressure to make public the Vatican’s
version of development in the case. On 10.27.86, Laghi released a document that served this
purpose.
It is revealing to consider the process whereby Laghi’s Vatican chronology (document 4,
assessed below) was released. The account in the 10.31.86 National Catholic Reporter
identifies several of the participants involved and the interests at stake. Because it is highly
detailed and the only relevant source I can find on this matter, I will quote this particular
article at length.
Laghi, under growing pressure to make public the Vatican’s version, had initially worked out a plan
with [NCCB President James] Malone. According to that plan, Laghi’s chronology was to be released to
the U.S. bishops and the press along with a Malone cover letter that at one point contained an
endorsement of the pro-nuncio’s chronology, a source said.
But after conversations with other bishops, Malone decided to maintain a neutral approach.
He convened a teleconference Oct. 23 of the NCCB executive committee during which it was
decided that the U.S. bishops would distribute the Laghi chronology only if an accompanying Hunthausen
chronology were included.
The bishops scrupulously wanted to maintain neutrality on the matter, but at that point ended up
forcing Laghi to change his approach in handling the matter, one source said. “They wanted to be fair and
acted in a very American way,” he added.
At first, Laghi agreed with the changed plan, but he later telephoned Malone to say that under the
circumstances the Vatican Embassy would release the document on its own.
It was not clear whether all committee members participated in the Oct. 23 conference call. The
committee is made up of Malone, NCCB Vice President John May of St. Louis, Boston Cardinal Bernard
Law, Washington Auxiliary Eugene Marino and Rockville Center Bishop John McGann.
Laghi had shared his chronology with Hunthausen, who, another source said, made it clear to both
Laghi and Malone that he disagreed with aspects of the apostolic pro-nuncio’s version. Hunthausen asked
Malone and Laghi not to distribute it. Hunthausen, one source said, thought that making the document
public at this time would distract attention from the work of the Nov. 10-12 annual U.S. bishops’ meeting
and would cause further division in the church.
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But a major concern among the U.S. bishops for not wanting to release the chronology without an
accompanying Hunthausen chronology was the potentially awkward position it would place Hunthausen
in. He would have to respond publicly to the disputed points or say nothing at all. On the one hand,
responding publicly, the source noted, would have placed him visibly at odds with Laghi. On the other
hand, not replying would have allowed the appearance of accepting Laghi’s chronology as fact.
The critical factor in these initial deliberations was that the bishops appeared to remain neutral, even
if it meant requesting Laghi to change his approach to publicizing the chronology. Malone last week
referred calls on the matter to the NCCB communications department.
Russell Shaw, NCCB spokesman, said Oct. 23 that there had been “a tentative plan” to distribute the
chronology but that “there followed a series of consultations involving officers of the conference,
Archbishop Hunthausen and Archbishop Laghi” and that “the outcome of those conversations was that
the bishops’ conference would not distribute the document as prepared.”
The next day, however, an NCCB spokesperson said the chronology would be available to the press
Oct. 27 with a one-day embargo.
This abrupt reversal, according to sources, including one Catholic conference member familiar with
the case, came after the following sequence of events.
Chicago Cardinal Joseph Bernardin received a call from Laghi, who told Bernardin of the Vatican’s
distress over the NCCB decision not to release the Laghi chronology as initially planned.
Bernardin told Malone that Laghi had spoken with the prefect for the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger and prefect for the Congregation for Bishops, Cardinal Bernardin
Gantin, and that “it was the request of the Holy See” that the NCCB distribute the chronology. The
cardinal discussed with Malone ways in which the chronology could be released that would both satisfy
the Vatican and maintain the independence of the NCCB. Bernardin suggested that Malone again convene
an NCCB executive committee meeting.
Malone then called Laghi, who relayed the Vatican “request.” A second hastily called conference
took place and the decision to distribute the Laghi chronology was made.
Under the latest terms of the agreement between Laghi and Malone, the chronology will be
distributed with a Malone cover letter stating that the document is being distributed “at the request of the
Vatican and authorization of the Holy See.” One observer noted that implicit in this NCCB position was
the desire to separate the bishops from the chronology. Another source said it was the intention of the
bishops to go along with the Vatican request but to continue to stand back from the chronology, giving
Hunthausen “room to maneuver.”
Several sources said the Vatican and Laghi’s office have been “deluged” in recent weeks with
Hunthausen support letters. One source said this had “irritated” at least some Vatican officials; another,
however, said it was pushing them to answer critics’ complaints that it had failed to explain adequately
what exactly led to the Vatican move to give Seattle Auxiliary Donald Wuerl final authority in several
ecclesial areas in the archdiocese.
A spokesperson for the Seattle archdiocese said Hunthausen was “discouraged” by the developments
and had not yet decided how he would respond.  
D.d. Conflict Functionality of the Intervening Developments (September-October 1986)
The events just described take us from Hunthausen’s announcement of Wuerl’s possession of
faculties to Laghi’s distribution of the Vatican chronology. We can characterize this period in
terms of a few key actions and reactions. It begins with a public relations offensive from
Hunthausen, who announces the faculties, justifies his actions and strongly asserts his own
personality. Hunthausen’s statements generate a public reaction. An outcry arises among the
priests and people of the Seattle archdiocese, and some supporters begin to campaign on
Hunthausen’s behalf. Fellow U.S. bishops offer a muted response and seek to minimize the
appearance of conflict. Two Vatican officials briefly comment on the case and observe that
the action taken in Seattle was disciplinary and perhaps temporary. In the course of the
controversy that brews, the priests of the archdiocese ask Bishop Wuerl to denounce the
visitation. Wuerl refuses, defending the Holy See’s actions. Rather than agreeing to challenge
Rome, Wuerl attempts to engage in problem solving by directing attention to the issues
identified in the visitation and showing his willingness to go with Hunthausen to Rome to
discuss the current situation. But tensions remain high between Wuerl and many of the
priests. As the public debate grows more heated, the pro-nuncio prepares the Holy See’s
statement of response. Laghi works behind the scenes to have the Vatican statement
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(chronology) endorsed by the U.S. bishops’ conference. The NCCB leadership strives to
maintain neutrality. Eventually, through the intervention of Cardinal Ratzinger, a compromise
is reached. The NCCB releases the document not with an NCCB endorsement but with a
statement that it was being distributed “at the request of the Vatican and authorization of the
Holy See.”
Notice that the field of participants increases dramatically as the result of Hunthausen’s
announcement. The NCCB begins to play a significant third party role in the affair at this
point, though initially the conference’s involvement is limited to hidden negotiations
involving its executive committee (NCCB President James Malone, NCCB Vice President
John May of St. Louis, Cardinal Bernard Law of Boston, Auxiliary Bishop Eugene Marino of
Washington, Bishop John McGann of Rockville Center). Individual bishops also weigh in
with their own opinions, though in very guarded ways. (I mentioned Walsh, Power and Law,
but one could identify numerous others.) Moreover, the involvement of certain officers of the
Roman curia comes into the open for the first time: Cardinal Gantin, prefect of the
Congregation for Bishops; Monsignor Marcello Costalunga, under secretary of the same
Congregation; and Vatican spokesperson Joaquin Navarro-Valls. Bishop Wuerl, for his part,
begins to engage the conflict issues more actively in public. Finally, Cardinal Bernardin
(himself a past president of the NCCB) plays an important intermediary role between Rome
and the present leadership of the conference in the matter of the release of the Vatican
chronology. Beyond the increasing activity by members of the hierarchy, we also see a
sudden rise in the level of press coverage of the affair and in the involvement of other
concerned parties (lay persons, priests, Religious).
There are two main thrusts to Hunthausen’s activity during this period, with some
contradiction between the two. The main thrust is his public relations offensive, which reveals
Wuerl’s possession of faculties and justifies Hunthausen’s actions up to this point. By
disclosing Wuerl’s faculties, Hunthausen resists the Vatican’s preference for secrecy, taking
the matter out of the confines of the bureaucracy and into the open. Hunthausen’s arguments
of self-justification (persuasive argumentation) emphasize his own loyalty (embodied in his
good working relationship with Wuerl: fraternity), good faith and good intentions (deference
to the structural order and mindset of the Church; associate one’s own efforts with the best
interest of the Church). The implication is that Hunthausen is an innocent who has been
wronged. (Possibly one may locate incipient forms of strategies here. Is Hunthausen
portraying himself as a victim? Apparently so. Is he demonizing those who have acted against
him? If so, only with very subtle indications.) In his delivery of these messages, Hunthausen
adopts a businesslike and measured tone. He explains the current situation, a necessary
practical task for moving forward with leadership of the archdiocese, and pleads for support
from the people of the archdiocese (territorial control) by asserting his own identity
(vulnerable, of good will, a victim) and making ample use of God talk. Ironically,
Hunthausen’s act of disclosure reveals the conflict and escalates it, but it does so in language
that emphasizes unity and harmony.
The other thrust of Hunthausen’s activity during this period is his behind-the-scenes effort to
convince Laghi not to release the Vatican chronology. In this case, the center moves for
openness (abandons secrecy) and the periphery resists. (In secret, Hunthausen argues for
secrecy.) Though Hunthausen does not achieve his overt objective – Laghi releases the
chronology anyway – his resistance may have been a factor which kept the NCCB
administrative board from going so far as to endorse the chronology.
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The production and release of the Vatican chronology appears to be a direct response not so
much to the announcement of faculties in and of itself, but to the debate that erupted in
response to Hunthausen’s announcement and subsequent elaborations. Prior to releasing the
chronology, Laghi says little about the affair in public, but his comments at Archbishop
Levada’s installation show him struggling to find words to dampen the controversy. The
Vatican’s action was not intended to be a “slap in the face,” he says (minimize the appearance
of conflict). Seattle has done “many things very well,” but “we have to contain all those
energies in a straight line.” We are not a uniform church, but we are one church. We admit
diversity, but we don’t admit isolation or separation. The chronology itself will prove to be
less balanced and more decidedly critical in its judgments.
Strikingly, at the same time that Laghi asserts that the redistribution of power was not a slap
in the face for Hunthausen, two Vatican officials offer statements on the record that send
mixed signals regarding this question. Congregation for Bishops Under Secretary Costalunga
says the act was “disciplinary” but not necessarily permanent, and Vatican spokesman
Navarro-Valls says the action was a “regular” (legal) one, but has the possibility of reversal.
What is surprising here is that Costalunga, in particular, speaks on the record, since he sits on
the critical congregation in Rome (the one that gave the final clarification on the faculties
question, but also that his message contradicts Laghi’s. Here the center party speaks with
three voices, not one, and it is difficult to know how to interpret the statements that the
disciplinary action could be reversed. Is this simply a tactic (leaks?) to quiet controversy, or
does the Vatican have some concrete plan under consideration?
 Clearer, in a strategic sense, is Laghi’s back room attempt (secrecy) to get a seal of approval
for his account of the case from the NCCB. The chronology itself is a rhetorical effort to
achieve legitimacy (through argumentation justifying the Vatican’s actions); Laghi seeks
further legitimacy by having it accredited and distributed by an influential third party. At the
same time, Laghi seeks to secure that party as an ally. This struggle is crucial because
winning over the NCCB would take away Hunthausen’s only likely source of support within
the hierarchy. It would isolate Hunthausen as one out of step with the Church leadership.
By seeking the endorsement within the forum of the NCCB executive committee, Laghi saves
himself time (he does not have to wait until the gathering of the entire body in November) and
he limits the number he has to persuade to five or fewer. But the number of participants in
this negotiation increases as it bogs down. Hunthausen is involved from early on thanks to
Laghi’s decision to show him the chronology in advance of its release. (Why does Laghi do
this? Strategically, it seems to work to his disadvantage.) When it appears that the NCCB will
not be distributing the document at all, Laghi consults with Ratzinger and Gantin in Rome
(they possess more coercive power), who make clear their desire to have the NCCB circulate
the document. This leads Laghi to call on another bishop (cardinal) to intervene: Bernardin
(recruit allies). Bernardin calls Malone, Malone calls Laghi, and then Malone reconvenes the
executive committee to come to a new decision. The result is a compromise, wherein the
NCCB maintains neutrality on the content of the statement but serves the Vatican’s wish that
it be the vehicle of distribution.
This is the first time in the conflict that we see the Vatican making a concerted effort to gain
third party support. Hunthausen’s effort to do so has been apparent from a much earlier time.
This suggests that the Holy See now finds itself lacking the ability to resolve the conflict with
resources it already possesses. Through news media projections the conflict has become
rapidly enlarged and amorphous. The direct appeal of the Vatican raises the stakes for other
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bishops who might choose to take a stand in the affair, since the lines are now more clearly
drawn. Individual bishops, as we see in the statement of the Northwest bishops and the
comments of those present at Archbishop Levada’s installation, show a high degree of caution
(as in Power’s refusal to comment), but they also offer hints of where they stand (Walsh
speaks of the bishops’ “concern” about the situation, implying some level of support for
Hunthausen, whereas Law’s remark about the legitimacy of the Vatican action suggests more
of an affiliation with the center party.)  The NCCB executive committee’s firm decision to
remain neutral, even after the preference of Ratzinger and Gantin is made known (it yields on
the distribution question but not on the endorsement question), suggests that the bishops’
conference enjoys a significant degree of autonomy and does not feel compelled to slavishly
follow Rome’s lead.
Bishop Wuerl is at this point tightly wedged between the positions of the center and periphery
parties. Certain priests of the archdiocese want him to denounce the visitation process as
unjust, and Hunthausen himself leaves open the possibility of taking this stance himself
(which he later does, in his NCCB address). But fidelity to Rome requires Wuerl to defend the
visitation. Wuerl resolves this dilemma of dual (conflicting) loyalties by asserting the
“justice” of the proceedings but acknowledging that the process was “painful.” He also
declares himself ready to go with Hunthausen to Rome to discuss the current state of affairs
and the criticisms of the process that have arisen. Thus, Wuerl appears to engage in problem
solving.
Perhaps the hardening tension between Wuerl and many priests of the archdiocese is what
leads Hunthausen later (in his NCCB address) to call the present arrangement in the
archdiocese “unworkable.” It is intriguing that Wuerl, like the Vatican officials just days
before him, foresees a chance of Hunthausen’s faculties being restored. (“Once the reason for
the faculties no longer exists, it seems to me neither does the need for the faculties.” Does
Wuerl possess inside information at this point, or is he just following the lead of the curial
officers public pronouncements?) Noteworthy, too, is Wuerl’s emphasis on the importance of
concretely addressing the Vatican concerns identified through the visitation process. This is a
question that is largely neglected in much of the press coverage (mostly supportive of
Hunthausen) of the time. Hunthausen establishes a process for addressing the concerns, but it
may have been difficult for Rome to gauge Hunthausen’s level of commitment to this process.
Uncertainty about this could have been a source of tension between Hunthausen and Rome.
In general, the priorities of the third party (member-of-the-hierarchy) participants at this point
seem to be, first, cautiously to avoid getting oneself into trouble and, to second, signal one’s
own position in a nonaccountable (indirect way). By holding out for neutrality, the NCCB
executive committee and other bishops support Hunthausen in an intentional (surreptitious)
way, or by default. Rome has made clear its wish for the American bishops to side with the
Holy See. Openly criticizing Rome or defending Hunthausen would be problematic for
individual bishops own relations with Rome. Thus, neutrality is the most Hunthausen can
hope for from his fellow bishops at this stage, and he gets it.
7.2 Document Number: 4
Laghi, The Vatican Chronology (10.24.86)
Source: The Progress, 10/30/86, pp. 2-4; Origins, 11/6/86, pp.362-364.
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7.2.1 Summary of Contents:
The text carries the title, “A Chronology of Recent Events in the Archdiocese of Seattle,” and
consists of four numbered sections divided into lettered paragraphs. All four sections
highlight key points related to the visitation from the Vatican perspective. The document
contains no stand-apart introductory or concluding material.
Section 1, Decision for an Apostolic Visitation of Seattle, opens the chronology with a
reference to 1978, when the Vatican began a correspondence with Hunthausen about “pastoral
practices and the presentation of the church’s teachings” in the Archdiocese. The Vatican-
Hunthausen correspondence arose as the result of letters of complaint that the Vatican had
received about Hunthausen’s pastoral leadership.
Laghi asserts that the Vatican interest in the matter developed out of its concern for the well
being of the universal Church. The text explicitly denies that the Holy See’s action had
anything to do with Hunthausen’s stance on “nuclear weapons and the payment of taxes.”
According to the chronology, Hunthausen agreed certain abuses exist and needed correction.
Though Hunthausen took some corrective actions, the Vatican continued to receive
“substantiated complaints” about ongoing abuses. At the prompting of “certain bishops” who
saw the need “to clear the air,” the Vatican decided to conduct an Apostolic Visitation of
Seattle.
Section 2, Preparation for the Apostolic Visitation, identifies two Vatican priorities in the
affair: (1) building up the local Church in harmony with the universal Church, and (2)
protecting Hunthausen’s good name. Thus publicity was kept to a minimum and the Vatican
sought to inform Hunthausen and enlist his cooperation throughout.
The chronology then describes Archbishop Hickey’s consultation with Hunthausen prior to
his conduct of the Visitation. Together they reviewed the forthcoming procedure and the
doctrinal and pastoral issues in question. Hickey also discussed with Hunthausen specific
letters of complaint of which Hunthausen was already aware. As part of this process,
Hunthausen was allowed to suggest persons to be interviewed. Laghi notes at the end of
section 2 that Hunthausen insisted that a public announcement of the Visitation be made.
Section 3, The Visitation, describes the Visitation process, including its information sources
(public documents, personal interviews with persons of the Archdiocese, an extensive
interview with Hunthausen himself) and its findings (“five areas of concern” remained after
the information gathering). According to the chronology, “the testimony of ‘unfriendly
witnesses’ added little to the data on which the criticism of the Holy See was based.” The
areas of concern are identified with brief titles (The Tribunal, The Liturgy, Health Care,
Homosexuals, Inactive Priests, Clergy Formation) followed by descriptions of the problems
encountered. (NB: Laghi speaks of five areas of concern but names six.)
Laghi ends this section by presenting the overarching conclusion of the visitation that, though
the Holy See judged Hunthausen “to be an effective bishop in many respects,” it nonetheless
“considered him lacking the firmness necessary to govern the archdiocese.” Laghi continues,
“The archbishop would dissent from such a judgment,” but Hunthausen said in a 9/11/85
letter to the pro-nuncio that he could begin to understand why the Vatican might want to
consider appointing an auxiliary bishop in light of its holding that viewpoint.
Section 4, The Decisions After the Visitation, begins with a reference to an October 9-10,
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1985 meeting at the apostolic nunciature, at which the visitation findings were discussed with
Hunthausen again. (Apart from Hunthausen, the chronology does not identify the meeting
participants.) Of concern to the Holy See was Hunthausen’s “interpretation of the importance
of these matters and the inadequacy of his response...” Laghi says Hunthausen “did not
dispute the facts” revealed by the Visitation.
While considering Hunthausen’s request for an auxiliary bishop, the Holy See examined
options that would enable the auxiliary bishop to assist Hunthausen in the five “problem
areas.” Paragraph c. of this section cites Canon 403.2 of the Code of Canon Law, which
would enable the Holy See to grant special faculties. However, the chronology states,
Hunthausen agreed in a 12/2/85 letter to a compromise whereby he himself would grant the
faculties to the auxiliary bishop. For more than six months after Bishop Wuerl’s arrival, the
agreed-faculties were not given. Laghi allows, “This could be attributed to a
misunderstanding or misinterpretation on [Hunthausen’s] part." After clarification from
Rome, Hunthausen granted the faculties and went public with a statement that the act was
“mandated by Rome.” In closing, Laghi makes clear that the Vatican is displeased with
Hunthausen for “portraying this whole process as a one-sided affair.”
7.2.2 Conflict Functionality of the 10.24.86 Vatican Chronology
The Vatican chronology is an attempt to make the Vatican’s case with the public, with the
American bishops being, apparently, the primary intended audience. Unlike in his letter
reporting on the visitation findings, Laghi here does not write in his own name or identify an
intended readership. Instead, he constructs this text to read as an objective chronicle of events.
The overall thrust of the document is to explain and justify the Vatican’s actions (from the
beginning to the present) and to simultaneously undermine Hunthausen’s position. It is a
surprisingly open -- and contentious – expression of the Vatican’s unhappiness with one of its
own bishops. Here the Vatican shows a willingness to abandon the polite language of
episcopal graciousness when it deems necessary.
Laghi’s narrative and organizational structure depicts the Vatican interventions as reasonable
and carefully managed (persuasive argumentation; legitimize use of power). His four sections
offer a rationale for Vatican action at each stage of the affair, with one step logically
following another. The repeated pattern in the chronology is one of the Vatican discerning a
problem (which has arisen on the Seattle side), assessing it and responding to it. Thus, the
Vatican received complaints about conditions in Seattle (problem), discussed these with
Hunthausen (assessment), and sought his assistance in improving the conditions (response).
The complaints continued and Hunthausen’s own documented responses were worrisome to
the Vatican (problem), discussions with other bishops suggested a need to “clear the air”
(assessment), and the Vatican decided -- here reportedly at the suggestion of other bishops –
to conduct a visitation (response). The Vatican foresaw a challenge in maintaining
intraecclesial harmony and Hunthausen’s good name (problem), “consequently, it was
determined [assessment] that publicity would be kept to a minimum…” (response). The
visitation showed Hunthausen was “lacking the firmness necessary to govern the archdiocese”
(problem), so the Vatican discussed with Hunthausen the possibility of appointing a bishop
with special powers to Seattle (assessment), whereupon Wuerl was appointed (response).
When Hunthausen finally gave to Wuerl the special faculties, he claimed he was forced to do
so by Rome (problem), an act, together with its ensuing publicity, that has been deemed
“regretful” (assessment) by Rome. Therefore, the Vatican has authorized production and
release of this chronology (response). The repetition of this pattern leaves one with an
impression of the Holy See as a responsible adult managing an inattentive or willful young
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charge. It is surely no coincidence that the Holy See applies to Hunthausen just the sort of
disciplinary limit setting that he has, in the Vatican’s view, failed to implement in his local
Church.
What is most remarkable in the chronology is the abandonment of the policy of courtesy. My
own reading of the document finds twelve assertions within the document that can be
characterized as face threatening for Hunthausen. I present these in the list that follows.
1. Complaints about pastoral practice in the Seattle Archdiocese have been a concern to the Vatican for a
long time (since 1978). The volume of such complaints has been “high,” and they have come from a
cross-section of the archdiocese (priests, religious and laypeople). Rome became concerned about this
situation in light of its own responsibility for “the well-being of the Universal Church…” (par. 1.a.)
2. Hunthausen himself agreed there were “abuses.” (par. 1.b.)
3. Complaints continued despite the fact that the matters had been brought to Hunthausen’s attention.
(par. 1.c.)
4. The “documented responses” of Hunthausen were themselves of concern to Rome. (par. 1.c.)
5. “Other bishops” suggested the need for a visitation of Seattle.
6. Key euphemisms are dropped in the chronology. Thus, Laghi calls the visitation an “investigation”
(par. 3.b.) and the “areas of concern” are identified here as “problems” (par. 3.b.).
7. “The Holy See considered [Hunthausen] lacking the firmness necessary to govern the archdiocese”
(par. 3.c.).
8. Hunthausen’s “interpretation of the importance” of the visitation findings “and the inadequacy of his
response” were of concern to the Vatican. (par. 4.a.).
9. Even more drastic power-sharing arrangements in Seattle had been considered, including the
appointment of an auxiliary with full power and the appointment of an administrator. (par. 4.b.)
10. Hunthausen failed to give Wuerl the faculties in a timely manner after agreeing to do so. (par. 4.d.)
11. Hunthausen mischaracterized the granting of faculties as having been “mandated by Rome.” (par.
4.e.)
12. Hunthausen’s public announcement of the faculties came as an unwelcome “surprise” to Rome, one
that misrepresented the matter of faculties as a “one-sided affair.” (par. 4.e.).
These breaches in the language of politeness send a clear signal that the Holy See has lost
patience and is frustrated with Hunthausen (revealing the conflict instead of hiding it). Here
Laghi (contentiously) lays blame for Hunthausen’s troubles right at his own doorstep: “the
inadequacy of his response” to problems which had been pointed out to him – since 1978 --
was a decisive factor leading to the Vatican’s actions.
Laghi identifies two recent sources of the Holy See’s irritation with Hunthausen: his “surprise
announcement” making the news of Wuerl’s faculties public (breach of secrecy), and his
declaration that the faculties were “mandated by Rome.” Laghi justifies the Vatican
preference for silence in the affair generally by calling them expressions of concern for the
good of the Church (associate one’s efforts with the best interest of the Church) and
Hunthausen’s reputation (deference to the order and mindset of the Church; courtesy;
fraternity). (As for the Vatican’s refusal to supply Hunthausen with a copy of Archbishop
Hickey’s visitation report, Laghi attributes this to promises of confidentiality which had been
made to visitation interviewees.) In the question of Rome’s mandating the giving of faculties,
Laghi shows a willingness to engage Hunthausen directly by contesting his interpretation of
events: “In fact, a more precise description would have been that this was the agreement
reached between Archbishop Hunthausen and the Holy See after much discussion and effort
to support him.” This is an intriguing and potentially revealing point of contention. Simply
put, Laghi says Hunthausen was not forced to give over the faculties: this was something he
agreed to (legitimize use of power). But Hunthausen’s own testimony over time consistently
attests to his resistance to give the faculties. It is hard to imagine that Laghi experienced
Hunthausen’s “agreement” to surrendering these powers as something Hunthausen entered
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into willingly. So the question is: Did Laghi hear in Hunthausen’s agreement only what he
wanted to hear; or did Hunthausen so desire to present himself as cooperative that he gave the
impression that he freely agreed to surrendering the powers; or was some other kind of failure
to communicate at hand?
Regardless of what had been the case, with the release of this document the Vatican shows its
readiness to criticize Hunthausen publicly, to test his base of support and look for support of
its own in an open forum. Distribution of the document escalates the conflict.
E. Intervening Developments (October-November 1986)
Once the chronology was released, its highly critical tone and content was not lost on outside
observers. The 10.28.86 New York Times noted that the chronology “was studded with
references that could embarrass the Archbishop, something regarded as uncommon in a
document about a functioning archbishop.” A 10.31.86 article in the National Catholic
Reporter carried the title, “Laghi’s perspective seen as blaming Hunthausen.” The article
observed that the chronology: placed the onus for the entire affair on Hunthausen; challenged
Hunthausen’s version of the special faculties discussion; said that other U.S. bishops had
recommended the visitation; mentioned complaints received from within the archdiocese; and
portrayed Hunthausen as a weak leader, unable to govern the archdiocese effectively. The
same issue of the NCR offered editor Tom Fox’s comment that, through its release of the
chronology, “the Vatican played hardball again.”
Attention in the press quickly turned to how the matter would be addressed at the forthcoming
meeting of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, November 10-13 in Washington,
D.C. (See the 10.30.86 New York Times, the 11.7.86 National Catholic Reporter and the
11.9.86 National Catholic Register.). On November 6, the bishops released their agenda (cf.
The Progress, 11.6.86) for the meeting: the Hunthausen case was scheduled for discussion in
a closed-door session on November 11.
Hunthausen’s first public response to the Vatican chronology was measured. In a statement
released on 10.27.86, Hunthausen wrote that the chronology, “prepared by Archbishop Pio
Laghi… and released at the direction of the Holy See, is an attempt to condense into three-
and-one-half pages of print an extremely complex network of events, meetings, conversations
and exchanges of correspondence which took place over a period of several years.”
[…] In my judgment, a fair description of just the context in which all these events took place, let alone of
the underlying issues themselves, would require considerably more space than that given. And it goes
without saying that a much longer and more detailed document would be required in order to report
adequately and faithfully the precise unfolding of each individual development in all its complexity. I
prefer not to do this—at least not at the present time or in this particular forum.
For the present, I will simply let it suffice to say that my understanding of a number of statements,
interpretations and conclusions that are set forth in Archbishop Laghi’s “Chronology” differs significantly
from his.
My respect for Archbishop Laghi and for the office he holds, as well as my personal loyalty to our
Holy Father, prompt me at this time to reserve the making of more specific comments and judgments to
other more appropriate forums. One of those forums may be the Executive Session of the forthcoming
meeting of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, where I have been given an indication that I will
have an opportunity to speak.
Hunthausen closed his statement with an “earnest plea.” “[L]et us help break the cycle of
tension that now exists by making every sincere effort in word and action to rise above any
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contentious spirit, and let us do all we can to preserve the bond of unity that is ours as faithful
members of the church, committed always to witnessing to the truth in love.”
By this time, a number of themes had emerged repeatedly in the local and national media
discussion of the case. Examples of these themes appear in the 10.30.86 New York Times,
which observed: “Hunthausen has become a favorite of liberal church activists in the United
States, who say the church in Rome is out of touch with most American Catholics in matters
of birth control, homosexuality and other social issues.” (The Hunthausen case was often
linked spoken of in conjunction with the Vatican’s August, 1986 revocation of Fr. Charles
Curran’s license to teach theology, another controversy that received considerable attention as
an example of a Vatican crackdown on the U.S. church.) But, the same article went on to
note, “Hunthausen also has his detractors. Thrust into the limelight in 1982 when he withheld
part of his income taxes to protest the arms race, Archbishop Hunthausen has been criticized
for both his political and religious stances… Conservative Catholics in Seattle say his
interpretation of liturgy and the Gospel are out of line. They criticize him for allowing a
homosexual group to sponsor mass at St. James Cathedral.” Other writers, especially in
Catholic publications, focused on ecclesiological questions of relationship: between the
Church Universal (symbolized in Rome’s centrality) and the church in the U.S., and between
the bishop of Rome and the American bishops. How was Church unity being affected by the
case? How autonomously could the American episcopal conference function in cases where it
found itself at odds with Rome? Finally, some writers (cf. The New York Times, 11.10.86; but
also note this same view was expressed by Hunthausen’s Vicar General, Michael G. Ryan as
early as 1985, cf. The Progress, 12.5.85) raised the question of why Hunthausen and Seattle
were being singled out. Such pastoral problems could be located in any number of other
American dioceses. (Briggs 1992 offers a detailed presentation, in narrative form, of the
speculations and arguments that permeated contemporary American discussions of the case.)
Beyond these specific perspectives, it is safe to say that in the fall of 1986 many shared the
view of Archbishop Hurley of Anchorage, who said, “It is no longer a question of Archbishop
Hunthausen of Seattle. It’s a question of the state of the church.”
As a means of presenting his case to his fellow American bishops, Hunthausen prepared two
texts in anticipation of the November 10-13 gathering. One text was a detailed response (see
document 5, below) to points raised by the Vatican chronology. The other was an address to
the bishops that Hunthausen intended to deliver orally (document 6, below). The bishops
would already have in their possession a copy of the Vatican chronology, which had been
distributed earlier.
The conference itself opened on the morning of November 10 with an address by the outgoing
NCCB President, Bishop James Malone of Youngstown, Ohio. Malone was finishing his
three-year term as conference president. Malone offered an assessment of the current state of
the Church in the United States, which called attention to the vitality of parish life and to
vitality within the episcopal conference itself (the latter demonstrated by collegiality within
the conference and a willingness to offer critiques of American culture). Malone also
highlighted certain challenges facing the American Church, specifically: how to manage
questions concerning the relationship between the local and universal Church, the role of
women in the Church, the celebration of the Eucharist in the face of a declining number of
priests and the relationship between the teaching office of bishops and that of theologians.
Malone made reference to the Hunthausen case in the context of his remarks about the
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relationship between the Church universal and Church local. He spoke of “a growing and
dangerous disaffection of elements of the church in the United States from the Holy See.”
Some people feel that the local church needs more freedom. Others believe that more control is in order.
Some feel that appeals to authority are being exercised too readily. Others applaud what they perceive to
be a return to needed central control. Wherever you stand, this division presents the church in the United
States with a very serious question: How will we move to address this developing estrangement, to
strengthen the cognitive and affective bond between the church here and the Holy See? We do not exist
alone. We cannot exist alone. We are a communio. We are a church.
We all know that in recent weeks the situation in the Archdiocese of Seattle has exemplified these
concerns. Tomorrow we shall take up this matter in our executive session. Let me be very clear about the
reasons for doing so.
We recognize that our conference of bishops has no competence to interject itself into the special
relationship between the Holy Father and a local bishop. Nor have we any intention of engaging in a
retrospective review of events which have already occurred and which have been placed on the public
record.
The purpose therefore of addressing this matter in our executive session is simply this: to offer
fraternal support to Archbishop Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl in their future efforts to minister to the
church in Seattle. We look to this as a constructive expression of the collegial spirit which unites us with
one another and with the Holy Father.”
Following Malone’s address, the Apostolic Pro-Nuncio spoke to the body, presenting first a
few remarks of his own and then reading a message of Pope John Paul II to the bishops. In his
own remarks Archbishop Laghi drew attention to the significant role he himself had played in
the naming of a many (almost one-third) of the bishops present.
As I look out over this assembly, permit me to express satisfaction at the presence of so many who have
been appointed to the hierarchy during my tenure as papal representative. We have not yet reached the
“magic number” of 100, but we are not yet far from it.”
Laghi then proceeded to read the Pope’s message, which did not address the Hunthausen case
specifically, but did speak to issues directly pertinent to it. Calling himself, “the first servant
of the church’s unity and universality,” the Pope offered some reflections on the Petrine
ministry and then noted three instances in which he was currently engaged in trying to serve
and collaborate with the U.S. bishops.
The very mystery of the church impels us to recognize that the one, holy, Catholic and apostolic
church is present in each particular church throughout the world. And since the successor of Peter has
been constituted for the whole church as pastor and as vicar of Christ (Lumen Gentium, 22), all the
particular churches – precisely because they are Catholic, precisely because they embody in themselves
the mystery of the universal church – are called to live in communion with him.
Our own relationship of ecclesial communion – collegialitas effectiva et affectiva – is discovered in
the same mystery of the church. It is precisely because you are pastors of particular churches in which
there subsists the fullness of the universal church that you are, and must always be, in full communion
with the successor of Peter. To recognize your ministry as “vicars and delegates of Christ” for your
particular churches (Lumen Gentium, 27) is to understand all the more clearly the ministry of the chair of
Peter, which “presides over the whole assembly of charity, protects legitimate variety and at the same
time sees to it that differences do not hinder unity but rather contribute to it” (Lumen Gentium, 13).
To promote the universality of the church, to protect her legitimate variety, to guarantee her Catholic
unity, to confirm the bishops in their apostolic faith and ministry, to preside in love – all this is what he
successor of Peter is called by Christ to do. This Petrine service by the will of Christ is directed to the
good of the universal church and all the ecclesial communities that compose her.
For that reason I endeavor to be of service to all the bishops of the church, so that together as one
college, each of us having a different role, we can all serve the Church of Christ in the distinctive ministry
assigned to us as bishops.
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The specific ways named by the Pope to exemplify his recent – and forthcoming – efforts to
be of service to the American bishops were the apostolic visitation of American seminaries he
had commissioned, his establishment of the Pontifical Commission for Religious Life, and his
plan to make a pastoral visit to the United States, September 10-18, 1987.
Having heard these opening speeches (see Origins, 10.20.86 for the full text of each), the
bishops then moved on to other business in their afternoon session of September 10 and their
morning session of September 11. The most important business undertaken during this time
was the election of new officers of the bishops’ conference. (Archbishop John May of St.
Louis was elected the new President and Archbishop Daniel Pilarczyk of Cincinnati was
elected Vice President. Both were described as Church “moderates” in most press accounts.)
On the afternoon of September 11, the bishops began a closed executive session to discuss the
Hunthausen case. A copy of Hunthausen’s response to the Vatican chronology and his address
to the bishops was provided to each bishop at the beginning of the session, along with an
initial draft of a statement by Bishop Malone (see discussion of document 7, below). Malone
opened the session with a prayer. The bishops were then given twenty minutes to read the
three documents.
E.e. Conflict Functionality of the Intervening Developments (October-November 1986)
Between the distribution of the Vatican chronology and Hunthausen’s detailed response to it
two weeks later at the NCCB meeting, we see the center party press the critical third party
(the NCCB) while Hunthausen offers a first response and prepares to make an all-out defense
of his position.
Despite the highly critical tone and content of Laghi’s chronology, Hunthausen’s initial
response is measured and polite (courtesy; deference to the order and mindset of the Church).
Hunthausen professes respect for Laghi and his office and personal loyalty toward the Holy
Father. He characterizes his conflict with Laghi as a matter of differing understandings.
Rather than attack individual points in the chronology, Hunthausen suggests (persuasive
argumentation) that Laghi has oversimplified a highly “complex” matter. Hunthausen does
not leave it at that but indicates a specific time when he will answer Laghi’s assertions, most
probably at the forthcoming NCCB meeting. It is not hard to find reasons for why Hunthausen
might choose not to fire back immediately with a contentious response to the chronology. For
one, many news media commentators and Church members were already voicing ample
criticisms of Rome, lessening the need for him to make certain arguments himself. For
another, by showing restraint and once again declaring his loyalty, Hunthausen protects his
own appearance as a faithful and non-threatening Church leader. Moreover, the critical
audience to persuade at this time is the bishops’ conference: Hunthausen would have reason
to presume they would prefer to hear from him directly and in private.
Once the NCCB meeting starts, Conference President Malone makes clear his (the conference
leadership’s) desire to confront challenges facing the American Church, not the least of which
is a “growing and dangerous disaffection of elements of the church in the United States from
the Holy See.” But just as clear is Malone’s intention not to let the discussion get out of hand.
Malone states unequivocally that the NCCB has “no competence to interject itself” between
Hunthausen and the Holy Father, and it will not engage in a review of “events which have
already occurred and which have been placed on the public record.” (From the viewpoint of
this study, his reference to the contents of the public record is ironic. That may be the most
problematic issue of all: what was and was not on the public record.) The purpose of the
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discussion of the case would be, according to Malone, to “offer fraternal support to
Archbishop Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl in their future efforts to minister to the church in
Seattle” (act fraternally; associate oneself with the best interest of the Church). As we will
see (section F., Intervening Developments), a number of procedural controls govern the
debate of the Hunthausen case, but in his speech Malone already points to one type of
restriction – the format of the meeting itself. The consideration of the Hunthausen case will
take place in “executive session.” Reese (1992, 174-175) explains that, while most of the
NCCB’s work takes place in the open (i.e., in the presence of reporters), the bishops “meet in
executive session without the press at least once every time they gather… By making these
sessions a regular event, the bishops can meet to discuss issues and problems privately
without signalling a major crisis.” Reese adds, “Topics that tend to be treated in executive
session are sensitive or controversial.” By assigning discussion of the Hunthausen case to the
executive session of the gathering, the NCCB leadership ensures the privacy (secrecy) of the
discussion, keeping infighting out of public view.
The center party also shows a decided interest in controlling the NCCB debate. Laghi, in a
rare public reference to his own political power in the Church, reminds the assembled bishops
that he has played a role in the appointment (power of remuneration) of almost one-third of
the men in the room. He then reads Pope John Paul II’s message to the conference, which tells
the bishops that they are, “and must always be, in full communion with the successor of
Peter.” In and of itself, the Pope’s message – a standard feature of NCCB meetings – amounts
to a symbolic intervention of the center party into the territory of the periphery (territorial
control). But the Pope makes this still more explicit with repeated assertions of papal
primacy. Because the Pope “has been constituted for the whole church as pastor and as vicar
of Christ… all the particular churches… are called to live in communion with him.” Though
the Pope makes no specific reference to the Hunthausen case, his ecclesiological reflection
(God talk) leaves no room for doubting where the bishops’ accountability lies. Ecclesiastical
communion requires all to come to Rome: there is no discussion of the other way around.
The Pope presents his role as one of divinely sanctioned service – service offered in effective
and affective collegiality (fraternity) for the “good of the universal church” (associate self
with the best interest of the Church). It is hard to ignore, however, that the concrete examples
of his own service that the Pope identifies -- the apostolic visitation of American seminaries (a
process that Bishop Wuerl played a key role in), the establishment of the commission for
religious life, and the Pope’s imminent pastoral visit to the U.S (in September of 1987: this
will become an increasingly important question as the conflict progresses) -- are all forms of
surveillance. The term surveillance has a sinister ring to it, but it effectively highlights the fact
that all of these activities are means by which the Pope can monitor local conditions
(monitoring and being of service are not, of course, mutually exclusive). Notably, the Pope
quotes the statement of Lumen Gentium about the responsibility of the Petrine ministry to
protect “legitimate variety” in the Church. This seems to make room for pluralism in the
Church, but the power to determine what is legitimate and what is not remains with Rome.
7.3 Document Number: 5
Hunthausen’s Detailed Response to the Vatican Chronology (11.11.86)
Source: The Progress, 11/13/86, pp. 15-16; Origins, 11/20/86, pp. 406-408
7.3.1 Summary of Contents:
This statement, together with the written text of Hunthausen’s 11.11.86 address to the NCCB
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(see document 6, below), provides the “more specific comments and judgments” regarding
recent events that Hunthausen promised in his 10.27.86 press statement. Though the response
to the chronology and the address work together, they differ in their focus. Whereas this
document takes its lead from the contents of the chronology, the address considers the history
of the conflict and its central issues more generally.
Hunthausen’s response to the Vatican chronology contains introductory remarks, four
numbered sections, and some brief concluding remarks. The numbered sections group various
difficulties Hunthausen has with the Vatican chronology under headings that tell us what,
specifically, Hunthausen objects to in that document. The headings of the numbered sections
are self-explanatory: “1) The Chronology contains some misleading things;” “2) The
Chronology contained some new learnings;” “3) The Chronology contained some
disappointing things;” “4) The Chronology also contains some very real inaccuracies.”
Hunthausen’s introductory remarks pick up where he left off in his earlier press statement,
arguing that the Vatican chronology failed to do justice to the complexity of the present
circumstances. He also asserts that his own recollection of prior transactions differs from that
presented in the chronology. In Hunthausen’s opinion, the Vatican chronology tried to do
either too much or too little: it either tried to say too much in too little space or failed to
address some of the “deep, underlying problems which are at stake.”
Section one provides three examples of how the chronology is “misleading.” Hunthausen
observes that if “substantial complaints” were made about his leadership of the archdiocese,
he himself was “never told who made them or who substantiated them and on what basis.”
Hunthausen also asks why, if his own responses to Vatican inquiries were a strike against him
(even as far back as 1978), he was never informed of this at the time. Another misleading
point for Hunthausen is the Vatican suggestion that Hunthausen erred by describing the
handing-over of special faculties as an act “mandated by Rome.” Hunthausen challenges this
point on two grounds. He says first that he did not use the phrase “mandated by Rome,” and
that, second, even if he had it would have been, essentially, an accurate description of the
interaction.
Section two focuses on ways that the chronology came as a revelation to Hunthausen. Prior to
its release, he writes, he was unaware that Rome’s dissatisfaction with Seattle’s priestly
formation program centered on its admissions practices. Nor did he know of Rome’s specific
concerns about the Archdiocesan Continuing Education program for priests before he
encountered this item in the Vatican chronology. Hunthausen writes that he wishes he had had
this information sooner. In this section Hunthausen also learned for the first time that the Holy
See judged him to lack the “necessary firmness” to run the Archdiocese.
Section three identifies “disappointing things” Hunthausen discovered in the Vatican
chronology. Among these are the intimations that Hunthausen did not carry out his promise to
award the special faculties to Wuerl, and that he had acted intransigently and in bad faith.
Hunthausen argues that such was not the case, that he had made it clear to the Vatican that he
would be willing to resign his office, or to yield certain powers to Wuerl (without giving
Wuerl final authority in these areas), but that he would not agree to a solution that would
leaving him pretending to have powers he no longer possessed. Hunthausen emphasizes that
he made his position on these matters quite clear to the Vatican all along. His decision to stay
on as Archbishop, he writes, was influenced by the advice of colleagues, who persuaded him
it would be the best choice for the local Church.
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Section four highlights two inaccuracies Hunthausen perceives in the Vatican chronology.
Hunthausen challenges the Vatican statement that he insisted on a public announcement of the
Apostolic Visitation. He offers the alternate characterization that he expressed to the Holy See
his “earnest desire” that, if a Visitation were necessary, it be conducted in a spirit that was
“open and positive and constructive.” A second inaccuracy Hunthausen identifies is the notion
that his public announcement of Wuerl’s special faculties surprised the Vatican. This could
not have been the case, Hunthausen writes, because “I repeatedly made the point in my
conversations and exchanges with Archbishop Laghi... that, in the then unlikely event that I
would agree to accept the special faculties arrangement... I would have no choice but to make
this matter known to all my priests and close collaborators...” Hunthausen is at pains
throughout this section to show that secrecy is counterproductive for the Church and is not in
keeping with the spirit of the Second Vatican Council. He raises the question, too, of how on
a practical level it could be expected to work. “I also find it difficult to understand how
anyone could ever have believed that keeping the Special Faculties a secret could possibly
have worked in the first place. If nothing else, the early history of the Visitation to which I
have just referred should have clearly indicated otherwise.”
Hunthausen concludes the statement with a request for a “review of all these matters” by the
NCCB. He expresses his intention to offer additional perspective in his oral remarks before
the group and thanks the bishops for their attention.
7.3.2 Conflict Functionality of Hunthausen’s 11.11.86 Response to the Vatican
Chronology
Hunthausen’s primary aims with this text appear to be to refute specific Vatican attacks
(persuasive argumentation), assert his own personal integrity (personal identity) and call on
his fellow American bishops to identify with and support his cause (recruit allies). With the
release of its chronology, the Vatican has begun an open argument. Here Hunthausen takes up
the challenge and engages the argument.
The claims in the Vatican chronology – that Hunthausen had not corrected the problems in his
archdiocese, that he had failed to hand over faculties after agreeing to, that he had broken with
the Vatican preference for secrecy, etc. -- put Hunthausen on the defensive. Most of
Hunthausen’s energy here goes to responding to those claims, but he opens up some new lines
of argument as well.
Hunthausen makes clear that he is appealing here first and foremost to the American bishops.
Not only does he address them directly, but he also identifies with them and makes a point of
mentioning Archbishop Laghi in only the most respectful (courteous) terms (“…it frankly
embarrasses me to be engaging in this form of exchange of information. I have the greatest
respect and admiration for Archbishop Laghi and appreciate his time and efforts to resolve
this matter.”) Hunthausen is fully aware that individually and collectively the bishops are
concerned not to place themselves in a precarious position by seeming to oppose the Holy See
(deference to the order and mindset of the Church). Hence, Hunthausen tells the bishops that
he did not make a point-by-point response to the chronology earlier because that “would only
have escalated an already tense situation” and caused “further confusion for our people”
(minimize the appearance of conflict).
Hunthausen is at pains to avoid presenting this is a personal attack on Laghi (“the matters
which I will set forth herein are in no sense an attack on his person or his integrity”). In order
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to excuse Laghi, Hunthausen points to the limits of the human mind: “That our recollections
and interpretations differ in some important respects should not be so surprising when one
considers that we are both attempting to present in capsule form a very long and complicated
series of events.” Hunthausen, at the same time, professes himself to be just as concerned
about saving face for the Holy See.
From the very outset of these events, which now go back some three-and-one-half years, I have been
concerned about adverse publicity for the Holy See. I expressed this concern in my earliest
correspondence and in all my conversations with the Holy See, with Cardinal Ratzinger, Archbishop
Laghi, Archbishop Hickey, and even with the Holy Father himself. It was always my deepest desire and
my strongly expressed wish that, whatever steps might be taken to address certain concerns in Seattle,
that they be taken in a way that would strengthen and cement our relationship with the Holy See, and not
in any sense detract from it.
Ironically, Hunthausen’s concern to avoid negative publicity for Rome caused him to urge
Laghi not to publish the Vatican chronology (secrecy). Hunthausen felt the chronology would
“raise more questions than it could possibly hope to answer.” He also feared that it “would
generate a whole new round of publicity in a setting in which accusations and counter-
accusations rather than the voices of reason would dominate and that, in the minds of many, it
would ultimately reflect unfavorably on the Holy See…” Considering Hunthausen’s own
history of practicing and advocating openness (often against Rome’s wishes), and
considering, too, the strong case he makes against the use of secrecy in this text (secrecy
smacks of the “pre-Vatican II Church”) and in his address to the bishops (document 6, below),
Hunthausen’s remark here are a further sign of his ambivalence about this issue. In any case,
one cannot categorically associate Hunthausen with openness and the Holy See with secrecy.
(In the aftermath of the NCCB meeting, at least one commentator, a Hunthausen critic,
pointed out that Hunthausen seemed comfortable with the bishops’ decision to discuss his
case in a closed session. Nonetheless, Hunthausen handed over his own texts to the press
immediately thereafter.)
Before leaving the secrecy-openness issue, one further observation is in order. It is that
Hunthausen follows his reference to “the Holy See” in the paragraph quoted above with a
specific list of his conversational partners: Ratzinger, Laghi, Hickey and the Holy Father. This
contrasts with the typically unspecified references to the Holy See that we have seen
throughout the case. Though the list is not especially revealing in and of itself, it is a sign of
the discussion forum – he is addressing bishops -- and of Hunthausen’s readiness to get down
to details (within the limits of politeness). Significant, too, is Hunthausen’s reference to “a
letter from Cardinal Ratzinger.” This is almost certainly a reference to the 9.30.85 letter
wherein Ratzinger shared the visitation findings with Hunthausen. Hunthausen has already
shared this letter with his priests (and Wuerl mentioned it in his open letter to the priests). Its
existence is now acknowledged in a still wider forum. In the commission report (see
document 9, below) one finds further references to the letter, and with the release of the
commission report comes release of the Ratzinger text as well. Thus, eventually Hunthausen
achieves his original objective of having the letter made public -- and the Vatican itself takes
the step to do so.
Tactically, the way Hunthausen proceeds to voice his complaints without getting personal is
to heap blame on the chronology itself, and not on the chronology’s author (from ad hominem
to ad rem). Essentially this is the same approach Ratzinger and Laghi took in their letters
presenting the visitation findings, when they described problems in the archdiocese but
refused to directly connect the problems to a particular person (saving face for Hunthausen).
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In Hunthausen’s response to the Vatican chronology (not the Laghi chronology), we read:
“the Chronology contains misleading things… disappointing things… inaccuracies,” and so
forth.
A significant portion of Hunthausen’s argumentation goes to challenging the process used
against him. Concerning the visitation, Hunthausen says, “If there were substantial complaints
I was never told who made them or who substantiated them and on what basis.” Only after the
visitation was decided upon, was Hunthausen told “what some of those complaints were”
(emphasis his). Hunthausen’s irritation with the process is further signalled with his choice of
a verb in this passage. He does not speak of the decision to conduct or undertake a visitation,
but rather to “mount” a visitation, a word choice that echoes the common expression “to
mount an attack.” (This usage recurs in Hunthausen’s address to the bishops.) Hunthausen
maintains that in the period following the visitation, the provision of information to him
continued to be inadequate. Thus, certain Vatican criticisms of Seattle were made known to
him only through the Vatican chronology itself. Hunthausen also makes explicit his
disapproval of the decision to divide power between the archbishop and the auxiliary bishop,
and that ultimately he did not feel free to choose other than what the Vatican wanted him to
choose. “That I ‘agreed’ to go along with these wishes is clear, too, although I did not do so
with any sense of freedom since the consequences of my not agreeing to do so had been made
clear to me on more than one occasion.” (Hunthausen was on the receiving end of coercive
power.) Indeed, in the course of his negotiations with Seattle, Hunthausen’s frustration had
been such that he had considered resigning his position.
A critical issue for Hunthausen in this presentation is making the case for his own integrity.
The possibility of resigning was considered as the alternative to an unacceptable choice. The
Vatican wanted Hunthausen to give Wuerl the powers but not to make Wuerl’s possession of
these powers public (secrecy). Hunthausen states here that he could not agree to such an
arrangement – that it would amount to posing as the Archbishop of Seattle, pretending to have
powers he did not in fact have. Hunthausen: “I made it clear that I would never carry out a
public charade by pretending to be something I was not. I am just not constitutionally capable
of that.” Because Hunthausen believed he had made this stand on principle clear to Laghi, he
was, in his own retelling of events, surprised that the Vatican later still had the expectation
that he would give Wuerl the faculties. In Hunthausen’s view, he had agreed to give Wuerl
special responsibilities but not final decision-making power in the key areas. “It would later
be suggested,” Hunthausen said, “that I might have acted in bad faith. I did not.”
Hunthausen also challenges the implication that he violated an earlier agreement by
announcing Wuerl’s faculties publicly (Laghi called this a “surprise announcement”). “The
record will show… that I repeatedly made the point in my conversations and exchanges with
Archbishop Laghi at Collegeville this past summer, that, in the then unlikely event that I
would agree to accept the special faculties arrangement… I would have no choice but to make
this matter known to all my priests and close collaborators since it would be absolutely
essential for them to know to whom they were accountable…”
In making the case for the integrity of his own actions (persuasive argumentation),
Hunthausen places his own personality and view of events in the forefront (assertion of
personal identity). This makes Hunthausen’s text a very different one from the chronology he
is responding to, which strives for the appearance of impersonality and objectivity. Though
Hunthausen has few options at this point in his exchange with the Holy See, the chosen
strategy shows promise (and his own shrewdness?) because his personality is an attractive one
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(witness the strong loyalty shown to him within the archdiocese) and he already has a
reputation for being principled (based on his public stand against nuclear weapons, among
other things). In short, Hunthausen says here: I have only done what I thought right, according
to my vision of how the Church should be. I am willing to accept the consequences as
necessary.
Hunthausen implicitly invites the other bishops to identify with his cause and explicitly
welcomes “some sort of review of all these matters” by the NCCB, “should that be the wish
of the members.” This is a contentious statement, which responds directly to the
contentiousness of the Vatican chronology.
7.4 Document Number: 6
Hunthausen’s 11.11.86 Address to the NCCB
Source: The Progress, 11/13/86, pp.11-13; Origins, 11/20/86, pp. 401-405
Whereas Hunthausen response to the Vatican chronology limits its consideration to the
contents of that particular text, Hunthausen’s address to his fellow bishops considers the
conflict experience (the visitation and its aftermath) as a whole. The assembled bishops were
given the opportunity to read Hunthausen’s “address” to them, but he himself did not have the
opportunity to read it aloud (which he knew in advance). Instead he made some brief oral
remarks to the assembly (see section F., Intervening Developments, below). My analysis here
is of the written text he supplied to the bishops.
7.4.1 Summary of Contents:
Introductory and closing remarks frame four main sections that make up the body of the text.
Hunthausen’s introductory remarks begin with an acknowledgement of his primary audience,
the assembly of bishops, and of the relationship he has with them. Hunthausen expresses his
distress at the thought that he may have brought “anguish” or “division” upon his “brother
bishops,” something he gladly would have spared them. But the controversial issues of the
moment, he points out, “are not just issues that touch the life of the Church in Seattle: they are
issues that touch the lives of each of our churches...” Following up on this thought,
Hunthausen stresses that the matter at hand does not come down to “some sort of battle of
wits between a maverick archbishop and the Holy See…” but that it is “an ecclesial matter
with serious theological implications which touch very directly and profoundly on our
individual role as bishops and on our corporate responsibility as members of the College of
Bishops.”
Hunthausen mentions the response to the Vatican chronology he has already released, but
says he will not comment further on the chronology in the present context. He then names the
“four main areas” he will address:
1) The process used in deciding to conduct the Visitation as well as the process followed in
carrying it out.
2) The five areas of my ministry singled out by the Holy See as areas of serious concern.
3) The identification of the important issues which this entire matter has brought to light.
4) Some thoughts and suggestions regarding the future.
At one point in his prefatory comments Hunthausen pauses to put all of the recent events in
context, reflecting on what the Church might learn from this experience.
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Most of you know that I am not a professional theologian. Many of you know far more about
these matters than I do and can surely articulate them better. Nonetheless the experience that
has been mine over these past years can perhaps serve as something of a laboratory for
viewing, studying, and probing the issues in some way other than the purely theoretical.  If that
be so, then I honestly believe that this sad experience which has been the source of such pain
and confusion for the Church of Seattle and beyond -- even to the point of causing serious
scandal for many -- will not have been in vain, but will have been a new moment of life and
growth.
Most of section one of the address presents an indictment of the Vatican’s use of secrecy in
the visitation process. Hunthausen criticizes the policy of secrecy on the grounds that “secrecy
does not work in matters of this sort” and it “should not work.” Hunthausen says he feels he
compromised his own principles by agreeing to secretive methods. He also communicates his
dismay that the Vatican use of secrecy put him at a disadvantage in the affair. Hunthausen
laments never having received a “Bill of Particulars” -- that is, a formal, detailed summary --
of the Vatican concerns prior to the visitation, nor did he receive a copy of the visitation
report Archbishop Hickey filed with the Vatican. In Hunthausen’s view, the manner of
proceeding, with “unwitnessed, private questionings” and “no opportunity for the subject of
the questionings to face his accusers, or hear or to be informed of their allegations, or to
defend himself” is not a “just” manner of proceeding. Moreover, “This kind of an approach
seriously wounds the community of faith and trust that is the Church.”
As final observations in section one, Hunthausen calls the Visitation process “badly flawed
from the very start” and notes that “confusion and anger” in the local Church and elsewhere
are the result. He also conveys his displeasure with the “punitive” dimensions of a Vatican
action that was presented to him initially as “fraternal exchange of views.”
Section two addresses the five areas of concern that led to the handing over of special
faculties. Hunthausen broaches this topic with the help of “four headings for the purpose of
clarity.” Under the heading “matters of history” he lists specific problems identified through
the Visitation process that have already been resolved. These include: “some confusion... with
regard to the use of the so-called Internal Forum solution; the lack of a plan to employ
degreed personnel in the Archdiocesan Tribunal; and the practice of one hospital of the
Archdiocese permitting sterilization even for contraceptive purposes in some limited cases.”
According to Hunthausen, none of these problems continues to exist in the Archdiocese, nor
have they for some years.
Under the heading “pastoral judgment” Hunthausen discusses criticisms of decisions he made
in pastorally complex and sensitive matters. Calling pastoral judgment an “imprecise
‘science’... even when carried out prayerfully under the guidance of the Holy Spirit and with
every due regard for Church Tradition and Law,” Hunthausen argues that mistakes and
uncertainty are unavoidable in pastoral care. As examples, Hunthausen cites the conscientious
effort he made to decide rightly in the questions of general absolution, the order of first
reconciliation-first communion, and the use of the Cathedral church by the group Dignity.
Hunthausen’s third category for the purpose of clarification bears the heading “ongoing
concerns.” In this area Hunthausen admits to having erred “on one or another occasion since
coming to Seattle.” He mentions two cases in which laicized priests served as lectors and
eucharistic ministers in parishes, and another case in which the wife of an unlaicized priest
was employed by the Archdiocese. Hunthausen characterizes this last case as an “oversight.”
In regard to the liturgical role of the laicized priests Hunthausen says that the practice was
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occurring long before he learned of it, and, in one of the instances, to have stopped it “would
have caused admiratio of the most severe kind.”
Under his fourth heading, “matters I do not understand,” Hunthausen shares his perplexity at
the negative assessment given to the Archdiocesan priestly formation program -- specifically,
its admissions process. He observes that the process was reviewed and approved by the
NCCB visitation team. Hunthausen also professes not to understand the criticism of the
Archdiocesan program of continuing education for clergy, and he denies that he has tolerated
practices of intercommunion.
Section three of Hunthausen’s text focuses on “important issues which have been brought to
light by the visitation and its processes.” Hunthausen identifies three such issues. The first
point he makes is that the present controversy is not a matter of “dissent” in the Church, and
“I am not a dissenter...” More accurately, he says, what the controversy illuminates is the
difficulty that teachers, pastors and servants of the Lord face as they strive to be both loving
and truthful in their witness.
The second point Hunthausen makes in this section is that the controversy is also not a matter
of “personal obduracy or obstinacy” on his part. Though Hunthausen admits to being “strong-
willed,” he assures the bishops that he has been “cooperative and obedient” throughout the
affair. In a provocative aside, however, he notes that his understanding of the virtue of
obedience has never allowed him “simply to acquiesce.” “It has, rather,” he declares,
“prompted me to engage in a process of dialogue, one which, to the best of my ability, I have
always carried out in a respectful, docile and faith-filled manner.”
Hunthausen’s final point in section three acknowledges that adverse publicity around the
affair has caused confusion and scandal for many people. Hunthausen says that this fact
grieves him, especially because he believes it could have been avoided. In his view, a more
open and forthright manner of conducting the visitation would have better respected the
people of the local Church, who have “come of age,” and “deserve to be treated as adults.”
Section four provides Hunthausen’s “thoughts and suggestions regarding the future.” Here
Hunthausen invites the bishops to reflect on three “over-arching” issues. The first issue has to
do with the mutual involvement of Church leaders. Hunthausen pursues this issue through two
questions he puts to the bishops. The first is “How does a diocesan bishop who is himself the
Vicar of Christ in his particular church, carry out his role with the degree of independence
which this role implies while at the same time doing so in full union with and under the
rightful authority of the Supreme Pontiff?” Hunthausen asserts that “very real practical
questions” remain in this area. The second question is, what is the proper role of bishops’
conferences in situations such as the present one? Hunthausen argues that the visitation should
have been “carried out in close collaboration between the Holy See and this Conference.”
The second over-arching issue Hunthausen wants the bishops to reflect on concerns “the role
of legitimate diversity” in the Church. Hunthausen wonders what role bishops’ conferences
might play in establishing the legitimacy and limits of local ecclesial adaptations.
Hunthausen’s third encompassing question places a challenge before the bishops. Church
leaders, Hunthausen asserts, needs to be as eager to establish just structures inside the Church
as they are promote them outside the Church.
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Having offered these broad and far-reaching comments, Hunthausen brings his statement to a
close with a personal appeal for help from the Conference in addressing the issues identified
through the Apostolic Visitation. He calls the present power-sharing arrangement with Bishop
Wuerl “unworkable” and voices his conviction that the governance of the Seattle Archdiocese
needs to be returned to “normal” as quickly as possible. Hunthausen’s final words propose
that “the good of the Church is what is at stake here.” He expresses his confidence in the
ability of the bishops and of the Church itself to weather the difficulties before it.
7.4.2 Conflict Functionality of Hunthausen’s 11.11.86 NCCB Address
Hunthausen pursues several strategies at once with this text. First, he addresses multiple
audiences (the American bishops, the general public via the press, the people of his local
Church, and the Holy See). Each of these audiences can help his case in a distinct way.
Second, picking up where he left off in his response to the Vatican chronology, he challenges
the validity of the overall visitation process and its conclusions (persuasive argumentation).
Third, he recontextualizes the discussion of those issues, framing them within intraecclesial
and extraecclesial perspectives that he perceives to be advantageous to his case (these frames
are, respectively, the spirit of Vatican II and certain aspects of the American legal justice
system). Fourth, he asserts his own personality, presenting himself as a man of integrity
whose position has been compromised by a process that is not “just” (a highly provocative
word choice, which Hunthausen underlines in the copy of the text he distributes). Fifth,
Hunthausen raises the possibility that other bishops could be subjected to similar treatment if
the present situation is not rectified. Sixth, Hunthausen suggests that the good of the Church
as a whole is at stake in the handling of the case and that he himself is acting for the good of
the Church (associate oneself with the best interest of the Church). Finally, Hunthausen
makes an explicit appeal to the NCCB (recruit allies) to help Wuerl and Hunthausen address
the matter with the Holy See. In the paragraphs that follow, I will succinctly characterize his
application of these strategies.
Hunthausen indicates that his fellow American bishops are his primary audience by standing
before them, naming them explicitly  (“this assembly… this Conference”) and supplying them
with photocopies of his text. That Hunthausen is also concerned to convey his message to the
local (Seattle), national and international press – and the audiences they serve – is indicated
by his action of promptly handing over his text to them once the bishops had had a chance to
discuss his case. When Hunthausen speaks directly to the bishops, his tone suggests
familiarity (fraternity). “Most of you probably know me well enough to realize that I did not
accept the invitation to make a presentation this afternoon because I personally relish
speaking in a forum like this,” he writes. But it was necessary to do so, because the issues
under consideration are not peculiar to Hunthausen: they are “our issues” (the emphasis is
Hunthausen’s). Several times it becomes clear that Hunthausen is at pains to show the bishops
he is not grandstanding of being unnecessarily resistant to the Vatican’s wishes (show
deference to the order and mindset of the Church). This is not, he declares, “some sort of
battle of wits between a maverick Archbishop and the Holy See.” Rather, the matter needs
forthright discussion in this forum because it touches “very directly and profoundly on our
individual role as bishops and on our corporate responsibilities as members of the College of
Bishops.”
That Hunthausen has a wider audience in mind as well is seen in the nontechnical language he
employs. Church jargon and references to doctrines and documents appear rarely.
(Admittedly, Hunthausen’s style in general – and not just in this context – is to avoid rarefied
terms when discussing Church matters. I attribute this to a self-professed lack of interest in
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the nuances of scholarly theology – “I am not a professional theologian,” he says here – and
to a fundamental predisposition on his part to speak as inclusively as possible.) Hunthausen
focuses several of his arguments on issues sure to get a welcome hearing in an American (and,
more-broadly, Western-democratic) setting. Among these are the Vatican’s use of secrecy and
its refusal to let Hunthausen confront the evidence and personal testimony against him. (For a
discussion of contrasts between Roman Catholic and American (Roman) Catholic views on
authority and governance, see Coriden 1999, O’Brien 1994 and Hellwig 1990.) Addressing as
wide an audience as possible offers at least two potential benefits to Hunthausen’s cause. One
potential benefit is that persons around the country will be sympathetic to his position and
pressure their own bishops to support him and challenge the Vatican. A second possible
benefit is that outcry of any kind (even outcry that carries criticisms against Hunthausen) will
work in Hunthausen’s favor, simply by perpetuating a controversy that Rome has reason to
want quieted as quickly as possible, in light of the Pope’s approaching visit to the U.S., now
just ten months away.
Though Hunthausen does not expressly address the Holy See with this text does not mean that
he is not speaking to that audience. On the contrary, Hunthausen was fully aware that
Archbishop Laghi would be present at the gathering and would read these same texts. More to
the point, Hunthausen knows that ultimately only the Vatican has the power to change the
situation as he wishes. Thus, near the end of his presentation we hear Hunthausen say: “For
the good of the Church in Seattle and beyond, I am absolutely convinced that the matter of the
governance of the Church of Seattle needs to be returned to normal as soon as humanly
possible. I would even say at once.” Here Hunthausen speaks most directly to the center, the
party with the ultimate decision making power.
Hunthausen’s challenge to the validity of the visitation process and its findings involves a
series of assertions. He begins with an attack on the policy of secrecy. Though he allows that
“in some extraordinary circumstances secrecy might be warranted, the presumption should
nevertheless be against it because open disclosure and candor are far more consistent with
respect for persons in a mature church.” As negative developments emerging from the
Vatican’s practice of secrecy, Hunthausen cites: the absence of dialogue about whether a
visitation was needed in the first place; the Vatican’s failure to provide a “Bill of Particulars”
in anticipation of the visitation; and “most devastating” of all, Rome’s refusal to allow
Hunthausen to see “the formal Visitation report including the testimony against [Hunthausen]
and the appraisal made by Archbishop Hickey.” For Hunthausen, “such unwitnessed, private
questionings with no opportunity for the subject of the questionings to face his accusers, or
hear or to be informed of their allegations, or to defend himself are not a just manner of
proceeding. This kind of an approach seriously wounds the community of faith and trust that
is the Church.” By using the image of a “shroud of secrecy” (emphasis mine), Hunthausen
suggests that the policy of secrecy is not merely unjust, it is deathly.
Two frames of reference (persuasive argumentation) are operative in Hunthausen’s critique of
the way the visitation was carried out. The first is an intraecclesial frame. In Hunthausen’s
view, the conduct of the visitation “seems extraordinarily inadequate given the kind of open
Church we have become since the Second Vatican Council” (ecclesiological God talk).
(Hunthausen invokes this same reference frame in section IV, where he discusses the
relationship of local bishop to pope.) The second is an extraecclesial frame (openness to the
world). Hunthausen grounds a number of his critiques of the visitation process in principles
associated with the American legal justice system. (It is notable that he invokes these
principles – and not those of the Church’s own system of Canon Law -- as his reference
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frame.) Hunthausen sees the aforementioned proceeds as having, despite Vatican denials, the
nature of a “trial” (employment of legal power) But to his dismay, “the rights of all
concerned” have not been guaranteed. He himself has been denied the opportunity to know
the charges against him, to face his accusers, and to hear the findings from his own trial. Only
the nature of the punishment has been made clear to him. By making his arguments with
reference to these two contexts of understanding (Vatican II and the American legal justice
system), Hunthausen appeals to those who value those frames of understanding. Presumably,
the American bishops would have some appreciation for both reference frames.
Hunthausen’s challenge to the validity of the visitation process and its findings continues with
a description of his view of the visitation findings themselves (section II). In short,
Hunthausen claims that he has already addressed a number of the Vatican’s concerns
(subsection 1) and he is in the process of addressing others (subsection 3). Some problems are
difficult matters of pastoral judgment (subsection 2), where the solution is not obvious and
where charity to all those affected by the decisions must be carefully considered. Certain other
matters Hunthausen professes not to understand (subsection 4). Taken together, the separate
subsections of section II show Hunthausen justifying his own position by arguing that he has
acted in good faith and he has acted to resolve problems known to him. Where he has failed, it
has been due to the imprecise nature of pastoral judgment itself. Thus Hunthausen writes:
“We all know that matters of pastoral judgment are always open to further understanding and
that in such matters we never really get beyond the possibility of making a mistake no matter
how hard we try to faithfully discern the Spirit” (God talk). This statement is a good example
of how Hunthausen defends and advances his own position by employing several strategies at
once. Here Hunthausen simultaneously minimizes the significance of his purported failure
(characterizing it as a “mistake”), attests to his own conscientious effort and piety (he tried
hard to faithfully discern the Spirit), and suggests that one can never comprehend pastoral
situations in their fullness (they are “always open to further understanding”).
It is remarkable how little Hunthausen concedes (yields) with this document. In section II as a
whole, which treats the problem areas identified by the Vatican, Hunthausen gives hardly an
inch. Not once does Hunthausen admit outright to having failed to carry out his
responsibilities. The closest he comes is in his discussion of roles accorded to unlaicized
priests within the archdiocese (subsection 3). Hunthausen says, “I believe I have erred in this
matter on one or another occasion since coming to Seattle.” But even this statement is
qualified twice internally (“I believe… on one or another occasion”) and is followed by a
series of multi-layered qualifying statements:
My doing so was never a purposeful defiance of Church regulations, however. In one case it involved an
oversight with regard to the employment of a wife of an unlaicized priest; in two other cases it involved
the well-accepted service as lector and Eucharistic Minister by a laicized priest, a practice that had been
going on long before I learned of it and one which, to have discontinued it would have caused admiratio
of the most severe kind. I am unaware of any cases beyond these.
In short, Hunthausen says that if in fact he did err, his intentions were still good, the number
of instances was quite small, and for each instance there were relevant exculpatory factors
(one problem was the result of “oversight,” two were not obviously problems because they
were in keeping with “well-accepted” practice – though presumably not well-accepted by the
Vatican? – and one problem predated Hunthausen’s arrival and would have created new
problems by its discontinuance).
A similar example of Hunthausen’s refusal to give ground appears in his discussion of his
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decision to allow the group Dignity (an organization of homosexual Catholics) to celebrate
Mass in St. James Cathedral.
I have subsequently been informed that it was an ill-conceived judgment. Perhaps it was. I am willing to
stand corrected. But my decision does not differ in kind from the decision made by many bishops to allow
local Dignity groups to celebrate Mass in or another church on a regular basis. Again, pastoral practice
will now need to be looked at carefully in light of the most recent document from the Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith, but I do not deem it fair to be placed under a judgment, even to the point of
being deprived of significant pastoral responsibilities, because of the conclusion contained in a document
that was not issued until some three years after my own conscientious, carefully studied judgment was
made, a judgment, by the way, which I shared very openly with the Holy See in a timely fashion.
Again, Hunthausen does not make an outright admission of his own culpability. “Perhaps” it
was an ill-conceived judgment, he says. And then comes a freestanding declaration (it is not
of necessity related to the previous sentence) of his willingness to stand corrected – if at some
point that should become necessary. And even if Hunthausen did make a poor decision, plenty
of other bishops have done the same thing, he is being judged by a standard (expressed in the
Congregation’s 1986 Instruction) that postdates his action, and, again, his own action was the
product of careful, conscientious discernment.
At the same time that Hunthausen refuses to budge on the Vatican’s issues, he opens up a
whole set of new issues (sign of escalation) of his own in this document. Some of these new
issues he merely touches upon in the course of defending his own actions – as when he points
out that certain resolutions to pastoral problems can themselves cause new problems. But
others he develops with more extensive argumentation, as in his attack on the practice of
secrecy in section I. Similarly, in section III, Hunthausen raises the question of how the
standard of compassion (and the example of Jesus himself) applies in matters of pastoral
leadership in general and in the present case in particular. Then he argues that one should not
equate the virtue of obedience with mere acquiescence, and he makes a case for fostering
dialogue in the Church and treating Church members as “adults” who share in the
“ownership” of the Church. Thereafter, Hunthausen goes on to argue that much adverse
publicity could have been avoided (save face for the Church; associate self with best interest
of Church) if the Vatican had acted with more openness and forthrightness all along the way.
(More on this later.) In section IV, Hunthausen raises still more new issues. First, he asks how
a diocesan bishop is to go about independently exercising his role as Vicar of Christ in his
particular church while remaining “in full union with and under the rightful Authority of the
Supreme Pontiff.” Then he asks whether the national conference of bishops should not have
had some intervening or consultative role in the visitation process, and whether it should not
in the future have some role in addressing “the role of legitimate diversity within a Church
that is called to be one…” Finally, Hunthausen talks about the need to promote honest, just
and loving relationships within the Church and not simply to direct exhortations outwardly,
“toward the order of things outside the Church” (openness to the world).
More striking than any one argument in particular is simply the expansiveness of
Hunthausen’s argumentation. He issues challenges on a multitude of fronts at once. It is
almost as though, on the Hunthausen side, no plausible argument is left untried in this forum
with the bishops. The text creates an impression of Hunthausen venting accumulated
frustration (near the end, Hunthausen says explicitly, “I guess a lot has built up within me
during the past three and a half years”) – and of his doing so on the occasion of his last stand,
his last best chance in a conflict where the odds are against him.
This impression of Hunthausen heroically waging battle relates, too, no doubt, to his own self-
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presentation (assertion of personal identity) here. I have spoken previously of Hunthausen’s
tendency to stress his own commitment to act in good faith and according to principle. In the
present text, his personality stands very much in the forefront. Despite humble professions of
what he is not (“a maverick archbishop,” a “professional theologian,” a “dissenter”), and
despite a tendency to describe his pastoral leadership as a matter of “striving” (to be “a
teacher, a pastor, and a servant of the Lord and of the Church”) rather than accomplishment
(at best we can only strive to be servants of the Church!), the evidence of the text points
demonstrates the combativeness of Hunthausen’s personality while challenging Rome’s
combativeness. There is a decided boldness to Hunthausen’s refusal to admit to failures of
leadership. There is also boldness to his recurrent association of immediate circumstances
with a larger cause. The conflict is not about specific pastoral problems, Hunthausen
suggests, or about winning or losing. It is, rather, about making “the servant attitude of Jesus
the most identifying mark of our own lives” (God talk), and about the relationship between
individual bishops and the Holy Father, and about “the proper role of National Bodies of
Bishops.” Ultimately, Hunthausen says, it is about “the good of the Church” (associate self
with best interest of the Church).
At least two advantages come to Hunthausen by claiming transcendent significance for the
conflict developments at hand. One is that local and specific questions become minimized.
Why should we worry about a few pastoral oversights when the real question is the state of
our relationship to Jesus and the good of the Church? A second advantage is that Hunthausen
thereby increases his own stature. He is no longer a bishop who is in trouble because he was
not strict enough in his diocese. Instead he is an advocate in a great cause – one that is of
relevance to all bishops and all Catholics.
Rhetorical flourishes at various points serve to heighten the effect of Hunthausen as crusader.
Hunthausen’s opening words in the text are a good example. (They are another good example,
too, of his tendency to claim transcendent significance for the conflict.)
Once before I had the privilege of addressing this assembly. It was at the time we came together in our
common quest for peace in a nuclear world. Today I come before you again in the quest for peace, but for
a different kind of peace: peace for the Archdiocese of Seattle, peace for the Church in this country, peace
within this Conference, peace for the Church throughout the world, and my own personal peace with the
Holy See.
This is elevated language. Hunthausen’s use of parallel structure (signalled by the repeated
use of “peace”) and hyperbole (the question on the table is “peace for the Church throughout
the world”) make clear that he is addressing matters of consequence. His employment of the
word “quest” (twice) deepens this impression. And with his use of pronouns (you, we, our),
Hunthausen indicates his intention to enlist his fellow bishops in this same quest.
Nothing, of course, raises the stature of a protagonist like a good antagonist. In this text the
antagonist is always just outside of view. We know from the beginning that whatever, or
whoever, Hunthausen is up against is a threat to peace and is a source of “turmoil.” In regard
to that threat, Hunthausen expresses his own vulnerability in a disarmingly plainspoken way:
“I wish it would all go away. How I wish that!” (It is good to keep in mind how different this
sort of language use is from what we see in the Vatican communications from Ratzinger and
Laghi. They themselves do not take the stage in their texts (assert personal identity).
Moreover, Hunthausen himself, prior to the bishops’ meeting, typically reserved this sort of
linguistic self-presentation for communications to the people of his own archdiocese.)
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Ironically, one of the ways Hunthausen sets up the protagonist-antagonist contrast early is by
saying what sort of conflict this is not: “[T]his is not,” he writes, “some sort of battle of wits
between a maverick archbishop and the Holy See.” Here Hunthausen conjures an image that
we cannot simply erase from our minds because: (1) once it’s there it’s there; (2) despite
Hunthausen’s denial, it rings true to the conflict; and (3) the image of itself is a compelling
one, with the lone cowboy figure taking on the diffuse and faceless bureaucratic entity
(Hunthausen is not Reagan, but in a way he is!).
The enemy Hunthausen names is a wounding and unjust process (symbolically summed up as
“the Visitation”), authorized and carried out (“mounted”) by opaque agencies ("the Holy
See,” “the Apostolic Nunciature,” “a Vatican official,” “the Roman Curia,” “the Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith”). In this text, and to a lesser extent in Hunthausen’s detailed
response to the Vatican chronology (document 5), we find that the technique of refusing to
name agents of the Holy See serves a strategic function that it did not in earlier documents
(from Hunthausen and others). Whereas previously the emphasis seems to have been on
maintaining secrecy as an expression of face-saving and of the hierarchy’s standard operating
procedure – keep the public out of the Church’s internal affairs – here the technique serves
Hunthausen’s attack by taking on another dimension. It is easier to distrust and feel enmity
toward one who is unknown, hidden, without a face. Hunthausen has argued strongly against
the use of secrecy in this address. By repeatedly invoking the anonymous “descriptors” to
name his antagonists, Hunthausen’s own transparent humanity is cast in a more favorable
light and the humanity of his opponents is called into question.
I have already Hunthausen’s invitation to his audience to see this antagonist as a threat to us
all: “they are really our issues,” he writes in his introductory remarks (emphasis his). On a
rhetorical level, we can only be grateful that he is willing to take up this fight on our behalf. A
key to the success of this argument is Hunthausen’s ability to generate the fear that any
bishop, or any Catholic for that matter, could be subject to treatment similar to what he has
suffered. (Notably, this fear of secretive and far-reaching Vatican power plays into
longstanding historical fears of the papacy among Protestant Americans and more recent fears
among those of a more secular viewpoint, who feel threatened by Vatican interventions in
political affairs. In that sense, his message here also has the potential to find a receptive
audience beyond the confines of the Catholic Church itself.) An example of Hunthausen’s
suggestion of shared vulnerability (susceptibility to punishment) appears in the discussion of
his pastoral outreach to homosexual Catholics in the Archdiocese. “Each of us bishops,”
Hunthausen observes, is faced with the challenge of addressing such delicate matters. Noting
that his own judgment was found lacking (with the loss of “significant pastoral
responsibilities” as a consequence), he goes on to suggest that his decision did “not differ in
kind from the decision made by many bishops” in similar circumstances (emphasis
Hunthausen’s). Hunthausen is still more explicit when he writes (in his closing remarks): “But
it is not me I am concerned about. I am concerned about the Church. And I guess my
realization that each of you shares that same concern just as deeply as I do has given me the
courage to say more than I normally would in a situation like this.”
Hunthausen does not limit his appeal to an invitation to make psychic identification with his
cause. The conclusion of his address expressly formulates a call to action. The situation in
Seattle, “as far as Bishop Wuerl’s faculties are concerned” is “unworkable,” he writes.
[…] I would hope that this Conference would be willing to afford some positive assistance to address this
issue with the Holy See. For the good of the Church in Seattle and beyond, I am absolutely convinced that
the matter of the governance of the Church of Seattle needs to be returned to normal as soon as humanly
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possible. I would even say at once.”
Achieving that objective – which raises a question of definition power: who decides? -- will
mark a significant advance, but by no means the only necessary advance in the great struggle
that is already underway. Hunthausen’s text closes with a rhetorical intensity that recalls his
opening words.
There are some major questions which will not go away no matter how much we might wish they would.
They are questions which will severely test our mettle as a Conference of Bishops. But we have been
tested before and we have almost always come through well. Amazingly well. And united, too. I firmly
believe that the present moment will be no exception.
A final word: my friends, we need not look upon this as a win / lose situation. I do not feel the need
to win so that others will have to lose. Winning or losing is not what this is all about. The good of the
Church is what is at stake here. Nothing less. We are all united in our commitment to that goal, and for
that reason I have no doubt that we will find a way to address all the questions I have posed and others
like them. And I have no doubt, either, that we will do so courageously – in a spirit that is truly and fully
Catholic, with all that word implies: a spirit that is at the same time faithful to the Lord and His Gospel,
loyal to our Holy Father, and true to the people of God whom we serve and who look to us now, perhaps,
more than ever before, for guidance, inspiration, and leadership.
F. Intervening Developments (November 11-12, 1986)
Some time before the bishops’ meeting Hunthausen had learned that he would have only a
limited amount of time to address the bishops – in any case, not nearly enough to read the
entire statement he had prepared. (As it turned out, he spoke for about two minutes, according
to the 11.13.86 Washington Post.) In the week before the conference, a discussion ensued
between Hunthausen and two friend-advisers, Fr. Michael G. Ryan and Archbishop Hurley
(Anchorage, Alaska), about how best to use the time Hunthausen had available for oral
remarks. Drawing on this input, Hunthausen decided upon a set of select remarks to share
with the bishops at the beginning of the closed session on November 11.
This was a valuable opportunity for Hunthausen, since public speaking was one of his
strengths. As an orator, Hunthausen possessed a low-key eloquence: he was persuasive in an
understated way. In general, Hunthausen came across as a person internally at peace, as one
who was nonthreatening and who had integrated his own values.
The National Catholic Reporter (11.21.86) account describes Hunthausen as “visibly tense”
(cf. also Hurley’s description in the 11.20.86 Progress) when he stood to address the bishops.
He talked of his pain and of the hurt the episode was causing the church; he said he was personally
embarrassed by the affair. Never did he have any intention of challenging papal authority, he said, adding
he implied no ill will on anyone’s part and saying it was understandable that differences in perception
could occur regarding events which took place over several years.
The first indication of the conference’s sentiments followed Hunthausen’s brief address. When the
Seattle archbishop sat down… applause broke out throughout the chamber, a “sustained applause,”
according to one bishop.
(NB: Hunthausen’s select remarks have not been published. A request to the NCCB also
failed to turn up a transcript of the words that were actually spoken to the bishops.)
After Hunthausen spoke other bishops were given the opportunity to speak in turn, with each
being allotted three minutes. The format for the discussion had been determined ahead of time
(November 8-9) by the 48-member administrative board of the NCCB. The bishops were
asked to focus their remarks not on the prior history of the visitation and disciplinary action
202
but rather on the content of a statement draft that Conference President Malone had prepared
(and the administrative board had approved) in advance. The statement had been prepared
before the bishops had seen Hunthausen’s texts. No copy of the draft statement is on the
public record, but the (11.21.86) National Catholic Reporter revealed that the critical line
under discussion in the subsequent debate was the following: “While we are not authorized to
judge the facts of the case, it is clear that the process employed by the Holy See was in accord
with the law of the church and was just and reasonable.” After the bishops came to agreement
about the final form of the statement, it would be issued to represent the bishops’ collective
view of the situation.
The session lasted four hours. Twenty-seven bishops spoke. Hunthausen was frequently
given time to respond to questions or comments made by the other bishops (cf. The New
York Times, 11.13.86). (Hunthausen also had another chance to speak, on the following
morning, at the conclusion of all the debate. Cf. The Progress, 11.20.86.) The (11.21.86)
National Catholic Reporter offers the fullest public accounting of what took place behind
the closed doors.
[…] Sentiments were divided, although most speakers offered Hunthausen significant fraternal support.
“The real hurt in Seattle, the deep pain and divisions had come home, even if only in a direct way for a
few hours,” one bishop said of the meetings.
Among the principal themes to emerge in the bishops’ addresses were their desires to avoid being or
appearing to be critical of the Vatican action, to be viewed in full accord with Rome, to address honestly
any injustice that may have occurred, to pass to Rome the ever deepening distress of growing numbers of
mainstream Catholics, including many priests, across the nation, and to be credible in the eyes of the
public, especially the press.
The dilemma the bishops faced, one said, was the need to address a perceived injustice without
ending up pointing a finger at Rome.
[Milwaukee Archbishop Rembert] Weakland was among the first to call for a change in the Malone
letter. He said it lacked credibility in light of the Hunthausen documents.
Seattle Auxiliary Donald Wuerl spoke early, calling for the bishops’ support in making the situation
work according to the Vatican’s wishes.
Cardinal Joseph Bernardin, speaking on behalf of “four cardinal ordinaries,” offered his support for
the Malone letter. He said it was essential that the conference offer Rome its support and also said unity
was necessary so a climate of reconciliation could occur and the situation could move toward
normalization.
Washington Archbishop James Hickey, who conducted the Vatican apostolic visitation in Seattle,
spoke about his personal involvement in the case, saying he did what was asked of him and carried out
the visitation according to church procedures. Hickey said he had prepared the documents and knew them
well, implying, in the eyes of several bishops, that there was definitely more to the story than was coming
across in the Hunthausen documents. His remarks later moved Anchorage Archbishop Francis Hurley – a
close personal friend of Hunthausen’s and the man who served as his informal legal counsel – to speak as
well. Hurley reminded the bishops that they were not gathered to discuss the specifics of the Vatican
visitation. Then he said that, because Hickey had raised the subject, he felt free to reassure the body of
bishops he, too, had seen many of the documents in the case and could attest to the correctness of
Hunthausen’s version.
Minneapolis-St. Paul Archbishop John Roach made a strong appeal that the bishops change the
Malone letter to reflect the sentiments of the entire conference. Anyone reading the letter in light of the
Hunthausen documents would view the bishops as looking foolish, he said. His remarks drew loud
applause.
[….]
New York Cardinal John O’Connor also spoke of the need to be one with Rome but added that the
bishops also had to find a way to help Hunthausen resolve an unworkable situation.
By 5:30 p.m. the bishops had not yet reached agreement on the Malone statement and the
session was adjourned, to be resumed the following morning. When the bishops met again
the next morning, a new version of the Malone statement submitted to them had excised
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the phrase “just and reasonable” as a descriptor of the visitation process. It would be
replaced in the final version by a declaration that “the process employed by the Holy See
was in accord with general principles of church law and procedures.”
F.f. Conflict Functionality of the Intervening Developments (November 11-12, 1986)
Having heard the reports of the center and periphery parties (the Vatican chronology and
Hunthausen’s two texts in answer), the question before the third party (the NCCB) is how
to formulate its own reaction. The debate about which position to adopt takes place on the
NCCB’s own “territory,” in the context of its own meeting in which its own leadership has
set the agenda and parameters for debate. Both Laghi and Hunthausen have sought to win
the outright support of the NCCB with their statements. In the discussion at hand, the
individual bishops must decide how best to protect their own interests and, collectively, the
interests of the conference, while carrying out their responsibilities on behalf of the Church
universal.
Though the bishops mostly stay within the debate format set by the conference leadership
in advance (note the exception of the Hickey-Wuerl exchange, wherein both refer to the
history of the visitation), enough disagreement arises about the text of the Malone
statement (Weakland and Roach are two who challenge its wording) to lead to its
reformulation. Objections bring about removal of the phrase “just and reasonable” from the
statement. Instead of an ethical value judgment (legitimacy standard) in the statement, the
bishops offer the observation that the process was correct according to Church law (legally
legitimate). This change considerably diminishes the expression of approval of the
Vatican’s handling of the case. To put it bluntly, the NCCB goes from saying the
intervention was just to saying it was not against any Church laws.
It is unclear whether the papal pro-nuncio participated in this debate. (I have found no
report of him speaking.) The most evident advocacy of the center party position in the
debate comes from the apostolic visitator, Archbishop Hickey. Hickey defends his own
conduct of the visitation (it was carried out according to Church procedures) and he
contests the account offered in Hunthausen’s texts, on the basis of his own knowledge.
This provokes a response from Archbishop Hurley, who aligns himself with the periphery
party by assertively defending Hunthausen’s version of documents and events. Cardinal
Bernardin and Bishop Wuerl stress the importance of supporting Rome (center party
alignment). Cardinal O’Connor of New York does too, but he declares the need to support
to Hunthausen at the same time.
Hunthausen himself speaks in defense of his own cause at times, but we lack a record of
his exact comments. The National Catholic Reporter’s summary of his opening remarks
shows him touching upon key themes he elaborates on in his two written texts. Judging by
the summary, he is physically tense, deferential, apologetic and nonconfrontational
(courteous) and he observes only good will (good intentions) on the part of all. This
description is at odds with the more contentious stance Hunthausen adopts in his written
texts (where we find vulnerability but also confrontation). If, based on their reading of his
written statements, certain fellow bishops may have felt inclined to attack him or his
positions verbally, his tense and deferential oral remarks might well have had a disarming
effect, inviting a less-than-aggressive response from his fellow bishops. (Archbishop
Hurley says as much in an interview in the 11.20.86 Progress: “[Hunthausen] speaks the
truth… in a way that is very respectful of his audience. This was much appreciated by the
bishops.”)
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In any case, none of the bishops seems eager to attack Hunthausen or the Vatican. This will
be reflected in the Malone statement itself. This closed-door (secret) debate serves an
effort to contain the conflict (prevent escalation), engage in problem solving, and save face
for the Church (by managing the threat to unity). All of the American bishops have an
incentive to preserve their own autonomy of action -- individually and as an episcopal
conference -- which is symbolized in Hunthausen’s predicament. But protecting their own
freedom to move (including vertically within the hierarchy) requires not offending the
Holy See, which has the power to grant and limit freedoms. It is a delicate balancing act,
taking shape in words in Malone’s statement on behalf of the conference.
7.5 Document Number: 7
Bishop Malone’s Statement (11.12.86)
Source: The Progress, November 13, 1986, p. 11; Origins, November 20, 1986, pp. 400-401.
7.5.1 Summary of Contents:
Given the brevity of the Malone statement, I will quote it in its entirety.
In recent weeks all of us have felt much concern for those involved in the situation in Seattle.
The pain of Archbishop Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl, our brothers in the episcopacy, the abuse directed
at the Holy Father and the Holy See, the dismay and confusion experienced by many good people – these
things are deeply troubling.
Not only is there suffering in the church in Seattle, though: the controversy has spread via the media
and in other ways and has affected Catholics throughout the country. It is unusual for the conference of
bishops to address such a matter, but these are unusual circumstances.
The issues raised here touch on the relationship between the local churches and the universal pastor.
Bishops exercise their office in communion with him and under his authority. On this occasion the
bishops of the United States wish to affirm unreservedly their loyalty to and unity with the Holy Father.
The conference of bishops has no authority to intervene in the internal affairs of the diocese or in the
unique relationship between the pope and individual bishops. By universal church law and the
conference’s norms, the conference is not able to review, much less judge, a case involving a diocesan
bishop and the Holy See.
Based on experience, bishops are conscious that in such matters the Holy See proceeds carefully and
charitably, employing procedures developed over many years to protect the rights of individuals and
promote the common good of the church. With specific reference to Seattle, while we are not authorized
to judge the facts of the case, I believe it is clear that the process employed by the Holy See was in accord
with general principles of church law and procedures. The decision reached at the end of the process was
made by proper church authorities. As such, it deserves our respect and confidence. Where there appear to
have been misunderstandings at one point or another along the way, the need now is to look to the future,
not to the past, and carry out the decision. The best assistance I or anyone can give is to offer precisely
this counsel.
We could address the issues involved in this situation all week, but we would deceive ourselves if
we thought that such discussions would solve all the problems, heal all the hurt. We need to do some
additional things.
Is it paradoxically possible that what has happened in the Archdiocese of Seattle has given, and
continues to provide, a vivid demonstration of the unity of the church, perhaps the best demonstration we
have seen in many years? I am deeply convinced that the degree of pain which has been felt and
enunciated in Seattle, but far beyond Seattle, really is the kind of pain that can only be felt by members of
a family. At least that is how it feels to me.
If my analogy is correct, it suggests some of the directions in which we must go. There are certain
things that a family must do when it wants to resolve a problem.
A family comes together. Each member expresses the pain, the anxiety, the doubts they feel. These
things are listened to with respect and sympathized with, deeply and in the heart. Then support is
expressed, for the persons as persons, and for the responsibilities they must bear. This we bishops have
done together in these days. Archbishop Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl have been given a job to do by
the Holy See. We are prepared to offer any assistance judged helpful and appropriate by the parties
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involved.
A family also takes steps to see that, insofar as possible, a painful situation does not happen again.
In our case that means working to find creative ways of presenting the church’s teaching in the best light
possible, but also seeking the mechanisms of responding when confusion or error occurs. We must be
seen as committed to hearing and solving the problems.
There is at least one more thing a family of faith does when it is in difficulty, and that is pray. We of
all people must not give short shrift to this. Let us bring our people together in prayer for the church in
Seattle, so that what has happened may be an occasion of grace and growth, there and in the church
universal.
7.5.2 Conflict Functionality of the 11.12.86 Malone Statement
Though Malone is the one who reads this text to the press, the statement itself shows an
ambiguity of voice. It is not clear who is speaking in the text. (Nor is it clear to whom the
speaker is speaking.) Is this Malone’s statement or the bishops’? Alternations of usage within
the text make it hard to know (e.g., we read “the bishops of the United States wish to affirm
unreservedly…” but then later we encounter Malone saying, “I am deeply convinced…” and
“at least that is how it feels to me.”). As a reflection of this difficulty, the 11.12.86 National
Catholic News Service report called it Bishop Malone’s statement, whereas the 11.13.86 New
York Times called it “the bishops’ statement, read by… Malone.”  That this ambiguity is of
some consequence is shown by an especially puzzling example of alternation in the
grammatical presentation of person.
Based on experience, bishops are conscious that in such matters the Holy See proceeds carefully and
charitably, employing procedures developed over many years to protect the rights of individuals and
promote the common good of the church. With specific reference to Seattle, while we are not authorized
to judge the facts of the case, I believe it is clear that the process employed by the Holy See was in accord
with general principles of church law and procedures. The decision reached at the end of the process was
made by proper church authorities. As such, it deserves our respect and confidence. While there appear to
have been misunderstandings at one point or another along the way, the need now is to look to the future,
not the past, and carry out the decision. The best assistance I or anyone can give is precisely this counsel.
Here Malone begins by speaking of bishops (“bishops are conscious…”) in the third person,
but it is unclear to which bishops precisely he is referring (All bishops? Bishops in general?
All American bishops? Some American bishops?). Then he shifts to the first person plural
“we”(“we are not authorized to judge the facts of the case”). Presumably here he speaks on
behalf of the entire conference, but there is all the possibility that he means to include the
general public with this usage (none of us, apart from the Rome and Seattle insiders, are in a
position to judge --?). Then comes a shift, within the very same sentence, to the first-person
singular (“I believe it is clear that the process…”). Here it is not the bishops who declare the
process used to be “in accord with general principles of church law and procedures,” but only
Malone. Significantly, this passage, which is already toned down from an earlier version that
declared the process used as “just and reasonable,” is further qualified here with the
expression “I believe.” Thus, from draft to final statement the position has been watered down
from a firm declaration by the entire conference that the process was just and reasonable to a
hesitant declaration from one bishop that the process was in accord with general principles of
church law and procedures.
The sentences that follow in the passage cited above mostly leave open the question of who is
talking through the text. After offering us Malone’s presentation of his own opinion, there
follow three statements which cannot be attributed to any particular voice (“The decision
reached… was made by proper church authorities. As such it deserves our respect and
confidence. While there appear to have been misunderstandings… the need now is to look to
the future, not the past, and carry out the decision.”) Who is telling us this? Is it still Malone
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talking for himself, or has he shifted back to speaking on behalf of other bishops? Following
these three statements comes another mixed message: “The best assistance I or anyone can
give is to offer precisely this counsel.” Malone’s associates himself clearly enough with the
counsel offered (though still only hypothetically: it is presented as an ideal possibility). But
what are we to make of the reference to “anyone”? Suffice it to say that what we do not learn
from these words is what exactly the position of members of the conference on this issue is.
The ambiguity of voice in this document is not a matter of haste or carelessness. Before its
release the statement was reviewed line-by-line by the bishops. Strategically, the ambiguity of
voice offers the advantage to the bishops of responding to the need to say something
collectively without pinning any one bishop or group of bishops down to any particular set of
positions. By this means, the conference is able to issue one statement that is acceptable to the
majority of its membership.
But not only is the speaker in this text unclear, so too is the intended audience. The absence of
a stated addressee and the release of the text as a press release point to the intention to reach
the press and the general public. The opening sentence seems be a statement made on behalf
of the bishops themselves, but also one directed to any and all who have a stake in the case’s
outcome: “In recent weeks all of us [emphasis mine] have felt much concern for those
involved in the situation in Seattle.” Malone (henceforth, I will refer to him as the text’s
producer, while keeping in mind the hidden participation of other bishops, as discussed
above) is quick to express sympathy toward a number of parties within the Church:
Hunthausen and Wuerl have suffered “pain;” the Holy Father and Holy See have been on the
receiving end of “abuse;” “many good people” have faced “dismay and confusion;” Catholics
in the Seattle Archdiocese have experienced “suffering;” and Catholics throughout the
country have been “affected.” These observations show Malone’s readiness to identify with a
variety of (afflicted) audiences within the Church. Strangely enough, there is no indication of
who is causing all this misery (thus saving face for the Church).
Although Malone paints the matter at hand as an internal Church matter – albeit one that is
relevant for the entire Church (he prays that this will be an occasion for growth within “the
church universal”) – he also uses language that shows openness to extraecclesial viewpoints
as well (openness to the world). One example of this is his comment about procedures
designed to “protect the rights of individuals and promote the common good” (of the church).
The concept of protecting individual rights and promoting the common good is a keystone of
American civil society. Whereas such language is also familiar within Catholic social
teaching applicable at the time of the Hunthausen case (see, among numerous other writings,
the papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Pacem in Terris, but also the U.S. bishops own
pastoral letter, “Economic Justice for All,” which was then in its final stage of production),
the concept of individual rights, at least, is not an especially old tradition within the Church,
and it is highly unusual to see this notion applied to papal-episcopal relations. Malone’s
choice to invoke these terms has an odd sound to it. One could almost rephrase his argument
as follows: bishops don’t need a union to protect their rights against the Holy See, because the
Holy See always makes sure that individual rights and the common good are guaranteed
within the Church. My only point here is to show that this language sounds more American
than Catholic and appears directed to a broad American audience rather more than to Rome.
Other language in the statement seems to be explicitly meant for Rome. Thus the Pope’s right
to intervene in the local church is signalled by designating him “universal pastor” here. (NB:
This usage echoes earlier communications from the Vatican. Cardinal Ratzinger prominently
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employed this same term to refer to the Pope in his 12.12.83 letter to Hunthausen announcing
his receipt of the Hickey report, and the Pope used nearly the same formulation – “the
successor of Peter has been constituted for the whole church as pastor” -- in his message
presented to the U.S. bishops on 11.10.86. In the 11.7.86 issue of the National Catholic
Reporter, the Vaticanologist Peter Hebblethwaite argued that the term is of recent origin in
the Church and has come to be used “to mean that the pope can intervene anywhere, at any
time, without consultation, thus usurping the pastoral function of the local bishops.”)
The Malone statement declaration that the bishops exercise their office “in communion with
[the Pope] and under his authority” (emphasis mine) also appears meant for the Vatican, as do
the unreserved profession of “loyalty to and unity with the Holy Father” (show deference to
the order and mindset of the Church) and the modest concession of the bishops’ lack of
authority to intervene in the case. In addition, the recommendation to look to the future
(minimize the appearance of conflict) and carry out the decision also appears designed, in
part, to please the Vatican. But beyond serving to reassure Rome, I assume these instances of
language also are signals to overhearers that the bishops have no intention of instigating a rift
with the Holy See.
At the same time, the bishops have something to offer Hunthausen as well. I have already
mentioned their backing away from the description of the visitation process as “just and
reasonable” and their acknowledgment of the pain he has suffered (he and quite a few others).
Going further, they voice their willingness “to offer any assistance judged helpful and
appropriate by the parties involved.” (This, for Hunthausen, is a hopeful sign, since he made
just such a request in his address to the bishops.) Moreover, they implicitly suggest that the
handling of the visitation and post-visitation process was inadequate, with the statement that a
family takes steps to see that “a painful situation does not happen again.” “We must be seen
as committed to hearing and solving the problems.”
Apart from a desire to appease any audience in particular, however, the strongest impulse
evident within this text appears to be a desire to damp down the conflict (or the appearance
thereof) as much as possible. Several tactics work toward this end. First, we see the
conciliatory acknowledgment of the suffering of all. Then there is the attempt to speak to all
parties in their own language, in ways that I have detailed above. Next comes a (surprisingly
quick) recommendation to move on to the future (the future orientation being fairly American
in its own right). “We could address the issues involved in this situation all week,” Malone
writes, but then he asks, in essence, what would be the point? The important thing is to “look
to the future, not the past.” After this quick shift of perspective, Malone deftly manipulates
language to make the conflict disappear. “Is it paradoxically possible,” he asks, “that what has
happened in the Archdiocese of Seattle has given, and continues to provide, a vivid
demonstration of the unity of the church, perhaps the best demonstration we have seen in
many years?” Here Malone substitutes a euphemistic erasure (“what has happened in the
Archdiocese of Seattle”) for a frank acknowledgment of conflict, but even this erasure is
further erased by the assertion that what in fact is showing itself is “unity.”
The linguistic sleight-of-hand continues with the employment of the extended metaphor that
dominates the last part of the statement. A comforting image of family life is called forth,
with the implication that the Church is a family. Families that want to resolve a problem come
together, Malone declares. American-style “therapeutic culture” is well represented in the
language that follows.
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Each member expresses the pain, the anxiety, the doubts they feel. These things are listened to with
respect and sympathized with, deeply and in the heart. Then support is expressed, for the persons as
persons, and for the responsibilities they must bear. This we bishops have done together in these days.
Neglected in the analogy, as it is thus far presented, is the fact that the whole family is not at
the table. While the brother bishops commiserate and share their pain and anxiety, the
patriarch – the Holy Father – is present to the discussion only in the form of an abstract
statement. Also missing is a candid assessment of accountability. Who caused the pain that
everyone is feeling so deeply? Though according to this image a highly meaningful
conversation, marked by mutual vulnerability, has taken place, no change is the result.
“Archbishop Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl have been given a job to do by the Holy See.”
The bishops offer their assistance, but essentially Hunthausen and Wuerl are invited to make
peace with the very arrangement that Hunthausen has come to the meeting to protest and has
just called “unworkable.” The family problem solving covers up the genuine disharmony that
exists and pretends that a solution has been reached. The image of family as it is employed
here also suggests that, in any case, the strength of the relational bond makes the tensions
(conflict) irrelevant since they pose no threat to the bond (fraternity; unity).
In the next paragraph we find again a refusal to assign blame.
A family also takes steps to see that, insofar as possible, a painful situation does not happen again. In our
case, that means working to find creative ways of presenting the church’s teaching in the best light
possible, but also seeking mechanisms of responding when confusion or error occurs. We must be seen as
committed to hearing and solving the problems.
In this passage, painful situations “happen” and confusion and error “occur” independently of
any actors’ actions. Thus do the bishops characterize their own responsibility not as a matter
of stopping the infliction of pain, but of seeing that “a painful situation does not happen
again.” Surprising, too, is the emphasis on appearance. The bishops’ role here is envisioned
not as helping people to better understand church teaching, nor, still less, to change church
teaching. It is, rather, “to find creative ways of presenting the church’s teaching in the best
light possible” (emphasis mine). This same disposition shows itself in the statement: “We
must be seen as committed to hearing and solving the problems” (again, emphasis mine).
Malone rounds out the picture of family life with an image of the family at prayer. (In the
American saying, “the family that prays together stays together.”) The closing words
recommend (to the whole Church “family” but also to the bishops themselves) prayer in
regard to the current “difficulty” and hold out the possibility that the current “difficulty” may
prove to be “an occasion of grace and of growth.”
What gets lost in the Malone statement is not simply an articulation of the conflict issues and
why these issues are of interest for the competing parties, but also a description of the
concrete steps of conflict handling which have been taken and still need to be taken. From
accounts that were leaked to the press, it quickly became apparent that the bishops had
engaged in a rather heated exchange concerning the case. According to these reports, a
number of significant concerns and questions were brought to the table in this process. But the
Malone statement hides these exchanges (secrecy) and asserts that what is really important is
holding fast to unity and harmony. Instead of a picture of ongoing conflict, the statement
offers us ready-made resolution.
With this statement, the NCCB sends several messages at once. By professing loyalty to the
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Holy Father and affirming their lack of authority to intervene, the bishops signal conformity
(deference) to Rome’s leadership. By acknowledging the pain felt in Seattle, refusing to
decisively affirm Rome’s action, and offering their assistance, the bishops indicate their
intention to stand by Hunthausen as well. By avoiding the assignment of blame and arguing
that the present conflict demonstrates the unity of the Church, the bishops proclaim to Church
members and outside observers that the institution is unthreatened by the tensions at hand.
The NCCB debate of the Rome-Hunthausen case and the Malone statement that is its product
do not resolve the conflict, but they do bring the conflict to the threshold of a new stage.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
NARRATIVE AND ANALYSIS OF THE ROME-HUNTHAUSEN CONFLICT: THE
LATE STAGE (NOVEMBER 1986-APRIL 1989)
G. Intervening Developments (November 1986-February 1987)
The bishops came to final agreement on the Malone statement during their morning session
on Wednesday, November 12, which lasted for more than an hour. At 10:15 a.m., Malone
reopened the conference room to the press. Television cameras recorded Malone’s reading of
the statement and the standing ovation he received from his fellow bishops in response (The
New York Times, 11.13.86).
Several bishops offered commentary afterwards. Malone said he saw the ovation as a sign of
full support for the statement from the bishops. Cardinal O’Connor of New York said, “I think
it’s a very well-balanced statement. It shows the unity of the bishops, it shows the loyalty to
the Holy See and it demonstrates our explicit recognition that the Holy See has acted very
charitably and very justly.” Juneau, Alaska Bishop Michael Kenny was blunt in expressing
criticism of the statement, saying: “I am not satisfied. Archbishop Hunthausen was never
given a chance to adequately respond to anonymous charges made against him, nor was he
provided an opportunity to even correct problems he was said to have caused” (Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, 11.13.86). Archbishop Pilarczyk of Cincinnati challenged those who would
judge the handling of the case based on the “Anglo-Saxon system” of due process. Canon law,
he said, was designed “for the protection of the individual, the protection of the Church, the
protection of doctrine and the protection of the rights of the Holy See” (The Washington Post,
11.13.86). Bishop Wuerl, who, along with Hunthausen, had refused interview requests since
September 4, described the discussion during the bishops’ meeting as having been “open,
fraternal, respectful” (Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 11.13.86).
On the same day that Malone issued his statement, Hunthausen issued a written response (The
Progress, 11.20.86, Origins, 11.20.86). Hunthausen expressed his gratitude to Malone and to
the Conference administrative board for the opportunity to speak. “I am hopeful,” he
continued, “that this documentation has clarified matters for my brother bishops and, indeed,
that it will now do so for all our people who are trying to understand what is surely a very
complex situation.”
Secondly, I want to say that I support the statement Bishop Malone issued this morning. Like any
statement, it will probably not please everyone, but it is, in my judgment, a good statement, one that has
emerged from a very honest exchange of many different points of view.
It addresses the issues in a manner that respects our identity as a Conference of Bishops united with
each other and with the Holy Father. It also indicated a genuine readiness on the part of the conference to
offer any assistance judged helpful and appropriate by me and by the other parties involved. This is a very
hopeful sign for me. It is the kind of assurance I was seeking when I accepted the invitation to make a
presentation to the conference in the first place.
Hunthausen closed his statement by conveying his hope for healing and the resolution of any
problems that still remained.
On November 13, Hunthausen returned to Seattle, where he was welcomed by 350
enthusiastic supporters at the airport. The following day, Hunthausen gave a press conference
(cf. The Seattle Times, 11.15.86, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 11.15.86, The Progress,
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11.20.86), his first since the September 4 announcement of Wuerl’s special faculties. At the
briefing, Hunthausen’s words suggested that the issues at hand were far from resolved.
Hunthausen described himself as being “in the middle of a conflict that has the potential of
causing a rift in the church” (with an accompanying qualification that working through
tensions was “part and parcel of the Christian life”).  The power-sharing arrangement
continued to be, to his mind, “unworkable,” and the source of inefficiency and confusion.
Noting the bishops’ conference’s offer of assistance in the affair (and offering specific details
of how the Malone statement had been reworked to omit the phrase “just and reasonable”),
Hunthausen said that an appropriate type of assistance had not yet been decided upon, but that
he would be discussing this further with other bishops and with the conference leadership.
Especially troubling to Hunthausen was his perception of a media effort to portray the affair
as “win or lose, me against the Vatican.” And yet, he admitted that, while the words
“apostolic visitation” are “very comforting words,” the reality of having dealt with the
visitation had been painful and made perhaps less effective through a shortcoming in the Holy
See’s understanding of American culture. “There are different approaches to making
judgments in different cultures,” he said.
Few public reactions to the recent developments in the Hunthausen case came forth from the
Vatican, but those that did expressed satisfaction with the way the U.S. bishops had handled
the matter. An Associated Press report (Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 11.14.86) quoted a Vatican
official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, as saying that “the U.S. bishops came out
surprisingly strong on the side of the Holy See on the Hunthausen affair. They were on the
right track.” Another official, also unnamed, said there was a “general sense of relief and
satisfaction” at the Vatican regarding the Malone statement, which he called “amicable and
satisfactory.”
The Pope’s only public comment on the affair came on November 19 abroad the papal plane,
en route to Bangladesh (cf. the 11.19.86 Seattle Post-Intelligencer; the 11.27.86 Progress).
Asked about a possible rift between U.S. Catholics and the Vatican, the Pope replied,
“Sometimes one creates divisions that do not exist” by “talking and writing.” “Our task – that
of myself and the bishops of the United States – is the same, the good of the church. It is our
common ministry… The American Church is part of the universal church and still wants to be
a part of the universal church.” When asked specifically about the Hunthausen case, the Pope
said, “I know only the statement by the (bishops’ conference) president, and it was correct.”
Further action in the case, however, was slow in coming. Four weeks after the bishops’
conference meeting, newly elected president of the conference, Archbishop John May said
there were reasons to hope “that the NCCB offer may be accepted to help work out a method
of restoring peace and unity to the pastoral administration of the Seattle Archdiocese” (The
Progress, 12.8.86). In Seattle, Hunthausen reiterated his willingness to go with Wuerl to
Rome to discuss the situation, if Vatican officials would extend an invitation. “That has really
been the intent we’ve had all along,” Hunthausen said (Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 12.13.86).
But Hunthausen acknowledged that even if the opportunity for such a trip were to develop, it
could be “months away.”
In the aftermath of the confrontation in Washington, Hunthausen had become a well-known
figure in the culture at large and not simply in the Catholic community. For better or worse,
Hunthausen would be chosen as one of People magazine’s “25 Most Intriguing People of
1986.” Hunthausen placed seventh on the list, after the Duchess of York, insider-trader Ivan
Boesky, Dr. Seuss, entertainer Bette Midler, Lt. Colonel Oliver North and Nicaraguan
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President Daniel Ortega.
Amid this period of waiting and newfound notoriety, came a different sort of unsettling
development for Hunthausen. On December 10, he entered Providence Medical Center in
Seattle for tests. Six days later Hunthausen underwent major prostatic surgery. The surgery
successfully removed the tumor, which had spread in a microscopic amount into some of the
lymph node tissues as well (cf. Archdiocesan news release, 12.16.86). After the surgery,
Hunthausen’s physicians said they expected Hunthausen to recover completely, and Maury
Sheridan, director of the archdiocesan office of telecommunications, announced that
Hunthausen would probably be hospitalized for 2 ½ weeks (Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
12.17.86). In fact, because his convalescence went smoothly, Hunthausen left the hospital
sooner than expected, on Christmas Eve. During his hospital stay (on December 22),
Hunthausen received a telegram from the Pope. It read: “I have been informed of your recent
operation and I wish to assure you of my fraternal solicitude for your speedy recovery. I shall
remembrance (sic) you in my prayers, especially as we celebrate the mystery of the incarnate
word of God” (cf. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 12.25.86).
Hunthausen returned to work in the middle of January, initially at less-than-full capacity. At
the end of January, Archbishop Laghi granted an interview to the New York Times, which
revisited certain points Hunthausen had made in his NCCB statements (see the 1.30.87 issue
of the Times: the 90 minute interview took place at the Vatican Embassy in Washington),
Laghi commented, with reference to the Hunthausen case, that Americans have a “complex of
Watergate,” which is reflected in an insistence on candor in judicial matters. “When
something is behind the door, there is the impression that something is wrong.” Laghi said
that the Vatican believed more in the “principle of charity” and sensitivity to the need for
privacy for those involved in an investigation. Application of this principle explained the
Vatican’s two-year silence concerning the case (broken by Laghi’s release of the Vatican
chronology in October of 1986). Issuance of the Vatican chronology, Laghi said, came at the
urging of several influential American bishops, some of whom had complained that
Hunthausen was being punished without a clear sense of the charges against him.
According to the New York Times interviewer (Joseph Berger), “Laghi seemed to
acknowledge that the episode, if handled differently, might have had a less fractious
outcome.” Laghi was quoted as saying, “I am learning also.” But in the same discussion Laghi
observed that critics of the handling of the Hunthausen and (theologian Charles) Curran cases
often focused on the Vatican’s disciplinary procedures rather than on the doctrinal deviations
that were at the heart of Rome’s concern. “Our procedure, canon law procedure, does not
match American procedure. But we cannot follow the procedure of a given country if we want
to be a universal church.”
In other remarks related to the Hunthausen case, Laghi said that the Vatican was well aware
that many of the attacks on Hunthausen came from conservative groups, such as Catholics
United for the Faith. Laghi resolutely denied that the Vatican had given these voices improper
weight when making its assessments. Laghi also said that Hunthausen’s stand on nuclear
weapons had played no part in the case. Hunthausen offered no comment in response to the
Laghi interview.
Less than two weeks later (February 9, 1987), Laghi issued an announcement (see document
8, below) that the Holy See had appointed an ad hoc commission of three American bishops
to assess the situation in the Seattle Archdiocese. The two-sentence statement, which was
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relayed by a spokesman for Laghi in Washington, D.C., noted that Archbishop Hunthausen
had expressed his concurrence. Background information provided by the nunciature along
with the statement cited the offer of the NCCB to provide “any assistance judged helpful and
appropriate by the parties involved,” but referred, also, to the conference’s observation that it
had no power to intervene formally on Hunthausen’s behalf. The spokesman for the
nunciature who presented the statement to the press would not speculate on whether the
committee’s work could lead to the restoration of Hunthausen’s power, but he said, “There is
a wide scope of possible recommendations that could be made.” He also observed that, while
Pope John Paul II would have the final say in the matter, the input of the committee would be
significant. “When they examine the situation, they will be in a better position than anyone to
make a recommendation” (The Wanderer, 2.19.87).
In a telephone interview from Dallas, Laghi insisted that creation of the commission did not
come in response to criticism of the Vatican’s handling of the case. “This is just an
assessment,” he said (Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 2.10.87). “This was foreseen when he was
given the auxiliary in January 1986. It’s an internal helping, an assessment.”
G.g. Conflict Functionality of the Intervening Developments (November 1986-February
1987)
After the NCCB meeting, all parties involved respond and offer interpretations of what has
transpired. The first response is the standing ovation the bishops offer for their own statement,
which Conference President Malone reads to the world at a televised press conference. The
ovation provides symbolic “proof” of the conference’s unity. But as the statement’s contents
show obliquely, and the press statements of individual bishops after the closed session show
explicitly, the conference is more divided than it wants to let on. Juneau Bishop Michael
Kenny’s remarks are notably disputatious. Hunthausen’s first reaction is haltingly pacific
(“like any statement, it probably will not please everyone, but it is… a good statement”), but
as soon as he arrives back in Seattle he restates his charge that the current situation is
“unworkable” and he observes that the conflict “has the potential of causing a rift in the
Church.” Still more contentiously, he highlights the bishops’ removal of the phrase “just and
reasonable” from the Malone statement.
Other individual bishops offering early reactions defend the center party intervention in the
local Church. Cardinal O’Connor disingenuously proclaims that the Malone statement
explicitly recognizes that “the Holy See has acted very charitably and very justly” – exactly
the conclusion the bishops had decided not to include in the statement. Archbishop Pilarczyk,
for his part, challenges Hunthausen’s “due process” argument and provides a defense of
Church juridical procedures that is similar to what Laghi argues on other occasions (see, for
example, Laghi’s 1.30.87 New York Times interview). Church procedures, he argues, though
distinct from the Anglo-Saxon procedures of legal justice, are fair and legitimate in their own
right. Hence, we see that the immediate fallout from the NCCB debate is a willingness to take
sides openly, as opposed to the more noncommittal statements that bishops issued before the
debate.
Reactions coming from the Vatican show a uniform inclination to view the outcome
positively: the press is invited to believe that the NCCB has sided with Rome and there is no
reason for Rome to worry. Two officials who speak on the condition of anonymity pronounce
the results satisfactory to Rome. Even the Pope, for the first and only time, makes specific
reference to the affair. The Pope suggests that there is less to the conflict than some
(apparently he means the media) would have us believe: “Sometimes one creates divisions
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that do not exist” (minimize the appearance of conflict). The Pope emphasizes that the
American Church and world Church are unified, and that the American bishops and the Pope
himself share a concern for “the good of the church” (associate self with the best interest of
the Church). In his most direct reference to the Hunthausen case, the Pope offers a comment
that is puzzling and even startling. What is puzzling is the Pope’s declaration that the Malone
statement is “correct.” In what sense is it correct? Is it correct as a description of the NCCB’s
experience? (How would the Pope know?) Is it theologically correct? Is it functionally
correct, staying within the bounds of what the conference should and should not say under the
circumstances? The Pope does not elaborate. What is startling is his profession that Malone
statement is all he knows about the case. Obviously this is not true. Part of the difficulty of
making sense of the Pope’s statements on this occasion may lie with the way the question was
formulated and later reported in press accounts. But still, it is clear that the Pope is unready to
talk publicly about a conflict that is the preoccupation of a large and influential national
Church and three hundred of his fellow bishops. The Pope’s strategy here is to keep silent and
reserve the handling of the affair to a private forum (secrecy).
In an intriguing move in the other direction, however, the Pope’s nuncio in America proves
himself ready to be more forthcoming and open than he has shown himself to be up to this
point. Though Archbishop Laghi offers no comment in the immediate aftermath of the NCCB
debate, two months later he gives an interview to the New York Times that is more highly
personal than any of his previous communications in the affair. There Laghi admits that
Hunthausen case could have been handled better (“I am learning too”). This type of frankness
is more akin to Hunthausen’s usual style of first-person discourse and contrasts with the
bureaucratic facelessness typical of Laghi’s “official” statements. Perhaps Laghi, observing
the effectiveness of Hunthausen’s assertion of personal identity, seeks to counterbalance that
by giving a more human face to the Vatican position? Most of Laghi’s commentary in the
interview responds to specific questions Hunthausen raised in his NCCB texts (persuasive
argumentation), but Laghi does not initiate any new attacks.
This reluctance to further escalate the conflict is not limited to Laghi. After Hunthausen’s
ripostes immediately after the November meeting, he too settles into a period of
nonconfrontational communication (which consists mostly in silence regarding the conflict),
as do the American bishops in general. The period is one of stalemate, with all parties waiting
to see how the Vatican will respond to the NCCB debate and the conference’s offer to help
find a more workable solution in Seattle.
Hunthausen’s battle with cancer reminds all involved that Church politics is not everything.
The Pope’s telegram exemplifies a personal form of fraternal solicitude. Hunthausen’s
recovery allows the conflict handling to run its full course. Shortly after Hunthausen’s return
to work, Laghi announces that the Vatican has formed a three-man commission to assess the
current situation in Seattle. With this announcement the Vatican signals its readiness to
engage in a new form of problem solving. The announcement also serves as an implicit
acknowledgment that the Vatican takes seriously Hunthausen’s complaints and sees value in
the NCCB’s offer of assistance.
8.1 Document Number: 8
Laghi Announcement of Commission Appointment (2.9.87)
Source: The Progress, February 12, 1987.
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8.1.1 Summary of Contents:
Here is the full text of the statement:
The Holy See has appointed an ad hoc commission composed of Cardinals Joseph Bernardin and John
O’Connor and Archbishop John Quinn to assess the current situation in the Archdiocese of Seattle.
Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen has expressed his concurrence.
8.1.2 Conflict Functionality of the Laghi Announcement of Commission Appointment
Laghi’s announcement marks a turning point in the conflict communication. It comes in the
midst of a stalemate and signals the possibility of de-escalation. Laghi, however, avoids
suggesting that the Vatican is committed to any particular course of action. Thus, the
announcement is minimalistic: it is short and businesslike in tone.
In terms of content, the key items are the composition of the commission itself and the
indication of Hunthausen’s concurrence. Most observers at the time characterize the make-up
of the commission as promising for Hunthausen. Quinn was considered to be rather
progressive in Church matters, much in the way of Hunthausen. Bernardin was viewed as
more of a moderate than a progressive, but nonetheless one who would have sympathy for
Hunthausen. Only O’Connor was thought to be too strongly in Rome’s camp to side with
Hunthausen. The indication of Hunthausen’s concurrence suggested that he, too, could
imagine the commission’s involvement as having favorable consequences.
Two word choices in particular stand out: “assess” and “situation.” Both bespeak neutrality.
“Assess” lacks the threatening finality of “judge,” and “situation” sounds less worrisome than
“conflict.” But a conflict it was, and Hunthausen and his supporters were well aware that an
assessment could bring unwanted outcomes. As proof of this, Hunthausen supporters needed
only recall the statement of Archbishop Hickey’s secretary, Fr. Maurice Fox, at the time of
the visitation. Fr. Fox announced that Hickey “was not given any specific agenda or area of
concern” but was rather given only a general mandate to “assess the situation” and report his
findings back to the Holy See (The Progress, 11.3.83).
H. Intervening Developments (February-May 1987)
Following the announcement of the commission appointment, Hunthausen offered no
comment and Archdiocesan spokesman Russ Scearce said, “We’re not saying anything”
(Seattle Times, 2.9.87). The timing of the announcement coincided with a gathering of most
of the American bishops in Dallas, Texas for a workshop on medical ethics. Another topic of
discussion at that gathering was the forthcoming visit of the Pope to the U.S., in September. It
was not lost on observers that the bishops had incentive to bring the Seattle situation to a less
volatile state prior to the Pope’s arrival.
On February 10, Bernardin, O’Connor and Quinn issued a joint statement, saying that they
had been notified of their appointment in a January 26 letter from Archbishop Laghi. The
commission members noted that the formation of the commission was in keeping with a
longstanding plan of the Vatican. The assessment “was envisioned by the Holy See and
agreed to by Archbishop Hunthausen when the auxiliary, Bishop Wuerl, was appointed more
than a year ago.” The work of assessment was already underway. “We initiated our task in
Dallas and will make our report to the Holy See when it has been completed.” (The
commission report, document 9, below, says that Hunthausen and Wuerl met with the
commission in the presence of the pro-nuncio on the morning of February 10 in Dallas.
Further meetings, without Laghi, took place between the commission and the Seattle bishops
that same afternoon and evening. See also the 2.20.87 National Catholic Reporter.) The
217
commission added in its press announcement that there would be “no further public
statement” (The Progress, 2.12.87).
Taking the discussion of the case in a somewhat different direction, but only adding to the
intrigue, was a 2.13.87 report that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had kept a file on
Hunthausen and on another well-known “peace bishop,” Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit (cf.
the National Catholic Reporter, 2.13, 2.20 and 2.27.87). The National Catholic Reporter had
filed a request for information from the FBI under the federal Freedom of Information Act
and thereafter reported on the materials that had been released. Not everything in the bishops’
files was made public. The majority (the great majority in Gumbleton’s case, where only 26
pages were provided and 129 were held back) of items in the files were not released by the
agency, for security and confidentiality reasons. According to the FBI declaration, the file on
Hunthausen contained 10 pages in total, four of which were turned over for inspection. The
four pages given over consisted of two newspaper articles on Hunthausen’s activity of
resistance to the use of nuclear weapons. The first was a 3.1.83 Seattle Post-Intelligencer
article on a U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange in which Hunthausen was briefly mentioned. It
attributed to Hunthausen a statement that nuclear weapons are immoral, even as a deterrent.
The second was a 5.8.69 article in the Montana Standard. It concerned Catholic priests who
were criticizing the installation of antiballistic missiles in Montana. Hunthausen was bishop of
Helena, Montana at that time. An FBI statement said that the files on the two bishops were
“cross-reference files,” which are kept on individuals who are not necessarily under
investigation but whose names appear in connection with other investigations. (A subsequent
National Catholic Reporter article, 4.3.87, would reveal that U.S. Naval Intelligence also kept
a file on Hunthausen. This file focused on Hunthausen’s planned participation in a June, 1982
anti-nuclear submarine demonstration in Puget Sound and included a 6.8.82 article of the
Seattle Post-Intelligencer describing Hunthausen’s plans.)
Upon learning of the FBI’s monitoring of his activity, Hunthausen said he was “surprised and
concerned” that the FBI would feel compelled to “keep records on occasions or events when I
simply exercise my right as a citizen to speak on public issues.” In the context of
Hunthausen’s conflict with the Vatican, news of the FBI file furthered speculation that the
Vatican action against Hunthausen was somehow related to Reagan administration
displeasure with Hunthausen’s peace activism. This theory had been previously voiced in a
number of forums (cf., for example, Colman McCarthy’s nationally syndicated column in the
11.18.86 Seattle Times, and Shelby Scates’ column in the 9.7.86 Seattle Post-Intelligencer).
The Seattle Weekly, in its 1.13.87 issue, framed the speculation this way:
Consipiracy theorists note that the same Archbishop Laghi who implemented the pope’s discipline is the
Vatican’s first-ever delegate to the U.S. [sic: actually, Laghi was the first to have the status of an
ambassador; apostolic delegates had previously represented the Vatican in the U.S.], sent when the
Reagan administration and the Vatican established formal diplomatic relations in 1984. They figure that
reining in the tax-resisting archbishop was part of a quid pro quo for those formal ties. Laghi’s statement
that “at no time did the Holy See pursue with Archbishop Hunthausen the criticisms it received on
controversial issues, e.g., nuclear weapons and the payment of taxes,” is accordingly taken as evidence
that the opposite must be true.
Was it possible that churchmen were “protesting too much” when they said that the visitation
had nothing to do with Hunthausen’s stand on nuclear arms and the payment of taxes?
Throughout the conflict, the Vatican position on this issue remained consistent. On November
2, 1983 the apostolic visitator, Archbishop Hickey, said explicitly that the visitation had
nothing to do with this issue. Then Laghi reaffirmed this in the Vatican chronology and in his
New York Times interview, and Bishop Wuerl did so as well in 1987, when he was quoted as
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saying, “In none of the concerns listed at any point by the Holy See was the archbishop’s
political activity ever mentioned. Matters of Church teaching and practice were the only
things indicated” (Pittsburgh Catholic, 6.19.87). (Perhaps most notably, the 9.30.85 Ratzinger
letter makes no mention of Hunthausen’s stand on nuclear weapons.)
In the absence of any conclusive proof for this “conspiracy theory,” news of the FBI file on
Hunthausen at least provided food for thought by supplying evidence of the government’s
interest in Hunthausen’s activity. Still missing, however, was evidence that the Holy See
would be willing to cut a deal to pressure one of its own bishops in exchange for favors from
the U.S. government.
Another version of the conspiracy theory held that persons in the Seattle archdiocese who
were unhappy with Hunthausen for political reasons sought to attack him on other grounds
that were more telling for the Vatican: i.e., doctrinal and pastoral issues. Though its
population was politically liberal in many respects, the Puget Sound area was also home to a
number of key military bases (including the nuclear submarine base at Bangor, of course, but
also including major installations such as the Ft. Lewis Army base and McChord Air Force
base) and was a good example of the military-industrial economy at work, with military
contractor Boeing being the most prominent local employer. Thus, any number of persons
would have reason to be unhappy with Hunthausen’s challenge to stop building and deploying
weapons that were not only part and parcel of the nation’s security strategy but also the source
of paychecks to tens of thousands of local citizens. This theory may have been more plausible,
and certainly was being discussed as the controversy continued, but again it seemed to result
more from speculation than from hard evidence that emerged at the time.
Within days after meeting with the assessment commission in Dallas, Bishop Wuerl was in
Rome, where he met privately with Pope John Paul II (Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 2.17.87).
The fifteen-minute audience, in the Pope’s study overlooking St. Peter’s Square, came in the
midst of a week Wuerl spent in Rome to carry out a study of the North American College.
This task was in keeping with Wuerl’s Vatican-assigned participation in an assessment of the
state of American seminaries. Though many press accounts wondered whether the visit might
have some special significance for the situation in Seattle, Vatican spokesman Joaquin
Navarro-Valls called Wuerl’s meeting with the Pope “routine.” Wuerl declined comment.
In Seattle, Hunthausen’s supporters continued their activism on his behalf. A favored activity
was sending letters to influential members of the hierarchy. The Seattle-based groups
Concerned Catholics and Catholic Network Northwest circulated lists of addresses for key
American bishops, the pro-nuncio, and heads of Vatican congregations, along with
suggestions of possible topics to be taken up in the letters. The same tactic had been and
continued to be practiced by groups opposing Hunthausen as well. (This tactic for applying
pressure on Church leaders is discussed in Reese 1996, 252-253 and Reese1989, 332-334.
Many copies of letters sent to American bishops and Vatican officials, and the actual letters
received in response, are contained in the Wasden Price collection.) On the national level, a
Hyattsville, Maryland group called Catholics Speak Out lobbied for reinstatement of
Hunthausen’s powers. One of its tactics was to release a petition in a full-page advertisement
in the 1.9.87 National Catholic Reporter. Critics of Hunthausen (prominent among them
being Erven Park, editor of the newsletter, The Catholic Truth, and William Gaffney,
president of the local chapter of Catholics United for the Faith), meanwhile, complained that
thus far the visitation and presence of Bishop Wuerl had done little to correct abuses within
the local Church (Seattle Times, 3.14.87).
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Behind the scenes, the Vatican-appointed commission carried on with its work of assessment
(See the commission report; the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 3.9.87; The Progress, 3.12.87). On
March 6-7, 1987 the commission interviewed a select group of archdiocesan leaders and
Northwest bishops at St. Patrick’s Seminary in Menlo Park, California. This group was
comprised of eight bishops, seven members of the Archdiocesan Board of (Priest) Consultors
and five members of the archdiocesan staff. The commission interviewed the invitees
separately, for at least thirty minutes each. The bishops interviewed were Archbishop Levada
(Portland, OR), Archbishop Power (retired, Portland, OR), Bishop Connolly (Baker, OR),
Bishop Treinen (Boise, ID), Bishop Curtiss (Helena, MT), Bishop Murphy (Great Falls-
Billings, MT), Bishop Schuster (retired, Great Falls-Billings, MT) and Bishop Skylstad
(Yakima, WA). The priests interviewed, who held the status of priest consultor in the
archdiocese, were Revs. Anthony Domandich, Richard Hayatsu, Joseph Kramis, James
Mallahan, Theodore Marmo, Gerald Stanley and William Treacy. The archdiocesan staff
members interviewed were Rev. Michael McDermott, archdiocesan director of
administration; Rev. Michael G. Ryan, chancellor and vicar general; Rev. David Jaeger,
director of seminarians; Patrick Sursely, associate director of administration; and Ned Dolejsi,
director of faith and community development.
After the gathering, Revs. Stanley, Treacy and McDermott described their interview
experience in positive terms. Fr. McDermott said the meetings were “very pleasant, helpful
and hopeful.” In McDermott’s recounting, the commission members emphasized that they
were making an assessment of Seattle “at this moment” and were not in any sense resuming
the process of apostolic visitation. According to Mr. Sursely, the commission members left
the impression that they did not foresee a need to make a personal visit to Seattle. Sursely
noted that, while the interviewees had not been sworn to secrecy, they had agreed among
themselves not to discuss specifics of their conversations with the commission in order to
“respect the process and allow the commission the freedom needed to do its work.”
Standing out by reason of his absence at the Menlo Park gathering was Bishop Wuerl, who
was not asked to participate. (The reason is unclear.) But on March 12, Wuerl and
Hunthausen met individually with the commission and the pro-nuncio in Chicago. (Again,
none of the participants commented on the meeting.) Shortly thereafter, the members of the
commission, together with several other American bishops, travelled to Rome for meetings
(March 18-21) with the Pope and leaders of key Vatican congregations in preparation for the
Pope’s forthcoming U.S. visit (Origins, 4.2.87). The Hunthausen case was reportedly not on
the agenda.
The commission report also tells us of subsequent consultations the commission pursued in
the course of its assessment. On March 19, Archbishop Quinn interviewed Fr. William Lane.
Lane was an archdiocesan consultor who was not present at the Menlo Park gathering. Then
Quinn and Bernardin met with Archbishop Hickey on March 25 in Washington, D.C. On
March 29, Quinn met with (Anchorage Archbishop) Hurley and on March 31 Quinn met with
Hurley and Juneau bishop Kenny.
The assessment process for the two succeeding months (according to the commission report)
was as follows:
During the entire month of April and into the month of May, a number of visits and telephone
conversations, as well as an exchange of letters with individuals who had previously been interviewed
took place. In addition Archbishop Hunthausen met with the Commission in Chicago on April 8, 1987.
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Since then the Commission has been in continuing contact with the Archbishop by telephone.
The commission also studied voluminous documentation, all of which was available to Archbishop
Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl.
Between the announcement of the commission’s formation in February and the early part of
April, little news came forth in the case. Then, on April 15 (in its issue dated 4.19.87), the
National Catholic Register (a Catholic weekly that was a conservative alternative to the
National Catholic Reporter) published a lead story declaring that, “according to highly placed
sources,” Wuerl was about to be reassigned to another diocese. Hunthausen’s would be retired
from office after a face-saving grace period in which his powers would be fully restored.
Thereafter a new ordinary would be appointed “with an eye to calming hostilities between
those who support Hunthausen and others who saw Wuerl’s arrival as a welcome attempt at
restoring order and direction” to the local Church.
The first official reaction (Seattle Times, 4.15.87) from the archdiocese came from public
affairs director Russ Scearce. “It is a speculative story and we do not have a comment.” He
added, however, “This is not the kind of news we were hoping to receive during Holy Week.”
Increasing the plausibility of the Register report was the fact that Hunthausen had met with
the commission the previous week, on April 8, in Chicago. Also, unnamed sources at the
chancery described Hunthausen as appearing burdened of late and they noted that he had
spent the weekend praying and consulting with trusted advisers. Archdiocesan Vicar General
and Chancellor Michael G. Ryan immediately sent a letter to the priests of the archdiocese,
which was released simultaneously to the press, that urged the priests to “disregard the
National Catholic Register article, because not only is it speculative; it is incorrect (Origins,
4.30.87). The information that formed the basis of the article was apparently leaked to the
reporter by an uninformed and irresponsible party in Rome or Washington, D.C….” Ryan
went on to “assure” his readers that “the Archbishop has not been asked to retire or resign, nor
are any ‘deals’ being made in that direction.” Ryan also suggested that the story may have
been intended as a sort of “trial balloon” to test acceptance among the U.S. bishops of a
solution forcing Hunthausen’s early retirement; or, conversely, it might have been meant to
head off a commission proposal to restore Hunthausen’s full authority (Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, 4.17.87; Seattle Weekly, 5.5.87).
The reaction among Hunthausen supporters in the archdiocese was to organize quickly to
voice their strong disapproval of the sort of resolution suggested by the Register article. In the
first days after the story emerged, groups of priests, nuns and laypersons met separately
within the archdiocese to formulate and express their concerns. According to Fr. David
Jaeger, archdiocesan director of seminarians, many Hunthausen supporters had been kept
silent in the recent past for fear that speaking out would only damage the prospects for a
favorable outcome. But now in the face of a near-at-hand, possibly unacceptable outcome,
many felt compelled to speak out forcibly. Jaeger himself offered some of the most
contentious comments. He said, “This is a call for help. Do not let the Holy See do something
that is going to do damage to the Catholic Church here and beyond. Stop them.” Jaeger went
on to say that “loyalty means more than consenting to something that is wrong” (Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, 4.21.87).
On April 20, priests of the archdiocese gathered at St. Paul parish in Seattle to prepare a
statement of support for Hunthausen (The Progress, 4.23.87; 4.30.87; Origins, 4.30.87). The
statement affirmed the priests’ conviction that Hunthausen was a “faithful and orthodox
teacher of the Catholic faith” and it condemned the Vatican action against Hunthausen.
Hunthausen, in the priests’ view, had been “evaluated improperly, inadequately, and
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unjustly.” The priests characterized the “remedies” applied to Hunthausen as having “all but
been forced upon him through a form of moral persuasion based more on coercion than on
evangelical obedience.” The statement closed with a plea for the full reinstatement of
Hunthausen’s powers. (Eventually the statement would be signed by 150 of the 179
archdiocesan priests in active service at the time. It was published with the names of the priest
signers in the 5.14.87 Progress.) On April 21, the archdiocesan Sisters’ Council prepared a
similar statement of support. The text from the sisters observed that “witnessing such
scandalous actions against a highly respected prelate causes doubts and questions about the
Catholic Church’s commitment to living out its own principles and pronouncements about
justice.” The statement speculated that it might take “more than a generation” to overcome the
confusion and divisions which had arisen because of the present arrangement. As in the
priests’ statement, the sisters (328 of approximately 500 active sisters signed it) called for full
restoration of Hunthausen’s powers.
The Register article proved to be by no means the final word of speculation about how the
Hunthausen case would be resolved. The 4.24.87 edition of the National Catholic Reporter
challenged the Register’s information and declared that, in fact, an alternate kind of resolution
was in the making. According to the NC Reporter’s own sources, the assessment commission
had proposed a solution to Rome which had been accepted after the Pope had amended it. The
agreed-upon solution involved no expectation that Hunthausen would retire early. Rather, the
sticking point was the determination of the commission (and Rome) that a coadjutor
archbishop be appointed to assist Hunthausen. While the coadjutor would have no special
powers (these would be fully restored to Hunthausen), he would have the right of succession
once Hunthausen did finally retire.
The NC Reporter’s sources said that
Hunthausen was taken aback and would not agree to the proposed compromise during his meeting with
Bernardin in Chicago. The commission members are irritated, even angered, by what they perceive to be
Hunthausen’s recalcitrance, the sources said. Though neither side is altogether happy with the
compromise plan, sources said, it is the only way Hunthausen will be able to stay on as archbishop of
Seattle. If he rejects the compromise, Rome will appoint an administrator and ask Hunthausen to step
down, the sources said.
The 4.25.87 New York Times, citing “several Roman Catholic officials,” also reported that a
solution featuring the appointment of a coadjutor with right of succession was in the works.
As in the NC Reporter version, Wuerl would be reassigned and Hunthausen’s full powers
would be restored. But, the Times pointed out, the plan for the coadjutor had “not been fully
approved by the top Vatican officials.” And, it was “unclear whether the plan was a harsher or
more lenient measure against Archbishop Hunthausen than the ones taken against him in 1985
and 1986.” The Times characterized the plan on the table as a “compromise.” Whereas it
would meet Hunthausen’s goal of having his own power fully restored, the placement of a
coadjutor would nonetheless provide a means for the Vatican to “maintain some control over
the archdiocese.” A new detail which cropped up in the Times account was word that
Hunthausen was pressing for the right to decide whom the coadjutor would be, a request that
the commission was not willing to grant.
On May 8, in an interview with the National Catholic News Service at the apostolic
nunciature, Pro-Nuncio Laghi said he hoped the Seattle controversy would come to a
conclusion soon (The Progress, 5.14.87). “I am the first one to hope there will be some
reconciliation, but reconciliation without compromising” on principles, he said. Laghi stated
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that he expected the ad hoc commission to give its assessment soon and possibly make a
recommendation. Implementation of the recommendation would depend on the approval of
both Rome and Hunthausen.
Meanwhile, the atmosphere in Seattle was thick with expectation (National Catholic
Reporter, 5.8.87). There appeared to be “no other issue, no other concern in the Catholic
church save for resolution of the Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen affair.”
There is a feeling in western Washington that the end may be near. News reporters covering the
story have cancelled scheduled trips out of town. A few from distant cities are prepared to fly into Seattle.
Church people are staying close to home, too. They say they want to be here if and when something
happens.
No account of the commission negotiations with Hunthausen has ever been issued by any of
the direct participants. The most comprehensive record of the hidden proceedings comes from
Briggs (1992, 337-341). As Briggs tells it, negotiations between Hunthausen and the
commission broke down in the second half of April and first week of May. The solution
proposed by the commission would restore full power to Hunthausen but would also require
him to accept a coadjutor archbishop with right of succession. Moreover, it meant accepting
the commission’s report on the state of the archdiocese. But Hunthausen was reluctant to
accept this solution because agreeing to a coadjutor would be a tacit admission that Seattle
needed Rome’s help to correct problems locally; and he disapproved, too, of the sharply
critical tone of the preliminary draft of the commission report.
Under the provisions spelled out by Cardinal Bernardin, the archbishop would have partial control over
the selection of a coadjutor. The three names normally forwarded by Rome by the papal pro-nuncio,
Archbishop Laghi, would be approved by the archbishop. That did not mean he would pick all three, only
that he go along with whatever names made the final cut.
…[Hunthausen] forwarded to the commission three preferences of his own: Bishop Michael H.
Kenny of Juneau, Archbishop Francis T. Hurley of Anchorage, and Bishop William S. Skylstad of
Yakima. The commission scratched Bishop Kenny as too much a liberal in the Hunthausen mold.
Archbishop Hurley was crossed off because, according to church protocol, the move to coadjutor would
be considered a demotion for someone already an archbishop. That left Bishop Skylstad. After much
jockeying, the commission agreed to submit two names, Bishop Skylstad, of the archbishop’s choosing,
and Bishop Thomas J. Murphy of Great Falls-Billings, Montana, a man the archbishop liked and
respected but had some immediate qualms about placing in that role…
The commission had also considered criticisms of its first evaluation and was busy revising it to
rectify the tough-minded quality imparted to it by Cardinal O’Connor…
[….]
By the first days of May, the tension between the archbishop and the commission was at the
breaking point. The archbishop remained adamant that his acceptance of a coadjutor was contingent on
his choice of both nominees. The commission refused to back down from its offer. At this point, the four
of them were wearing down each other’s nerves daily during long, gruelling conference calls.
[….]
Though the settlement seemed rational, even generous, to [the commission] and the Vatican, it did
not strike the archbishop that way. As the commission tried to seal the deal, an exasperated archbishop
threatened to go over their heads by flying straight to Rome, only to have the Vatican put the kibosh on
his plans. There would be no meeting with the pope or top Vatican officials, they informed him, without
what amounted to a signed confession and a pledge to mend his ways.
[….]
Alarm was growing on both sides. But from the commission’s perspective, the jittery impasse could
not go on much longer. What resulted amounted to an ultimatum: accept the assignment of a coadjutor,
agree to submit the names of Skylstad and Murphy, and go along with a final, revised assessment. He
held out for the choice of both names. Without agreement, the settlement talks would break off. The
consequences appeared dire. Archbishop Hunthausen would be forced by the Vatican to leave the
archdiocese.
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On May 4, all indications were that Archbishop Hunthausen would reject the package and, in effect,
quit.
But on May 7, the archbishop “accepted that which he had nearly spurned.” Briggs, citing the
reports of persons close to Hunthausen, attributes this turnabout to Hunthausen’s belief that he
owed it to the Church of Seattle and to his loyal backers to stay on. More fundamentally,
doing so was “God’s will as he understood it.” Briggs also notes the contribution of a “skilled
lay intermediary” (unnamed), who played a crucial role in helping Hunthausen sort out the
issues and make peace with the commission’s proposal. “With the archbishop’s acceptance in
hand, the commission scheduled a trip to the Vatican to talk it over and nail down additional
details.”
The first official declaration that a decision in the case was imminent came on May 21 (cf.
National Catholic News Service bulletin, 5.21.87). In a press conference at the Vatican,
Cardinal Bernardin reported that the commission had met with Vatican officials (of the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and the Congregation for Bishops – cf. the
National Catholic Reporter, 6.5.87) and with Archbishop Laghi on May 19-20. An audience
with the Pope took place on May 20. During these meetings, which Bernardin described as a
“positive exchange,” the commission delivered its assessment of the Seattle situation.
Bernardin said: “We came over to present our report and in due time the Holy See will be
making its recommendation. They are reflecting on it now. Our specific mandate was to
assess the situation and present a recommendation, and that is what we did.” Later that same
day (May 21), the Pope agreed to the commission’s recommended solution. The National
Catholic Reporter (6.5.87) quoted him as saying to the commission: “It this is the way you
want to do it, then this is the way we will do it.” (Briggs 1992, 341 reports that Cardinal
Ratzinger was more reluctant to endorse the plan.)
The commission’s assessment report to the Vatican was dated May 20, 1987. The commission
and pro-nuncio left Rome with instructions to implement the plan. Thereafter, the commission
prepared a cover letter, dated May 25, 1987, to accompany the release of their report to the
American bishops and to the press. Also included in the packet was a copy of the 9.30.85
letter from Cardinal Ratzinger to Hunthausen detailing the visitation conclusions, which the
Vatican had authorized for release.
In the cover letter accompanying their report, the three bishops observed that on January 26,
1987 they had been appointed by the Holy See to “assess the current situation in the
Archdiocese of Seattle” and that they had also been “invited to suggest a plan for resolving
the difficulty.” This task was now completed and “the Holy See has made its decision based
substantially on the proposal we submitted.” The letter then summarized the commission’s
main recommendations:
(1) that full faculties be restored to Archbishop Hunthausen;
(2) that he be given a Coadjutor to assist him in carrying out the provisions of the letter
of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (enclosed);
(3) that our Commission continue to assist him in fulfilling this responsibility during
the course of the next year.
Hunthausen released the commission report at a 45-minute press conference in Seattle on May
27, 1987, his first formal meeting with reporters since November of 1986. Alongside
Hunthausen at the press conference was newly appointed Coadjutor Archbishop, Thomas
Murphy. (Murphy had been notified of his appointment on May 23.) Both bishops took
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reporters questions. Up to that time Murphy had been serving as bishop of Great Falls-
Billings, Montana. (Hunthausen had met with Murphy in Great Falls on May 26.) Auxiliary
Bishop Wuerl was not present at the news conference but did release a written statement.
(Wuerl did conduct at least one individual interview on May 27, with the National Catholic
News Service. See Origins, 6.4.87) Hunthausen and Murphy also released written statements
at the press conference.
H.h. Conflict Functionality of the Intervening Developments (February-May 1987)
From the time of the commission appointment to the release of the commission report, the
conflict handling activity of center, periphery and primary third party (the commission) stays
mostly invisible. More easily observed is the activity of Hunthausen supporters and critics
who are not part of the hierarchy. While the bishops attempt to hammer out a new accord in
secret, other concerned parties pressure the decision makers to come to an agreement that is in
keeping with their own interests.
Rome’s appointment of the commission accomplishes several things at once. First, it pushes
the parties beyond the impasse resulting from the NCCB debate by providing an alternate
(once again secretive) avenue for conflict handling. Second, it places a new third party in the
critical intermediary position of the conflict handling. The commission effectively displaces
the NCCB itself, replacing it with a small body that symbolically represents the conference
(Bernardin, O’Connor and Quinn are recognized leaders of the conference and recognized
representatives of a cross-section of Church-political viewpoints). But now, instead of dealing
with the entire conference, Rome is able to engage a much smaller group of its own choosing,
according to a mission that Rome has determined. Third, it allows the pro-nuncio to take a
step back (partially withdraw) from direct negotiations with Hunthausen. If the power-sharing
arrangement with Wuerl was “unworkable,” the same might be said of Hunthausen’s
bargaining with Laghi, following the misunderstanding about the faculties and their exchange
of criticisms.
The decision to appoint the commission shows us that Rome agrees with the judgment that the
current arrangement is Seattle is not working. (Wuerl’s difficult relationship with the priests
of the archdiocese is the strongest evidence of this.) If it had been working better – and if the
public outcry had been less, Rome might simply have told the bishops and the local Church to
learn to accept the decisions that had already been made. The commission appointment also
signals Rome’s intention to be sensitive to Hunthausen’s preferences. Hunthausen could
rightly perceive that Bernardin and especially Quinn would be sympathetic to his position,
given their moderate (Church) politics and pastoral sensitivities (cf. the Seattle Weekly,
5.5.87). From the outside, the make-up of the commission hints of no intention by Rome to
“crack down” on Hunthausen. One could almost argue the opposite. Given that, the Holy
See’s creation of the commission shows a flexibility on the part of Rome and a genuine
interest in problem solving, and it suggests that Rome’s primary need in the conflict is not
simply to demonstrate its power to make Hunthausen submit to centralized control.
For Hunthausen, the establishment of the assessment commission is a promising sign but not
unequivocally so. Though the composition of the commission could be more threatening, the
commission’s reason to be comes from Rome, and ultimately the commission will submit its
recommendation to Rome and seek Rome’s stamp of approval. Moreover, with the
introduction of the commission, the conflict negotiations now return officially to a private
forum, where Hunthausen’s success in pursuing his own objectives has been mixed.
Hunthausen offers no public comment about the commission itself.
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The apostolic commission has the least to lose in the conflict handling. While a successful
resolution brings enhanced prospects for future remuneration (more influence in Rome,
perhaps a cardinal’s hat for Quinn), failure can likely be blamed on intransigence from
Hunthausen, and at worst probably brings only a loss of prestige and influence. For
Hunthausen, the optimal outcome is a complete restoration of authority, with no threats to that
in sight (other bishops who might potentially encroach upon his power). Less palatable
options are regaining power, but with conditions (as in the appointment of a coadjutor with
right of succession) or leaving office, either through resignation or forced retirement.
Hunthausen must consider not only the consequences to his own person if he leaves office,
but also to the local Church (turmoil, probably, but also freer reign for Rome to impose its
own style of pastoral leadership locally and the likely removal of Hunthausen friends from
leadership posts). For Rome, the most desirable outcome is to have Hunthausen accept, in
appearance and in fact, Rome’s vision for the future of the local Church. But since
Hunthausen seems not to share that vision on the level of specifics of governance, the Holy
See faces a choice between making Hunthausen back down and backing down itself. By
making Hunthausen back down, it “wins” the administrative conformity issue and shows that
it is in charge, but it loses the public relations battle with a large sector of the Church
(including the target archdiocese) and likely stirs further unrest and confrontation. By backing
down itself, Rome admits that it is not all-powerful and must retreat in a confrontation with
one of its own bishops, but it comes out better on the public relations front and avoids further
controversy in this corner of the Church.
Once the commission’s work is underway, both the Vatican and Hunthausen remain tight-
lipped in public. Archbishop Laghi meets with Hunthausen, Wuerl and the commission on at
least two occasions early on, but most of the commission’s work involves exchanges with
Hunthausen, Wuerl and other parties. The practical challenge for the commission is as
follows. To appease the Vatican it needs to find a mechanism for addressing the pastoral
problems (a means for monitoring and correcting abuses) in Seattle, while quieting the public
outcry there and elsewhere. To appease Hunthausen it needs to restore his power and remove
Wuerl (not necessarily because Hunthausen has personal difficulties with Wuerl, but because
Wuerl is unavoidably linked in people’s minds to the unwanted Vatican intervention).
In the course of seeking a new arrangement agreeable to both parties, certain questions are
more easily resolved than others. Apparently, there is no disagreement about moving Wuerl
(even Wuerl himself later admits that the situation were “unworkable” once his faculties
became known – see section I, subsequent developments). There also seems to be little
disagreement about the restoration of full decision-making power to Hunthausen. Hunthausen
insists on this, and it appears the Vatican is open to the possibility. The sticking point is how
Rome – at a minimum symbolically, but preferably in effective practical ways as well – will
maintain its own control over the local Church while exiting the conflict gracefully.
The commission’s coadjutor plan offers a creative resolution to this difficulty. It offers to
Hunthausen the restoration of his power (no special faculties are involved) and the removal of
Wuerl. To Rome it offers a means for establishing tighter control over the archdiocese in the
future: by appointing someone of its own choosing, by having that person in office alongside
Hunthausen, and by having that person inherit the position of ordinary once Hunthausen
retires. It also offers to Rome the face-saving advantage of replacing one “helper” bishop with
another (who has the potential to be more easily accepted). Thus, Rome shows it has not
beaten a complete retreat: it retains control.
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For Hunthausen, there are several problems with the coadjutor solution. First, as a matter of
appearances, a coadjutor appointment is worse than an auxiliary appointment, since
auxiliaries normally come as a reward to a bishop, but a coadjutor appointment often signals
leadership trouble in a diocese. Second, a coadjutor has right of succession, which gives the
appointment long-term implications. Third, Hunthausen has just had a bad experience with an
assistant bishop, one in which the arrangement turned out to be other than expected. Could the
same situation recur? Finally, and perhaps most crucial of all: Who will the person be? If
Hunthausen must, for the Vatican, have a bishop serve alongside him, Hunthausen wants the
right to decide who he is. The most difficult questions in Hunthausen’s negotiations with the
commission appear to concern whether it is necessary for another bishop to come to Seattle,
and if so, whether Hunthausen will be able to guarantee for himself that it will be someone he
finds compatible.
The Briggs account gives us a glimpse of the exchange of arguments (persuasive
argumentation) that occurs behind the scenes. A key tactic the commission employs is to give
Hunthausen freedom of choice within a predetermined range. Hence, he is allowed to give
input into the selection of a coadjutor by forwarding names and “approving” the final
selection of names to be sent to Rome. But the impact of Hunthausen’s contribution is
minimalized, since two of the three names he proposes (Hurley and Kenny) are rejected
before submission to Rome and the final name (Skylstad) is rejected in Rome. Though
Hunthausen agrees to submit Murphy’s name, he does so only under (social) pressure and
after first resisting.
The hidden negotiations reproduce the pattern of earlier conflict developments. Contention by
both parties (Hunthausen’s resistance, the commission’s insistence) escalates the conflict until
a stalemate is reached. The stalemate is broken when one party (Hunthausen) yields.
Settlement (agreement) follows. A difference, however, is that, following the more open
conflict handling of the NCCB debate, Rome yielded to break the stalemate. Here, however,
in much more private negotiations, Hunthausen yields.
The commission is not inflexible. According to Briggs, it meets Hunthausen’s request (yields)
by toning down the language (face saving) of the assessment report somewhat (though
obviously not to Hunthausen’s satisfaction, since he later criticizes the report). And while
Murphy is not one of the choices that Hunthausen himself advances for coadjutor, his naming
shows willingness by the commission to find someone reasonably acceptable to Hunthausen.
On the other hand, in the face of resistance from Hunthausen, the commission shows it can
also stand firm, and increase the pressure on Hunthausen as necessary. Eventually
Hunthausen is left with a take-it-or-leave-it offer: accept the submission of the two names and
the commission’s assessment or be prepared to step down.
When Hunthausen expresses the intention (threat) to fly to Rome to deal directly with the
Holy See, it becomes clear that Rome is ready to back up the decision-making authority of the
commission. Rome refuses to grant permission for Hunthausen to come unless he meets
certain conditions (in effect: gives in completely) first. This is a pronounced example of
territorial control by the Vatican. The doctrinal or legal basis for the Holy See’s refusal to
grant to a fellow bishop access to the Pope and the Vatican bureaucracy is unknown. (Note on
the question of territorial control. It is striking that the commission never visits Seattle during
its assessment. The assessment information gathering and negotiations take place almost
exclusively on what might be described as neutral territory: that is, not in Seattle, but not in
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Rome either.)
The key to Hunthausen’s decision to yield appears to be his perception that no better outcome
can be obtained otherwise. Since he does not have the option of bypassing the commission’s
authority with an appeal to Rome, his only options are to further escalate the conflict by
taking his complaints to the press (likely consequence: removal from office and chaos in the
local Church), step down without protest (likely consequence: chaos in the local Church), or
give in and make the best of the commission solution (likely consequence: personal
dissatisfaction but the possibility of returning conditions to normal in the archdiocese in the
near future). Hunthausen chooses to submit rather than rejuvenate the conflict.
The seal of secrecy put on the conflict negotiations between Hunthausen and the commission
proves to be not inviolable. The April 15 story in the National Catholic Register (declaring
that Wuerl would leave and Hunthausen would be retired after a face-saving period of
restoration of power) shows that some person familiar with the negotiations was willing to go
to the press to influence public discussion of the case. On behalf of the archdiocese, Fr.
Michael G. Ryan denies the story. He also suggests that the story may have been put forth as a
“trial balloon,” to see how American bishops would react to the prospect of Hunthausen
retiring early or, alternatively, to try to raise protest against the possibility that Hunthausen’s
powers would be fully restored. This concept of the leak as a “trial balloon” is plausible, but
we lack evidence to ascertain the specific intention(s) behind the leak.
The Register leak does not prove to be the last. Quickly, in answer, news stories with inside
information appear in the April 24 National Catholic Reporter and the April 25 New York
Times. Again, the source of the leaks is unknown, but there is little room for doubt that the
leaks constitute intentional efforts to influence the public debate by controlling the flow of
information. One more notable example of this is the apparently autonomous action on the
part of the National Catholic Reporter to inquire about and then report on the FBI’s
surveillance of Hunthausen’s peace activism. The NC Reporter never made a secret of its
support for Hunthausen, and this sidelight investigation and report appears to be an attempt to
generate support for him by winning him sympathy. Probably, too, it is the product of a
genuine curiosity about possible ties between the Vatican and the Reagan White House.
The public debate fueled by the news media places a continuous pressure on the conflict
handling. So, too, do letter-writing campaigns to members of the hierarchy carried out by
Hunthausen supporters and opponents. And finally, there is the impending pastoral visit of the
Pope: at the start of May it is only four months ahead. It is not surprising that the conflict
negotiations come down to an ultimatum.
By agreeing to the commission’s proposal, Hunthausen accepts a compromise. Though he
does not get everything he wants, and he remains frustrated, he nonetheless finds himself in a
significantly improved position at the end of May, 1987: he has the final word in his
archdiocese again, and he has an assistant bishop in place who is more familiar to Hunthausen
and more likely to be effective than his predecessor. The commission has reason to be
pleased, or at least relieved, that agreement has been reached. It has achieved its most
important objective of getting an agreement in timely fashion that avoids further escalation of
the conflict and that offers face-saving for both sides. The Vatican, too, has reason to be
satisfied. Though it is doubtful that Hunthausen’s pastoral vision is significantly more
“Roman” than it was prior to the conflict (the opposite may even be true), it has at least
established greater control over the archdiocese and has sent a strong signal of its expectations
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to the American Church. Most importantly of late, it has removed itself from a conflict that
was quickly becoming more costly than it was worth.
With the press conference announcing implementation of the commission solution, the
principal parties share with the public the details of the plan they have worked out in private.
8.2 Document Number: 9
Assessment Commission Report (5.20.87)
Source: The Progress, 5/28/87, pp. 3-4; Origins, 6/4/87, pp. 39-41.
8.2.1 Summary of Contents:
The document is divided into four numbered sections. No title appears on the versions of the
document published in The Progress or Origins, but a copy of the document distributed to the
chancery staff of the Seattle Archdiocese (Wasden Price collection) shows the following title:
“Report to the Holy See Presented by Commission Appointed by the Holy See To Assess the
Current Situation in the Archdiocese of Seattle.” No introductory remarks precede the first
section. Concluding remarks appear in section IV. The section titles are as follows: I. The
history; II. The assessment; III. Proposal for resolving the problem and concluding remarks.
Section I., “The history,” begins with a statement of the commission’s appointment and
mandate. The commission was appointed by the Holy See, through a letter of the Apostolic
Pro-Nuncio, “to assess the current situation in the Archdiocese of Seattle.” The rest of the
section describes the history of the commission’s activity. It consists mostly of a list of
interviews conducted, each of which identifies the principal participants and date of the
interview. The final two paragraphs of the section note that telephone conversations, letters,
and “voluminous documentation” also served as information sources for the commission.
Section II, “The assessment,” declares that, in the absence of a mandate regarding the
procedure for conducting the assessment, the commission has adopted informal methods in
order to arrive at what it believes to be a “common sense judgment.” As a “context” for its
approach, the commission has chosen two documents, “both known to Archbishop
Hunthausen, to the Holy See and to everyone concerned,” these being a summary of
Archbishop Hickey’s interview with Hunthausen, dated 8 November 1983, and Cardinal
Ratzinger’s letter to Hunthausen, dated 30 September 1985. Section II also contains an
explicit statement of the commission’s procedural decision to base its conclusions “only on
documents seen by Archbishop Hunthausen and on discussions with persons designated by
him or consulted with his knowledge and concurrence.” The remainder of this section lists, in
numbered subsections, the nine “judgments” unanimously decided upon by the commission.
The judgments:
1) Archbishop Hunthausen has taken “laudable steps” to carry out “certain of the provisions”
in the 9/30/85 Ratzinger letter.
2) In spite of these steps, confusion still exists among some in the Archdiocese about certain
“clear” magisterial teaching, and some teachings have been “modified arbitrarily” by
archdiocesan leaders.
3) The Archdiocese “suffers an inadequacy in communications” which may be interfering
with reception of the Archbishop’s articulations of magisterial teaching.
4) Though the Archbishop, who is well known for his compassion, “seems generally to
balance compassion with the law,” some in the archdiocese neglect Church law “under the
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aegis of compassion.”
5) In sum, though the Archbishop himself may be firm in his teachings and practices, “he is
perceived as generating or at least accepting a climate of permissiveness.”
6) One could supply examples of all of the observations above, but the Commission has
decided not to because “it is the overall attitudinal ‘climate’ or psychological and
ecclesiological orientation of the Archdiocese which is the ultimate key to the situation. No
substantive changes will perdure until this climate or orientation changes.” This climate has
remained unchanged since the Visitation and Ratzinger’s letter.
7) The Commission finds Ratzinger’s 9.30.85 letter “reasonably clear in both specifics and
intent.” The Commission speculates that the Ratzinger letter did not provide an “exhaustive”
list of “concrete points for correction” because he too was more concerned with broader
perspectives or attitudes that inform specific decisions about practice. Ratzinger’s preference
was to write to Hunthausen “as bishop to bishop.”
8) The Commission concludes that the Ratzinger letter should stand as “the primary guide”
for future action. The Commission has, in a separate forum, provided Hunthausen with
specific examples of problems in need of correction and will supply more if necessary.
9) Bishop Wuerl merits “highest praise” for his dedication in carrying out his responsibilities
in such difficult circumstances.
Section III, “Proposal for resolving the problem and concluding remarks,” begins with a
statement that the proposal was developed “in consultation with the Holy See taking into
account both the concerns of Archbishop Hunthausen as well as those of the Holy See.” It
then declares that one point of near unanimity among persons interviewed by the Commission
was that the present arrangement of “divided authority” was “not effective and should be
changed.”
The Commission report then identifies five “essential elements” of its proposal. I reproduce
the list below, retaining its exact wording.
1) The Auxiliary Bishop should be transferred to another See.
2) The Archbishop should recover his faculties as diocesan bishop.
3) A Coadjutor Archbishop should be appointed to Seattle.
4) The Holy See should establish target dates for the completion of the tasks referred to in the
letter of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.
5) The Commission should be mandated for a period to be determined by the Holy See, to
assist in the accomplishment of these tasks.
The final paragraphs of the Commission report assert the report represents the “best, most
honest and unprejudiced judgment” of the commission members, who unanimously agreed on
the findings therein. The Commission also pledges future assistance to the Holy See in
carrying out elements of the report, however that may be deemed necessary.
No steps taken by the Holy See or the present Commission were, in the Commission’s view,
intended to be “punitive, regardless of perceptions to the contrary.” Throughout its own
involvement, the Commission has sought to keep before its eyes “the need for charity and
compassion, the need for fairness and openness, the need to reach decisions and to make
recommendations.” It has also been mindful of the Second Vatican Council’s perspective on
the role of a bishop, wherein he is understood to be both one who exercises power in his own
right in caring for his flock (he is not simply the Pope’s vicar), and one who is a member of
the College of Bishops under its Head, the Pope. But since the first century, it has
occasionally been necessary for the Pope to intervene in local situations for the good of the
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Church. “If the Church, spread through many cultures and existing on all continents is to
remain one and maintain its identity, the Pope must make decisions which must be binding on
the whole body of the Church.”
The Commission document supports this last point with a quote from the well-known Jesuit
theologian Karl Rahner, which emphasizes the papacy’s place in “the binding content of our
faith.” The quotation proceeds to observe that “the Church cannot be a debating society: it
must be able to make decisions binding on all within it. Such a demand cannot be a priori
contrary to man’s dignity if... he is indeed a social being. And then a supreme point at which
all reflections and democratic discussions are turned into universally binding decisions cannot
be without meaning.”
The final paragraph of the report offers the hope and prayer of the Commission members that
humility, obedience, charity and peace will prevail in the acceptance of the Holy See’s
decision. The signatures of the three Commission members appear at the end of the report.
8.2.2 Conflict Functionality of the 5.20.87 Assessment Commission Report
The assessment report tells the public, and fellow bishops in particular, what process the
commission has followed in making its evaluation of Seattle, what conclusions it has drawn,
and what recommendations it makes for the future. Its primary purpose appears to be one of
legitimation: of the commission itself, and of the commission’s process and conclusions.
Beyond this, it seeks to persuade all involved of the efficacy of the recommendations. The
text saves face for both Rome and Hunthausen, sparing both parties direct criticism but not
indirect criticism.
In order to sell the agreement, the report establishes the legitimacy of the commission and the
assessment process it has employed. The first words of the report tell us that the commission
was “appointed” and given a “mandate” by the Holy See (deference to the order and mindset
of the Church). Official notification of this appointment took place through the bureaucratic
apparatus of the Church (the communication of the pro-nuncio, prot. n. 317/87/2). The
remainder of section I and much of section II offer a rationale (persuasive argumentation) for
the chosen assessment procedure and a description of how this was carried out. Legitimation
takes several forms in these sections. Section I suggests that the assessment process was
extensive in time, carefully documented and varied in its information sources (not only in the
people consulted but also in the forms of information: visits, telephone conversations, letters,
documentation; see also section III’s comment that “we listened to many voices and weighed
many views”). Section II suggests that the means of making the assessment were acceptable
to the conflict parties themselves. Thus, the commission explains how it interpreted and
carried out the mandate given it by the Vatican in a manner that was open to Hunthausen’s
concerns as well (fraternity): the commission would speak only with Hunthausen, Wuerl and
persons designated by Hunthausen; the commission would refer only to documents known by
Hunthausen, the Holy See and everyone concerned; and the assessment’s conclusions would
be based only on these personal and documentary sources. A further legitimation of the
commission’s process is the minor aside that “shared prayer” would be an element in the
assessment procedure (God talk). In section III, we have an additional attestation in the same
vein as the mention of prayer. After setting forth the heart of its assessment and proposals, the
three bishops declare: “By signing this document, each Commission member testifies that it
represents his best, most honest and unprejudiced judgment…” In other words, the bishops
are willing to assert their own personal integrity (personal identity) as one more guarantor of
the report’s legitimacy. On the whole, however, the commission members play down their
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own personal identities in this report. The commission typically refers to itself in the third
person (as “the Commission”) or in the first person plural and their individual identities are
distinguished only in the report of who met with whom when. They also stress the unanimity
of their judgments (fraternity). These tactics of self-presentation minimize the reminders that
human fallibility and personal biases are a factor in the assessment process.
Strikingly, the commission report states explicitly that the commission understood its
assignment to be to conduct an “assessment,” not an “Apostolic Visitation.” One has to
wonder at the significance of this distinction. (I pointed out is section 4.8.2, above, that the
word “assess” was used by Archbishop Hickey’s secretary to describe the visitation process.)
What exactly is the difference between an assessment and a visitation, since the Vatican
seems to have been at pains to present the visitation as a rather detached form of looking into
the archdiocese? One key difference appears to rest in the matter of whether the archdiocese
actually receives a personal visit from the official enquirer. The commission, according to its
own report, never visited Seattle. All personal meetings took place elsewhere.
The commission’s rationale for its manner of proceeding takes an interesting turn in section
II, when the following connection is made.
It [the commission] was asked to provide an assessment of the “current situation” in the Archdiocese of
Seattle. In common sense terms, it seemed quite clear that the Holy See was looking for a common sense
judgment, and this is all the Commission attempts to provide here.
One wonders how the second proposition “quite clear(ly)” follows from the first. In the first
sentence, the commission highlights the words “assessment” and “current situation.”
According to the commission, this common-sensically leads to the conclusion that a “common
sense” judgment is sought. The connection between the two sentences is puzzling, as is the
meaning of common sense in this context. What sort of reference frame is implied by
“common sense” here? Does this mean doing away with all technical, theological arguments
(like those in the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter)? We might translate passage as: We heard the
Vatican telling us to resolve the conflict as quickly and efficiently as possible, not to go over
old ground or to engage in theoretical reflection. So that is what we have tried to do.
In the remainder of the report are three key components. The first (completing section II) is
the statement of the commission’s “judgment,” expressed in nine numbered points. The
second (in section III) is the statement of the commission’s proposals. And the third
(completing section III and the document itself) is a set of concluding remarks which serve as
a guide for interpreting the document. Some comments are in order about how these messages
are packaged for public consumption. Essentially, the legitimation work of the first third of
the document should place the reader in a position to accept the findings and proposals
contained in the middle third. Lingering questions about whether the conflict is being validly
resolved by the present means are taken up in the last third of the document.
The nine numbered points in section II, declaring the “unanimous judgment of the
Commission,” are the findings uncovered by the commission’s work of assessment. Of chief
importance in these points is that the commission offers no direct criticism of Hunthausen or
the Vatican (courtesy). Hunthausen, for his part, is given the benefit of the doubt in regard to
his carrying out of the visitation instructions received from Cardinal Ratzinger, his readiness
to balance the prescripts of compassion and the law, and his personal firmness as a leader.
And yet, at the same time, doubts about his leadership are sustained by this report. Praise and
exculpatory comments in regard to Hunthausen’s leadership are invariably qualified. Almost
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every sentence appears to carry a double meaning. To illustrate, I will reproduce a portion of
the passage and insert indications of constructions that appear to show favor (indicated with
an H+) or cast doubt (H-) on Hunthausen’s leadership. In some cases, a given construction
may bear positive and negative implications at the same time (H+, H-).
1) Archbishop Hunthausen has taken laudable steps (H+) to carry out certain (H-)
of the provisions of the letter of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.
2) In spite of such steps, certain clear teachings of the Magisterium seem to be
confused (H-) in the minds of some, and certain practices mandated by the
Holy See seem to be modified arbitrarily (H-) by some pastors and other
persons charged with responsibility for Archdiocesan activities (H+, H-).
3) Archbishop Hunthausen himself observed that the Archdiocese suffers an
inadequacy in communications (H-). It seems possible, therefore, that certain
ambiguities exist because not everyone is adequately familiar (H-) with the
Archbishop’s policies (H+) or with his articulations of magisterial teaching.
4) At the same time, the Archbishop attributes great value to compassion. His
own practice of compassion has become almost legendary (H+). While the
Archbishop himself, however, seems (H-) generally (H-) to balance
compassion with the law (H+), and asserts unconditionally his own
commitment to formal Church teaching (H+), it seems that some who admire
his compassion may not give similar weight to the place and demands of law
(H-), bending it in important matters under the aegis of compassion (H-).
5) In sum, no matter how personally firm (H+) in his teachings and practices the
Archbishop himself may (H-) be, without intending it (H+), he is perceived
(H+, H-) as generating (H-) or at least accepting (H-) a climate (H-) of
permissiveness (H-) within which some feel themselves free to design their
own policies and practices (H-).
What I have tried to show with my marking of this passage is that while the report never
offers outright criticism of Hunthausen, his portrayal here is loaded with implied criticism. A
persistent ambivalence is seen in the fact that all praise for Hunthausen is qualified. Hence,
Hunthausen has taken “laudable steps” to carry out Ratzinger’s provisions, but (unfortunately)
he has only done this in regard to “certain” of those provisions. And while Hunthausen
himself seems to have a clear grasp of Magisterial teaching and a real commitment to it, he
has, the document suggests, failed to inculcate this same attitude in the people of his local
Church. And though Hunthausen himself is admirably (legendarily!) compassionate, while
still managing to balance compassion with the law, some of his followers have taken
advantage of the freedom entrusted to them.
Repeatedly the criticism is deflected away from Hunthausen himself to his archdiocese, but
the implication (but only the implication) always surfaces that Hunthausen himself bears
significant responsibility for having allowed these conditions to develop locally. Even
criticisms of the archdiocese are relentlessly qualified, usually with the word “seems.”
Magisterial teachings “seem to be confused in the minds of some” and certain practices “seem
to be modified arbitrarily.” “It seems possible that ambiguities exist,” the report tells us – a
remarkably tentative assertion of ambiguity! And so on. Through this strategy the commission
avoids being tied to particularities in its “unanimous judgment.” The report points in the
general direction of the problem, but not to specific persons or groups or problems. By this
means, Hunthausen and his local Church are allowed to save face.
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Saving face for the Vatican consists primarily in another strategy. A basic source of face
saving for the Vatican has to do with the fact that the Holy See is mostly out of view in this
document. The focus is on Hunthausen, not Rome. Hunthausen’s volatile charges against
Rome – that the decision to undertake the visitation was presented to him as a fait accompli;
that secrecy does and should not work; that the process was unjust because Hunthausen was
not given a chance to see the charges or his accusers; etc. -- are taken up here only obliquely.
Hunthausen’s more contentious word choices are not repeated in this report (e.g., secrecy,
unjust). Nor are the Vatican’s (e.g., Laghi’s suggestion that the Holy See found Hunthausen
lacking the necessary “firmness). The main points at which the report speaks (directly) to the
Vatican’s handling of the affair are in numbered subpoints 6-8 of section II (the ‘unanimous
judgment” passage); in section III, when the commission says that interviewees found the
divided authority arrangement “not effective;” and again in section III, when the commission
denies that any Vatican actions were intended to be punitive. In each case the report offers a
defense of the Vatican’s conduct.
Section II, subpoint 6, addresses the charge (placed in the mouth of persons the commission
interviewed, not Hunthausen himself) that Hunthausen had been “unfairly asked to correct
aberrations without being told what they were…” In answer to this the commission says that
real issue is the “climate” of pastoral practice in Seattle. Thus does the commission reaffirm a
central argument of Ratzinger’s 9.30.85 letter to Hunthausen. For that reason, the report
continues (in subpoint 7), it would not be sufficient to supply a list of concrete examples.
Nonetheless, if examples are necessary, some have already been provided to Hunthausen by
Ratzinger’s letter (cf. subpoint 7), some have been provided by the commission itself, and the
commission is prepared to offer more as needed (subpoint 8).
Left unanswered (as it was in the Ratzinger letter) is the question of how Hunthausen is to go
about changing the archdiocesan “climate.” What is clear, however, is that this is one of the
more damning issues in the report for Hunthausen. According to the commission, the
problematic “psychological and ecclesiological orientation” of the archdiocese “seems
[seems!] to have remained substantially unchanged since the time of the Apostolic Visitation
and the letter of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.” Hunthausen is immediately
given an out from this from this charge – this is “in no way to suggest a lack of sincerity or
the presence of malicious resistance” on Hunthausen’s part – but again we find that a denial
can be an effective way, rhetorically, to make a charge that one purportedly is not making.
As for Ratzinger, the commission finds that his letter is “reasonably clear in both specifics
and intent,” a statement that constitutes an endorsement but less than a ringing endorsement.
While admittedly Ratzinger “made no effort to provide an exhaustive list of concrete points
for correction,” this is understandable, the commission finds, because he was speaking to
Hunthausen as “bishop to bishop, as between those who share one Lord, one faith, one
baptism, one Church.” It is unclear why speaking bishop-to-bishop brings supercession of the
need for specifics, but in terms of the discursive strategy of this report it answers the charge of
insufficient detail in Ratzinger’s letter.
Perhaps the most negative statement that focuses on the Vatican’s actions occurs at the
beginning of section III, where the commission report tells us: “Virtually all persons
interviewed by the Commission agreed that the present arrangement of divided authority…
was not effective and should be changed.” In other words, the Vatican instituted an
arrangement of power sharing that all agreed did not work. But the report does not put it so
bluntly. The arrangement itself exists, here, independently of agency: the Vatican is not
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named as the entity establishing the arrangement. And since it does not work, the commission
concludes, someone, somewhere would do well to change it. Significantly, the report makes
no attempt here to explain why the arrangement was not effective. It simply notes it in
passing, disassociates the situation from Vatican action and moves on.
One more instance of the commission presenting Vatican decisions in a less than critical light
comes in section III, where the report declares: “Thoroughly aware of the steps taken by the
Holy See up to this point, the Commission is convinced that no steps were intended as
punitive, regardless of perceptions to the contrary.” It is curious that (after asserting full
knowledge of the history of the Vatican’s actions, and thereby its own legitimacy as judge)
the commission wants to make this argument. In public discussion of the case there was little
disagreement about the fact of punishment itself. Hunthausen, his supporters and his
opponents generally saw the Vatican’s taking of power from Hunthausen as a kind of
punishment. Even the undersecretary for the Congregation for Bishops had called the action
“disciplinary.” The issue was not whether disciplinary action had been taken but whether such
action was appropriate. So why does the commission want to insist that “no steps were
intended as punitive,” and this “regardless of perceptions to the contrary”(!)? Is there
something embarrassing in the idea that the primacy would punish a local ordinary? Or does
this sticking point have something to do with the Vatican claim that Hunthausen agreed to
give the faculties? In any case, it seems a moot point in light of Hunthausen’s obvious
unreadiness to have this power-sharing arrangement posed on him. Notice that the
commission says that no steps were “intended” as punitive. Is this to say that the intention was
some higher motive (such as pursuing unity through a more efficacious form of collegiality –
i.e., redistributing powers to those who are best able to dispose them) and the punishment was
an unintended consequence? This question cannot be answered on the basis of the text, but
what is apparent is that the commission wants to rhetorically disassociate the Vatican from the
unpleasant practice of dealing out punishment.
Thus far I have gone to some lengths to describe how this report “sells” the commission’s
own involvement and its findings, a persuasive effort that has been infused with an emphasis
on saving face for Rome and for Hunthausen. Remarkably, however, there is no attempt to
sell or even explain the five specific proposals themselves (i.e.: transfer Wuerl; restore the
faculties; appoint a coadjutor; establish target dates; have the commission continue to assist).
The report gives almost no context to illuminate why these specific recommendations are set
forth. A minor exception applies in the case of the first and second recommendations, which
seem directly related to the observation that the arrangement of divided authority has been
found ineffective. But all in all, we have no rationale supplied to us for why these changes and
not others should be implemented. Most especially, we are left to wonder about the rationale
for appointing a coadjutor archbishop. Certainly the commission has reasons for this, reasons
which have been shared with Hunthausen and the Holy See, but for whatever reason, this
rationale is not shared with the public in the report. Another question surrounds the fourth
recommendation (“The Holy See should establish target dates for the completion of the tasks
referred to in the letter of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith”). If the expectation
is that Hunthausen will change the “overall attitudinal ‘climate’” of the archdiocese, how is
his success or failure to be measured? There are more questions that can be raised, but of
immediate significance for our analysis here is the silence kept here in regard to the thinking
that informs the recommendations themselves. Since the overall orientation of this document
appears to be to put an end to the conflict, it may well be that the decision to leave out the
rationale for the recommendations was based on the sense that including the rationale would
open up new issue fronts in the affair, an unwelcome prospect.
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The portion of the document that follows the statement of recommendations and closes the
document itself takes the form of a theological reflection on the office of bishop and the place
of the primacy as the “supreme point” of decision making in the Church (ecclesiological God
talk; expert power; persuasive argumentation). Here the document places the entire conflict
in context, answering past arguments (specifically, certain arguments Hunthausen made in his
NCCB address) and foreclosing future arguments at the same time. The reflection begins with
a nod to Hunthausen’s authority and the authority of individual bishops. Citing the Vatican II
document Lumen Gentium (itself an acknowledgment of Hunthausen’s preferred
ecclesiological starting point), the report affirms what Hunthausen says in section IV of his
NCCB address: that local bishops possess authority in their own right: they are not merely
vicars of the Roman Pontiff. As a strategy of argumentation, there are clear advantages to
beginning with the viewpoint and strongest argument that one wishes to refute, as the
commission does here. And indeed refutation – or, to put it more mildly, counterbalancing of
the argument – is what follows. “At the same time,” the report continues, “… No bishop is an
independent agent, standing in isolation. As a member of the College of Bishops, he exercises
his office only in communion with and obedience to the Head of the College of Bishops, the
Pope, the Successor of Peter and Bishop of Rome.” The concept of obedience finds reiteration
in the succeeding sentence, which notes that every bishop promises obedience to the Pope in
his ordination (i.e., obedience is inseparable from the office of bishop itself).
We recall that in his address to the NCCB, Hunthausen argued that obedience should involve
more than a simple acquiescence, and rightfully includes dialogue. The final paragraphs of the
commission report (excluding the very last) answer this argument. The components to the
response are the following propositions: (1) Tradition justifies such interventions by the
primacy: the Pope has intervened in local churches since the first century. (2) This power to
intervene is necessary to maintain the unity and identity of the Church. (3) The papacy
“belongs to the binding content of our faith itself.” In other words, the papacy’s role within
the Church is divinely sanctioned, permanent and of fundamental importance. (4) Democratic
discussions have their place in the Church but there needs to be an end point for debates. It is
meaningful to have a means for turning democratic discussions into binding decisions. (5)
The papacy’s power to make universally binding decisions poses no threat to the dignity of
the human person, who is rightfully acknowledged to be a social being. The gist of these
arguments for accepting the commission’s recommendations is that doing so is in keeping
with what the Church is (a hierarchical, divinely-sanctioned unity) and how it has always
conducted itself (since the first century A.D.), and what it must do for its own good (“We are
and we shall remain also in the future the Roman Catholic Church). Hunthausen’s desire to
keep arguing is uncalled for (“the Church cannot be a debating society”) because it is not
consistent with the Church’s identity, its traditional practice and its concern for its own well
being (it is not in the best interest of the Church).
While making this response, the commission quotes extensively from a theological work by
Karl Rahner. This instance of manifest intertextuality is striking for two reasons. First, Rahner
is an academic theologian writing expressly in that capacity. No other such sources have been
cited in the case documents analyzed thus far. Theological writings produced by the hierarchy
(in the form of Conciliar documents, papal teachings, curial instructions, bishops’ pastoral
letters) have been invoked, but no works of academic theologians. One can imagine why this
has not been done in the past. Such works by definition lack the authority of teaching issued
by the Church hierarchy (thus, they are not the best source for “proving” a point), and,
contemporaneous with the Hunthausen case, certain theologians were in the process of being
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taken to task by the Vatican (most prominently, Charles Curran and Leonardo Boff). Hence,
the works of academic theologians were doubly suspect.
The second reason the commission report’s citation of Rahner is striking is that the reference
is highly intraecclesial. Rahner is well known among theologically educated Church insiders
(i.e., the target audience of bishops), but the name would mean little to the general public. The
choice to quote him in particular marks something of a departure from the commission
report’s overall approach, which seems to be to use straightforward, nontechnical language to
persuade as broad an audience as possible to accept the conflict resolution here proposed.
So what is the Rahner passage doing here, then? It may be primarily a choice of convenience.
The passage says what the bishops want to say, and there is always value in showing that
outside authorities hold the same view as oneself. The commission is busy making the point
that Hunthausen cannot simply go his own way as a bishop, he has to answer to Rome, and
Rahner makes this point succinctly in this particular book. One need attribute only minimal
significance to the fact that Rahner per se is chosen (as opposed to some other theologian or
theological source). In any case, Rahner is a safe choice as far as the conflict parties are
concerned. Rahner can be characterized as a forward-thinking theologian (acceptable to
Hunthausen) who was not subject to Vatican suspicion (acceptable to the Vatican).
Two other references to external texts – to the transcript of the 11.8.83 Hickey-Hunthausen
interview and the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter -- stand out in this report. These are the documents
known to all parties which have served the commission’s assessment process. The
commission puts forth one of these documents, the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter, as a guide for
future pastoral action in the Seattle archdiocese. Use of the letter in this way is a cornerstone
of the commission’s proposal for addressing the situation in Seattle. This letter, which
Hunthausen was not originally allowed to share with the public, has undergone a process of
progressive revelation to the public (first through rewriting by Laghi, then by Hunthausen’s
sharing of the letter with his priests, then by Wuerl’s mention of the letter in his own letter to
priests, then by Hunthausen’s mention of the letter obliquely in his response to the Vatican
chronology, and finally by the commission report’s provision of the letter itself in
accompaniment to the commission report). What are we to make of this progressive
unveiling? Does it constitute a minor success for Hunthausen, who wanted the letter released
in the first place? This is hard to say. Since the letter was not especially favorable toward
Hunthausen to begin with (it was less favorable, in fact, than the Laghi rewrite), it does not
seem to benefit Hunthausen by polishing his image. Moreover, at this late date it may not
even amount to a concession, since it is not clear that Hunthausen still desires its release. Seen
from another angle, the Vatican’s publication of the letter further chips away at the wall of
secrecy, which has been one of Hunthausen’s priorities. The handling of the Ratzinger letter
runs as a thread through the conflict as a whole. The fact that references to it recur and that it
finds an ongoing functional relevance make it one of the keys to comprehending the total
conflict.
The Hickey-Hunthausen interview is the second key reference document the commission
makes use of in its assessment. Like the Hickey visitation report to the Vatican, the Hickey-
Hunthausen interview transcript has never been made public. It is interesting that Hunthausen
never criticizes the Vatican’s use of secrecy in regard to this document and that he never
presses to have this transcript made public (nor does he release his own copy), especially
since the quality of his responses to questions raised by the Vatican is a conflict issue. There
are some reasons we can imagine for Hunthausen’s not being interested in doing so. For one
237
thing, he already knows its contents, so the secret is not being kept from him. Another reason
may be that he agreed to the use of secrecy in this interview ahead of time: so perhaps it is
simply a question of keeping his word. A further reason could be a desire to protect the
identities of persons mentioned in the interview. The most likely reason, however (and this
does not rule out the relevance of the other reasons), for not releasing the transcript or
excerpts thereof is simply that, for whatever reason, doing so would not, on balance, help his
cause. It is probable that the contents of such a long interview session would prove to be a
mixed bag. Apparently benign things said in private conversation may look very different
when one considers the prospect of their widespread public distribution. We should note, too,
that Hunthausen had no opportunity to edit the interview transcript. He was simply presented
with a word-for-word transcript that he was asked to sign as an indication of accuracy. Thus,
he was not offered the opportunity to rework his comments for a target audience.
I have sought to illustrate the apostolic commission’s attempt to usher in the end of the Rome-
Hunthausen conflict by means of its evaluation and report. The report itself answers a number
of questions raised by the conflict exchanges, proposes a new arrangement in Seattle, and
markets a vision of resolution that, the commission hopes, will be acceptable to the American
bishops and the public at large. The success of the document in achieving these ends depends
on public reception of the report and the cooperation of the direct participants in the affair.
I. Subsequent Developments (May 1987-April 1989)
At the May 27 news conference (Seattle Times, 5.28.87; Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 5.28.87)
with Murphy, Hunthausen appeared, for the most part, positively disposed to the settlement
and at ease with his new coadjutor. Of the agreement he said, “I am so hopeful, so desirous of
making it work. I just think it has tremendous potential. Calling Murphy “a friend and a
trusted co-worker,” Hunthausen said, “I have assurance that Archbishop Murphy comes
without special faculties. I think you know that I could not and would not accept such an
arrangement.”
When Murphy was asked about his own understanding of his role, he answered, “Archbishop
Hunthausen is my archbishop just as he is the (archbishop) of the others in the faith
community of Western Washington. I really am looking forward to the experience of sharing
this responsibility with a person I respect…” Does Murphy represent “the long arm of the
Vatican?” Hunthausen was asked. Hunthausen patted Murphy on the back and turned the
question over to him. Murphy replied: “I am here primarily because of a process where I was
one of the people Archbishop Hunthausen felt he could work with and share ministerial
responsibilities that are his in this archdiocese.”
But despite the apparent satisfaction and good rapport between Hunthausen and Murphy, it
was also evident from one of the written statements Hunthausen distributed that he had mixed
feelings about the settlement that had been reached. Whereas Hunthausen’s general press
statement offered up only a minor indication of dissatisfaction and a lingering combativeness
(“It is only honest for me to acknowledge that that [the commission and I] have not always
agreed on every aspect of the work they have done – even some important aspects…”), his
letter to priests of the archdiocese, which was also released to the press, was more explicitly
contentious. There Hunthausen wrote, “I want you to know that, while I am not in agreement
with a number of important aspects of the assessment and am therefore not prepared to
endorse it, I have nonetheless come to the point of accepting the Commission’s proposed
resolution to our situation.”
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Even the letter to the priests, however, was essentially conciliatory. “For better or worse,”
Hunthausen wrote, “we are at this particular moment in our history. While there are many
thoughts and hopes in my heart at this time, my prayer is simple: that we will be able to see
this new moment as a graced moment; a moment in which we are challenged as a Church to
become all we strive and profess to be and more…”
In his general statement to the press, Hunthausen began by thanking the Pope for Murphy’s
appointment. He then said he saw this as an “opportunity for us to move forward together as a
Church after a long and very difficult period of struggle and uncertainty.” Hunthausen praised
Murphy for his energetic and committed service to the Church; the assessment commission
for their dedication to the good of the Church while carrying out their difficult assignment;
and Bishop Wuerl for giving himself generously to his episcopal duties, which were made all
the more demanding by the circumstances. The remainder of the statement offered words of
thanks and spiritual encouragement to the people of the archdiocese.
Murphy’s statement called his appointment as Coadjutor Archbishop “a great honor.” Murphy
said, “I have responded to this request of the Holy Father in a spirit of prayer and hope that I
may be of help and service to the Church of Seattle.” Murphy went on to say that he looked
forward to his assignment but that it would be difficult to leave the Church of Eastern
Montana, which he had grown to love. Murphy pledged his “respect, loyalty and commitment
to Pope John Paul II and the Holy See” and he also pledged his “support and service to
Archbishop Hunthausen and the Archdiocese of Seattle.”
Wuerl’s statement called Murphy’s appointment “a welcome sign of the resolution of the
difficulty and tension that has developed in this local church.” Wuerl described Murphy as
“an energetic, gifted, prayerful and articulate bishop” and he expressed his hope that
Murphy’s talents and gifts would “work to the healing and benefit” of the archdiocese. Wuerl
noted that his own new assignment had not yet been specified but that he was grateful for the
occasion to reflect on his own ministry in Western Washington. Most especially, he was
grateful for the warmth of welcome and depth of kindness that had been shown to him by the
people of the archdiocese during his period of service. Wuerl also extended his appreciation to
Archbishop Hunthausen: “During the time we worked together, even though the situation was
difficult, he was always considerate and kind.”
Cardinal Bernardin of the assessment commission also released a statement of his own on
May 27 (cf. National Catholic Reporter, 6.5.87), saying, “I am very pleased with the
resolution proposed by our commission and accepted by the Holy See.
I believe we have addressed the concerns of both the Holy See and Archbishop Hunthausen with
sensitivity to the persons involved and to the needs of the universal and local church.
I know that many join me in prayer and good wishes for Archbishop Hunthausen, Archbishop-elect
Murphy, Bishop Wuerl and the priests and people of the Archdiocese of Seattle. Those of us on the
commission remain ready to assist in every way possible, confident that everyone involved is eager to
move forward in truth, peace, unity and love.
Bernardin’s final sentence clearly relates to the intention for the commission to continue in
existence (“for a period to be determined by the Holy See”) to aid Hunthausen and Murphy in
carrying out the provisions of the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter summarizing the visitation
conclusions.
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More generally, the first reactions to the settlement were typically expressions of satisfaction
tinged with uncertainty. Interestingly, this was true of both supporters and critics of
Hunthausen. Both sides seemed to struggle to discern what the full implications of the new
arrangement were, while finding reason to be optimistic. Sister Chauncey Boyle, president of
the 700-member archdiocesan Sisters’ Council, said, “My reaction is really mixed. This is sort
of the best we could get” (Seattle Times, 5.27.87). Some were puzzled by the decision to send
a coadjutor archbishop who would not have special faculties, since coadjutors normally were
appointed with possession of such faculties. Erven Park, an outspoken Hunthausen critic, said
that restoring Hunthausen’s power while appointing a coadjutor amounted to “a contradiction
in terms.” Hunthausen himself repeatedly resisted attempts to characterize the resolution as a
matter of winning or losing. “That spirit comes out of a spirit of competition, and that’s not
where we are here.”
The response to Murphy himself was, for the most part, positive. The two main local
newspapers and the archdiocesan newspaper all reported that Murphy had made a good first
impression on the priests of the archdiocese at a large gathering on May 29 (Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, 5.30.87; Seattle Times, 5.30.87; The Progress, 6.4.87). From his first moments
in Seattle, Murphy had shown his talent for defusing troublesome questions with humor.
When asked what might have possessed him to step into the Seattle mess, he attributed it to
“the Gaelic spirit of adventure” (Seattle Weekly, 6.9.87). And at his first gathering with the
priests, Hunthausen told of a young relative who asked him what it meant to be named “co-
agitator.” Early accounts noted, too, that Murphy had a knack for Church politics. During
Murphy’s years of service as a young priest in Chicago, he had “gained a reputation as a
conciliator amid the ecclesial infighting rampant under the late Cardinal John Cody”
(National Catholic Reporter, 6.19.87).
After the first flurry of news reports about the implementation of the commission
recommendation in Seattle came a more extended period of reflection on what the
developments meant. This discussion was carried on in the Catholic press, primarily, and
among Catholic theologians. Contrary to Hunthausen’s wishes, many observers were inclined
to speak in terms of political victory and defeat. University of Notre Dame theologian Fr.
Richard McBrien said, “On balance, Hunthausen is the victor. The bottom line is that he has
full episcopal authority restored. It shows once again that the pope is much more a political
realist than some of his right-wing supporters… and if people and especially the bishops
confront him, the pope does back off, and he has backed off” (National Catholic Reporter,
6.5.87). Though not normally one to agree with McBrien, Wanderer editor A. J. Matt
expressed the same view. “In the political sense, it certainly is a victory (for Hunthausen),”
Matt said. “Whether it is a moral or spiritual victory, I would have serious reservations.”
James Hitchcock, a historian at St. Louis University, however, cautioned against overstating
the extent to which the outcome favored Hunthausen. Not only did the commission report
present “very strong criticism of Archbishop Hunthausen’s governance;” it also established
“target dates” that indicated an expectation of “measurable results.” “There is already a
mechanism in place,” Hitchcock said, “whereby if the results don’t come, then Hunthausen
can be made to move aside” (Seattle Times, 5.30.87). Fr. Andrew Greeley of the National
Opinion Research Center in Chicago called the settlement “a typical Cardinal Bernardin
solution – one with which everyone can live, but with which no one is completely happy.”
Father Richard Hynes, president of the National Federation of Priests’ Councils, described the
settlement as a healthy “exercise of the collaborative process.”
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More of Hunthausen’s thoughts and feelings about the outcome and the process that led to it
emerged in a May 28 interview with The Progress, which was publicly circulated in the June
4 issue. The central point in Hunthausen’s message was the need to move forward. “I think
we are at the point where a decision has been made, and so there is nothing to be served by
going back and saying, ‘I wish that…. I think that….’ I just don’t think that is what we need
to do or want to do.”
Archbishop Hunthausen said the commission’s report and solution were “obviously the result of a
great deal of prayer. We have all been praying and I believe the prayers are answered.
“As they describe this church, it is not the church that I know,” he said. “I don’t view the ministry as
they have viewed it; but they have come to this position by a process” which was open and honest.
The archbishop said that the process was a “constant dialogue. It was a discussion of pros and cons.
They legitimately examined my wish list and honestly told me what was viable and what was not, and
ultimately we got to this point.”
“I am confident that this is what God wants and it will work for the best,” the archbishop continued.
“My own wish and will doesn’t always identify with what God wants, and I think one has to be open to
finding out what God wants.”
[….] I am grateful that I was given the opportunity, and the freedom and the privilege to say what I
felt about these developments as I went,” he said. “To try and keep these those from being from being the
center of public attention and the center of public debate… that’s a hard thing.”
“I guess in all this, one of the real tensions has been how to bring forth the reality of who we are and
the truth of this church without giving the impression that we were setting ourselves up in opposition to
our superiors,” Archbishop Hunthausen said.
“That is a very, very fancy balancing act.”
Questioning judgments made by church leaders, even when invited to do so, he said, can give some
the impression of disloyalty and disobedience.
“If you give that impression, then you also run the risk of scandalizing some of the faithful,” he said.
“I don’t think there were ever instances of loyalty or disobedience,” he added, “but if it is perceived
that way, you run the risk of really alienating some people.”
“That’s been the tension,” he said. “It’s been extremely difficult.”
Archbishop Hunthausen also emphasized that he has “never, never had the slightest question about
my loyalty to the Holy Father or his right to act in this (local) church.”
While questions about parts of the four-year process remain, the local church has its agenda for the
next year: addressing the concerns in the Ratzinger letter with the assistance of the commission members.
“Obviously, this has touched the church well beyond Seattle, which means that it hit a sensitive
nerve…. It says something about the way we view how the church ought to function,” he said.
Archbishop Hunthausen said he would rather leave the lingering questions to theologians and
historians to wrestle with. “We have to move forward or we will destroy ourselves.”
On June 7, Bishop Wuerl celebrated his farewell Mass at Holy Rosary Church in West
Seattle, the parish where he had been in residence. Wuerl’s new assignment was not yet
known. After the Mass, Wuerl said he felt no bitterness and was “glad it’s over. I’m glad it’s
settled” (Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 6.8.87). One week later, on July 13, a formal service of
welcome to Archbishop Murphy was celebrated at St. James Cathedral. In what was perhaps a
Freudian slip of the liturgical variety, Fr. John Pinette, one of the masters of ceremonies,
absent-mindedly handed the crozier to Archbishop Murphy at the end of the service. Murphy
laughed, shook his head, and handed the crozier to Hunthausen.
A press conference followed three days later (July 16). Hunthausen and Murphy answered
questions and said they would soon be meeting with the assessment commission in Chicago
(Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 7.16.87). They said the Chicago meeting would be their first
opportunity to seek clarification and guidance from the commission since the settlement had
been reached. Hunthausen and Murphy were jovial and appeared to quite at ease with one
another. At one point Hunthausen was asked if events in Seattle had shed light on what had
been called a tension between the “Roman Catholic” and the “American Catholic” views of
241
their church, Hunthausen sighed deeply. “I appreciate your question,” he said. “It’s a question
I ask myself very, very often. I’m not sure I’ve found the answer” (Seattle Times, 7.16.87).
Back in his home diocese of Pittsburgh, Bishop Wuerl broke his extended silence regarding
the Seattle controversy. In an interview with the diocesan newspaper, Pittsburgh Catholic
(6.19.87), Wuerl said that certain “myths” had developed during his time in Seattle. In sum,
these mistaken notions were “that he had arrived in Seattle with ‘special faculties,’ that there
ever was a secret agreement unknown to Archbishop Hunthausen, that his appointment was
an ‘injustice’ to the archbishop, and that Vatican decisions were designed to discourage the
archbishop’s well-known anti-nuclear arms activities.”
Wuerl noted that he and Hunthausen had always enjoyed a good relationship personally, but
that the assignment had been a difficult one. “I’m physically and psychologically tired,” he
said. Though his parish visits were as positive as his exchanges with Hunthausen, Wuerl
admitted that some in the archdiocese had been less than welcoming, and some had shown
him outright animosity. (The 4.30.87 Seattle Post-Intelligencer reported that Wuerl had
received death threats during his time in Seattle. In its 6.9.87 editorial on the occasion of
Wuerl’s departure, the same newspaper noted that Wuerl had even drawn fire from
Hunthausen opponents, “who expected Wuerl to champion their cause to drive Hunthausen
out.”) A daily toll was taken by the fact that, “My very presence was an implied criticism.
Some of them had difficulty with that,” Wuerl told the Pittsburgh paper, “yet others tried very
hard to keep the focus on issues and not the person. I said to a gathering of all priests and
chancery staff that I don’t think I was ever seen as an individual human being but more as a
symbol of the visitation.”
Wuerl observed that addressing the issues identified by the Vatican became impossible amid
the controversy around his role. “From the time the faculties were granted in August (1986)
until last week, the public furor over all this became so intense it was impossible to address
the issues.” Wuerl said that he had maintained his silence during the controversy because “my
hope was to effect some healing in Seattle rather than add to the tension and division.”
Sustaining Wuerl was the sense that the Church is bigger than “human misunderstandings,”
which are, in any case, “a natural part of life.” “What is important is not that there are
misunderstandings, but the manner in which you resolve them. That should always be done
with patience, understanding and, above all, love.” Bishop Wuerl was appointed ordinary of
his home diocese, Pittsburgh, on February 12, 1988. (The apostolic visitator, Washington
Archbishop James Hickey, was elevated to cardinal on June 28 of that same year.)
Starting on July 16, 1987 in Chicago, Hunthausen and Murphy met with the assessment
commission quarterly to discuss their progress in addressing the concerns identified in the
Ratzinger letter. The next meeting took place on November 10, 1987 in Washington, D. C.
The third meeting was on February 26, 1988 in Seattle. Archbishop Quinn did not participate
in this meeting. He was on a leave-of-absence at this time  (Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
2.26.88). Cardinal Bernardin offered a few remarks to the press during the Seattle meeting.
Murphy and Hunthausen appeared to be working well together, he said: “things are going
quite well. The situation has been very tranquil.” Bernardin said he intended to make no
formal statements in connection with the quarterly meetings that had been agreed upon by
Hunthausen, Murphy and the commission. Bernardin also reiterated that “the only purpose of
this commission is to assist Archbishop Hunthausen as diocesan bishop and Archbishop
Murphy as his assistant in fulfilling the requests of the Holy See. There is no hidden agenda
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here” (The Progress, 5.3.87). Two subsequent meetings occurred between the Seattle
Archbishops and the commission (dates unknown. Apparently the last meeting took place
during an extraordinary synod of bishops in Rome, March 1989: cf. Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
3.15.89).
The exchanges between Hunthausen, Murphy and the commission concluded with
Hunthausen’s filing of a set of formal responses to the concerns identified through the
visitation and post-visitation process. The Holy See accepted these responses (National
Catholic Reporter, 4/21/89).
The completion of the work of the apostolic commission was made public through an
announcement of the papal pro-nuncio in Washington, D.C. and an announcement by
Hunthausen in Seattle on the same day (The Progress, 4.13.89; see also the inter-office
memorandum from Hunthausen to “Central Agency Employees,” dated 4.11.89, in the
Wasden Price collection.) The statement from the nunciature reads:
Archbishop Pio Laghi, Apostolic Pro-Nuncio, announced today, April 11, 1989, that the work of the
Apostolic Commission chaired by Joseph Cardinal Bernardin is completed and its mandate has been
terminated in relationship to the Archdiocese of Seattle.
Archbishop Raymond G. Hunthausen has indicated that he, along with Coadjutor Archbishop
Thomas J. Murphy, will continue to address the issues which have been of concern to the Church in the
Archdiocese of Seattle by implementing the changes in the pastoral care of the Archdiocese which have
already been initiated.
Hunthausen thanked Laghi and the commission, and put the conflict experience in a positive
light.
I am grateful for the announcement by Archbishop Laghi of the closure of the work of the Apostolic
Commission. I am also grateful to the members of the Apostolic Commission, Joseph Cardinal Bernardin,
John Cardinal O’Connor and Archbishop John Quinn, for their pastoral assistance.
Both Archbishop Murphy and I acknowledge the trial the Church here has faced over the past
several years, yet we are also able to view the whole experience as a time of grace, a grace which, with
the Lord’s help, will enable us to offer our leadership to the Church in Western Washington in the years
ahead with renewed dedication and commitment to the Gospel and the Universal Church under our Holy
Father, Pope John Paul II. We ask for your prayers as we continue to meet the challenges of being a
Roman Catholic community of faith here in Western Washington.
In somewhat less formal language, Hunthausen said at a press conference, “I rejoice in the
fact that the apostolic visitation is over… We’re going to have a party” (Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, 4.13.89). When asked what changes had been wrought by the prolonged review,
Hunthausen said, “I’m not sure the ministry has changed. In those areas especially, we have
deliberately examined what as archdiocese… we should be doing. We have reissued the
guidelines, but if you look you will see there have been no substantive changes.” Hunthausen
observed that violations which had taken place in the archdiocese had been limited to isolated
instances. “Generally speaking, we have not been in violation. This has been a very limited
thing.” Hunthausen also shared the view that Seattle’s pastoral policies were not notably
different from those of other dioceses. “I’m not able to say precisely why we were singled
out…” he said. Hunthausen indicated that he would continue to “redirect” his income tax and
be active in the anti-nuclear arms movement. The years of visitation and assessment, he said,
had not compromised his ministry.
From beginning to end, the process of active intervention by the Holy See in the Archdiocese
of Seattle lasted five-and-a-half years. Archbishop Hunthausen retired from office on his
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seventieth birthday, August 21, 1991, some two years after the conflict had run its course.
That same year, Archbishop Laghi, who had served as pro-nuncio in the U.S. until 1990, was
made a cardinal.
I.i. Conflict Functionality of the Subsequent Developments (May 1987-April 1989)
The release of the commission report and announcement of Murphy’s appointment as
coadjutor archbishop of Seattle marks the beginning of the end of the Rome-Hunthausen
conflict. The announced agreement proves to be a lasting one, with no further escalations of
consequence occurring beyond this point. The tensions between center and periphery never
disappear entirely. At the time of the announcement itself, Hunthausen expresses his
disagreement with certain aspects of the commission report, and even at the end of the
commission’s oversight, almost two years after the implementation of the new arrangement,
Hunthausen continues to profess bewilderment about the Vatican’s intervention. But for the
most part, from the time of the agreement announcement forward, Hunthausen downplays his
dissatisfaction, and couches any disgruntlement in abundant expressions of cooperativeness
and hopefulness.
When Hunthausen presents the commission report and his new coadjutor archbishop to the
press, he shows that he has not lost all taste for contention. Though he publicly welcomes
Murphy with open arms, he puts in writing at the same time his opposition to important
aspects of the commission report. This is a surprisingly provocative declaration, since it
contradicts the public display of acceptance of the plan and resolution for the conflict. But
Hunthausen buries his provocation in a show of loyalty and obedience (deference to the order
and mindset of the Church), and indeed, the announcement ushers in a new period of
graciousness (courtesy) all around. Hunthausen thanks the Holy Father and praises Murphy,
the commission and Wuerl. Wuerl praises Murphy and thanks the people of the archdiocese.
Bernardin offers his prayer and good wishes to Hunthausen, Murphy, Wuerl and the people of
Seattle, and he expresses his confidence that “everyone involved is eager to move forward in
truth, peace, unity and love.” Significantly, Hunthausen’s prickly comment prompts no
response from the commission, the pro-nuncio or Rome: as a result, no escalation occurs.
Similarly, in April of 1989, when the pro-nuncio announces the completion of the assessment
commission’s work of evaluation of Hunthausen’s ministry, Hunthausen gives the impression
that center and periphery still do not see eye-to-eye. When asked what changes had resulted
from the extended Vatican intervention, Hunthausen responds by saying that “there have been
no substantive changes,” except for in isolated instances. “Generally speaking, we have not
been in violation.” One can imagine that these remarks were received with some irritation in
Rome and at the nunciature in Washington. But again, no retort comes from the center and no
rise in conflict tension materializes in consequence. These comments suggest that, even at the
apparent end of the conflict handling process, Hunthausen is not fully reconciled to the
visitation and its conclusions.
Nonetheless, it is not to be denied that, once the commission plan is announced and he has
voiced his immediate reservations, Hunthausen works determinedly to quiet the conflict
(minimize the appearance of conflict) and put it behind him and the archdiocese. As part of
the resolution plan, Hunthausen accepts the continued monitoring of his ministry by the
commission (surveillance; or as Bernardin euphemistically puts it: “the commission remain(s)
ready to assist [emphasis mine] in every way possible”). Apart from his comments in April of
1989, Hunthausen rarely ever speaks of the visitation experience again – in any case, not in
detail and not in public. His silence is matched by other direct participants. Once it is over, it
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is over for Laghi, Hickey, Wuerl, the assessment commission, and above all for the key
players in Rome, who almost never spoke about the case in public anyway, even when it was
in the fullness of intensity.
As before, Hunthausen’s meetings with the commission (they are now joined by Murphy in
place of Wuerl) take place in private (secrecy). Though the commission report recommends
that the commission stay in its role of assistance role for a year, its service continues for
almost two full years. No public record accounts for the content of the meetings or the reason
for their extended continuance. The bureaucratic act of closure of the assessment process –
Hunthausen’s filing of formal responses to the Vatican’s concerns – is also not open to public
scrutiny, at the time or thereafter.
Implementation of the commission plan brings about a restoration of Hunthausen’s power in
the local Church (territorial control). No longer is there someone who can overrule him
within the archdiocese. Over time, Murphy succeeds in the archdiocese (effectively
contributes) in a way that Wuerl was unable to. Whereas Wuerl was widely seen to be
“symbol of the visitation,” as Wuerl himself put it, Murphy receives the benefit of the doubt
from many in the archdiocese. Wuerl’s strong ties to Rome and his rather formal personal
style fueled suspicions, Murphy’s prior period of service in the Northwest and his casual style
and quick wit work to undermine suspicions. Most critical to Murphy’s acceptance is the
basic fact that his presence does not come at the cost of Hunthausen’s own power to lead.
As the conflict experience recedes, the Holy See remunerates several who have served the
center party cause. Pope John Paul II rewards for his efforts in a difficult assignment with an
appointment as ordinary of his home diocese, Pittsburgh. The Pope makes Archbishop Hickey
and Laghi cardinals. Archbishop Quinn retires without having been made a cardinal, as, of
course, does Hunthausen. Upon Hunthausen’s retirement, Archbishop Murphy succeeds him
in office in Seattle, according to plan. Murphy dies in office of cancer in 1997, without having
been promoted further.
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CHAPTER NINE
INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF COPING STRATEGIES
APPLIED IN THE ROME-HUNTHAUSEN CASE
9.1 Review of the Expected Findings
The question that guides the present investigation is, what coping strategies are observable in
center-periphery conflict discourse? After having summarized the case and having analyzed
the strategic functionality of selected documents and other case developments, I am now
prepared to put an answer to that question.
The expectations I formulated (chapter 3) were the following:
General Stance Toward Conflict Handling: All members of the hierarchy participating in center-
periphery conflict will strive to save the face of and enhance the power of the Church organization and
themselves.
Perspective on the Use of Power: All members of the hierarchy participating in center-periphery conflict
will strive for (the appearance of) legitimacy in their employments of power.
Operative Strategies:
1. Show deference to the existing structural order and mindset of the Church
2. Associate one’s own efforts with the best interest of the Church
3. Minimize the appearance of conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies
I anticipated that the above-named strategies would be embraced by all members of the
hierarchy participating in the conflict, but that they would be embraced in more or less
enthusiastic ways depending on one’s position in the hierarchy and the circumstances of the
conflict. In this chapter I will compare my expected findings with the data from the case, a
process that includes the identification of strategies that were not anticipated. I will then
integrate the findings in a summary table for the conflict as a whole and will consider the
findings in light of the conflict theory material presented in chapter four. Finally, I will
conduct two forms of validational control of my findings: first, by means of an analysis of
certain documents that have been set aside for comparative purposes; and then by comparing
my own view of the conflict with another provided by a conflict insider (Fr. Michael G.
Ryan).
9.2 Confirmation / Disconfirmation of Expected Approaches to Conflict Handling
I will now reconsider the expectations in light of the data presented in the case narrative
chapters (6-8). For each expectation, I will declare whether it was confirmed or disconfirmed,
or both, and in what ways.
9.2.1 General Stance toward Conflict Handling:
Save the face of and enhance the power of the Church organization and oneself. By
formulating the expectation in this way, my intention was to point to the intermingling of
concern for oneself and for the Church organization that marks the Church hierarchy, a
concern that translates into efforts to save face (for oneself and the organization) and grow in
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power (personally and organizationally). The data from the case confirms that members of the
hierarchy pursue each of these four distinct interests in conflict situations and that they are
indeed intermingled in practice. It remains difficult to say, however, which of these four
converging priorities (saving face for self, saving face for the Church, enhancing one’s own
power, enhancing the Church’s power) is predominant for a given party at a given time.
Making such distinctions is complicated by the fact that saving face itself can be a form of
power enhancement. My inclination is to continue to see these priorities as interrelated and
often simultaneously applied. But at the same time I must acknowledge that the problem of
sorting out these interconnected interests is only slightly clarified by the present study.
Before considering evidence of how this stance is operative in practice, it is worth our while
to consider a few things we never see in the empirical example. For one, in the entire five-
and-a-half year period, we never see a single bishop criticize the Church institution itself, nor
do we ever see one bishop criticize another outright. For another, we never see a bishop make
a convincing admission of his own error or sin. In the rare instances when such admissions (of
shortcomings but not of sin) appear at all, they are consistently minimized by qualifying and
justifying language that contextualizes them and even turns them into attractive forms of
“humility.”
Instead, what we do see is that all parties use euphemisms and indirect language to downplay
the negative appearance of the conflict and to save face for themselves and their opponents.
The Vatican says it is “visiting” Hunthausen rather than investigating him and tries to keep
the entire business as discrete as possible. The curial officials stay out of sight and manage the
affair as an impersonal, bureaucratic problem-solving exercise. (The key to their power is
their hiddenness, their role of organizational oversight and their ability to have access to the
Pope while denying access to others.) The papal nuncio and visitator seek the practical
implementation of Vatican preferences by presenting themselves as fraternal intermediaries.
(The key to these intermediaries ability to stay in power is their effectiveness in carrying out
Rome’s – the Pope’s – bidding effectively: that is, without alienating Hunthausen, they need
to make him fall in line.)  Hunthausen continually walks a tightrope. He tries to preserve his
own power and autonomy (the right to stay in office and govern his diocese in the way he
judges best), which depends on staying in Rome’s good graces. His strategic solution is to
resist the Vatican intervention in private while politely cooperating in public.
For a time, these converging approaches save face for the Church leadership, allowing it to
continue to give the appearance of moving ahead harmoniously according to its vision of
unity. Harmony suggests effectiveness, and effectiveness is a sign of power and a magnet for
power. By refusing to criticize one another, the participant bishops preserve their own power
through reinforcement of the closed, autonomous and self-protective culture of the hierarchy.
At the same time, they guard individual possibilities of favor and advancement. But
eventually a breakdown occurs when the periphery party realizes there is not a one-to-one
correspondence between his own power and that of the Church. Hunthausen is forced to
choose between running his archdiocese Rome’s way – which implies keeping power and
losing power at the same time – or trying to run the archdiocese according to his own vision
and running the risk of removal from office.
Faced with this pressure, Hunthausen tries to achieve both ends, of staying in office and
maintaining as much leadership autonomy as possible. This requires pushing Rome back
(going public with his case), but not so hard that retaliation results (he stays polite and
continues to profess loyalty). When Hunthausen begins to resist Rome’s course of action, the
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papal pro-nuncio’s position (appearance) is threatened, because he is the one responsible for
generating compliance on a practical level. The Holy See’s face is also threatened because the
resistance sends a signal to all observers that Roman orders do not automatically meet with
compliance on the periphery (not just in the pews, but even in the hierarchy itself). Once
Hunthausen’s resistance comes into the open, the equation for face saving changes. Rome is
left to choose between various ways of looking good and / or being powerful. By forcing
compliance from Hunthausen, Rome looks good to those who want a strong central leadership
and who distrust peripheral diversity; but at the same time it looks bad to those who favor
peripheral freedom and a more tolerant style. By giving in to Hunthausen, Rome looks good
to those freedom-tolerance partisans, but looks weak to those who want strict uniformity and
control in the Church. So long as no conflict was apparent, Rome had the luxury of having
most people believe whatever they wanted to believe about relations between Rome and the
local Church.
Rome, like Hunthausen tries a balancing act. After a brief outburst of open conflict (marked
by Hunthausen’s announcement of Wuerl’s faculties, the Vatican chronology, the NCCB
debate), Rome makes the concession of establishing the assessment commission. The point of
this act is to show some degree of flexibility while angling, once again, for a solution in a
closed forum.
In the end, it is hard to say who comes out ahead. Hunthausen comes out looking like a man
of principle to reform-minded members within the Church and to many outside the Church.
But his possibilities for exercising greater power within the hierarchy itself are negated. The
hierarchy ends up looking heavy-handed without clearly having its own way. It cannot be
counted as a public relations success for the Vatican, but perhaps it sent the signal that Rome
wanted to send and has had the desired effect of bolstering centralized control in the long run.
The Church itself shows itself to be internally divided, which is the reality.
In general, we can observe that center-periphery conflict appears to change the dynamics of
intrahierarchical discourse by straining the link between the identity of the individual bishop
and the identity of the hierarchy and the Church itself. When all is well, a bishop should have
no problem seeing his own well being as one with the hierarchical culture and institutional
culture that has already amply rewarded him with his prestigious office. But center-periphery
conflict drives a wedge between the personal and collective identity. For the local bishop,
who may find himself (as Hunthausen does) unhappily constrained by his superiors, personal
power may no longer be closely associated with institutional deference. The dilemma for the
periphery party is knowing how far to continue in support of the existing Church culture,
knowing that one’s own position and power may or may not be enhanced by doing so. This
will surely involve questions of personal principle and one’s understanding of the nature of
the Church. The dilemma for the center party is different. Being the higher power party, it
has, on the one hand, nothing to lose by reinforcing the current Church order and by
continuing to identify oneself fully with that order. It also has reason to want to retain
conformity within the hierarchy. On the other hand, however, refusing to share power more
widely may lead to a loss of face for the Church and perhaps even to severe structural tensions
that could eventually jeopardize the hierarchy’s privileged position of power.
At the beginning of this section I pointed out the difficulty of knowing when a bishop is
acting primarily to secure personal advantages and when he is acting more selflessly for the
sake of some greater good (“the good of the Church,” for example). To illustrate the
difficulty, let us recall the evidence provided by two key documents from the Rome-
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Hunthausen conflict, Ratzinger’s 9.30.85 letter to Hunthausen and Hunthausen’s address to
the NCCB. The Ratzinger letter is, on the surface, much concerned with the well being of the
Church and little concerned with Ratzinger himself. But one can make a pretty good case that
Ratzinger wants to save face for himself (he hides his individual involvement in the decision
to impose discipline) and for the Church (he writes privately to Hunthausen and he presents
arguments directed to the good of the Church, as he understands it). One can also show rather
easily that Ratzinger desires to enhance the power of the Church by maintaining order within
the hierarchical ranks and clarity and discipline within the organization as a whole. Given
Ratzinger’s high position within the Church, there are obvious advantages to him (in terms of
his own possession of power) if the Church’s success and his own vision for that success go
hand in hand. But at what point, if any, does Ratzinger put his own ambition ahead of the well
being of the Church? Is a disinclination to speak in the first-person a sign that he is humbly
carrying out his duty or is it a way of protecting and applying his own power?
To take another example, consider Hunthausen’s address to the NCCB. Here Hunthausen
takes a very different approach from the Ratzinger letter. Hunthausen consistently
foregrounds his own identity, and through this approach he invites the other American
bishops to see the business at hand as a human business, one that has touched him and has the
potential to affect them profoundly as well. Hunthausen also professes to be desirous of what
is best for the Church. But what are we to make of his words and actions? Is he a prophet,
putting his own office and reputation on the line for the sake of a better future for the Church?
Or is he embracing the prophetic role as a means of raising his own profile?
It may be possible in future studies to characterize bishops with the terms realism and
idealism (see also the discussion of worldly-type and spiritual-type Church leaders in section
2.4.3.1). If the realist values ideals for their service to the acquisition of power, then the
idealist values power for its service of ideals. The pure realist places a premium on his own
power and any institutions that guarantee his power. The pure idealist values power (his own
or an institution’s) only to the extent that it contributes to the realization of his ideals. (In this
scheme, face saving can serve either idealistic or realistic ends.) The realist and idealist are
ideal types. Bishops will inevitably show degrees of both qualities. The most the present study
reveals in this matter is the tension between realism and idealism that seems to be present in
all bishops’ conflict handling. It does not provide us with a decisive way of ascertaining
which bishops are more realistic and which more idealistic, since hidden components of
internal motivation complicate the discernment.
9.2.2 Perspective on the Use of Power:
All members of the hierarchy participating in center-periphery conflict will strive for (the
appearance of) legitimacy in their employments of power. My expectation was that
applications of power in center-periphery conflict participants would reflect an overriding
concern with having one’s own / the Church’s use of power look good (legal, just, charitable).
As a normative organization, the Church is limited in its ability to command compliance (it
lacks the apparatus to coerce its membership by physical force), and the Church’s stated
ideals (regarding justice and charity, for example) further restrict Church leaders ability to
apply certain kinds of (raw) power. Church leaders, however, remain likely to encounter
situations in which they will want to generate compliance over and against the natural
inclinations of the Church membership. I presupposed that in such situations Church leaders
would favor power employments strong enough to work but legitimate enough to go
unchallenged. I also anticipated that the degree of rawness of the power applied would
increase in the face of resistance from the other party. My confrontation of the data largely
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confirmed these expectations, but applications of raw power showed up earlier and more often
than expected.
There is in the case no tidy pattern of center-periphery cooperation giving way gradually to
heavier and more coercive employments of power in the face of resistance over the course of
the case. Instead we see an up-and-down pattern, wherein less coercive means are followed by
more coercive means when the less coercive means have failed, but thereafter we often see
what appear to be more cooperative exchanges (less coercive exchanges again) for a time. To
illustrate, let us consider some of the more coercive and less coercive actions taken by both
parties. Four conflict moves show the center at its most coercive: the visitation, the placement
of an auxiliary with special powers, the distribution of the Vatican chronology and the
appointment of a coadjutor with right of succession. Legitimation for the visitation was
provided by the Holy See’s expression of concern for the local Church, its right under canon
law to conduct a visitation, and Hunthausen’s agreement to the process. Legitimation for the
appointment of Wuerl came again from the Holy See’s legal right and Hunthausen’s
agreement to the appointment. Note, however, that the justification for (legitimation of) the
release of the chronology is of a rather different quality. Legitimizing this harsh criticism of
Hunthausen’s leadership is not only the Vatican’s legal prerogative but also, as Laghi
characterized it, Hunthausen’s provocative behavior. (Here legitimation is also indictment.)
Finally, in the case of the coadjutor appointment, legitimation was provided by the show of
good will contained in the commission’s involvement and, again, by Rome’s legal right to
decide.
The center at its least coercive would seem to be those moments when the Vatican most fully
concedes the legitimacy of Hunthausen’s viewpoints and leadership autonomy. Since so much
of Rome’s conflict negotiating takes place in private, it is hard to know when and if such
moments take place. But perhaps the best example of Rome apparently showing a willingness
to take seriously the periphery position is in its creation of the (mostly) independent
commission and its willingness to accept the commission’s recommendation (although,
admittedly, the commission proposal is not fully acceptable to Hunthausen). Perhaps, too, the
previsitation exchanges between the Holy See and Hunthausen were also noncoercive, but this
is speculation since they were hidden from view.
As for Hunthausen, his employment of coercion is rather subtler, since he is the lower power
party. He has at least five options for coercing Rome, either by acting directly himself or
employing surrogates. He can: (1) resist Rome’s will in a low-key way through
argumentation, delay, putting up a false appearance, etc.; (2) resign, or threaten to; (3) reveal
secret information, or threaten to; (4) criticize Rome; or (5) generate social pressure that
makes Rome’s position untenable. Hunthausen appears to be at his most coercive at three
points: when he reveals Wuerl’s faculties (thus he resists, reveals and invites criticism of
Rome all at once), when he expands the conflict debate at the NCCB meeting, and when he
resists the commission’s recommendations and proposes resigning during the commission
negotiations. Hunthausen offer’s rhetorical legitimation for announcing Wuerl’s faculties,
associating the act with his official accountability to the people he serves (leads). The need to
act on principle again serves as the primary legitimation when Hunthausen expands the
NCCB debate to include a range of issues not yet considered and when he proposes resigning.
Hunthausen is at his least coercive when he takes to heart the Vatican’s concerns without
reacting defensively or resistantly in response. From what we see, he is at his most agreeable
prior to the visitation and, secondarily, after the visitation but prior to the communication of
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faculties to Wuerl.
If we see these less- and more-coercive applications of power by both parties in the context of
the conflict as a whole, we see that the Vatican pattern is one of heavy tactic followed by
retreat (spread out over the five years of conflict), whereas Hunthausen’s is one of persistent
resistance with three main attempts to force the Vatican’s hand in the most intense (nine
month) period of the conflict. As a visual aid, I provide the following chart of conciliatory and
coercive gestures by both parties over time.
Acts of Coercion and Conciliation in the Conflict
       5’
    Coercion                    1     1 2          3        6
                                 3’    4’
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1’ 2’                 4   5
               6’
Conciliation
1983    1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Key
Center:
1 Visitation (coercive)
2 Appointment of auxiliary with intention for special faculties (coercive)
3 Vatican chronology (coercive)
4 Creation of assessment commission (conciliatory)
5 Acceptance of commission’s recommendations (conciliatory)
6 Appointment of coadjutor archbishop with right of succession (coercive)
Periphery:
    1’ Hunthausen cooperates with visitation process (conciliatory)
    2’ Hunthausen cooperates after visitation (conciliatory)
    3’ Hunthausen reveals Wuerl faculties (coercive)
    4’ Hunthausen argues case before NCCB (coercive)
    5’ Hunthausen resists commission recommendations and proposes resigning(coercive)
    6’ Hunthausen accepts implementation of commission plan
FIGURE 9.1
(Note: With this figure I do not attempt to distinguish between levels of intensity within the
coercion or conciliation areas.)
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One of the surprises from the case is that Rome employs a rather heavy tactic – a visitation --
quite early in the conflict handling. This challenges the expectation that more coercive kinds
of intervention will only show up after less coercive means have failed, since prior to this we
do not see lighter tactics failing. Consequently, we are left to suppose that either the
expectation is wrong or there was more contentious conflict negotiation going on behind the
scenes prior to the announcement of the visitation itself than we have access to. We cannot
know for certain (this discussion continues in the conflict-theory analysis, later in the
chapter), but it is worth noting that the visitation apparently catches Hunthausen off guard,
which suggests that, in his own understanding as well, there is a gap between the use of such a
drastic means and his perception of the quality of his exchanges with Rome before the
visitation.
Invariably, the parties to the conflict try to put a good face on their employments of power.
For a further discussion of some of the techniques used for doing so, see section 9.2.2.1,
which follows.
In order to further break down the use of power in the conflict, let us now return to the
typology from Vaillancourt (1980), which we considered in chapter two. Vaillancourt
identifies three types of “raw” power employed by members of the Church hierarchy to
coordinate and control the Church (ecological power, remunerative power and coercive
power) and five types of normative power put to the same end (social power, legal power,
traditional power, expert power and charismatic power). Here below I present an overview of
how each of these types of power was applied in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict. A summary
table precedes a detailed discussion with examples.
Applications of Types of Power in the Rome-Hunthausen Conflict
Center Party
(The Vatican)
Periphery Party
(Hunthausen / Seattle)
1. Ecological Power Rome exercises various forms of
territorial control: A.
Conducting visitation B.
Denying Hunthausen access to
Visitation report. C. Appointing
Roman insider as auxiliary
bishop with special faculties. D.
Limiting Hunthausen’s access to
the Vatican decision makers and
site of decision-making. E.
Making a rhetorical case for the
Pope’s jurisdiction at the Nov.
1986 NCCB meeting. F.
Appointing coadjutor archbishop
with right of succession. G.
Placing apostolic commission in
ongoing assessment role. H.
Pope’s pastoral visit to U.S.,
1988.
A. Hunthausen exercises
territorial control by maintaining
strong support within the Seattle
archdiocese (the support of his
priests, in particular, was
crucial) and signalling his
wariness of Roman
(interventionist) initiatives.
2. Remunerative Power A. Hickey, and to a lesser extent
Ratzinger, remunerates
Hunthausen publicly with praise.
B. After reassigning Wuerl out
of Seattle, Rome appoints him
Applies only in the minimal
sense of Hunthausen’s public
shows of good will toward
Rome.
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ordinary of his home diocese,
Pittsburgh. C. John Paul II
elevates visitator Hickey to
cardinal. D. The Pope makes
Laghi a cardinal.
3. Coercive Power A. Rome conducts the visitation.
B. Rome sends an auxiliary
bishop not of Hunthausen’s
choosing. C. Rome takes
faculties from Hunthausen and
gives them to Wuerl. D. Rome
appoints a coadjutor archbishop
not of Hunthausen’s choosing
and gives him the right of
succession. E. Rome keeps
Hunthausen under assessment
for almost two years after the
agreement announcement.
A. Hunthausen holds out the
possibility of escalating the
public, through public
disclosure, further
confrontations, his own
resignation, etc. – all actions that
could make the Holy See look
bad. B. Hunthausen resists
Vatican initiatives in public and
private. C. Hunthausen holds out
the possibility (threat) of
resignation.
4. Social Power A. Rome pressures Hunthausen
to behave loyally and faithfully
(by not challenging Rome). B.
Rome pressures the NCCB
executive committee to endorse
Laghi’s chronology. C. Rome
releases Vatican chronology,
which paints Hunthausen as a
weak leader and recalcitrant. D.
Laghi reminds NCCB of his
own role in appointing almost
100 conference members. E. The
Pope’s address to the NCCB
reminds the bishops of their duty
of loyalty.
A. Hunthausen takes his case to
the news media as a means of
pressuring the Vatican, playing
on American cultural biases in
favor of open and democratic
decision making. B. Hunthausen
presses his fellow U.S. bishops
to empathize with and support
his case, playing on shared
cultural viewpoints and shared
vulnerabilities to Vatican action.
5. Legal Power A. Rome undertakes the
visitation. B. Rome assigns an
auxiliary bishop with special
faculties. C. Rome appoints a
coadjutor archbishop with right
of succession.
A. Hunthausen attacks the
Church’s application of legal
power on the basis of American
civil legal standards calling for
the right of the accused to
confront his accusers and the
charges against him.
6. Traditional Power A. Ratzinger holds out a vision
of singularity and uniformity of
tradition, with the hierarchy, and
Rome above all, as the guardians
thereof.
A. Hunthausen proposes a more
pluriform (“People of God”)
vision of tradition, rooted in
Vatican II notions of reform and
lay empowerment. He makes a
case for discernment of the
promptings of the Holy Spirit
when making pastoral judgment.
B. Hunthausen positions himself
as a man of the people,
minimalizing the use of
linguistic signals of hierarchical
authority.
7. Expert Power A. Ratzinger acts as an expert on
Church affairs and doctrine in
his 9.30.85 letter to Hunthausen.
B. The Pope employs expert
power in his Nov. 1986 message
to the U.S. bishops.
A. Hunthausen acts as an expert
on conditions in the local church
when defending his pastoral
leadership decisions.
8. Charismatic Power NA A. Hunthausen courts the people
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of his own diocese in person and
in writing. B. Hunthausen makes
a passionate appeal to the U.S.
bishops in person and in writing,
drawing on his reputation as an
advocate for peace. C.
Hunthausen appeals to a wide
(in particular, American)
audience through statements he
releases to the press.
TABLE 9.2
9.2.2.1 Applications of Raw Power
Ecological power, especially in the form of territorial control, was the most commonly
employed type of raw power in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict. It is interesting that neither
party enjoyed much success at establishing control over the territory controlled by the
other. Hunthausen never made significant inroads at the Vatican: he appeared to gain few,
if any, allies or advocates there; showed little awareness of how to manipulate the Vatican
bureaucracy; and was physically present there only at the time of Wuerl’s ordination,
which amounted to a symbolic concession within the conflict. He was also denied the
opportunity to go to Rome to carry out the late-stage conflict handling directly with the
Pope and top Vatican officials. On the other hand, Rome had equally little success making
its case and asserting control in Seattle. Though of course the Holy See demonstrated and
maintained its juridical power of governance over the archdiocese, it failed to garner
anywhere near the level of popular support for its position that Hunthausen enjoyed within
the archdiocese. During the course of the conflict, the constituency which favored Rome
over Hunthausen did not appear to grow any larger than it had been prior to the visitation.
Most crucially, Hunthausen maintained strong, vociferous support among his priests. This
made it difficult for the Holy See to generate a feeling among the people in the pews that
Hunthausen was somehow a danger to the faith. The fact that Hunthausen enjoyed such
consistent support in the archdiocese made it highly risky for Rome to act upon its juridical
right to control the local church. Before the end of the conflict, Rome was forced to make a
partial retreat from its intervention as a result.
The most crucial intermediate territory between Rome and Seattle proved to be the forum
of negotiation provided by the American bishops’ conference. Without being able to
anticipate support from his fellow bishops, and then actually gaining it, Hunthausen surely
would have been chastened in his struggle. Whereas bishops positioned at the Vatican have
the reassurance of working alongside the Pope and many other bishops who hold key
offices within the hierarchy, a local bishop is more or less alone as a member of the
hierarchy within his own diocese. This amounts to a physical and psychological isolation
which can only be counteracted periodically and with some effort. The obvious outlets for
contact and alliance-formation with other bishops lie in the regional and national bishops’
conferences. There a bishop has the opportunity to commiserate about the unique burdens,
challenges and possibilities of his office. Through contact with his fellow American
bishops, Hunthausen was able to gain advice and personal support for his conflict
handling, and awareness that the pastoral problems in his own diocese were not unique
within the American Church. Having the benefit of this input made the thought of
continuing to defend his position against Rome conceivable.
Rome attempted to establish control over the NCCB response to the conflict issues in
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several ways. Most especially, it sought to do so through hidden negotiations and
procedural manipulations, as in the effort to gain an NCCB endorsement for Laghi’s
chronology. Rome finally did manage to gain more control over the NCCB’s participation
in the affair by selecting out the three members who served on the apostolic commission.
With this act, Rome took the body as a whole out of the discussion and replaced it with a
much smaller entity that it might have more influence over.
The NCCB leadership (as embodied in the executive committee and administrative board)
demonstrated a form of territorial control of its own by sticking to its preference for
neutrality and by setting up terms for the debate of the Hunthausen case which kept the
discussion within prescribed limits.
Hunthausen enjoyed strong support among individual bishops of the NCCB, and Rome had
strong supporters of its own. On the whole, the NCCB’s stance of neutrality worked in
Hunthausen’s favor because it kept Rome from isolating Hunthausen. Moreover, the
NCCB’s refusal to criticize Hunthausen, much like the show of support by his own priests,
sent a signal to Catholics at large that Hunthausen’s leadership was not necessarily out of
line with mainstream (and even official) Catholic thinking. In strategic terms, fending off
the Holy See’s attempt to control the intermediate territory represented by the NCCB
ultimately was a key to his retention of power in his own archdiocese.
Remunerative power was employed most obviously in the affair in the later appointments
of Bishop Wuerl as ordinary of his home diocese of Pittsburgh and promotion of
Archbishops Hickey and Laghi to cardinal. These appointments are rewards for faithful
service, with the handling of the Hunthausen affair being but one component of that. It is
more difficult to say whether Rome remunerated Hunthausen as a conflict strategy, or vice-
versa. By loosely interpreting the concept of remuneration, one might argue that mutual
remuneration was shown between these parties in the form of praise, signs of favor and
acts of compliance. Thus, perhaps Rome rewarded Hunthausen for his public show of
docility and politeness by agreeing to provide a rewritten version of the 9.30.85 Ratzinger
letter and by allowing Hunthausen to give Wuerl faculties himself (though this did not
work out according to the Vatican’s plan). And perhaps, in some sense, Hunthausen
rewarded signs of forbearance by Rome with continued obeisance. But it is probably more
accurate to understand these actions as applications of social power, since they seem to be
more reflective of conditioned politeness and a strategic effort to ingratiate oneself with the
other party than anything else.
Although applications of coercive power in the conflict were much more apparent coming
from the center party, the periphery party also applied such power, and to a greater extent
than I expected. Rome applied coercive power rather transparently by undertaking the
visitation, by appointing an auxiliary bishop who was unknown to Hunthausen, by
redistributing key powers from Hunthausen to Wuerl, by appointing a coadjutor archbishop
with right of succession who was not of Hunthausen’s choosing, and by holding out the
threat of removing Hunthausen from office.
I would call the undertaking of the visitation itself an employment of coercive power
because, though Rome prefers to paint the visitation process as a neutral inquiry, it is in
fact a rather drastic step, which automatically casts a shadow over a bishop’s leadership. In
other words, visitation in and of itself amounts to “denouncement,” which Vaillancourt
declares to be a form of coercion. The counter-argument may be made that, if a local
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bishop cooperates in keeping a visitation out of public view, no shadow is cast over his
leadership. But the visitation of the diocese of Bishop Walter Sullivan (Richmond,
Virginia), which came close in time to the Seattle visitation, does not bear this view out.
Even with Sullivan’s cooperation, the visitation of Richmond could not stay completely
hidden. And though the specific nature of the Vatican’s doubts about Sullivan never
surfaced in a highly public way, the fact that his leadership had been called into question
became well known. (For further discussion of Sullivan and the relevance of his case to the
Hunthausen case, see section 9.6.4.4, but also Granfield 1987, Briggs 1992, Tom Fox’
editorial in the 11.21.86 National Catholic Reporter, and the 11.10.86 issue of Sojourners
magazine.)
It is also possible to see Rome’s appointment of Wuerl as auxiliary bishop, as opposed to a
local or at least known candidate, as an application of coercive power. Though it is not
known which names Hunthausen advanced as his own preferences for filling the position,
it is at least known that Wuerl was not one of the names because Hunthausen had to
inquire about who Wuerl was at the time of his naming. (He remembered Wuerl but
vaguely from an earlier meeting.) As for the mandated redistribution of power from
Hunthausen to Wuerl, this is a blatant act of (legal) coercion. This change was made
against Hunthausen’s will and by virtue of the Vatican’s possession of greater power.
The imposition of a coadjutor archbishop with right of succession amounts to a further
application of coercive power by the Holy See. Symbolically, the appointment of a
coadjutor normally suggests that something is wrong in a diocese. Whereas an auxiliary is
normally seen to be an assistant to help meet the growing pastoral and administrative needs
in a diocese (the bishop of a vibrant and growing diocese is seen to be rewarded with the
appointment of one or more auxiliaries), a coadjutor often comes as a remedy for specific
problems that have arisen, often due to some incapacity or negligence on the part of the
ordinary. Though in this case the coadjutor improved Hunthausen’s situation in one respect
(he possessed no special faculties), the stigma of the need for a coadjutor remained.
Moreover, unlike the auxiliary appointment, the coadjutor appointment came with a right
of succession clause. Thus, the Vatican asserted its power to declare future control over the
life of the Archdiocese.
Finally, the ever-present threat of imposing additional sanctions – most especially, the
possibility of removing Hunthausen from office or of publicly humiliating him in some
other way – served as another form of coercive power, though it came to be voiced in only
the subtlest ways (the most suggestive language is in Ratzinger’s 9.30.85 letter and Laghi’s
chronology).
On the periphery party side, though Hunthausen was less well positioned to apply coercive
power, he managed to do so in three ways: by forcing the Vatican, against its wishes, to
address the conflict issues in the open; by raising the prospect of his own resignation, with
the likely result of heightened fractiousness in the Church; and by delaying resolution of
the affair, thereby opening up the possibility of controversy clouding the Pope’s imminent
pastoral visit. By forcing the conflict discussion into the open, Hunthausen played away
from the Vatican’s advantage in closed bureaucratic struggles. Hunthausen applied this
strategy repeatedly, if selectively, pushing for public disclosure of the visitation, of the
visitation findings and of Wuerl’s possession of faculties. Tactically, Hunthausen
succeeded in pushing the conflict into the open by arguing this point with Rome, by taking
advantage of news leaks (from unknown sources), by moving unilaterally to reveal
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information to the news media, by employing his own archdiocesan communications
resources, by sharing information with his own priests and key archdiocesan insiders, and
by taking his case to the NCCB. At the same time, Hunthausen expanded the scope of the
debate, which drew more and more participants into the discussion: no longer was the
debate about conditions in his diocese, it was about secrecy and fairness and the role of
individual bishops and the role of conferences of bishops. Once the issues were in
circulation, Rome had the choice of either speaking to them or of appearing to be
stonewalling. Either response held possibilities for intensifying the dispute.
Another way Hunthausen was also able to force degrees of acquiescence from Rome was
by consistently working to maintain his own level of support in the local Church, while
holding out an offer to resign at the same time. (According to Hunthausen’s own report --
cf. his response to the Vatican chronology – he voiced his readiness to resign soon after the
visitation process began.) Strategically, the offer to resign functioned simultaneously as a
demonstration of devotion to the Church and as an implicit threat. It showed Hunthausen’s
desire to put the well being of the Church ahead of his own office. Concurrently, it invited
consideration of an unwelcome scenario: the popular bishop stepping down and the local
church erupting angrily in response. With this approach, Hunthausen was able to confront
Rome with a hard choice, with neither outcome being optimal.
In a similarly indirect but nonetheless effective application of pressure, Hunthausen
delayed resolution of the conflict past a point beyond which Rome was comfortable. At the
time of the NCCB meeting, the Pope’s forthcoming pastoral visit was but ten months
away. Such trips were a critical tool of the Pope’s pastoral outreach. It would not do to
have the event marred by controversy. Though Hunthausen simply presented himself as
declaring his own position and responding to charges made in the Vatican chronology, the
effect of his pressing his case was that the controversy remained unresolved after the
NCCB meeting, since he himself had shown no inclination to accept the status quo. The
longer that the matter remained unresolved, the greater the time pressure on Rome proved
to be.
Summary of the Use of Raw Power
Drawing on these findings, we can make a few general observations about the employment
of raw power in this case of center-periphery conflict. To begin, the center party had
greater opportunity to employ raw power and did so more often in practice. Rome held
more cards and played more cards. This was as expected. What was not expected was that
the periphery party would be able to force concessions from the center party as effectively
as it did. Having been rather familiar with the case beforehand, I was nonetheless surprised
to see, after detailed study, how often Rome was made to go in a direction it did not want
to go. Consider: Against its wishes, the Holy See was induced to (1) publicly announce the
visitation; (2) publicly announce the visitation findings (if only in summary form); (3)
break with its own politeness norms; (4) debate the conflict issues in public; (5) withdraw
Wuerl; and (6) restore Hunthausen’s faculties. Though to some extent achieving these
concessions was the product of effective use of more normative kinds of power (exercising
forms of social influence that leave significant room for personal choice), beneath the
surface (on both sides) lay a willingness to play hardball as necessary. By going public
with the news of Wuerl’s faculties and then opening up a full-scale defense of his position
at the NCCB gathering, Hunthausen forced Rome’s hand. Hunthausen put his own office
on the line and confronted Rome with a choice: either take further action against him and
bear the consequences (likely a public relations fiasco), or make concessions and perhaps
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thereby win his renewed cooperation. What gave this challenge its rawness was the fact
that Hunthausen did not leave Rome to make the choice it wanted to make: i.e., have the
current power sharing arrangement work without friction and public complaint.
The expectation that all parties would be inclined to demonstrate the legitimacy of their
uses of power was confirmed. Throughout the conflict one finds an effort to cloak the use
of raw power in “normative” language and recognizable politeness conventions. This
question and this finding stand central in this research project.
Though the Holy See made Hunthausen do things against his will, it did so while by
applying legally sanctioned powers and by going to great lengths to portray its own actions
as reasonable, for the good of the Church and accepted by Hunthausen. Prominent
examples of the effort to put a rational (and well-meaning) framework on uses of raw
power were Ratzinger’s letter presenting the visitation findings and Laghi’s chronology.
The effort to secure Hunthausen’s agreement can be seen in the pro-nuncio’s asking
Hunthausen if he would be willing to receive a visitation (it was not necessary to have
Hunthausen’s permission to intervene), in the center party’s persistent commitment to
respectful language, and in its willingness to make certain concessions (Hunthausen was
provided with a visitation findings report to make public; he was also permitted to think
about Wuerl’s possession of powers in language of his own choosing – though this
flexibility later backfired on the Vatican when Hunthausen interpreted the agreed-to
language to mean that Wuerl did not have final say in any area). Later, after Hunthausen
announced Wuerl’s possession of faculties, the Vatican cried foul (in Laghi’s chronology),
saying that Hunthausen had failed to hand over the “agreed-to” faculties and suggesting
that he had broken another implicit agreement by issuing his “surprise” announcement.
Hunthausen also made a point of putting a normative sheen on his more “raw” applications
of power. After having put the Vatican in a bind by going his own way (resisting giving
Wuerl faculties, and then publicly announcing the faculties once they were given),
Hunthausen stressed that both actions were the product of prior discussions where,
supposedly, common understanding had been reached. Thus the failure to give over the
faculties in a timely matter was the result of miscommunication. And the Vatican,
Hunthausen said, should not have been surprised by his announcement of Wuerl’s faculties
because he had made it clear to Rome that he would need to publicly reveal such powers
were they to be given. Hunthausen also consistently respected the prevailing politeness
conventions (with a few exceptions) and underscored his deference to Roman authority.
9.2.2.2 Applications of Normative Power
It was often difficult to tell within the conflict precisely when one party was effectively
forcing another to a particular action and when more room for real choice was being
allowed – this because so much emphasis was placed by both sides on having the conflict
appear to be a reasonable and amicable exchange within the episcopal brotherhood. But the
Rome-Hunthausen case shows that raw power can serve both the center and periphery
parties as necessary. Let us now consider how various kinds of normative power were
employed by the principal participants in the conflict.
Social power was applied pervasively in the conflict. Rome applied social power by
playing on Hunthausen’s sense of loyalty, duty and commitment to the good of the Church.
A common way to pressure Hunthausen to keep his social obligations was to praise and
thank him for having acted in accord with these standing responsibilities and ties.
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(Ratzinger in his 12.12.83 letter to Hunthausen: “I want to express to you my sincere
thanks for your own complete cooperation in this understandably difficult project…”) This
tactic served as a reminder and exhortation to him to persist in the docility and conformity
to the prevailing Church order he had already shown. Notably, this form of social pressure
was applied primarily in public and in the early stages of the conflict, before the conflict
handling became openly antagonistic. Ratzinger’s private letter to Hunthausen detailing the
visitation findings (9.30.85) makes only minimal attempts to establish camaraderie, leaving
us to conclude that praise and flattery are more meant as a show for the public (as in the
Laghi rewrite of Ratzinger’s letter) than for Hunthausen himself.
Placing Wuerl in a power-sharing arrangement with Hunthausen was as a further
application of social power. Through this act, the Holy See forced Hunthausen to cooperate
closely with someone who, at the very least, reminded Hunthausen of the Roman point of
view. Even if Wuerl himself had no intention of watching over Hunthausen in a suspicious
or critical way, Hunthausen himself could not have avoided the feeling that he was being
monitored -- by a fellow bishop, with strong ties to Rome, who now was fully on the inside
of the Seattle archdiocesan operation.
Once Hunthausen began to act independently of the Vatican’s wishes – that is, once he
announced Wuerl’s possession of faculties – public praise for him from Rome ceased. The
Vatican chronology, contrarily, applies a new form of social pressure – the threat of
exclusion -- by criticizing Hunthausen and attempting to shame him into renewed
conformity. The most stinging charges in the Vatican chronology were that Hunthausen
was judged to lack the firmness necessary to govern the archdiocese and correct its
longstanding problems, that his own response to the situation had been inadequate, and that
of late he had failed to carry out Vatican directives and had begun to go his own way in the
handling of the matter.
Rome (Laghi) sought an NCCB endorsement of Laghi’s chronology. Thus social pressure
was applied to the NCCB executive committee as a means of applying pressure to
Hunthausen. (Ratzinger and Gantin increased the social pressure by communicating their
displeasure that no endorsement was forthcoming.) This effort succeeded only minimally,
since the NCCB ended up releasing the document but only with a neutral statement in
accompaniment, not with an endorsement.
During the November 1986 NCCB meeting, Rome applied social power through the public
messages of Pope John Paul II and Archbishop Laghi. Laghi’s brief address to the bishops
reminded them of his own role in appointing nearly one hundred of the conference
members present in the room. Unavoidably, this suggested a debt owed and the power of
Laghi’s office which would continue into the future. The Pope’s message offered a
reminder of his own power. It was less nakedly political than Laghi’s remark, offering
instead a theological reflection on the Pope’s traditional authority to preside over the
bishops, who owe their fidelity to him.
When it became clear, in the aftermath of the NCCB meeting, that Hunthausen was not
going to back down and that the NCCB was willing to stand behind Hunthausen (without
making a big show of doing so), the Vatican options for applying social pressure
diminished considerably. Hunthausen had support from the priests and people of Seattle,
support from many of his fellow bishops and support from many in the news media. With
Laghi and Hunthausen at loggerheads, the pro-nuncio was no longer in a position to
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persuade Hunthausen individually in private negotiation. Thus, the most obvious options
left were either to have Vatican operatives or the Pope himself more directly involved, or
to call upon a third party that might have more possibility of bringing Hunthausen back in
line. Rome decided to pursue the latter option and the assessment commission was formed.
The commission became Rome’s new channel for directing social pressure in the
Hunthausen case. Formation of the commission, and in particular its conciliatory makeup
suggested that the Vatican was willing to pursue Hunthausen’s renewed cooperation
through concessions. From this point on, until the time of the disbanding of the
commission, social pressure was applied through the behind-the-scenes, directly personal
persuasion of the commission members. The key to the agreement appeared to be to allow
both Hunthausen and Rome to save face.
Hunthausen was not simply on the receiving end of social power; he also applied it himself
in his exchanges with the Vatican. Hunthausen’s strategy early on (up until his
announcement of Wuerl’s faculties) was simply to demonstrate, particularly in public, his
own faithful, deferential and polite compliance with Vatican wishes. By so doing he placed
limits on the sort of action the Vatican could take against him. So long as Hunthausen kept
up the appearance of a good and faithful bishop, the burden of showing reason to challenge
him would remain with Rome. So long as Hunthausen did not show signs of dissension,
the average churchgoer would have no reason to fear him as a dangerous rebel and would
be willing to give him the benefit of the doubt. A circumstantial factor enhancing the
effectiveness of this strategy was the Vatican’s own delay in processing the visitation
findings. The result of this was that Hunthausen was able to show himself to be
cooperative and nonthreatening for a very long time (almost two full years), at little cost to
himself, since no changes had yet been implemented in the archdiocese.
Even after Rome finally did take action, Hunthausen maintained the posture of respectful
cooperativeness in public. When the break in public politeness finally came, it came from
the Rome side first, by means of the Vatican chronology. Apparently, what piqued Laghi’s
anger (barely disguised in the chronology) was the difficulty of dealing with a Hunthausen
who, as Laghi saw it, was significantly more resistant in private than he showed himself to
be in public. (Laghi accuses Hunthausen of responding inadequately to issues Rome had
brought to his attention, failing to give the “agreed-to” faculties to Wuerl, and issuing a
“surprise” announcement of Wuerl’s faculties.)
Because Hunthausen had been publicly cooperative for so long, and because the Vatican
side had been the first to break with the policy of mutual graciousness, Hunthausen was
able to gain newfound stature as a victim, which increased the social pressure on the Holy
See. Many are put off by the thought that an innocent victim is being attacked. The key to
this perception of victimization working in his favor was that Hunthausen came across as
an attractive underdog, a heroic figure people who heroically stood alone against long
odds, not an anathema whose victimization might appeal to baser instincts. Hunthausen’s
reputation for integrity and a willingness to take a moral, and even prophetic, stand had
already been established. (Charisma was a factor here. More on this shortly.) By going on
the attack, Rome achieved the unintended consequence of enhancing Hunthausen’s stature
as an opponent. Hunthausen appealed to many in the United States, both inside and outside
the Church, who saw the Roman Catholic bureaucracy as tending to overstep its bounds to
try to control areas of life it had no right to control. By issuing the first attack, moreover,
Rome gave Hunthausen license to counterattack, under cover of simply defending his own
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reputation and situation.
During the NCCB meeting Hunthausen placed social pressure on Rome by gathering
support from other American bishops. By building support within the NCCB, Hunthausen
made Rome’s task much more formidable. This effort greatly increased the number of
persons directly involved in the conflict and, consequently, increased the scale of damages
to be incurred by Rome in the event of failure. For Rome, the risk of failure became that
dissent would manifest itself nationally rather than just in Seattle.
Hunthausen cultivated sympathy from his fellow American bishops by drawing on existing
personal bonds (based on personal friendship and shared theological / political views); by
making arguments favorable to his own position that other bishops would identify with
(the right to due process; the need for bishops to be granted leeway in making pastoral
judgments in their own dioceses; etc.); and by playing on the fear that what had happened
to Hunthausen could happen to any local bishop.
Through his arguments Hunthausen was able to point out that the matter at hand was not
simply a matter of one kind of loyalty – that of an individual bishop to the Holy See – but
that other questions of conscientious fidelity were also at stake in the matter. Hunthausen
never denied that bishops had an obligation to the Holy See. He conceded this fully. But
with varying degrees of explicitness, he pointed out that bishops also have a duty to be
faithful to their own conscience, to the people they serve (who might also be in agreement
with key Hunthausen positions), and to one another. The result of taking this approach was
that Hunthausen gave his fellow bishops the opportunity to be for something (e.g., the right
to due process, or autonomy for bishops), as opposed to being simply against the action of
Rome.
Another way that Hunthausen put social pressure on Rome during the course of the NCCB
meeting was by opening up a wide-ranging series of charges against Rome. Hunthausen, in
effect, complicated the matter as a whole. It was not, as the Vatican chronology would
have it, a rather straightforward matter of Hunthausen failing to govern his particular
church properly and then dragging his heels against corrective interventions. It was instead
a convoluted business of values in contestation – secrecy vs. openness, control vs.
freedom, clarity in Church teaching vs. compassion in pastoral discernments. By injecting
all of these questions into the discussion at the height of public attention to the affair,
Hunthausen in effect clouded the air and hindered Rome’s ability to wrap the debate up
quickly. At the same time, he drew to his side a wide variety of complainants against
Rome. By opening up so many issues he gave a foothold to any number of parties who
might have reason to be unhappy with Rome. And finally, Hunthausen, by illustrating the
complexity of it all, further reinforced his own defensive position. Given how involved it
all was, who could blame Hunthausen if he struggled with pastoral judgments and chose to
err on the side of compassion?
Ultimately, perhaps the greatest pressure was put on Rome by virtue of the fact that these
discussions took place more or less in the open. Though the oral debates were closed to the
press, the public had the benefit of statements issued by all sides (Laghi’s chronology,
Hunthausen’s responses, the Malone NCCB statement), and many bishops also offered
commentary outside of the closed sessions. For an intrachurch conflict, the exchanges were
quite public and highly charged. The controversy reached the point of drawing  front-page
attention in the New York Times. What had been a highly private business now generated a
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public uproar: certainly that is not too strong a word to describe the discursive volatility
manifest at the bishops’ gathering and in the Seattle Archdiocese both during the time of
the meeting and shortly thereafter.
After the NCCB meeting ran its course, the conflict entered a period of stalemate. Neither
party showed an inclination to escalate the conflict further, but neither was anxious to give
ground on its position either. No resolution had been achieved during the meeting, and
contrary to its own intention to have put further pressure on Hunthausen to cooperate,
Rome found itself under increased pressure to make amends to Hunthausen. Time became
the critical factor, a state of affairs that played in Hunthausen’s favor. Within less than a
year the Pope would be visiting a cross-section of America in a pastoral visit. The more
that time passed without a resolution acceptable to Hunthausen supporters, the more that
the Pope faced the prospect of public protests during his American visit. Rather than being
a demonstration of effective territorial oversight, a much-protested visit would show that
the universal pastor (like his local counterpart Hunthausen) did not have control over the
people under his governance. The task for Hunthausen became simply to do nothing.
Having no authority to change the problematic arrangement in his archdiocese, he could
only wait until Rome decided to take action to address this threat to the appearance of the
Church.
Legal power is a second type of normative power applied in the conflict. Rome applied
legal power in the conflict by making use of its right, recognized in canon law, to survey
and control local dioceses. The primary means chosen were the ad limina visit, the
apostolic visitation process, the appointment of an auxiliary bishop with special faculties,
the appointment of a coadjutor archbishop with right of succession, and the ongoing
interventions of the apostolic pro-nuncio. All of the above-named powers to act are
entrusted to the Holy See to be exercised in regard to particular churches. They are not
powers which can be applied in the other direction: that is, a local bishop cannot conduct a
visitation of Rome, appoint Roman officials, etc. Rome also applied legal power through
the act of interpretation. Cardinal Ratzinger’s letter to Hunthausen with the visitation
findings is perhaps the best example. Here Ratzinger explained to Hunthausen which
specific teachings – some articulated in canon law, some in other Church documents --
needed binding application in the local church (in other words, which Church rules needed
enforcing). Notably, some of the directives that Ratzinger called on Hunthausen to enforce
were rules that his own congregation had established (cf. his references to the 1975
instruction Inter Insigniores and the 1976 Declaration on Sexual Ethics). Thus Ratzinger
demonstrated the Holy See’s and his own congregation’s power to not only interpret and
enforce Church guidelines, but also to make them in the first place.
Hunthausen’s options for applying legal power over and against the opposing party were
limited. The Holy See possessed superior legal power in every respect. But Hunthausen
challenged Rome by suggesting that having laws on the books (i.e., within the Code of
Canon Law) does not guarantee the correct interpretation and application of such. Thus he
pointed to the “misunderstanding” that had arisen between himself and Rome regarding the
correct “interpretation of the precise nature and extent of Bishop Wuerl’s special faculties”
as articulated in canon 403.2 in the Code of Canon Law (cf. Hunthausen’s response to the
Vatican chronology).  In the same line, though in a much more general sense, Hunthausen
argued (in his NCCB address) that even showing “every due regard for Church Tradition
and Law” does not rule out “the possibility of making a mistake” in pastoral judgments.
Essentially, by making these points, Hunthausen created room to maneuver in relation to
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the existing legal structure. This approach did not work so much to put pressure on Rome
as it did to take pressure off of Hunthausen. It allowed him to suggest that his own actions,
while perhaps not strictly in accord with Rome’s preferences, were nonetheless within the
bounds of the existing Church laws.
Hunthausen also raised a challenge of a more fundamental kind. Put simply, he argued that
certain existing laws of the Church, at least insofar as they were applied in the Seattle case,
stood in questionable relationship to other crucial values. At least two examples of this
form of critique appear in Hunthausen’s address to the NCCB. There Hunthausen argued
that the Vatican’s failure to provide Hunthausen in advance with reasons for the visitation
and its subsequent refusal to allow him to see the Hickey report was not just. “I must state
emphatically… that such unwitnessed, private questionings with no opportunity for the
subject of the questionings to face his accusers, or hear or to be informed of their
allegations, or to defend himself are not a just manner of proceeding. This kind of an
approach seriously wounds the community of faith and trust that is the Church.” Here
Hunthausen criticizes the Vatican’s handling of the case with reference to principles that
would have been applied in a trial conducted within the Anglo-Saxon legal justice system,
but he also relates the concept of justice to the Church’s concern for its own well-being.
Later in the same address, Hunthausen asserts that “the very concept of special faculties –
at least of the sort and extent we are dealing with here – is already on somewhat shaky
ground from a theological point of view.” In other words, the redistribution of faculties
may have been legal in a technical sense but, as with the visitation process, within the
framework of other essential values it may be seen to be questionable and even
illegitimate.
Ultimately, however, applications of legal power did not prove decisive in the conflict.
Though Rome employed legal power in substantial ways and Hunthausen had little legal
power of resistance, and though Rome could have continued to take increasingly strong
legal measures against Hunthausen, it chose not to do so. My sense is that social pressure
not to take further action kept Rome from taking further legal action against Hunthausen.
Rome could have forced Hunthausen’s further cooperation or removal from office, but the
cost would have been more unwelcome publicity, more dissent and less-than-clear
possibilities for resolving the conflict thereafter. For this reason, Rome, after the NCCB
debate, limited its legal activity to implementation of a new agreement that was minimally
acceptable to Hunthausen himself (the appointment  of Murphy as coadjutor archbishop
with right of succession but no special faculties).
Traditional power will unavoidably suffuse any case of center-periphery conflict. The
Church itself and the offices of Pope and bishop are incomprehensible apart from long-
applicable concepts of Church authority and how such authority becomes manifest in
practice in recognizable ways. The key to this issue is discerning which elements of
Church tradition are called forth to serve the conflict handling in the present.
A good place to start in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict is to compare the parties’ views of
the responsibility of the hierarchy to Church tradition (as expressed in the Church’s
teaching and practice). Perhaps the sharpest contrast can be found between the visions
articulated in Ratzinger’s 9.30.85 letter and Hunthausen’s address to the NCCB.
Ratzinger’s perspective is that Church teaching, as contained in specific documents which
can be named, clearly and dependably establishes norms for Church practice. The role of
the magisterium is to work out and declare such teachings. Local bishops have a secondary
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role in contributing to the making of such teaching, but more primarily their task on behalf
of the Church is to see that this teaching is implemented and adhered to in the life of the
local church. This is a top-down, governance-based view of the activity of the Church.
(Ratzinger’s letter to Hunthausen favors verbs such as correct, overrule, inculcate, and
engender, all of which imply one-way transactions between a bishop and his people.)
Hunthausen, on the other hand, shows much more of a tendency to work from the bottom
up. As an example, Hunthausen points out that the human encounter precedes the
emergence of Church teaching on the encounter. “[T]he matter of ministry to
homosexuals… recently called forth an Instruction from the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith,” Hunthausen noted. The lived experience comes first, but even when clear
teaching is made available, that by itself does not eliminate gray areas of pastoral
discernment. Hunthausen also states that the faithful themselves, and not simply the
members of the hierarchy, have the capability and responsibility “of dealing maturely with
problems where they exist.” These same (lay) people share in the “ownership” of the
Church as a birthright of their baptism.
Another contrast lies between Ratzinger’s portrayal of Church teaching as internally
consistent and fully sufficient in its current form – when properly understood, clearly
taught and conscientiously administered – and Hunthausen’s conception of the same as a
“vital and living tradition.” Whereas Ratzinger’s letter associates Church teaching
primarily with its encoding in curial documents and canon law, Hunthausen invokes the
“Gospel message of Jesus proclaimed throughout the ages and in our own time in ways
that reflect both its enduring significance as well as its perennial relevance.” Practically
speaking, the difference here is that Ratzinger points to specific documents which spell out
particular solutions to particular contemporary problems, whereas Hunthausen argues for
the validity of an approach that centers on ongoing and highly personal interpretation of
Scripture itself. With Ratzinger’s approach one can find the answer to a pastoral problem
by looking it up. With Hunthausen’s it is more a matter of faithfully discerning the
foundational texts and the promptings of the Holy Spirit – a process wherein the answers
and the requisite accountability remain hidden within oneself, and the possibility of
making a mistake” is never ruled out.
Within the context of the conflict, these contrasting ecclesiologies served to position
Ratzinger and Hunthausen oppositionally. Ratzinger proposed to Hunthausen in a private
forum that the identified concerns be managed quietly in a technical way by elite
technicians. Only a small highly trained minority within the Church would be familiar with
the documents Ratzinger cites (bishops, some clerics, some religious, some lay
professionals, academics, intellectuals) and fewer among these would be in a position to
enforce the directives therein (bishops and, to a lesser extent clerics and others).
Hunthausen had, in Rome’s view, shown a reluctance to implement strict forms of top-
down control in his archdiocese (where control rests with a small minority). Ratzinger’s
earliest attempts to gain Hunthausen’s cooperation in doing this were undertaken within
the very operative mode from which he desires Hunthausen to operate. Hunthausen, who
had chosen to undertake his leadership, generally speaking, according to a populist stance,
resisted Ratzinger’s effort (which is supported by the pro-nuncio) to keep the discussion
under wraps. From the time of the proposal of the visitation itself, Hunthausen attempted to
bring others into the discussion, first within the hierarchy (he consults with NCCB
President Roach) and his own inner circle of advisers, but very shortly thereafter the public
at large (he argued with the pro-nuncio for the need to publicize the forthcoming visitation
process). Eventually it became clear that Hunthausen would not be driven to operate
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according to the clerical mode. Only then did the Vatican proceed to make its case with the
public. But this was not in fact an example of the Holy See (represented by Laghi and his
chronology) suddenly embracing a more populist view and mode of operation. The public
appeal, when it came, was made primarily to other members of the hierarchy. The public
involvement was welcomed insofar as it put pressure on Hunthausen. But strikingly, at no
point did the Vatican attempt to involve the people of Seattle or the American people in a
serious discussion of the pastoral issues themselves, which purportedly were the crux of
the entire affair. Whereas Hunthausen, according to his populist ecclesiology argued that
the people of the Church “deserve to be treated as adults” and are “capable of dealing
maturely with problems where they exist,” the main Vatican effort to take its case to the
public (the Vatican chronology) focused on Hunthausen’s ostensible intransigence rather
than on the pastoral concerns.
The advocacy of clerical and populist mindsets are both longstanding traditions within the
greater (total, integrated composite) tradition of the Church. In that sense, both Rome and
Hunthausen drew on tradition, albeit competing strands, to bolster their own position
within the conflict. Strategically, Hunthausen gained more by his employment of
traditional power within the conflict than did Rome. Though Rome retained its
overwhelming advantage in bureaucratic power, Hunthausen secured enough support from
“among the people” to offset the advantage and secure his own position.
Expert power was employed strategically in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict, but not with
decisive consequences. Its most prominent application appeared in Ratzinger’s letter to
Hunthausen detailing the visitation findings. There Ratzinger presented himself as an
expert on the teaching of the Church. Implicit throughout the letter is an assertion of his
own superiority in this regard over and against Hunthausen. Ratzinger leaves no room for
discussion of the points he raises. Having clarified the issues for Hunthausen, he turns over
to Hunthausen responsibility to implement the clarifications.
Hunthausen employs expert power in a contrasting and, in some sense, internally
contradictory way. He positions himself as the anti-expert or, put more positively, as the
people’s expert. In a nutshell, his message is, I may not be an expert on these technical
questions but I do know the people I serve. The internal contradiction in this stance lies in
the simultaneous desire to offer himself as a man of the people (thus, as one among them)
while at the same time implicitly suggesting that he has a superior knowledge of what is
operative in ordinary people’s lives (particularly within his own archdiocese) – superior, at
a minimum, to the knowledge thereof that Ratzinger possesses. There are links here to
Hunthausen’s employment of a populist ecclesiology (see the discussion of traditional
power above) and his effective use of charismatic power (see discussion that follows).
Hunthausen’s self-presentation as a people’s expert (himself being one of the people who
knows the people very well) comes out most clearly in his address to the NCCB. “Most of
you know that I am not a professional theologian,” Hunthausen writes. “Many of you know
far more about these matters than I do and can surely articulate them better.” This
disclaimer serves Hunthausen in two ways at this point. First, it sends a signal that he is not
“putting on airs.” Thus his fellow bishops need not feel threatened. Second, it excuses him
from losing the arguments of the present day on technical grounds. How can a simple
diocesan bishop be expected to compete in theological debates against the theological
firepower of the Vatican itself? Finally, it sets up what comes next: Hunthausen shifts the
focus away from “theoretical” questions entirely to the more pertinent matter of personal
suffering. “Nonetheless,” Hunthausen continues,
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The experience that has been mine over these past years can perhaps serve as something of a laboratory
for viewing, studying and probing the issues in some way other than the purely theoretical. If that be so,
then I honestly believe that this sad experience which has been the source of such pain and confusion for
the Church of Seattle and beyond – even to the point of causing serious scandal for many – will not have
been in vain, but will have been a path to a new moment of life and growth.
In effect, Hunthausen raises a rhetorical question here – what is theory (i.e., the involved
matter of the visitation issues currently under consideration) compared with the lived
experience of human suffering? The suggestion is that the Vatican is attempting to get the
questions right on paper but is failing to attend to the human dimension and costs of the
actions being pursued.
Hunthausen’s strategy plays to his advantage within the series of communications that is
underway between the two parties. To this point the Vatican communications to the public
have been minimal and largely impersonal. Archbishop Hickey had offered but a few
remarks to the press. Ratzinger allowed one brief letter (of 12.12.83) to Hunthausen
(acknowledging receipt of the Hickey materials) to be published, but not the critical
9.30.85 letter. Laghi made available his own letter revealing the visitation findings but the
text is impersonal in a conscientiously polite and formal way. Laghi’s next widely
distributed statement in the affair was the Vatican chronology, which is a diatribe against
Hunthausen. In contrast, Hunthausen all along structured personal appeals and injected his
own personality into his communications. What makes his NCCB address effective is that
he does not simply profess to know how the people feel, but that more than that, he shows
that he himself experiences the same kinds of feelings and vulnerability. Hunthausen’s
expertise is the product not of external analysis but of relating-to and suffering-with. Along
these lines, Hunthausen stakes a cautious claim to knowing well what his fellow bishops
are thinking and feeling. “[W]e all struggle to teach in a manner that is both faithful and
compelling; and we all strive in our own lives not only to find the right words to call our
people to service but to make the servant attitude of Jesus the most identifying mark of our
lives.”
One key difference between Ratzinger and Hunthausen’s applications of expert power is
that, whereas Ratzinger applies expert power in a direct way to Hunthausen himself,
Hunthausen, at least in the dimensions of the conflict that we are able to observe, applies
(anti-)expert (populist) arguments to win the support of third parties, but he shows little
inclination to try to win over Roman representatives themselves with this approach. In
other words, he does not attempt to feel Rome’s pain or identify with Rome’s struggles in
the same way he does with other parties. It would be interesting to see if use of such a
strategy is any more apparent in Hunthausen’s private correspondence with Rome,
especially that which took place before the appointment of Bishop Wuerl.
Others playing important roles in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict tended to present
themselves as experts on the conflict itself more than anything else. This was true both of
Laghi’s report of the visitation findings and his chronology and of the assessment
commission’s report. This is not surprising, since both of these parties were carrying out
rather clearly defined roles, which limited the scope of the attention they were to give.
As in the case of his employment of traditional power, Hunthausen’s populist instincts in
his employment of expert power proved advantageous in his conflict with Rome. With
little chance of winning arguments over Church teaching or policy with Rome, Hunthausen
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showed that he could make use of other forms of expertise to advance his own position.
Charismatic power proved to be crucial to the unfolding of the conflict. Hunthausen
demonstrated charismatic power and employed it to great effect as the conflict handling
came increasingly into the open. The overall strategy of the center party, however, mostly
excluded attempts to employ charismatic power. The obvious candidate to effectively
employ charismatic power oppositionally to Hunthausen was Pope John Paul II, but the
Pope never introduced his own personality into the conflict. This left only Roman curial
officials who, as a matter of standard practice, operate off stage rather than on it, and
Vatican representatives with the status of high-ranking functionary (diplomat,
spokesperson, temporary intermediary), who also were expected to do their work
unobtrusively. Thus on the center party side there was no one to serve as a charismatic
challenger to the charismatic Hunthausen. Moreover, doing so would not have been in
keeping with Rome’s intention to manage this particular affair quietly and efficiently
behind the scenes. As a result, Hunthausen’s personality was seen to be pitted against a
secretive and conspiratorial bureaucracy rather than against other, equally legitimate
leaders of the Church who also sweated and suffered and tried to do their best on behalf of
the community. Instead of Hunthausen versus another bishop of human appeal, it became
Hunthausen versus the establishment, Hunthausen versus unnecessary restrictions on
freedom, Hunthausen versus a distant force of control that had little grasp of local realities,
Hunthausen against “Rome.”
Hunthausen’s successful projection of charismatic power transpired in personal encounters.
Though not the most eloquent of orators, he was skilful at reaching his audience by means
of a down-to-earth style and a peaceful manner that reinforced his own reputation for
integrity. Hunthausen came across as a calm and peaceful person who had integrated his
own values. But the conflict with Rome was only partially transacted through personal
encounters, and one wonders whether Hunthausen’s particular type of charisma was
effective with Vatican representatives. Hunthausen could persuade people in a very direct
way in Seattle, and he could persuade his fellow American bishops in their semi-annual
meetings. But his contact with Roman officials was much more limited, and in any case it
seems not to have been very effective with that particular audience, since Hunthausen did
not get far in his behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Holy See. Indeed, Hunthausen’s
responses in these private forums were found lacking. What ultimately made Hunthausen’s
charisma a tremendous asset was his ability to communicate it across time and space to
those who were more susceptible to its appeal: that is, to those who were essentially the
stakes in the conflict itself, the Catholics in the pews. Because Hunthausen enjoyed great
popularity in his own archdiocese and elsewhere, other bishops were inclined to listen to
him, and so was Rome.
One lingering question from the discussion of charismatic power is why the Pope’s own
well-known charismatic resources (cf. Melady 1999) were never put into play. Given the
Pope’s flair for dramatic self-presentation and the strong loyalty he has commanded among
American Catholics (though, admittedly, he has more than a few against him as well), his
active participation in the foreground of the conflict would have put considerable pressure
on Hunthausen to back off of his own role as busy, public protagonist. Instead, the Pope
chose to inject himself into the affair in a public and personal way on only four occasions:
he ordained Wuerl in Rome; he indirectly touched on the conflict issues in his November,
1986 written message to the NCCB; he voiced to the press his support for Malone’s
statement on the conflict; and he sent a telegram to Hunthausen when Hunthausen was
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recovering from his cancer surgery (December, 1986). None of these occasions offered
served to raise the profile of his participation in the controversy in any significant way.
Presumably the Pope weighed for himself the potential costs and benefits of taking a more
active, public role in the affair. Some of these potential costs and benefits we can imagine
for ourselves. Potential costs would include: (1) drawing still more media attention to a
conflict that the Vatican preferred to keep offstage; (2) sending the signal that the conflict
was more serious than the Vatican wanted it to appear to be; (3) offering for public
consumption the unsightly fare of two successors to the apostles in opposition to one
another; and (4) having the Pope appear to be heavy-handed in his use of power rather than
above the fray of internal squabbles. The greatest potential benefit would be that the
conflict would be more quickly and efficiently resolved because neither Hunthausen nor
other American bishops would be likely to challenge the Holy Father himself. Whatever
his own reasons, the Pope remained remarkably hidden during the handling of a conflict
that was highly public and highly controversy, and his own charisma played only a limited
and obscured role.
Summary of the Use of Normative Power
Of the five types of normative power named above (social power, legal power, traditional
power, expert power and charismatic power), all five are employed by both parties in
prominent ways except for charismatic power. In my view, the Vatican did not put a
premium on employing charismatic power, though it could have chosen to do so.
Applications of power in the conflict were necessarily linked to operative ecclesiological
conceptions of the given type of power. Thus, on the Vatican side there was a prevailing
emphasis on the unicity and self-sufficiency of tradition (Church teaching and practice) as
encoded in Church law and guaranteed through monitored conformity of thought and
practice. The use of social power involved calling on Hunthausen’s feeling of loyalty to the
Church (a loyalty which could be verified through his conformity to the Vatican’s wishes
and his overt posture of deference to Vatican authority) and playing on his fear of
exclusion. The Vatican applied legal power in the form of specific legal mechanisms
(visitation, power of appointment) and operated within the traditional hierarchical mode of
secrecy to ensure his compliance. To a lesser extent, the Vatican tried to convince
Hunthausen to cooperate by supplying him with expert reasoning for doing so (Ratzinger’s
report of the visitation findings).
Hunthausen, for his part, operated according to a different ecclesiological perspective. His
more populist view held that Church tradition was marked by a plurality of understandings,
by diversity, change (“renewal”) and ambiguity. Thus, his employment of traditional
power was to highlight, as others had before him (reformers in particular), that flexibility,
open discussion and even change were real options for the Church. Hunthausen appeared
to be little interested in legal power (more precisely, in legal enforcement) – perhaps
because he did not enjoy much beyond the bounds of his own archdiocese and it offered
little leverage in his conflict with Rome. But he did employ legal power through his act of
legal argumentation and interpretation. This was primarily a defensive move. Similarly, as
a “man of the people,” Hunthausen showed little inclination to set himself apart as an
“expert” in the affair – except in the paradoxical sense of being the people’s expert, the one
who is on the journey with them and knows them and their suffering. This subtle
application of (anti-)expert power converged with Hunthausen’s deployment of his own
charisma – he took advantage of the growing perception that he was a heroic figure – to
apply a form of social power that was itself from the bottom up. Since Hunthausen lacked
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resources to press Rome from above, as he himself was being pressed, he opted
instinctively, and astutely in terms of strategy, to press Rome from the bottom. Hunthausen
held popularity within his own local church. As the conflict continued, Hunthausen
strengthened this local support while gaining a vociferous following nationally. By
positioning himself as a lonely figure standing on principle, Hunthausen grew in stature
within and without the Church. At the same time, Hunthausen avoided violating the
politeness conventions of the hierarchy and constantly reaffirmed his loyalty to Rome.
(That is, he constantly honored Rome’s ecclesiological perspective while managing to
remain somewhat detached from it.) Since Rome was unable or unwilling to condemn
Hunthausen according to any obvious and inexcusable violation of Church policy, and
since it was under increasing time pressure to end the conflict, it was left with no better
option than giving in to key Hunthausen demands and retreating from certain of its own
decisions.
Perhaps the most significant difference in the applications of normative power between the
center and periphery party was that, while Rome preferred in public to depersonalize its
own self-presentation and use of power, Hunthausen chose in public to maximally
personalize his own self-presentation and use of power. On the Rome side, the
personalities of individual advocates were not allowed to emerge in public and there was
great pressure put on Hunthausen to allow the conflict handling to take place out of public
view. The emphasis was on the logic of the existing organizational machinery, which
should be allowed to have its way: the Roman curia (distant, anonymous) would determine
the nature of the problems; canon law and designated Church teachings (both inanimate)
would declare the parameters of permissible solutions; and clarification, as necessary
might be sought by having quiet recourse again to the Holy See’s expert representatives
(the pro-nuncio, curial officials). Especially notable here is the great distant which exists
between the Vatican city state -- where decisions regarding punishments are made -- and
the local See – where the effects of such decisions were felt. This isolation and the
hiddenness of the decision making process kept the Roman officials who issued the
negative judgments from having to personally come into contact and work with those who
were judged (Hunthausen, first and foremost).
Hunthausen, while pursuing his own interests within the conflict, seemed to grasp
instinctively that Rome’s preference for hiding from view and acting with bureaucratic
anonymity was a public relations disadvantage in his own local church, but also nationally.
Few myths are more powerful within the American psyche than that of the lone, principled
figure standing up against monolithic vested interests (the establishment, the bureaucracy)
which seek to limit personal freedom. Ronald Reagan, who served as President through the
greater part of the Hunthausen affair, made supremely effective political use of this mythic
appeal – positioning himself as the cowboy outsider who would face down the corruption
of Washington and its mass of restrictive regulations. Hunthausen, at the opposite pole
from Reagan on many (but not all) political questions, nonetheless had something in
common with the public relations posturing of Reagan. Hunthausen said he was not some
sort of “maverick archbishop” (the cowboy lore imagery is reminiscent of Reagan), but in
a way he was, and in that same way many Americans would approve. Like Reagan,
Hunthausen took an individual stand arguing for local control and personal freedoms (in
matters of spiritual and pastoral discernment) over and against a distant, controlling
bureaucracy.
This is not to suggest that Hunthausen relished his confrontational role with Rome. By all
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accounts, it disturbed him. But when Hunthausen was pushed too far, the decision to assert
himself seemed to come naturally. He did not hesitate to take a stand on principle and to
assert his own personality on behalf of his cause. In this regard, perhaps he had been well
prepared for this confrontation by his years of anti-nuclear arms activism. There he had
often taken a stand publicly. Hunthausen’s style – underplaying his bishop status, while
arguing his position in a nonconfrontational, but calmly self-assured way – had served him
well in those debates. Hunthausen would have been aware of his own effectiveness in such
exchanges.
One can imagine, too, that Hunthausen was battle-hardened from his participation in the
nuclear weapons controversies. The public-forum weapons debate featured high levels of
contestation, anxiety and mutual distrust between opposing groups. By participating in
those debates, Hunthausen exposed himself to the sort of stressful political infighting that
later came – in much more intense form – in his conflict with Rome. Either Hunthausen
was by nature one who could take a beating or he was toughened up by earlier political
battles: in any case, his ability to tolerate criticisms directed against him and to persevere
for years in an unlikely cause was one of the keys to his coming out of his conflict with
Rome as well as he did.
The outcomes of these contrasting strategies – Rome’s anonymous maneuvers versus
Hunthausen’s highly personal assertions --  varied according to the playing field. If the
matter was handled out of public view, Rome tended to gain ground. But when Hunthausen
brought matters into the open, Rome was put on the defensive. To be more specific, up
until September, 1986, Rome had forced Hunthausen to yield: thus, he was left to accept a
visitation of his archdiocese, the imposition of an outsider bishop, and the loss of certain of
his own powers of leadership. None of these steps were discussed publicly before they
were taken. But once Hunthausen took his case into the open with the announcement of the
faculties, the momentum shifted in his favor. Thereafter, Rome was induced to abandon its
own preferred appearance of harmony within the leadership, to discuss the case in public,
to defend its own actions, and eventually to retreat from the earlier punitive action. If these
general patterns hold true, then why, according to the rationale I have just advanced, did
Hunthausen succeed to the extent he did, since the decisive stage of conflict handling
(Hunthausen’s meetings with the assessment commission) took place behind closed doors?
I see two reasons for this. First of all, Hunthausen’s public forays had greatly increased
public pressure on the Vatican to let Hunthausen off the hook. Secondly, the commission
membership, on the surface would appear to have been relatively sympathetic to
Hunthausen, being comprised of two of three members who stood on the moderate to
liberal end of American Church politics (Quinn and Bernardin; I would place Hunthausen
on the liberal end). It is important to recall, too, that Hunthausen did not get all that he
wanted through the closed-door negotiations with the commission. He declared the report
itself to be unsatisfactory in its descriptions; Hunthausen was not thrilled to be receiving a
coadjutor archbishop instead of an auxiliary; and he was not allowed to have his own first
choice for helper bishop appointed.
Before leaving this consideration of the employment of normative power in the conflict, it
is worth noting that the coordinated application of various types of normative power – on
both sides – had something of a raw effectiveness. By this I mean that employing several
types of normative power at once in coordinated fashion can have a combined effect
whereby the opposing party is more or less forced to take action it does not wish to take.
One can make a case that Rome won as many, and perhaps more, concessions from
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Hunthausen by applying a combination of social, legal, traditional and expert pressure on
Hunthausen (all forms of normative power) as it did by applying (legitimate) resources of
coercive power directly (i.e., invoking its canonical right to intervene in his
administration). I have already observed that Rome had much more success imposing its
will on Hunthausen behind the scenes than it did in the open. The key to keeping the
discussion out of public view was not coercive power – Rome did not require it of
Hunthausen with threat of sanction – but social and traditional  power. Implicitly, Rome’s
message was: Let’s keep it among ourselves, within the episcopal fraternity (social power),
because that is how it has always been done in the Church (traditional power). Though
ostensibly, Hunthausen remained free to accept or reject these normative pressures, there
came a point at which apparent choice became not much of a choice at all. Going the other
way, Hunthausen did not gain ground in his exchanges with the Vatican by refusing to
grant Rome access to the archdiocese or publicly supporting rebellion. He did it instead by
making use of his own charisma and communicative effectiveness to galvanize support
among the media, the American public, and especially the American bishops, the
achievement of which pressed Rome into an ever-tighter corner for decision-making. After
the NCCB meeting an impasse was reached because, though further options for forcing the
other party remained, the costs became prohibitively high for doing so. In light of the
unappetizing potentialities of escalation, de-escalation became a much more desirable
option.
Having reflected at some length on the question of normative versus raw applications of
power in the affair, let us now consider the appearance or non-appearance of specific
anticipated strategies.
9.2.3 Coping Strategy 1: Show deference to the existing structural order and mindset
of the Church
My presupposition was that members of the hierarchy would draw on existing organizational
structures and defer to existing organizational norms in center-periphery conflict situations. I
expected that they would be careful for the appearance of the Church and would want to
demonstrate their own trustworthiness as institutional guardians, which they would do
through conservative pronouncements and behaviors and shows of respect for the hierarchical
order. Analysis of the Rome-Hunthausen conflict confirms these expectations, but we see too
that numerous challenges to the established order arise, and that the order itself is in flux.
The case narrative and analysis above (chapters 6-8) gives us a glimpse of the conflict
handling styles of at least eleven bishops. Across the board, the bishops consistently (even
during periods of high conflict intensity) use traditional ecclesiastical terms, speak reverently
of the Church and its traditions, address one another politely, and only reluctantly take action
or speak in ways that directly challenge prevailing norms in the Church. The use of such
tactics was anticipated. (See section 3.5.3.)
At the same time, however, the Hunthausen affair shows that bishops may feel personal,
internal tensions (visible in their words and actions) around questions of institutional
deference. The requirement of deference at times stands at odds with personal beliefs or
principles that invite bishops to challenge the status quo. This tension is highly evident in the
case of Hunthausen himself, but it is also clearly present in a more diffuse way, in the
American bishops’ conference’s approach to the conflict.
The Vatican’s clash with Hunthausen demonstrates that the Church’s structural order and
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mindset is something in contested transition. Though none of the bishops involved show an
inclination to challenge the existing order and mindset in radical ways, even the more
conservative-sounding pronouncements within the case offer signs that the Church does not
simply stand still in time. A notable example is Ratzinger’s 9.30.85 letter to Hunthausen,
which, for all its emphasis on the surety of the teaching of the Magisterium, nonetheless
admits the legitimacy of the concept of “renewal” in Church thinking (presuming, of course,
that Ratzinger is not saying this solely to gain a more receptive hearing from Hunthausen).
The fact that there may be competing concepts of how renewal should be understood and
implemented (Ratzinger’s view versus Hunthausen’s) simply reinforces the point that there is
not a fixed unanimity of thought and practice in the Church organization and that
arrangements within the Church are the product of ongoing negotiation.
Indeed, to take this point further, we see that well developed but contrasting ecclesiologies
emerge in the course of the conflict. On the one hand we have Ratzinger’s presentation of the
Church as an essentially complete and impersonal entity, whose aspects are consistently
designated with the definite article: “the Church’s clear teaching about the indissolubility of a
sacramental marriage;” “the nature and mission of the Church;” “the meaning of the Church;”
the Church’s integral faith concerning Christ;” “the clear vision of the human person which is
at the heart of the Gospel message;” etc. On the other hand, we have Hunthausen’s tendency
to speak in relational terms of the Church as a collectivity of persons: “Our people have
‘come of age’ and they deserve to be treated as adults. They are capable of dealing maturely
with problems where they exist and they take seriously the ‘ownership’ of the Church that is
their birthright as baptized members of the Body of Christ.” Though both of these
ecclesiological visions are traditional within the Church, they do not sit together easily, and
the predominance of one over the other bears significant implications for the future of the
Church.
At times in this case, Hunthausen challenges Church procedural practices outright – as in
regard to the visitation process, the use of secrecy, the role of bishops’ conferences -- but we
should note that he almost always does this with an eye toward face saving for the Church and
with a marked ambivalence. The emphasis on face saving shows itself in his refusal to name
names and assign personal blame and the consistent stance of reverence he adopts toward the
Church itself. Hunthausen’s ambivalence can be seen in the reluctance with which he openly
challenges Rome (his resistance to Rome takes shape behind the scenes long before it does so
in public) and in his own continued adherence to norms that he purportedly is challenging
(though he voices opposition to the use of secrecy, he employs the same himself). In other
words, even in the rare instances in which Hunthausen challenges the dominant Church
culture, he does so in Church-familiar ways.
9.2.4 Coping Strategy 2: Associate own efforts with the best interest of the Church
This is a fairly obvious strategy to employ. I anticipated that all participants in center-
periphery conflict would be likely to use this strategy, but perhaps according to different
views of the Church’s interest. This expectation is born out in the Rome-Hunthausen
conflict. Ratzinger, Laghi, Hunthausen, Malone and the assessment commission members
all apply this strategy explicitly in the course of public statements and argumentation, with
contrasts arising in their articulation of which course of action is in keeping with the best
interest of the Church.
The expected tactics for carrying out the strategy – drawing attention to the Church, doing
so in positive ways, and explicitly associating oneself with the Church’s best interest – can
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all be found in the case history. Of greater interest is the case’s revelation of the various
forms, depending on the actor, that associative posturing can take. These relate to
conceptions concerning the type of organization that the Church is. Ratzinger presents
himself as a rational guardian of (expert on) the deposit of faith (the truth). The well being
of the Church consists in keeping this truth from being tainted by error, and passing it on
successfully into the future (Church as mission). Laghi positions himself as a facilitator of
the organizational machinery (Church as bureaucracy). Like Ratzinger, he tends to
background his own personality in his writing, but unlike Ratzinger, his focus goes to
relational politics as well (Church as clan and political-economic market). The good of the
Church within his orientation is achieved by having the Church leadership in sync and the
processes of decision-making and implementation well oiled. Hunthausen acts on behalf of
the good of the Church as a populist spokesperson (Church as mission and market). The
good of the Church is inseparable from the good of the Church’s people. Hunthausen
represents the people in the pews (who deserve to be treated as adults) and his fellow
diocesan bishops (who deserve autonomy in their own local churches). Malone and the
members of the assessment commission are like Laghi in associating their own efforts and
the good of the Church with the maintenance of intraecclesial harmony (Church as clan).
They position themselves as servants of unity.
In the course of the conflict, the question of how most properly to understand the best
interest of the Church stands central and is a source of much tension.
9.2.5 Coping Strategy 3: Minimize the appearance of conflict
My expectation was that members of the hierarchy would be strongly inclined to minimize the
appearance of conflict among themselves, first by hiding such conflicts and then, when
necessary, by putting the best face possible on aspects of the conflict that come into the open.
I also anticipated that the center party would have a stronger incentive to minimize the
appearance of conflict (because it is the greater beneficiary of the appearance of harmony and
unity) and that minimization of the conflict on the periphery side would come more from a
desire to prove its loyalty. These expectations were only partly confirmed by my
confrontation of the Hunthausen case data. Though the Holy See, Hunthausen and key third
parties of bishops do show a predisposition to keep conflict handling hidden and to minimize
the seriousness of those aspects of the conflict that come into the open, there are also
surprisingly numerous moves (by center and periphery both) to uncover the conflict for the
sake of advantage.
We see the Vatican’s preference to minimize the appearance of conflict in its initial
intention to keep the conflict entirely hidden from view: it seeks to conduct the visitation in
secret and to make the report to Hunthausen of its findings in secret. When Hunthausen
insists on having a report of the visitation findings that he can make public, Rome
commissions Laghi to write a revised version of the Ratzinger letter that has a softer tone
than its source. After escalation of the conflict leads the center and periphery parties to
criticize one another publicly, we see a swift resumption of secret negotiations and silence
and / or polite public pronouncements thereafter.
From the periphery party, as expected (see section 3.5.3), we see a much more ambivalent
approach to minimizing the appearance of conflict. Though Hunthausen consistently shows
a reluctance to appear at odds with Rome, and with the Holy Father in particular, he shows
an equal disinclination to be disadvantaged by conflict negotiations that are hidden. Thus,
while Hunthausen cooperates with the Vatican intention to keep the visitation secret
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(cooperative behavior can serve as a tactic to minimize the appearance of conflict), he also
(reportedly) argues against this decision in private. Then, once the visitation announcement
is made, Hunthausen speaks of the process euphemistically, making it seem more benign
than it is. While waiting the better part of two years for the Vatican’s report on the
visitation avoids public comment on the matter altogether. Hunthausen’s announcement of
Wuerl’s faculties shows his ambivalence in a microcosm. Hunthausen reveals a
controversial conflict development that Rome does not want revealed, but he does so in
determinedly neutral language. Later, after responding contentiously to Laghi’s
contentious chronology, Hunthausen returns to the practice of conflict engagement in
private and silence in public.
Throughout the conflict, the press serves as a strategic outlet for both parties. Unilateral
distributions of information to the news media play a critical role in the affair on multiple
occasions. Among the key examples of this are the news leak forcing Hickey and
Hunthausen to announce the visitation, Hunthausen’s revelation of Wuerl’s faculties
(against Rome’s wishes), Laghi’s circulation of the Vatican chronology (against
Hunthausen’s wishes) and the news leaks that precedes the release of the commission
report. On one more occasion, Hunthausen presses the Vatican to make public a document
(the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter) it does not wish to make public. Though Hunthausen proves
to be much more ready to take his case to the public through the press than does Rome,
Rome also shows a willingness to reveal aspects of the conflict to the news media when it
is advantageous to do so.
Perhaps most surprising in the case, in light of my expectations, is that both sides reach the
point of publicly attacking one another. Rome suggests that Hunthausen lacks firmness as a
leader; Hunthausen suggests that Rome uses methods that are unjust and do a disservice to the
people of the Church. Admittedly, it takes at least three years before it gets to this point, but
this does show that, with time and pressure, the proclivity to minimize the appearance of
center-periphery conflict can dissipate. We should not overlook the potential strategic
advantages to each side that come from revealing the conflict. By taking his message to the
public, Hunthausen garners sympathy as a courageous underdog. Rome, for its part, gains the
opportunity to paint Hunthausen as one who is wilful and a threat to Church unity.
9.2.6 Coping Strategy 4: Show fraternity
Before confronting the data of the Rome-Hunthausen case, I anticipated that participants in
center-periphery conflict would be both empowered and restricted by the bond(s) of
episcopal fraternity, and that all participants would explicitly and implicitly invoke the
concept. I expected that the center party would do so as a way of keeping control over the
periphery and that the periphery would do so to retain the privileges that follow from
loyalty and to avoid punishments.
We find all of these expectations confirmed in the Rome-Hunthausen case. This empirical
example shows the bond of fraternity to be quite strong within the hierarchy. It also shows
us that bishops are strongly inclined to preserve the strength of the bond in appearance and
in fact. Finally, the evidence of the case suggests that, while outside pressures can
significantly influence the course of intrahierarchical conflict handling, the ultimate key to
resolution of the conflict lies within the fraternity. Resolution depends on what the bishops
(and first and foremost the bishop of Rome) decide and not on what anyone else decides.
During the Hunthausen affair we find many occasions where the concept of episcopal
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fraternity is invoked explicitly. When Archbishop Hickey announces his forthcoming visit
to Seattle, he says that he comes “as a brother bishop… to offer appropriate fraternal
assistance and support.” In public, Hickey shows only graciousness to Hunthausen, and
Hunthausen shows the same to Hickey. Archbishop Laghi, in his 11.14.85 letter to
Hunthausen, repeats this description of Hickey’s role: “It was the Visitator’s role to speak
with you as a brother bishop… and to offer you appropriate fraternal assistance and
report.” The purpose of such statements appears to be to reassure Hunthausen and the
public that the business at hand is well intentioned (families look out for their own), but
they also serve as a subtle justification for conducting the business behind closed doors
(families keep their squabbles to themselves).
In the course of the conflict, the setting where the concept of episcopal fraternity gets its
most thoroughgoing treatment is at the November 1986 gathering of the American bishops,
where invocation of the concept appears mandatory. The pro-nuncio’s remarks begin with
a greeting to “Bishop Malone, my dear brother bishops and friends,” but any suggestion of
equality within the episcopal family is quickly dashed by Laghi’s suggestion that he has
been instrumental in the appointment of one-third of the bishops in the room. On the
whole, Laghi’s reference to fraternity seems perfunctory. Decidedly more than perfunctory
is the Pope’s embrace of the concept in his written address to the bishops. The Pope begins
with a greeting comparable to Laghi’s (“To my dear brother bishops in the United States of
America”), but then repeatedly reintroduces the concept of fraternity and explores its
theological implications. Thus, he says, “I wish to assure you of my fraternal solidarity
with you…” and proceeds to explore what such solidarity entails. What it clearly does not
entail in his presentation is independence or equality in regard to the papacy. The role of
the Pope is “to confirm the bishops in their apostolic faith and ministry” and “to preside in
love.” “It is an awareness of my own role in the church, and especially in regard to her
unity and universality,” the Pope writes, “that has prompted me to do everything possible
to confirm my brother bishops throughout the world in their own collegial ministry.” There
is nothing surprising in the content of the Pope’s message here. Church teaching is
consistent on the point that the Pope is unique among bishop: he is not simply one among
many bishops, he is first among them as leader of the Church. In essence, he reminds his
brother bishops that he is more father than brother. When the Pope reminds his brother
bishops of ways he has been of “service” to them, he highlights undertakings that, from
another angle, can be seen to be acts of surveillance: the apostolic visitation of American
seminaries, the formation of the Pontifical Commission for Religious Life, and the Pope’s
own forthcoming pastoral visit to the U.S. In short, the strategy of showing fraternity
cannot be understood without reference to papal fatherhood.
In Hunthausen’s address to the American bishops, he too draws on the fraternity concept.
Hunthausen clearly has something to gain if his fellow bishops turn to him as a brother. “I
want to tell you that I am particularly distressed about any anguish or even division that
may have come about among you, my brother bishops,” Hunthausen writes. Hunthausen’s
use of the term “brother bishops,” in the context of an extended, passionate plea, comes as
a reminder that family members have special responsibilities to one another. In contrast
with the Hickey and Laghi invocations of the concept, which are rather detached and
impersonal, Hunthausen infuses his employment of the brotherhood concept with feeling.
Of Bishop Wuerl he writes: “He is my brother and my friend and my heart aches for him
when I consider the ordeal he has had to suffer…” With Hunthausen, the emphasis stays on
the personal dimensions of the bond.
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In certain respects, Bishop Malone’s 11.12.86 statement on behalf of the NCCB is similar
to Hunthausen’s NCCB address in its tendency to personalize and associate feelings with
the concept of episcopal fraternity. There Hunthausen and Wuerl are referred to as “our
brothers in the episcopacy” and Malone develops an extended, and somewhat sentimental,
metaphor of a family coming together in a time of difficulty. Malone’s concern is with a
“kind of pain that can only be felt by members of a family.” This statement shows a
longing to make peace as quickly as possible. Hence the reminder that bishops are family
and therefore ought to be able to put their differences behind them. The idea of fraternity
carries a serious pressure for harmony.
Taken together, the examples above show that the notion of episcopal fraternity is a
commonplace within the discourse of the hierarchy and that invocation of the concept can
serve strategic purposes. But we also see fraternity practiced nondiscursively in the case.
We see it in the presumption in favor of keeping the bishops’ business among themselves
(private meetings, private correspondence, private debates) and in the formal instruments
of collaborative reflection and decision making (ad limina visits, the relationship between
ordinary and assistant bishops, national and regional episcopal conferences. We also see it
in the form of (purportedly) cooperative pastoral interventions (the visitation, the
appointment of auxiliary and coadjutor, the NCCB’s role of mediation, the ad hoc
commission’s assessment) and in more personal one-to-one or small group exchanges (as
in Hurley and Roach’s roles advising Hunthausen and in the hidden negotiations
concerning the NCCB endorsement for the Vatican chronology). Common to all of these
experiences is an operative sense that only bishops can solve bishops’ problems and that a
sharp line of demarcation exists between those who belong to the brotherhood and those
who do not. What this implies for handling of the conflict is that the ultimate key to
resolution lies within the fraternity of bishops and is not external to it. The alliances within
are what matters. Hunthausen survives his conflict with the Vatican and ultimately
achieves certain key objectives largely because he secures critical support from the
national episcopal conference -- active support from some members and support in the
form of neutrality from the conference as a whole. This support keeps the Vatican from
taking further action against Hunthausen. Another key to Hunthausen’s effectiveness is
that, though he tests the limits of the fraternal rules, he never goes so far as to break them
until Rome itself does so. Hunthausen, even under extreme duress never once openly and
directly criticizes another bishop, and his most critical language comes only when the pro-
nuncio himself has abandoned the politeness standard.
The Vatican could, of course, have acted unilaterally at any point to remove Hunthausen or
discipline him in another way, but the fact that it does not suggests that good relations with
national episcopal conferences are very important to the Holy See. When push comes to
shove, the Pope shows a willingness to accept and implement a solution not his own
making – one that comes from the assessment commission, which has listened to
Hunthausen at least well enough to find a solution he can live with.
9.2.7 Coping Strategy 5: Practice Courtesy
Prior to systematically analyzing the Rome-Hunthausen case data, my expectation was that
bishops would show a high degree of courtesy toward one another in center-periphery
conflict, and that this would be one means for defending or advancing one’s own position
within the conflict. This expectation was abundantly confirmed by the Hunthausen case,
but the empirical evidence from the case raised questions as well as answering them.
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From the time the pro-nuncio approaches Hunthausen to the time of the release of the
Vatican chronology, politeness reigns in both parties’ approach to conflict handling. Prior
to the release of the chronology, both parties – without obvious deviation – show courtesy
toward one another, going to significant lengths to be respectful, to not criticize the other,
and often to praise the other. The Vatican chronology instantiates a breach in this policy of
politeness on the center party side, an act that is quickly followed by a retaliatory breach of
politeness from the periphery party side (contained in Hunthausen’s NCCB messages). The
expressions of impoliteness on both sides are quickly contained after this outburst. After
the 1986 NCCB meeting, courtesy again becomes the norm, though the quality of the
courtesy changes. Rather than offering public statements laced with words of deference
and praise, the parties adopt a more negative form of politeness, wherein the two sides
limit contact and keep silent about the conflict as much as possible, thereby voicing no
criticism of the other (and concomitantly avoiding the obligation to use terms of deference
and praise in regard to the other). Once the commission releases its report, Hunthausen
briefly resumes public discussion of the conflict, offering a few statements that can be
considered contentious and somewhat discourteous, but thereafter he adopts a more or less
permanent silence in regard to the conflict and its history. Rome also adopts a policy of
silence about the affair after the NCCB debate, with normally only terse, official
statements breaking the (ultimately permanent) silence.
Regarding the strategic employment of courtesy in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict, a few
conclusions can be drawn. First, both the center and periphery parties by their conduct
show that courtesy – often in an exaggerated form -- is the norm in intrahierarchical
relations. Both the center and periphery parties put a premium on saving face for the other:
at a minimum by refusing to criticize the other or show the other in a negative light; and
more actively by publicly praising and expressing solidarity with the other member(s) of
the hierarchy. Apparently, maintaining this picture of mutual respect and harmony is one
of the unwritten rules of the hierarchy. Thus, in more than five years of (varying degrees
of) tense exchange, only a handful of obviously discourteous remarks surface publicly in
the Rome-Hunthausen conflict, and even these remarks come amid a flurry of face-saving
statements. On the surface, the episcopal culture is one of invincible graciousness.
Nonetheless – and this is my second conclusion about courtesy drawn from the Rome-
Hunthausen case -- for all its strength, the culture of graciousness does in fact break down
under great stress. Frustration with the other party appears to be the immediate cause of the
breakdown. Frustrated with Hunthausen’s public announcement of Wuerl’s faculties and
the resulting storm of protest, Laghi issues the face-threatening Vatican chronology. In
response, Hunthausen issues his own highly charged statements to the NCCB. Two
observations are in order concerning this breakdown: (1) the break with courtesy comes
initially from the center party side; and (2) Laghi’s is the more directly personal attack. By
being the first to break with courtesy, the center party gives Hunthausen an opportunity to
depart from courtesy – an opportunity that, in my view, he would not have had otherwise
(without likely suffering the consequence of removal from office). Since the Vatican fires
first, Hunthausen can, briefly at least, get away with firing defensively in response. But
even in responding defensively, Hunthausen apparently does not see advantage to be
gained by blaming any other member of the hierarchy, especially since, across the board,
his opponents are more powerfully positioned within the hierarchy than he. Instead,
Hunthausen avoids gaining particular enemies and does his best to maintain an appearance
of faithful service within the fold, while stoking a fire of public discontent about the way
277
he has been treated. Thus courteousness can be a means of contention.
A third conclusion we can draw concerning strategic applications of courtesy in the
conflict is that, after the outburst of contentious exchange between the parties, order is
quickly restored and politeness rules once again. The inclination to mutual courtesy
appears to be a standard that it is so firmly engrained in intrahierarchical relations that it
can be breached only under the most volatile of conditions, and even then only for a brief
time.
The fourth conclusion I would offer concerning the strategic employment of courtesy in
the case is that the Pope, at least so long as he stays in the background, is untouchable by
other members of the hierarchy. Whereas Hunthausen shows a willingness, when pressed ,
to challenge – in a very indirect way – the decisions or actions of other members of the
hierarchy, he speaks only deferentially of the Pope throughout the entire affair, generally
invoking his name in relation to the conflict only when necessary. And that is true of all
bishops involved in the controversy from beginning to end. Though the question of the
Pope’s involvement is crucial from beginning to end in the conflict – he has the ultimate
authority to determine Hunthausen’s fate, after all – no bishop ever once publicly and
directly raises the question of the Pope’s involvement in the affair or his view of it, and
certainly no one ever implies anything approaching criticism of the Pope. Perhaps if the
Pope had publicly involved himself in the affair, he might have exposed himself to
criticism (at least of the indirect kind). But in this case he does not become publicly
involved and is spoken of only with reverence.
9.2.8 Coping Strategy 6: Employ secrecy
My expectation concerning the strategic use of secrecy in center-periphery conflict was
that both parties would employ secrecy to protect the appearance of the Church and to
guard their own leadership autonomy. I presupposed that bishops would respect
conventional domains of secrecy and would respect conditions of secrecy around conflict
handling so long as doing so would not significantly disadvantage them. I also speculated
that the periphery party would likely to be the first to forgo or resist secrecy since it is the
party less likely to be advantaged by secrecy. How far the center or periphery would go in
turning its back on secrecy was unclear to me.
The evidence from the Rome-Hunthausen case confirms the expectation that the
hierarchy’s commitment to secrecy in conflict handling is strong but not unconditional.
There are obvious instances of both sides breaking with secrecy, as in Hunthausen’s
announcement of Wuerl’s faculties and Laghi’s issuance of the Vatican chronology. What
is not clear is which side first breaks with secrecy. (We do not know who leaked the news
of the visitation.) Notable is Hunthausen’s open criticism of the use of secrecy and own
ambivalent practice thereof.
Certain factors complicate the analysis of secrecy employments in the conflict. One
complication is the difficulty of distinguishing between secrecy employed as a matter of
habit and secrecy applied deliberatively for strategic gain. Another complication involves
distinguishing between silence and secrecy. Silence may look like secrecy but be simply a
reflection of a party’s lack of information or lack of desire to speak. Silence may also be
more a matter of politeness than of hiding something for direct gain. Finally, it may simply
be a matter of human limits and / or administrative efficiency. Organizational leaders
cannot possibly share all available and potentially relevant information with organizational
278
members and other interested parties. This would create functional gridlock. In other
words, not sharing all information is not automatically equivalent to keeping secrets. As
much as possible, I have tried to keep my focus on acts of hiding that appear to be clearly
strategic in terms of the conflict handling itself.
One should also note that there are layers of secrecy which apply. As far as possible, I
distinguish here between secrecy practiced jointly by the Vatican and Hunthausen (and
other members of the hierarchy) in relation to the public and these parties’ own strategic
keeping of secrets from one another. While Rome kept secrets from Hunthausen which can
be enumerated, the evidence is less clear about which kinds of secrets Hunthausen kept
from the Vatican, since Hunthausen protested specific uses of secrecy but the Vatican did
not.
To sum up the strategic use of secrecy in the Rome-Hunthausen case, I offer the following
observations. First, all parties (center, periphery, third) use secrecy with regularity, but
their use also shows that adherence to secrecy is not an inviolable norm of intrahierarchical
relations. Secrecy appears to be a normal mode of operation for discussing delicate matters
within the hierarchy – an approach reinforced by social pressure within the hierarchy and
by habit. The Hunthausen case begins and ends in secrecy and is suffused with secrecy
throughout. But significant resistance to secrecy and the abandonment of secrecy crop up
within the case as well. Breaks from secrecy come in the form of news leaks, joint center-
periphery party announcements (of the visitation, Wuerl’s appointment, implementation of
the commission plan), unilateral press announcements (Hunthausen’s announcement of
Wuerl’s possession of faculties), the release of relevant documents (the Laghi and
Ratzinger letters summarizing the visitation findings, the Vatican chronology,
Hunthausen’s NCCB statements, etc), and other interviews and comments shared with the
press.
Rome evidently is much more committed to adhering to secrecy than Hunthausen.
Hunthausen presses for a public announcement of the visitation, but the Holy See refuses
this request, giving in only after the news leak made it unavoidable. In the same vein, the
Holy See denies Hunthausen’s request to make the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter public and also
refuses his request to view the Hickey report. The Vatican’s own clearest, most significant
(unilateral) break from secrecy is the issuance of the Vatican chronology. This step comes
under duress: Rome is obviously frustrated by Hunthausen’s unilateral move to reveal
Wuerl’s possession of faculties and the public criticism of Rome that emerges as a result.
Hunthausen, for his part, expressly objects to secrecy on principle – highlighting modern
expectations of transparent leadership in his NCCB address – but in practice he maintains a
posture of adherence to Vatican secrecy wishes up to the point at which, apparently, he
feels he has been pushed too far by Rome (i.e., when he must give up the faculties). As
with Rome, Hunthausen’s most significant departures from secrecy comes under duress.
The two texts he supplies to the NCCB are also circulated within the period of highest
tension in the conflict, once the door to a more free discussion has been thrown open by
Hunthausen’s announcement and the Vatican chronology. While Hunthausen appears, all
along the way, to share as much information as he feels he can with the people of his
archdiocese, it is clear that he feels significantly constrained in what he is permitted to
share.
This period of fairly open discussion in the conflict is short-lived, lasting less than three
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months within a conflict of five-and-a-half years (September-November, 1986). For the
remainder of the conflict (and for the years preceding and succeeding the conflict as well)
we must speak of secret negotiations and only minimal presentations of the information
that has been gathered.
Third party participants in the conflict consistently keep secrecy as well. Bishop Wuerl
keeps quiet the fact that he is to have special responsibilities in Seattle and he also refuses
to reveal details of his personal meetings in Rome. The NCCB keeps its debate of the case
and other relevant negotiations out of view of the press. The assessment commission offers
its views only in its final report: all transactions prior to that are conducted in secret.
The use of secrecy in the conflict serves the parties in the following ways. By keeping
secrets from Hunthausen, Rome prevents him from interfering with certain courses of
action it chooses to pursue. Thus, Hunthausen is not presented with the possibility of a
visitation until that decision has already been made; he is denied access to the visitation
report, and is thereby kept from contesting its conclusions; and he is left to wait the better
part of two years to learn what the Vatican concludes from the visitation. Secrecy also
serves Rome, so long as Hunthausen remains complicit, by saving the appearance of the
Church and its hierarchy. As long as the conflict is out of sight, there is no conflict as far as
most of the Church and most of the public at large is concerned.
Secrecy serves Hunthausen in different ways. Most importantly, it keeps him out of trouble
with Rome. By conforming to secrecy expectations, Hunthausen does not make waves and
does not give Rome reason to be less happy with him than it already is. Secrecy also serves
Hunthausen by saving face for him. If secrecy keeps Rome’s heavy-handed use of its own
power from view, it also keeps any deficiencies in Hunthausen’s leadership from view, as
well as the fact that the Vatican is unhappy with him. Secrecy, in short, allows Hunthausen
to selectively determine his self-presentation to the public. Thirdly, secrecy is also, as with
the Vatican, a guarantor of his own autonomy. Secrecy enables him to take decisions
without interference, relative to his conflict with Rome but also in regard to day-to-day
affairs in his own archdiocese.
I have already noted that the most prominent departures from secrecy in the conflict occur
during the period of greatest tension in the affair. (The departures themselves contribute to
the escalation of tension.) To nuance that observation a bit, I would add that disclosure
apparently is applied when secrecy seems not to be working. Hunthausen goes to the press
when he finds himself in an intolerable situation and he has little left to lose. (The
legitimacy of Hunthausen’s point that the news would of necessity come forth anyway
must be conceded. Can the Vatican truly have imagined otherwise?) On the Vatican side, it
no longer works to manage Hunthausen in private once he himself takes the case to the
public. Only a public response will suffice if the Vatican hopes to regain its grip on the
affair. At that time, secrecy offers little hope of success, so disclosure is applied.
An interesting feature of the use of secrecy in the affair is how it comes to need
justification for its application. The practice of justifying one’s own use of secrecy starts
with Hunthausen’s announcement of Wuerl’s faculties. In the course of that
announcement, Hunthausen provides a rationale for not sharing his full awareness of
Wuerl’s responsibilities at the time of the appointment. “The importance of making Bishop
Wuerl’s transition to the archdiocese as smooth as possible and of assuring him of the best
possible climate for beginning this ministry among us seemed to outweigh any possible
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good that might have been realized by giving a full public acknowledgment of all the
specifications surrounding his appointment as auxiliary bishop,” Hunthausen writes. This
justification for using secrecy exemplifies a recurring phenomenon. Both the center and
periphery parties typically justify their employment of secrecy by saying it is on behalf of
another. Here Hunthausen says secrecy was practiced for Wuerl’s benefit. In the Vatican
chronology, Laghi writes the visitation publicity was minimized to avoid fostering
criticism of Hunthausen. Laghi also says in the chronology that data from the visitation
interviews was not released to Hunthausen because confidentiality for those who provided
the information needed to be respected. Still later, in his response to the Vatican
chronology, Hunthausen declares that he asked Laghi not to distribute the chronology
because it would generate publicity that would reflect unfavorably on the Holy See.
Notably, such justifying statements only occur during the brief period when the use of
secrecy itself is under discussion (i.e., around the time of the NCCB gathering) by the
principal parties. Before and after this period, the use of secrecy was normally undertaken
without explanation or comment.
9.2.9 Coping Strategy 7: Recruit allies
My expectation was that both center and periphery would try to recruit fellow bishops as
allies in the conflict once a lack of self-sufficiency became apparent in the conflict
handling. I supposed that the most powerful and influential members of the hierarchy (the
Pope, officials of the Roman curia, leaders of episcopal conferences) would be most in
demand as allies. I also presumed that conflict participants would seek support from
outside the hierarchy as a means of pressuring the opposing party.
These expectations were largely confirmed, but one surprise  from the Rome-Hunthausen
conflict is how hard the Vatican works to gain the cooperation of the American bishops’
conference, given that the Pope himself could simply resolve the conflict unilaterally, by
personal fiat.
Both the center and periphery parties address multiple audiences with the hope of winning
allies, but the target audiences vary as do the means used to reach the audiences. On both
sides, the initial efforts go to recruiting the support of fellow bishops directly (through
personal meetings and phone calls). As the conflict expands, both Rome and Hunthausen
take their case to the media as a way of winning support from other members of the
hierarchy and from the public at large (which can in turn put pressure on bishops to take
one side or the other.
At the beginning of the conflict, Rome (Ratzinger) focuses primarily on reaching
Hunthausen and perhaps insiders who have influence with Hunthausen to get him to
cooperate with its intervention in the archdiocese. This contact is undertaken in the form of
private correspondence, personal visits with Hunthausen in Rome (ad limina visits), and
communications via the papal pro-nuncio. Ratzinger’s 9.30.85 letter to Hunthausen does
not appear directed to a wide audience, given its highly technical ecclesiastical language.
But it is cautiously written, suggesting that Ratzinger foresees its possible release to a
broader audience and prepares for this possibility. (Perhaps he does this as a matter of
habit?) Laghi’s redraft of the Ratzinger letter, given the circumstances of its production
and evidence in the text itself, is clearly intended for a wide intraecclesial and (to a lesser
extent) extraecclesial audience. Hunthausen is also a target audience of this
communication. The key to reaching Hunthausen in this case is not in offering him the
information he already has, but in presenting the material for public consumption in such a
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way that Hunthausen’s further cooperation is enlisted.
To successfully defend his own position in his conflict with Rome, Hunthausen must
address Rome. He does so by means of personal visits and correspondence and through the
mediation of the papal pro-nuncio. Hunthausen’s principle message is to reassure Rome he
is a trustworthy bishop and that he should be allowed to govern his diocese without
exceptional forms of involvement by Rome. A less direct but nonetheless crucial way
Hunthausen sends messages to Rome is by demonstrating his support in his own
archdiocese and in the United States. (Hunthausen’s handling of the news media is
instrumental in this effort.) Hunthausen’s indirect message to Rome by way of this show of
the support he commands is to serve notice that he is effective in his own way and that
many will be upset if he is perceived as being mistreated. Demonstrations of strength also
contribute to his ability to recruit allies.
All along the way Hunthausen speaks to the people of his own archdiocese (especially
through the archdiocesan newspaper), expressly for the purpose of keeping them informed,
but also as a shepherd caring for his flock. Through his pastoral messages he both offers
support to his people amid the confusion and difficulty of the conflict and builds support
for his own position. A key group within this local audience are the priests of the
archdiocese. The stalwart support the local priests show Hunthausen significantly limits the
Vatican’s ability to paint him as a renegade and act against him on that basis. Hunthausen
communicates with his priests directly, through periodic meetings and letters, and
indirectly, through presbyteral council meetings and The Progress.
As the conflict progresses, Hunthausen increasingly turns his attention to convincing the
other American bishops to support him. Hunthausen forges alliances with individual
bishops (such as Archbishop Hurley), consults with others (e.g., Archbishop Roach),
lobbies other small groups of bishops (e.g.: the members of the NCCB executive
committee, prior to release of Laghi’s chronology; the assessment commission members;
and the bishops of the Northwest region), and communicates with the entire body of
American bishops both orally and in writing. Particularly notable is Hunthausen’s handling
of his auxiliary and, later, coadjutor bishops. By successfully establishing bonds with both
of these fellow bishops serving within his archdiocese, Hunthausen avoids the serious
problems that could arise by having a powerful opponent under his own roof. This is
crucial in Wuerl’s case. Though Hunthausen may have had theological differences with
Wuerl and had reason to be suspicious of his presence given the circumstances of his
appointment, Hunthausen saves face for himself before the Vatican and his fellow bishops
by treating Wuerl well. Indeed, Hunthausen comes to be Wuerl’s most visible supporter in
Seattle. In retrospect, there was no reason for Hunthausen to oppose Wuerl outright
because there were countless others who were ready to protest his presence in Seattle. In
the case of Archbishop Murphy, Hunthausen had less to fear from him because he was a
known quantity (a fellow bishop of the same region, and not a Roman insider like Wuerl),
and there was no expectation of him having special powers. Nonetheless, the positive
personal relationship that emerges between Hunthausen and Murphy was an important
factor contributing to the ultimate resolution of the conflict.
9.3 Coping Strategies Encountered That Were Not Expected
My confrontation of the data of the case reveals at least two, and likely more, coping
strategies that play a significant role in the conflict handling that I did not expect to find. I
will now introduce these strategies and describe aspects of their application in the case.
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9.3.1 Coping Strategy 8: Argue persuasively
In one sense, it is hardly surprising that highly educated people would apply rational
argumentation to sort through conflict issues and to persuade others. Perhaps the fact that
this seemed a bit too obvious kept me from including this among my initial expectations of
strategies applied. (Pruitt and Rubin cite persuasive argumentation as a potential strategy
of contention in their theory of conflict handling. See section 4.2.3) What is striking in the
Rome-Hunthausen case is how little persuasive argumentation between the principal
parties takes place in public. The most obvious places where it does are in Laghi’s
chronology, Hunthausen’s NCCB statements and the commission report, but all of these
texts seem more concerned with winning over the opinions of third party text consumers
(other bishops especially, and the public at large) than with persuading the opposing party.
Most attempts by center and periphery to persuade one another occur in places where the
public is not invited – in one-to-one discussions and private letters and phone calls. As an
example, Ratzinger’s 9.30.85 letter to Hunthausen seems to make a real effort to rationally
persuade Hunthausen. Ratzinger grants the legitimacy of Hunthausen’s principles –
implementing the renewal called for at Vatican II, for example – but then challenges
Hunthausen to see the difference between lesser and fuller concepts of what that renewal
entails. Contrast this with Laghi’s chronology, which shows no obvious rhetorical attempt
to win Hunthausen himself over, but does seek to persuade the American bishops and other
American Catholics. Similarly, Hunthausen’s NCCB addresses are directed more to his
fellow bishops and to the American public than to Rome, and the commission report is
meant at least as much for the bishops and the public as for Hunthausen himself. One can
argue that participants in center-periphery conflict prefer to conduct their open-ended,
rational debates out of sight (so as not to awaken unrest among the faithful), but in the
Hunthausen affair it seems to have been a constant frustration of Hunthausen’s that his
own viewpoints are not accepted as legitimate by Rome.
The range of techniques available for purposes of persuasion is vast (see, for example, the
survey in Kennedy 1980). Thus I am not in a position to catalogue the rhetorical tactics
that might serve to carry out a strategy of persuasive argumentation. But the following are
tactics that appeared functional within the handling of the Rome-Hunthausen conflict at
various times.
Ingratiation: By this technique, one shows favor to win concessions from the other (often
through praise or flattery). It would seem to be most effective when received as a genuine
expression of good will. In conflict situations, it may be hard for antagonistic parties to
apply this tactic directly in regard to one another, due to the undermining effect of mutual
suspicion. In the public dimensions of the Rome-Hunthausen case, it seemed to be directed
primarily toward third parties that might be recruited as supporters or allies. The best
example is probably Hunthausen repeated expression of affection and respect for his fellow
bishops and the people of his archdiocese.
Demonization: This tactic involves casting serious aspersions on the other and the other’s
intentions. Obviously, given all that I have said thus far, no bishop is likely to demonize
another in any overt way (that is, in any way he can be held accountable for). But we see at
least a mild version of this tactic when Rome suggests that Hunthausen is infirm and
intransigent, and when Hunthausen proposes that Rome has acted unjustly and brought
about unnecessary suffering.
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Definition power: The right to decide which words apply and what they mean is a classic
question in power struggles (cf. Alinsky 1971). In the Rome-Hunthausen case, both parties
attempt to claim the high ground in disputes about what the rightful interests and
aspirations of the Church are. This clash is abundantly evident when one places
Ratzinger’s 9.30.85 letter to Hunthausen alongside Hunthausen’s address to the NCCB.
These two texts advance sharply contrasting views of what the Church is and should be
about.
Perspective Shift: Related to the tension around words and their meaning is the
contestation over the conceptual frameworks that apply to a given question. Whereas
Rome (Ratzinger) tries to frame the discussion of Hunthausen’s leadership within one
particular set of strictly intraecclesial perspectives (the perspectives of the “human
sciences” are excluded), Hunthausen invites his audience to (re)consider the same question
according to the perspective of the Church “come of age” in the world. Hunthausen also
seeks a perspective shift when he asks his hearers to evaluate the “justice” of Church
procedures according to the standards of civil law. In a more fleeting example, Bishop
Malone proposes in his NCCB statement that we look to the future and not the past.
Simplification / Complexification: One can argue that matters are simpler or more
complex than they seem. Ratzinger’s emphasis on clarity (he argues that Hunthausen can
consult and transmit Church teachings that are straightforward and definitive) stands at
odds with Hunthausen’s position that pastoral leadership involves subtle discernments and
the weighing of multiple priorities. The simplicity argument puts pressure on Hunthausen
to take the specific action that Rome wants. The complexity argument enables Hunthausen
to excuse himself from committing to some particular course. In ecclesiological-
organizational perspective, simplicity arguments are especially helpful for top-down
control, whereas the acknowledgment of complexity preserves room for local autonomy.
God talk: Bishops use explicitly Catholic forms of God talk all the time. I use the term
God talk here as a catchall for explicit references to God and the Church. Such references
may be matters of habit (as in epistolary salutations), of pious show (I have identified
“pious interjections” in this research), of heartfelt belief, or of painstaking theological
reflection. The prime strategic potential of God talk would seem to be its demonstration of
full socialization on the part of bishops (bishops show that they belong) and its provision
of the vocabulary that one needs to carry out business (apply power) in the Church.
Though the Church enjoys similarities with other organizations, its terminology (and the
religious ideology it expresses) is one area that is highly idiosyncratic. One cannot manage
the Church without speaking this language. In the Rome-Hunthausen conflict, a highly
contested word such as “renewal” must be understood against a backdrop of Church
history and teaching. Both Hunthausen and Ratzinger attempted to place this particular
word in their own preferred interpretive context. The fact that neither won this argument
definitively says as much about the case, and the state of the Church, as anything else.
All of the tactics I have just described -- some of which (e.g., God talk) might better be
described as substrategies, or strategies in their own right – contributed to party
employments of persuasive argumentation in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict, with God talk
being especially significant.
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9.3.2 Coping Strategy 9: Assert personal identity
Given my general expectation that participants in center-periphery conflict would tend to
minimize the appearance of conflict and emphasize communal harmony, I did not anticipate
that there would be much readiness to strategically emphasize one’s own personal identity in
such conflicts. But in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict the periphery party asserts this strategy
consistently and the center party (Laghi, in late-stage news interviews) asserts it occasionally
as well. Given this finding, it remains puzzling that the Pope refuses to inject his own
personality into the public dimensions of the conflict handling.
In general, one can draw a sharp contrast between the center party’s tendency to erase signs of
personal identity in its public communications and the periphery party’s persistent
accentuation of personal identity in such communications. Whenever possible in the affair,
the Vatican conducts its conflict transactions in private. When this is not possible (because of
news leaks or pressure from Hunthausen), Rome minimizes traces of personal identity in
other ways. The key players in Rome keep out of sight (invocations of the Pope’s name come
mostly in the form of pious injunctions; Ratzinger’s involvement is obscured behind the
release of Laghi’s summary of the visitation findings; Gantin stays in the shadows
throughout). Center party self-references typically speak of “the Holy See” rather than of
distinct persons. Hunthausen, on the other hand, consistently speaks in the first person and
highlights the human, personally felt dimensions of the conflict at hand. By emphasizing his
own humanity, beliefs, principles, suffering and struggles, Hunthausen positions himself to
relate to others on this same level (something the Vatican almost never attempts to do) and he
takes full advantage of his own notable charisma.
The first public statement issued in regard to the affair, Hickey and Hunthausen’s joint
announcement of the forthcoming visitation, shows that this difference of approach manifests
itself from the beginning. Whereas Hickey offers almost no personal remarks in favor of a
description of his function, Hunthausen writes: “I welcome Archbishop Hickey’s visit… my
faith tells me that this renewal in the church is the work of the Holy Spirit… I am convinced
that our efforts in this archdiocese are in keeping with the spirit and intent of the Council… I
believe it will help bring into focus both our strength and our weaknesses… I ask your prayers
for the continued guidance of the Holy Spirit…”
After Hickey concludes his visit to Seattle, he effectively withdraws from public involvement
in the conflict altogether. When Ratzinger reports to Hunthausen what Rome has learned from
the visitation, he uses, even in the context of a private letter, formal, bureaucratic language
that disassociates the findings from his individual person. Laghi’s redraft of the Ratzinger
letter has a warmer tone and is phrased in more personal terms (“I commend you, Archbishop
Hunthausen, for your loyal cooperation and kindness during the Apostolic Visitation…”), but
it distinguishes Laghi’s personal identity only slightly more than Ratzinger distinguished his
own. It is simply more “diplomatic” than the Ratzinger letter, which is not surprising
considering its intended public release.
When releasing the Laghi letter, Hunthausen demonstrates his inclination  to assert his
identity in the affair by releasing a letter of his own in the Progress (11.26.85 issue). There
Hunthausen shows his preferred I-you stance in regard to the people of the archdiocese (“I am
writing in order to share with you a very important letter I have just received from the
Apostolic Pro-Nuncio…”) and he reminds his fellow “Friends of Christ” that they are “a
family” and are together on  “a journey.” “I take courage for the future and look forward to
the journey we will continue together,” Hunthausen writes. The contour of identity that
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Hunthausen illuminates is that of pastor of the local Church. The I-profession is the basis for
establishing relationship. It is a form of self-presentation that he maintains in local
communications throughout the conflict.
At times, personal acknowledgments of his own suffering (to the point of suggesting his own
victimization) invite sympathy and support for Hunthausen. But Hunthausen also presents
himself as a man of principle (of integrity, of “good faith”) and as an “ordinary guy,” as in his
declaration that he is not a “theologian.” This last example shows how one can make claims
for oneself implicitly by stating the opposite (Hunthausen says he is no maverick either).
Bishop Wuerl finds himself in the interesting position in the conflict of having to thrust off an
identity that is consistently forced upon him: that of the Roman infiltrator in Seattle, the living
“symbol of the visitation.” Hence Wuerl, by training a good Church company man, and
therefore self-effacing, finds himself having to assert his own identity to fend off an identity
that is imposed from without.
By humanizing his own position, in contrast with the faceless Vatican foe, Hunthausen is able
to generate broad sympathy for his cause. This proves to be one of the most important keys to
periphery party effectiveness in the conflict.
9.3.3 Other Strategies of Note
Though the following strategies are not given the fullness of consideration provided to the
nine strategies above – I did not identify them early enough in the research process to discern
their presence on a micro-level in texts – they deserve mention (and more careful attention in
the future, in other studies) for the contributions they appear to have made to the conflict
handling.
Manipulations of the Church bureaucracy serve strategic purposes in the Rome-Hunthausen
case. The attempt to establish procedural control is one strategy along this line. Though the
periphery party was not in a position to decisively determine what bureaucratic procedures
affected him and how, he often was able to have some influence over procedures that, in
many cases, were set up according to the circumstances at hand. Both the visitation and
assessment commission processes were ad hoc efforts, and the NCCB’s handling of the
Hunthausen case was also a matter of constructing a process along the way. Gaining control
over specific aspects of process can be a source of advantage. We see applications of this
strategy in the wrangling over the release of the Vatican chronology (Laghi sought an NCCB
endorsement and Hunthausen opposed this, in the context of an administrative board meeting)
and in the discussion determining the format of the NCCB debate. Though Hunthausen had no
control whatsoever over bureaucratic processes unfolding at the Vatican, he showed more
facility with processes closer to home, as in his exchanges with the assessment commission.
Avoidance is another strategy that appears to be operative in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict.
The extended time frame of the conflict seems to have something to do with the application of
this strategy, which involves “taking one’s sweet time” or providing the clues and letting the
other party put them together to draw its own conclusions. Avoidance allows a party to deal
out its blows slowly, over time, or to delay the receipt of blows. It might be seen a form of
what Pruitt and Rubin refer to as “gamesmanship” (section 4.2.3). The Vatican seems to
employ this strategy when it makes Hunthausen wait almost two years to hear the results of
the visitation, and again, when it keeps the assessment commission in place for an equal
length of time. Conceivably, Hunthausen, too, uses the strategy. Did he ignore Rome’s
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pastoral leadership concerns in the years prior to the visitation? Once Wuerl was in place, did
he stop asking Rome questions about what Wuerl’s role was intended to be, for fear of what
he might find?
One more strategy worth considering is the strategy of revealing. Revealing is the opposite of
hiding (employing secrecy). In this study I have chosen to treat revealing as a matter of
forgoing or overturning secrecy requirements or expectations about minimizing the
appearance of conflict, but revealing may well need to be handled as a strategy in its own
right. Tactics of revealing, which have been amply considered in the course of this research,
include unilaterally sharing information with the press (through official statements or news
leaks) and sending up “trial balloons” (i.e., provisional statements to test reactions). As a
strategy, revealing always has reference to some expectation about secrecy. Not all sharing of
information qualifies. Its power lies in the fact that the information in question is not yet
publicly available and someone may have reason not to want it available. In the Rome-
Hunthausen conflict, news leaks (the sources of which always remained hidden) often served
to put pressure on one or the other party.
Finally, we should ask ourselves what role, if any, threats may have played in the conflict
handling. Pruitt and Rubin identify threats as a contentious tactic. In my commentary on the
Rome-Hunthausen case, I have more than once speculated that an implicit threat may be
contained in one bishop’s message to another. Given politeness requirements, we should not
expect to see bishops threatening one another outright. But in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict ,
it seems clear that Rome held the prospect (threat) of further punishment over Hunthausen’s
head and he used the offer (threat) to resign as a tool to gain leverage against his opponent.
Summary
The following table offers a capsule summary of coping strategies and related tactics
encountered in the case, as compared with prior expectations.
Strategies and Tactics Encountered in the Rome-Hunthausen Case
Newly uncovered tactics (as compared with the expectations expressed in section 3.5.3 and
table 3.3) are highlighted below in bold print. The information summarized in the “Notable
Findings, Surprises” column consists entirely of unanticipated findings, as does all
information related to strategies 8-10 C.
Strategy Tactics Notable Findings, Surprises
1. Show
deference to the
structural order
and mindset of
the Church
Refraining from criticism of Church thought and
practice and of its leaders; using euphemisms to
describe problems in the Church; invoking familiar
ecclesiastical terminology (jargon, official titles,
theological words) and thought (Church doctrines);
praising the Church and its leaders; obeying one’s
superiors.
1. Some bishops showed an
internal, personal tension produced
by the requirement of deference
and held principles that might have
lead them in another direction.
2. The structural order appeared to
be in flux and the struggle for its
future was phrased in
ecclesiological terms.
2. Associate
one’s own efforts
with the best
interest of the
Church
Making frequent reference to the Church; refraining
from criticizing the Church (through silence, the
use of euphemisms, indirect language, etc.);
expressly linking oneself to the effort to achieve
recognized goals of the Church.
1. The case reveals various forms
of associative posturing, which
depend on the view of the Church
and the view of its best interest that
the bishop proposes.
3. Minimize the
appearance of
Conducting conflict negotiations in secret; refusing
to publicly acknowledge the existence, relevance
1. Both the center and periphery
parties chose to resist or forgo the
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conflict and / or importance of conflict (silence, denial);
using euphemisms to improve the appearance of
one’s relations with other parties, understate the
gravity of the problems, or overstate the degree of
harmony or prospects for resolution. // Behaving
cooperatively.
strategy of minimizing the
appearance of conflict more often
than expected.
4. Show fraternity Referring to other bishops as “brother bishops” in
public; invoking the concept of episcopal fraternity
(and related concepts such as bondedness,
collegiality, etc.); showing a heightened level of
graciousness and deference toward other bishops
(in comparison with what is shown toward those
who do not belong to the hierarchy); showing what
appears to be genuine kinds of trust and friendship
toward other bishops; conducting substantial
intrahierarchical exchanges in private; symbolically
drawing distinctions (through attire, use of
technical language, liturgical action, closed
meetings, etc.) between the knowledge and
experience of the bishops and the knowledge and
experience of others; indicating (one bishop to
another) what the limits of acceptable thought or
action are. // Employing formal instruments of
collaborative reflection and decision making (ad
limina visits, cooperation between the ordinary
and helper bishops, episcopal conferences, etc.).
Engaging in cooperative pastoral interventions
(visitation, appointment of helper bishop, ad hoc
roles of mediation and assessment).
1. The resolution of center-
periphery conflicts appeared to
depend on what the fraternity of
bishops (and not anyone else)
decided.
2. The notion of episcopal
fraternity in the case is
incomprehensible without
reference to the Pope’s one-of-a-
kind role as “Holy Father.”
3. Support from the national
episcopal conference was crucial to
the bargaining effectiveness of the
periphery party.
5. Practice
courtesy
Matter-of-course (defensive) courtesy: avoiding
criticism of the Church and Church leaders; using
honorary titles; showing respect for and carrying
out the wishes of superiors; honoring formality
rules; and using euphemisms and other forms of
indirect language to give a positive appearance to
problematic situations; diminishing oneself.
Tactics seeking advantage: using praise, shows of
common feeling, etc. to create a climate of
goodwill, thereby inducing concessions or
cooperation; demonstrating politeness to give a
good appearance (of reasonableness, charity) to
outsiders; using euphemisms, indirect language,
etc. to reduce conflict tensions. // Limiting
contacts and communications with the opposing
party in order to avoid confrontation.
1. A culture of invincible
graciousness applied within the
episcopal fraternity.
2. The courtesy that bishops
showed one another in public was
commonly exaggerated.
3. The practice of courtesy broke
down under great stress (when
frustrations mounted).
4. The break from courtesy came
first from the center party.
5. The center party’s break from
courtesy appeared to give
permission to the periphery, who
responded (forcibly but less
directly) in kind.
6. In the Rome-Hunthausen case,
order was quickly restored after the
breach in civility.
7. On no occasion did the Pope
come in for criticism from other
bishops. In the present case, he
proved untouchable.
6. Employ
secrecy
Refusing to acknowledge that a conflict exists;
minimizing even insider access to the conflict
handling; keeping the conflict handling out of sight
(by keeping silent about it and  limiting its handling
to private meetings, private correspondence, phone
calls); hiding the identity of conflict participants
(through silence or linguistic techniques that hide
agency); lying; limiting press contacts (refusing
1. Secrecy served the center party
by allowing it to pursue a chosen
course of action with limited
interference.
2. Secrecy served the periphery
party by showing cooperation with
the center’s preferences, by
preserving a certain amount of
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interviews, offering minimal press conferences,
providing little information in writing); and
archiving sensitive documents.
autonomy for the periphery, and by
saving face by hiding possible
deficiencies.
3. Secrecy itself became an issue in
the conflict and the use of secrecy
required justification.
7. Recruit allies Consulting with and drawing on the support of
friends within the hierarchy; looking for agreeable
intermediary contacts within the hierarchy who are
well positioned to influence a targeted party; using
persuasive argumentation to win potential allies;
appealing for support by going directly to the
people (of one’s own diocese, the broader Church);
appealing for support through the news media. //
Demonstrating own strength as an attraction for
others.
1. The center party worked harder
than expected to gain the national
bishops’ conference as an ally.
2. Retaining solid support from his
priests was a key to Hunthausen’s
effectiveness in the conflict
handling.
3. Maintaining good relations with
his auxiliary (Wuerl) and, later,
coadjutor (Murphy) also
contributed to his strength in
relation to Rome.
8. Argue
persuasively
Presenting rational arguments; ingratiation;
demonization; definition power; simplification /
complexification; God talk.
1. Most of the direct attempts of the
center and periphery parties to
persuade one another with rational
arguments seem to have taken
place in private. Arguments shared
in public tended to be targeted at
third parties.
9. Assert
personal identity
Speaking in the first person; sharing information
about oneself, including principles, feelings,
vulnerabilities, etc.; creating various kinds of public
personae (man of the people, man of principle,
victim, etc.) for oneself; using I-statements as a
basis for establishing relationship with others;
humanizing one’s own position to throw negative
contrast on impersonal foe; countering identities
others want to impose.
1. The center party consistently
avoided assertions of personal
identity, while the periphery
consistently adopted the strategy
(to advantage).
2. The Pope’s decision not to insert
his own personality into the affair
remains a mystery.
10. Other
strategies:
A. Establish
procedural
control
B. Avoidance
C. Revealing
D. Threats
A. Establish procedural control: determine or
influence relevant bureaucratic procedures.
B. Avoidance: delay; deal out blows slowly.
C. Revealing: news statements; news leaks; trial
balloons.
D. Threats: suggesting (implicitly, probably) that
one is prepared to take punitive action against the
other if concessions are not made.
A. Though the periphery had no
control over bureaucratic processes
carried out at the Vatican, he had
more opportunity to control ad hoc
procedures (as in the assessment
commission process) closer to
home.
B. The center avoided supplying
the periphery with the results of the
visitation and later extended the
period of the assessment
commission’s functioning.
C. News statements and leaks
frequently put pressure on one
party or the other in the conflict.
D. The Vatican implicitly
threatened to take further action
against Hunthausen; he offered
threatened to resign.
TABLE 9.3
9.4 Integrated Summary of Coping Strategies Applied
In the foregoing sections I have identified nine main coping strategies I have found to be
applied in the Rome-Hunthausen case. As a first step toward seeing the interrelationship of
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these strategies within the whole of the conflict, I provide the following table, indicating
which party applies which strategies at which point in the conflict.
Coping Strategies Applied in the Rome-Hunthausen Case
Key for Strategy Applications:
+ = evidence of application of the strategy
O = no evidence of application of the strategy
A = ambiguous
R = resistance to or rejection of the strategy
Key for Conflict Document and Development Period Identification:
Early Stage
A’. Developments prior to Hunthausen’s reception of 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter
1. Ratzinger, Letter to Hunthausen with Visitation findings, dated September 30, 1985
B. Intervening developments
2. Laghi, Letter to Hunthausen with Visitation findings, dated November 14, 1985
C. Intervening Developments
Middle Stage
3. Hunthausen, Public announcement of  Wuerl´s faculties, released September 4, 1986
D. Intervening developments
4. Laghi, Vatican Chronology, released October 24, 1986
E. Intervening Developments
5. Hunthausen, Response to Vatican Chronology, released November 12, 1986
6. Hunthausen, Address to NCCB, released November 12, 1986
F. Intervening Developments
7. Malone, Statement at NCCB meeting, released November 12, 1986
G. Intervening developments
8. Laghi, Announcement of Commission appointment, released February 9, 1987
Late Stage
H. Intervening developments
9. Commission, Assessment Report, released May 27, 1987
I. Developments subsequent to release of commission report
Key for Party Identification:
c. Center party
p. Periphery party
t. third party
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STRATEGIES A’ 1/c B 2/c C 3/p D 4/c E 5/p 6/p F 7/t G 8/c H 9/t I
General Stance:
Save face and
enhance power
for self and for
Church
c+
p+
tA
+ c+
p+
tO
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ + c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
Perspective on
Power: Strive
for the
appearance of
legitimacy
c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
tO
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ + c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
1. Show
deference to
order and
mindset of
Church
c+
p+
tA
+ c+
p+
tO
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ + cO
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
2. Associate
own efforts
with best
interest of
Church
c+
p+
tA
+ cO
pO
tO
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ + cO
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
O cA
pO
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
3. Minimize the
appearance of
conflict
c+
p+
tA
+ c+
p+
tO
+ c+
p+
t+
A c+
pR
t+
R cA
pR
t+
R R cA
pR
tR
+ c+
pA
tA
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
pA
t+
4. Show
fraternity
c+
p+
t+
+ cA
pA
tO
+ c+
p+
t+
A cO
p+
t+
O c+
p+
t+
+ + cA
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
A cA
pA
tA
+ c+
p+
t+
5. Practice
courtesy
c+
p+
tA
+ cO
pO
tO
+ c+
p+
t+
A c+
p+
t+
R c+
p+
t+
A A cO
p+
t+
+ c+
pA
tA
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
pA
t+
6. Employ
secrecy
c+
p+/R
t+
+ c+
p+
tO
+ c+
p+
t+
+/R c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+/R +/R c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
7. Recruit allies c+
p+
tO
O cO
pO
tO
+ cO
pO
tO
+ c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
+ + c+
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
A c+
p+
tO
+ c+
p+
tO
8. Argue
persuasively
cA
pA
tA
+ cA
pA
tO
A cA
p+
tA
+ c+
p+
tA
+ c+
p+
t+
+ + cA
p+
t+
+ c+
p+
t+
A c+
pA
tA
+ cO
p+
t+
9. Assert
personal
identity
cO
p+
tA
O cO
pO
tO
O cO
p+
tA
O cO
p+
t+
+ cO
p+
tO
+ + cA
p+
t+
O c+
p+
t+
O c+
pO
tO
O cO
p+
t+
TABLE 9.4
The table provides us with a glimpse of the conflict in its entirety. Some reflections based on
this overview are in order. I will now offer a generalization concerning the application of each
strategy and the interrelationship of strategies within the conflict as a whole.
Early Stage Middle Stage Late Stage
THE CONFLICT OVER TIME: DEVELOPMENTS AND DOCUMENTS
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9.4.1 The Identified Coping Strategies Seen Separately over Time
Each row in the table summarizes the use of a given strategy over the duration of the conflict.
Before considering how the strategies interrelate, I will offer a few more observations about
the individual strategies, based on the tabular presentation.
General stance toward conflict handling: Save the face of and enhance the power of the
Church organization and oneself.
This stance is honored by all parties in all stages of the conflict.
Perspective on the use of power: Conflict participants will strive for (the appearance of)
legitimacy in employments of power.
All parties in all stages of the conflict strive to have their use of power appear legitimate.
Show deference to the existing structural order and mindset of the Church
The table shows my finding that this strategy was applied by the center, periphery and third
parties throughout their involvement in the conflict. I find evidence of this sort of institutional
and ideological deference in all of the chosen documents and in all of the surrounding
developments -- with one possible exception. The exception is in the brief period between the
Hunthausen’s presentation of his statements to the NCCB and the subsequent release of the
Malone statement, less than one day later. Because I find no trace of center party activity
during this time, I mark this O. Nonetheless, I am by no means under the impression that the
Vatican abandons the strategy of deference during this time.
Though on one level it seems self-evident that members of the hierarchy, even in conflict
situations, will show deference toward their own Church (i.e., toward prevailing currents of its
thought and practice), the table is helpful for showing that close examination of an empirical
example bears this out. Within the data of the case one can find evidence of challenges to an
opposing party’s decision making and even to its ecclesiology, but challenges are always
issued from within recognizable existing parameters of Church thought and practice. Perhaps
the closest we come to that is Hunthausen’s suggestion that the Church’s practice of apostolic
visitations should be reformed in light of more just procedures which can be identified outside
the Church (in Anglo-Saxon civil courts of law). But of course Hunthausen does not make his
point nearly so bluntly, and the suggestion itself comes within a presentation that is
exceedingly deferential toward the Church as institution and tradition.
When we consider that the table summarizes the public activity of more than a dozen
members of the hierarchy over a five-and-a-half year period, it is a striking testimony to the
commitment to deference toward the Church shown by members of the hierarchy. Though the
experience of conflict puts pressure on the participants’ attitudes toward the Church,
Hunthausen, the most pressed of all, pronounces himself ready to resign sooner than bring
harm to the Church. We find no evidence of resistance to or rejection of the strategy.
Associate one’s own efforts with the best interest of the Church
All parties employ this strategy during all phases of the conflict. Certain positions in the table
are marked O, indicating there is no evidence of application of the strategy. This is true of
Laghi’s (minimalistic) announcement of the commission appointment, where the absence of
the strategy may be a function of the text’s brevity. Discourse samples from the center and
periphery parties regarding the visitation are lacking between Hunthausen’s receipt of the
9.30.85 Ratzinger letter and the 11.14.85 Laghi redraft of the same. Also much of the conflict
handling that took place during the November 1986 NCCB meeting is obscure; the activity of
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center and periphery parties both is largely hidden in the interim period between Laghi’s
announcement of the commission appointment and the release of the commission report.
Judging by the fact that it was so commonly applied -- by all parties, in all stages of the
conflict – this party appears to be a standard feature of intrahierarchical conflict handling.
Minimize the appearance of conflict
This strategy is not applied nearly as consistently as the strategy of showing deference toward
the Church. From the table we can see that early in the conflict there was a shared
commitment between all involved to minimize the appearance of conflict. Not only was the
conflict handling itself kept largely from view, but also all public statements emphasized a
prevailing harmony within the hierarchy. Public revelation of the existing tensions came from
the periphery party side (with Hunthausen’s announcement of Wuerl’s possession of faculties
and his subsequent elaborations in other statements), but it was quickly answered by the
center party (in Laghi’s chronology). By making clear its displeasure with Hunthausen, the
Holy See reveals a dimension of the conflict previously kept from view. The willingness to
forgo the policy of minimizing the appearance of conflict lasts only a short time, crystalizing
in the Vatican chronology and Hunthausen’s statements to the NCCB. Thereafter the
commitment to hiding the conflict resumes – permanently, essentially, with a few provocative
comments (from Hunthausen, primarily) serving as exceptions. Third parties show little
inclination to call attention to the existence of conflict or reveal more about the conflict than
has already been revealed. A prominent exception is isolated commentary after the conclusion
of the NCCB debates, wherein certain bishops who had participated note their displeasure
with Hunthausen’s treatment.
Some positions are marked ambiguous. Document 3 (Hunthausen’s announcement of Wuerl’s
faculties) is an ambiguous example of minimizing the appearance of conflict, because, though
the announcement brings a key conflict issue into the open, it does so in neutral language. The
statement does not acknowledge conflict per se, nor does it criticize the Holy See. More
directly revealing, and serving to heighten tensions further, are the other letters and interview
Hunthausen makes public at the same time. I also mark as ambiguous two periods of center
party activity. The first period is between the release of the Vatican chronology and the
NCCB meeting two weeks later. During this time the Vatican refrains from public comment
on the affair (normally a tactic for minimizing the appearance of conflict), but also lobbies for
support among the American bishops, thereby drawing more participants into the conflict. In
the one-day period between Hunthausen’s NCCB presentation and the release of the Malone
statement, it is unclear how exactly the Vatican is active in the affair. So I mark this
ambiguous.
Note that the deviations from the strategy of minimizing the appearance of conflict appear in
the middle stage of the conflict, wherein the conflict most sharply escalates and reaches its
widest participation and intensity.
One finds much resistance to minimizing the appearance of conflict in the middle (high
intensity) stage of conflict, and this resistance comes from all sides (first, second and third
parties). This suggests that minimizing the appearance of conflict is not an inviolable rule and
that all parties involved may find advantage in bringing aspects of a conflict into the open,
especially when tensions run high.
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Show fraternity
Demonstrations of fraternal relationship come forth from all parties to the conflict, but the
modality of fraternity varies. Beyond a habitual tendency to keep their business within the
family (fraternal clannishness), the bishops participating in the conflict also show, especially
early on, a tendency to play up the notion of episcopal fraternity in public. Thus in the early
stage we find repeated invocations of the term “brother bishops” and testimony of a readiness
to provide “fraternal” assistance. Later in the conflict, as tensions mount, these showy, public
attestations to the brotherly bond came forth less frequently, being replaced by the more
clannish type of fraternal behavior: the bishops close ranks to resolve the conflict out of the
sight of outsiders. Harder to detect are instances where bonds more personal than official play
a strategic role in the affair (Hurley’s support of Hunthausen is an example). The table above
accounts for strategic use of the fraternal relationship (draws on the fraternal bond) in various
forms, but accounts only for the activity of the center and periphery parties. Demonstrations
of fraternity by third parties are not accounted for here.
The center party stresses its fraternal relationship with Hunthausen in the early stage of the
conflict, but then drops its public display of fraternal good will (early in the middle stage)
with the release of the Vatican chronology. After the NCCB meeting come two months of
limited communication between the center and periphery parties. Once the apostolic
commission is appointed, this threesome becomes the fraternal stand-in for the center party.
But beyond this, the Vatican does not make further use of the strategy of demonstrating its
fraternity with Hunthausen. (The Pope does make a point of stressing his brotherly
relationship to all American bishops during his message to the NCCB, November 1986.) In
many instances it is unclear whether the center party shows fraternity. The ambiguity comes
from the fact that the conflict handling is out of sight or the message is mixed. The Vatican
shows a very strong inclination to preserve the clannish aspects of intrahierarchical relations,
repeatedly demonstrating a preference for keeping sensitive matters contained within the
episcopal family. The Holy See argues its case publicly in the affair only when forced to. But
its effort to handle the conflict within the confines of the hierarchy itself is a constant
throughout. On the Vatican side it is unknown where and when more personal kinds of ties
are a factor in the conflict handling. A possible example of this sort of outreach may be the
Pope’s (December 1986) telegram to Hunthausen, shortly after Hunthausen’s cancer surgery.
For Hunthausen, acting fraternally is normally a matter of cooperating and professing his
loyalty to the Holy Father. He applies this strategy through all stages of the conflict, with the
major exception of the (uncooperative) protests he registers at the NCCB meeting and some
minor exceptions in the late stage of the conflict. Hunthausen shows his willingness to
participate in the more exclusive aspects of the fraternal relationship with his fellow bishops
during all stages of the conflict, but he also shows, on several occasions a resistance to
proceedings which offers limited access to those who are not part of the hierarchy. More
personal draws on the fraternal bond appear to be a key form of support for Hunthausen in all
three stages of the crisis. Hunthausen consults with NCCB President Roach in 1983, and later
receives support and advice from his friend Archbishop Hurley of Anchorage.
Third parties tend to verbally highlight the relationship of episcopal fraternity (as Wuerl and
Malone do) as much as or more than the center and periphery parties. The third parties show
haste to have the principals reconciled.
Practice courtesy
All parties to the conflict practice courtesy in all stages of the conflict, but one also finds
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breaches of courtesy during the height of conflict tensions (the middle stage), as in the
Vatican chronology (the most discourteous document in the case because it directly criticizes
Hunthausen) and Hunthausen’s two statements to the NCCB (which criticizes the Holy See
without assigning personal blame). In the early stage of the conflict, the practice of courtesy is
exaggerated by all parties, center, periphery and third. After the breakdown in courtesy in the
middle stage between the center and periphery parties, these parties resume their show of
graciousness, but then in the form of polite silence and without hyperbole. Third parties
employ exaggerated forms of courtesy not only in the early stage, but in the middle stage (cf.
Malone’s statement) and in the late stage as well (cf. Wuerl’s words of parting and Murphy’s
statement upon his appointment as coadjutor).
In the table I mark Hunthausen’s statements to the NCCB as ambiguous in regard to courtesy.
The ambiguity rests in the fact that, while highly contentious, the documents also contain
professions of loyalty to the Holy See and respect for the nunciature, and direct criticisms of
other members of the hierarchy are absent. Hunthausen’s announcement of Wuerl’s faculties
is marked ambiguous because, while the language of the statement is polite enough, the act of
releasing the text may be construed as discourteous because it goes against Rome’s wishes.
Some third parties statements following the NCCB debate can also be considered
discourteous toward Rome. Since these are mixed in among courteous statements coming
from other bishops, I mark this position ambiguous. Certain other positions are marked
ambiguous because the conflict handling is hidden at that point.
Employ secrecy
One may be surprised to find that I have marked every position on the table as positive in
regard to applications of secrecy. Indeed, it is striking how pervasively secrecy is employed
within the Rome-Hunthausen conflict handling. The degree of secrecy varies, but it is
inevitably operative on some level. In the earliest phase of the conflict, prior to the visitation
itself, there is no public discussion of the Holy See’s concern with the situation in Seattle (by
either the center or periphery party), though according to the Vatican chronology, this concern
has been operative since 1978. When the decision to undertake a visitation is made,
Hunthausen resists the plan to keep the visitation secret, but he does so in secret (he is
complicit in the secrecy). Though the visitation is publicly announced, it is nonetheless
conducted in secretive fashion and its results are largely kept secret (even from Hunthausen
himself). Hunthausen shows a readiness to challenge the policy of secrecy (see column 3/p-
row 6, column 5/p-row 6, column 6/p-row 6), and gain strategic advantage in the conflict by
means of his challenge, but every time he reveals information (as in the announcement of
Wuerl’s faculties) he keeps information secret at the same time (e.g., Hunthausen repeatedly
keeps the details of the conflict handling itself out of the public eye). The debates about the
affair at the November 1986 NCCB meeting – which explicitly consider the matter of secrecy
– are not open to the public. Hence, we have no record of what the other American bishops
have to say about the use of secrecy. The Pope’s feelings about and level of involvement in
the conflict are almost entirely hidden from view from start to finish. The involvement of
Vatican officials is also hidden. The assessment commission’s meetings are also private, with
no public record of their contents. Though news leaks and press statements occasionally break
through the secrecy somewhat, they hardly make a dent in the overall embrace of secrecy,
which is steadfastly maintained by all parties. In the years since the conflict, documents
revelatory of the inside of the conflict handling have yet to be released for public inspection.
Recruit allies
There appear to be two phases in the periphery and center parties’ attempts to recruit fellow
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bishops as allies. In the first phase, the parties seek out individual allies behind the scenes.
The Vatican recruits Hickey as visitator and later seeks support from the NCCB executive
board and from Cardinal Bernardin. Hunthausen also quietly consults with, first, Archbishop
Roach and, then, Archbishop Hurley. And Hunthausen, too, attempts to sway the NCCB
executive board in the question of the endorsement for Laghi’s chronology. In the second
phase of ally recruitment, the Vatican and Hunthausen make broader, more public appeals for
support from fellow bishops, with both taking their case to the American bishops’ conference
as a whole (prior to and during the November 1986 NCCB meeting). In the late stage of the
conflict, after the appointment of the assessment commission, the key party to be persuaded is
the commission itself. Both Hunthausen and Laghi have access to the commission and have
opportunities to make their view of matters known.
Argue persuasively
Rarely in the case do we find examples in the open of either the center or periphery party
trying to convince the other with rational arguments. Presumably such exchanges, when they
do arise, take place out of sight of the public. (The 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter is a good example.
There Ratzinger attempts to enlist Hunthausen’s cooperation with a rationalistic presentation
of ecclesiological positions. Typically, both parties reserve their persuasive arguments for
third parties, such as other bishops, the press, American Catholics. While Hunthausen
presents many rational arguments in his NCCB statements, I would propose that he directly
targets the American bishops there, and the Holy See only indirectly.
Center and periphery party attempts to rationally persuade third parties are often undertaken
in public, at least during the middle stage of the conflict, when more of the conflict
management comes into the open. The best example from the center party is the Vatican
chronology (which seeks to gain the support of the bishops and secondarily of the press and
the American public). Hunthausen, for his part, consistently strives to persuade others of the
reasonableness of his position, starting with the people of his own archdiocese (early stage)
and later with the American bishop and American (press and) public.
The commission report is the most prominent example of a third party using rational
arguments strategically in the conflict. The primary addressees in this case were the American
bishops and the American (press and) public. In its report, the commission sought to show
that it was reasonable in its methods and conclusions.
On the table I normally marked as ambiguous those occasions on which the conflict handling
was out of sight. I marked with an O the documents and periods where there was reason to
believe that an emphasis on persuasive argumentation had been bypassed in favor of another
strategy (applications of coercion or social pressure, for example, or a refusal to communicate
about the conflict at all).
Assert personal identity
In the conflict this is primarily a periphery party strategy. Hunthausen uses the strategy from
start to finish. Most representatives of the Holy See (Ratzinger, Gantin, Hickey) avoid this
approach altogether, though the pro-nuncio, Archbishop Laghi, asserts his own identity
somewhat in public in the middle and late stages of the conflict, after the conflict has reached
its most heated and public level (e.g., he grants interviews to the New York Times and
National Catholic News Service that show the more informal side of his personality). In
contrast with Hunthausen’s self-presentation, which constructively builds on his personal
qualities to establish the very core of his strength in relation to the position of the Vatican,
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Laghi’s assertions of personal identity appear to be more of an attempt to counter the
advantage Hunthausen had gained through use of this strategy.
An interesting assertion of personal identity from a third party is Bishop Wuerl’s effort to
overcome the perception that he represents the visitation and a Roman infiltration of Seattle’s
affairs. Wuerl directly challenges such perceptions once the conflict issues came into the open
and also in the immediate aftermath of the commission’s settlement (i.e., during the middle
and late stages of the conflict). Certain other bishops also show a willingness to assert
themselves individually immediately following the NCCB debate. Bishop Kenny of Juneau,
Alaska, for example, offers a straightforward criticism of the Malone statement and thereby
stands apart from the collegial show of unity. More typically, however, third parties playing a
direct role in the conflict handling keep a low profile. Bishop Malone’s NCCB statement has
more “we” than “I” in it, and the apostolic commission communicates not as three individual
bishops but as one unit with no internal distinctions. An unwritten rule for representing the
Holy See during the conflict appears to be: do not call attention to oneself any more than is
strictly necessary.
9.4.2 Comparative Observations of the Use of Strategies
A look at the table lets us comparatively assess employments of each of the strategies by all
three parties in all three stages of the conflict. A summary of my findings from this
comparative assessment appears below.
Strategy Applications by Party (at Some Point) in Each Stage of Involvement
A. Strategies Applied by the Center Party in All Three Stages: Strategies 1-8. I find no
evidence of the center party applying strategy 9 (assert personal identity) in the early stage.
Certain strategies are practiced by the center party less consistently (and are even resisted or
rejected at times) during the middle, highest intensity stage of the conflict. We find resistance
or nonpractice of strategies 3 (minimize the appearance of conflict), 4 (show fraternity), 5
(practice courtesy) and 6 (employ secrecy) during the middle stage.
B. Strategies Applied by the Periphery Party in All Three Stages: All strategies with the
exception of 3 (minimize the appearance of conflict). The periphery party shows little
inclination to minimize the appearance of conflict during the middle stage.
C. Strategies Applied by Third Parties in the All Three Stages: Strategies 1-6. The main
representative of third party activity in the early stage is Wuerl. There is no clear evidence of
Wuerl applying strategies 7 (recruit allies), 8 (argue persuasively) or 9 (assert personal
identity) in the early stage.
D. Strategies Applied by All Parties (First, Second, Third) in All Three Stages: Strategies
1 (show deference to the order and mindset of the Church), 2 (associate own efforts with best
interest of Church), 4 (show fraternity), 5 (practice courtesy), 6 (employ secrecy). Of these
strategies, 1 was applied most consistently and 6 was abandoned most frequently.
Unbroken Commitments to Strategy Use
E. Strategies Applied by the Center Party in an Unbroken Way (used in all stages with no
evidence of intentionally forgoing use of the strategy in any stage of involvement in the
conflict): Strategies 1 (show deference to the order and mindset of the Church), 2 (associate
own efforts with the best interest of the Church), 4 (show fraternity), 7 (recruit allies), 8
(argue persuasively).
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F. Strategies Applied by the Periphery Party in an Unbroken Way: Strategies 1 (show
deference to the order and mindset of the Church), 2 (associate own efforts with the best
interest of the Church), 4(show fraternity), 7(recruit allies), 8 (argue persuasively, 9 (assert
personal identity).
G. Strategies Applied by Third Parties in an Unbroken Way: Strategies 1 (show deference
to the order and mindset of the Church), 2 (associate own efforts with best interest of the
Church), 4 (show fraternity), 5 (practice courtesy), 6 (employ secrecy).
H. Strategies Applied by All Parties in an Unbroken Way: Strategies 1 (show deference to
the order and mindset of the Church), 2 (associate own efforts with the best interest of the
Church), 4 (show fraternity).
Notable Departures from Strategy Use
I. Notable Departures from Strategy Use by the Center Party: There are significant
departures from strategies 3 (minimize the appearance of conflict), 5 (practice courtesy) and 6
(employ secrecy) in the middle stage. Shows of fraternity – strategy 4 -- are less explicit in the
late stage.
J. Notable Departures from Strategy Use by the Periphery Party: The periphery party
noticeably departs from the use of strategies 3 (minimize the appearance of conflict) and 6
(employ secrecy) in the middle stage. Shows of courtesy are less effusive and more guarded
in the middle and late stages.
K. Notable Departures from Strategy Use by Third Parties: Certain members of the
hierarchy choose not to minimize the appearance of the conflict (strategy 3) in the immediate
aftermath of the NCCB debate.
Can the Observations Be Integrated?
Attempts to read the table vertically have not yielded findings that jump out at the reader, but
one finding worth noting is that center and periphery party uses and abandonments of
strategies tend to correlate. In other words, the parties appear to use and abandon strategies
(such as courtesy and adherence to secrecy rules) in conjunction. This may stem from the fact
that most of the identified strategies function as general rules for practice (and hence are
normally applied by both). When one party breaks the rule seeking advantage, the other may
feel it has permission to do the same.
Configuring findings A-K, above, together suggests that intensification of the conflict
invites both parties to abandon of the ordinary rules of engagement (deference, courtesy,
secrecy) in favor of strategies that offer alternative routes to advantage (such as recruiting
allies or asserting personal identity.
9.5 Assessment of the Applied Coping Strategies in the Light of Conflict Theory
To take our effort to integrate our findings a step further, let us now reintroduce Pruitt and
Rubin’s theory of conflict handling (see chapter four) as an evaluative framework. With the
help of that theory we can describe the Rome-Hunthausen conflict in the following way.
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9.5.1 Sources of the Rome-Hunthausen Conflict
Pruitt and Rubin conceive of conflict as “perceived divergence of interest.” Conflict arises
when one party’s pursuit of its own interest is perceived to be incompatible with another
party’s pursuit of its interest. In Pruitt and Rubin’s terminology, interests (“people’s feelings
about what is basically desirable”) translate into aspirations (directed actions) toward goals
that are in keeping with one’s interests. At the same time, a party will have minimum
standards of achievement that are acceptable in regard to its interests.
In the Rome-Hunthausen case, we can express the apparent interests at stake most simply as
follows: Rome’s interest (the center’s interest) lies in seeing Hunthausen govern Seattle
Rome’s way; Hunthausen’s interest (the periphery’s interest) lies in governing Seattle his way
without alienating Rome. To simplify even further, the center has an interest in control and
the periphery has an interest in autonomy.
Rome’s interest in controlling the local Church involves ensuring that the thought and practice
operative in the local Church are in accord with the “official” thought and practice of the
Church universal. Thus, conformity from the people and from the bishop is sought, with the
local bishop occupying a crucial intermediate position between Rome and the people. In the
Hunthausen case, Rome sets as its goal the achievement of greater conformity and tighter
control in Seattle by means of applied pressure on Hunthausen (aspiration).
Hunthausen, however, does not equate his own best interest or that of his archdiocese with a
clampdown on thought and practice. From his earliest statements in regard to the visitation
(see his statement in the 10.27.83 Progress, chapter six, section A), Hunthausen defends and
praises the state of the local Church (“I am convinced that our efforts here in this archdiocese
are in keeping with the spirit and intent of the Council”). Repeatedly, his ecclesiological
emphasis is on renewal, the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and the need to treat Church
members as adults – concepts that suggest an openness to change and a preference for
freedom and flexibility.
The central incompatibility in the conflict is the clash between the center party’s attempt to
control the periphery and the periphery party’s attempt to allow for freedom and flexibility in
its pastoral activity and style of governance. Rome and Hunthausen perceive that their
respective interests in freedom and control stand in tension.
Pruitt and Rubin hold that three elements need to converge for conflict to develop: (1) Party’s
level of aspiration, (2) Party’s perception of Other’s level of aspiration, and (3) the apparent
lack of integrative alternatives. In the Rome-Hunthausen case, Rome’s level of aspiration is
apparently high. The Vatican engages Hunthausen over the course of years and employs
heavy tactics (visitation, redirection of faculties) to achieve its objectives. Hunthausen also
shows his own level of aspiration to be high, by resisting Vatican initiatives in private and
ultimately taking his case to his fellow bishops and the public at large. Both parties, observing
the actions of the other, have good reason to believe that the other’s level of aspiration is high
(the other’s commitment to own position is determined).
Pruitt and Rubin observe that other factors can contribute to raising a party’s level of
aspiration, including: own past achievements, perception of own strength, normative
justification, invidious comparisons and the formation of struggle groups. Rome’s level of
aspiration was likely raised by its awareness that local bishops normally conformed to Rome’s
wishes (past achievement), by its assurance that it held an overwhelming advantage in
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ecclesiastical power, and by its normative conviction that bringing the local churches in line
with Rome is the right thing to do (a position best expressed in the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter).
Hunthausen’s level of aspiration, on the other hand, was likely raised by his success at
maintaining a cooperative relationship with Rome in the past, by his perception of the support
he commanded in his own local church, by his conviction that he was doing what was right
for his people, by his awareness that the identified problems in his own diocese were also
taking place in many other dioceses (invidious comparison), and, over time, by the formation
of struggle groups in defense of his cause.
In the early and middle stages of the conflict, one finds the parties unable to recognize
“integrative alternatives,” that is, alternatives that would satisfy the aspirations of both sides.
There is, first of all, little agreement between the two sides about the seriousness of the
problems in Seattle. Hunthausen repeatedly emphasizes the positive conditions to be found in
Seattle, while minimizing or arguing away several cited examples of shortcomings, and in
only the most limited sense does he concede a need to tighten the reins of governance in
Seattle. Rome, however, shows a clear determination to establish stricter control over Church
communications (especially in the teaching of doctrine) and Church practice in Seattle, and
the Holy See betrays a lack of trust in Hunthausen to establish this stricter control. In short,
Rome wants Hunthausen to do what Hunthausen is not inclined to do, and both sides feel
(ethically, theologically) justified in their position. Rome’s lack of trust in Hunthausen
(embodied in the visitation and ordered redistribution of power to Wuerl) invites
Hunthausen’s lack of trust in response.
What makes the situation so difficult is Hunthausen’s own personal centrality relative to
Rome’s goal of establishing greater pastoral and doctrinal conformity in Seattle. Though of
course Rome could remove him at any time, this would likely be self-defeating, given
Hunthausen’s popularity locally. (It would possibly lead to more pronounced kinds of
“problematic” behavior in the local Church.) Thus, the ideal for Rome is to have Hunthausen
himself make the desired changes. Hunthausen, for his part, appears to be trapped between a
number of personal principles that are difficult to reconcile in the context of affair: he wants
to be true to his own experience of the local Church and his own belief about what is best for
it, but he also wants to be loyal to Rome. As the conflict progresses, his loyalty to Rome
undergoes serious tests when power is taken away from him. Hunthausen’s ideal solution
would be to honor his own experience and beliefs while pleasing Rome: but how to do this?
Thus far in this section I have spoken of the parties’ interests and goals in rather simple terms
and I have spoken of  “Rome” as a univocal entity. These are oversimplifications, which are
partially corrected (but only partially) by the table below. The table provides a glimpse of
various participants’ interests, standards and goals. I take as a given (but do not mark on the
table) the fact that all parties have an interest in enhancing the appearance and power of the
Church universal.
300
Orientations of Party Interest
PARTY INTEREST STANDARD GOAL
Pope John Paul II 1. Maintain papal control
over local churches
2. Promote the appearance
of the papacy
1. Do not make pastoral
situation worse in Seattle
2. Do not damage the
appearance of the papacy
by intervening in Seattle
1. Establish greater
pastoral discipline in
Seattle
2. Look good (strong but
compassionate) when
intervening in Seattle
Cardinal Ratzinger 1. Serve the Pope’s
interests
2. Maintain own power
and prestige (operational
forms: access to Pope,
control over Church
bureaucracy, denied
access to others,
theological expertise)
1. Resolve the Seattle
situation without making
the Pope look bad.
2. Resolve Seattle
situation without
damaging own power and
prestige (do not diminish
viability of operational
forms of power)
1. Resolve the Seattle
situation in a way that
makes the Pope look good.
2. Resolve Seattle
situation in such a way
that own power and
prestige are enhanced
(accentuate the
effectiveness of personal
operational forms of
power)
Cardinal Gantin 1. Serve the Pope’s
interests
2. Maintain own power
and prestige (operational
forms: access to Pope,
control over Church
bureaucracy, denied
access to others, control
over bishop appointments)
1. Participate in handling
of Seattle situation without
making the Pope look bad.
2. Help manage Seattle
situation without
damaging own power and
prestige (do not diminish
viability of operational
forms of power)
1. Contribute to resolution
of the Seattle situation that
makes the Pope look good.
2. Resolve Seattle
situation in such a way
that own power and
prestige are enhanced
(accentuate the
effectiveness of personal
operational forms of
power)
Archbishop Laghi 1. Serve the Pope’s
interests
2. Maintain own power
and prestige (operational
forms: access to Pope,
control over bishop
appointments in U.S.,
diplomatic-intermediary
role)
1. Resolve the Seattle
situation without making
the Pope look bad.
2. Resolve Seattle
situation without
damaging own power and
prestige (do not diminish
viability of operational
forms of power)
1. Resolve the Seattle
situation in a way that
makes the Pope look good.
2. Resolve Seattle
situation in such a way
that own power and
prestige are enhanced
(accentuate the
effectiveness of personal
operational forms of
power)
Archbishop Hickey 1. Serve the Pope’s
interests
2. Maintain own power
and prestige (operational
forms: status as a leading
U.S. bishop, access to
Pope, control over own
archdiocese
1. Conduct visitation
without making the
papacy look bad (heavy-
handed, petty).
2. Conduct visitation
without damaging own
power and prestige (by
reducing own access to
papacy or status within
American Church)
1. Conduct visitation in a
way that makes the papacy
look good (showing
papacy to be strong, fair,
compassionate)
2. Conduct visitation in a
way that enhances own
power and prestige
(showing self to be
efficient, effective and
able to accomplish task
without making
unnecessary waves
Archbishop Hunthausen 1. Maintain own power
and prestige (operational
forms: control over Seattle
archdiocese, status as
1. Avoid diminishing own
power and prestige (e.g.,
by appearing not to have
control over own
1. Handle conflict in a
way that maintains own
power and prestige (i.e.,
by demonstrating
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prophetic/justice-peace
bishop)
2. Maintain positive
relationship with the Holy
See
archdiocese; by seeming
not to act according to
own principles)
2. Avoid damaging
relationship with Holy See
(e.g., by offending Pope,
nuncio or curial officials;
by appearing rebellious;
by appearing ineffective as
an ordinary)
effectiveness as an
ordinary while remaining
faithful to justice-peace
and renewal principles)
2. Handle conflict in a
way that enhances
relationship with the Holy
See (by demonstrating
effective discipline in
Seattle and personal
loyalty to Rome)
Auxiliary Bishop Wuerl 1. Please Rome
2. Establish self as capable
bishop
1. Do not disappoint Rome
(by creating more
problems than already
exist in Seattle)
2. Demonstrate personal
competence, even if
Seattle situation does not
improve
1. Effectively serve Rome
by establishing good
relationship with
Hunthausen while
bolstering discipline in
Seattle
2. Demonstrate personal
competence by playing
key role in improving
Seattle conditions
NCCB 1. Maintain good relations
with Rome
2. Promote own status and
autonomy as an episcopal
conference
3. Protect freedoms of
individual bishops
(principle of subsidiarity)
1. Demonstrate loyalty to
Rome
2. Avoid losing status or
autonomy as an episcopal
conference (e.g., by
offending Rome or by
giving control of local
matters over to Rome
unnecessarily during
handling of Hunthausen
case)
3. Do not diminish
freedom of individual
bishops (by failing to
defend Hunthausen)
1. Enhance relations with
Rome by intervening to
support resolution of
Hunthausen case in a way
that Rome approves (get
Hunthausen back in line,
in time for papal pastoral
visit to U.S.).
2. Improve status and
autonomy as an episcopal
conference by introducing
self into conflict handling
and coming up with a
better solution than Rome
(without offending Rome
by doing so)
3. Defend Hunthausen in
such a way that
subsidiarity is affirmed
with Rome’s approval
Assessment Commission 1. Satisfy Rome in the
business at hand
2. Guard own careers
within hierarchy
3. Protect autonomy of
national episcopal
conference of individual
bishops
1. Generate solution to
conflict that Rome can
live with (minimal
conditions: reduced
disharmony in U.S.
Church and Seattle
archdiocese; Hunthausen
returned to docility or
removed; no appearance
of abandoning principle of
pastoral discipline)
2. Don’t show
incompetence by
intensifying already
volatile conflict
3. Don’t lose ground for
the national conference or
individual bishops by
seeming eager to promote
1. Generate solution to
conflict that pleases Rome
(by restoring peace in U.S.
Church and in Seattle in
particular; by bringing
Hunthausen into line in
such a way that he actively
supports efforts to tighten
discipline; by creating
impression that Rome has
won the conflict but in a
fair and compassionate
way).
2. Show selves to be loyal
and effective servants of
Rome who know how to
speak the language of
American Catholics
3. Enhance autonomy of
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independence from Rome national conference and
individual bishops by
showing how papacy is
best served by
guaranteeing such
autonomy
Coadjutor Archbishop
Murphy
1.Please Rome
2. Please Hunthausen
3. Distinguish self (own
identity) as a bishop
1. Keep further
controversy from arising
2. Give no public
perception of being at
odds with Hunthausen
3. Do not appear overly
tied to Rome’s or
Hunthausen’s perspectives
1. Increase level of
pastoral discipline in
Seattle without raising
further controversy
2. Demonstrate empathy
with his pastoral approach
3. Show that one can
creatively integrate the
Rome and Hunthausen
approaches to pastoral
leadership
TABLE 9.5
The table above is realistic, in that it focuses only on the question of power – personal power
and power of office. As such it does not take into account the complicating factor posed by
personally held, idealistic hesitations about power. One thing the table makes clear is that, for
bishops, power is a matter of properly distributing one’s loyalties. One eye must always be on
the papacy, and the other must attend to the specific constituency one serves as leader.
9.5.2 Choices of Strategy
Pruitt and Rubin point to two main concepts that help us to understand why parties act as they
do in the face of conflict (see section 4.2.2). These concepts are mutual concern (Are the
parties concerned for the other’s outcome as well as their own?) and feasibility (Is a course of
action likely to succeed?).
In the Rome-Hunthausen conflict, it is fair to say that the two parties show high levels of
concern for one another’s outcomes. The best evidence for this is the persistent attention to
face saving on both sides. Neither party wants to “win” the conflict at the expense of
embarrassing the other. Apparently this disposition is operative genuinely (on the level of
personal feeling) and instrumentally (for the sake of advantage). By virtue of their
membership in the hierarchy, bishops have much in common (identity, responsibilities,
burdens) and they enjoy opportunities for personal bonding. At the same time, in their role of
leadership, they are conditioned to an ideology of charity. These factors can work to induce a
genuinely felt common concern. On a more instrumental level, fostering good relations with
other bishops, and especially with powerful bishops in Rome, is important for guarding one’s
own professional privileges and prestige.
Though it is very difficult for an outsider to know when mutual concern is present (and still
harder to know how “genuine” it is), we see potential signs of concern for the other in the use
of politeness (refusing to criticize, employing euphemisms, keeping silence about
embarrassing matters) and in acts of deference (Hunthausen accepts the visitation, Rome
provides Hunthausen with an alternative to the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter) and kindness
(Hunthausen shows a gracious welcome to Wuerl, the Pope sends Hunthausen a telegram at
the time of his cancer surgery).
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Feasibility is a second matter fundamental to strategic choice in conflict. On a global level in
the Rome-Hunthausen conflict, there are clear limits of feasibility that apply to certain courses
of action. Though feasibility is, again, a question of perception, and the principals’
perceptions are not fully accessible to outsiders, we can at least say that certain desirable
outcomes must have appeared highly unlikely to the conflict participants. Rome, for example,
must have known that Hunthausen was not going to become a bishop entirely different from
the bishop he was. Telling him to be a law-and-order bishop would not make him one. Thus it
became necessary to determine how far Hunthausen could be pushed to reform the
archdiocese according to Rome’s wishes, as weighed against the consequences of removing
Hunthausen altogether. The experiments with assistant bishops appear to be an attempt to
strike a balance that achieves the best possible result. Hunthausen, on the other hand, must
have soon realized that Rome was not going to intervene as drastically as it had and then
simply walk away and admit to a mistake. If the purpose of the intervention in the first place
was, as many speculated, to send a message to local churches everywhere (and especially in
America) that Rome would not tolerate local pastoral experimentation, backing off entirely
would send precisely the opposite message. It would give the impression that the center did
not and could not control the periphery. So feasibility, for Hunthausen, was limited by
Rome’s need to save face for itself.
Levels of concern and perceptions about feasibility inform actual conflict choices. Pruitt and
Rubin characterize conflict activity with five key descriptors of strategy: contending involves
trying to prevail without regard to the other party’s aspirations; problem solving is a matter
of trying to satisfy the aspirations of self and other; yielding entails lowering one’s own
aspirations in favor of the other’s aspirations; inaction involves temporarily stepping back
from attempts to resolve the controversy; and withdrawal amounts to a permanent
withdrawal from the conflict handling process. In the figure that follows, I offer my own
general assessment of when these strategies were applied by the center and periphery parties.
The figure does not account for all applications of the (general) strategies, but rather, those
that in my view are most pertinent. The applications of the various strategies are presented in
chronological order.
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Chronological Presentation of General Coping Strategies Applied
Key:
C = Contending
Y = Yielding
P = Problem Solving
I = Inaction
W = Withdrawal
Rome Hunthausen
Early
Stage:
1978-Sept.
1986
C/P: Proposes visitation
C : Refuses request for bill of particulars and
for public announcement
Y/C: Agrees to make public announcement
of visitation (reluctantly, following news
leak) but maintains as much secrecy as
possible
C: Withholds visitation conclusions from
periphery for 22 months
C/P: Delivers unfavorable visitation report
(Ratzinger letter)
C: Refuses to grant permission to disclose
Ratzinger letter
Y/P: Provides Laghi redraft of Ratzinger
letter
C/P: Proposes appointment of auxiliary
bishop (outsider with special faculties)
Y/P: Gives in to Hunthausen’s request to
grant faculties to Wuerl his own way
C/P: Rome declares its intention for
Hunthausen to give Wuerl faculties
Y/P: Agrees to visitation
C: Requests bill of particulars and public
announcement of visitation
Y: Accepts visitation process that is largely
secretive
I: Hunthausen stays in a conflict holding pattern
while Rome processes visitation report
C/P: Requests public disclosure of Ratzinger letter
C/P: Insists on having visitation report to release to
public
C/P: Presents Laghi statement of findings in
advantageous light
C: Challenges the intention for the auxiliary to
have special faculties
Y/P: Agrees to cooperate with Wuerl appointment
P: Hunthausen works with Wuerl to address
Rome’s pastoral concerns in Seattle
C?/P?: Hunthausen grants Wuerl substantial
authority in Seattle but not faculties
Y: Hunthausen grants Wuerl faculties
Middle
Stage:
Sept.
1986-Nov.
1986
C: Produces Vatican chronology
C: Angles for NCCB endorsement of
C: Issues press release announcing Wuerl’s
possession of faculties
C: Begins public relations campaign to explain
own position
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chronology
C: At NCCB meeting, Laghi reminds bishop
of his critical role in U.S. bishop
appointments
C: The Pope’s message to the bishops
reminds them, in ecclesiological language,
of the importance of following his lead
C: Vatican officials paint the NCCB debate
outcome as favorable to the Holy See
C: Works against release of chronology and
provision of NCCB endorsement of chronology
C: Prepares statements (response to Vatican
chronology and more general address) to argue
case before NCCB
C: Hunthausen argues his case before the NCCB
C: Hunthausen points to positive outcomes from
the NCCB debate
I: Hunthausen waits to see what the Vatican’s next
move will be (keeping silence)
Late
Stage:
Nov.
1986-
April 1989
Y/P: Laghi announces appointment of
assessment commission
I: Laghi and other officials of the Holy See
step back from direct involvement in conflict
handling while commission conducts its
assessment
P: Pope agrees to accept commission
recommendation
P/C: Vatican keeps commission in place to
monitor Seattle for almost two years
P: Hunthausen (and Wuerl) meet with commission
to discuss resolution options
C: Hunthausen resists coadjutor idea; offers to
resign
C: Hunthausen presses for choice of who coadjutor
will be
C: Hunthausen challenges conclusions drawn in
commission report
P/Y: Hunthausen agrees to commission’s proposal
for resolution
P/C: Hunthausen publicly accepts commission plan
and Murphy appointment, while expressing
reservations about the commission report
P/C: Hunthausen acknowledges end of commission
oversight, acknowledging reservations one last
time before maintaining a more or less permanent
silence about the affair
FIGURE 9.6
The figure helps us to see that, whereas contending is mixed in with the use of a variety of
other strategies (excluding withdrawal, which never shows up) in the early and late stages, it
stands almost alone as the preferred strategy in the middle stage. The middle stage is the
period of highest conflict intensity. Note that instances of yielding usher in new stages in the
conflict: by Hunthausen (granting Wuerl faculties, which marks the beginning of the middle
stage) and by Rome (announcing the commission appointment, which signals the beginning of
the late stage.
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9.5.3 Escalation
As noted, the middle stage is the stage of contention. Clear signs of yielding and problem
solving are lacking during this relatively brief but intense period. Tensions between center
and periphery reach their height. Hunthausen, while giving in to Rome’s wishes by granting
faculties to Wuerl, nonetheless displeases Rome by announcing this publicly. Rome then
releases the highly critical Vatican chronology. Thereafter, both parties search aggressively
for bishop allies and public support.
Pruitt and Rubin equate contention with conflict escalation, identifying five transformations
that occur during escalation (see section 4.2.3, above): (1) heavy tactics replace gentle tactics;
(2) the conflict issues proliferate and parties commit increased resources to the struggle; (3)
specific issues give way to general issues and there is a deterioration of relationship between
the parties; (4) the emphasis shifts from doing well to winning to hurting the other; (5) the
number of conflict participants increases. Most of these signs of escalation are readily visible
in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict, especially in the middle stage.
Pruitt and Rubin note that the likelihood of escalation is reduced when conflict-limiting norms
and institutions are present, when there is fear of escalation, when significant bonds join the
antagonists, and when relevant other parties oppose the conflict. Several of these conditions
applied in the Rome-Hunthausen case and perhaps contributed to the tapering off of escalation
and the emergence of the stalemate and settlement stages. Certainly the Church knows norms,
or unwritten rules of conflict, that discourage bishops from openly waging conflict with one
another. As an institution, however, the Church lacks stated policies for conflict handling and
established structures (bodies) of mediation that could serve the management of center-
periphery conflict. In the Rome-Hunthausen case the parties appear to make up the rules for
conflict handling as they go along, with the basic rule being that the center decides. Fear of
escalation seems to have been an important factor preventing further escalation of the conflict.
By the time of the conclusion of the NCCB debate, certain consequences of escalation are
apparent to all concerned, with potential costs to center (disruption of the Pope’s pastoral
visit, damaged prestige), periphery (removal from office, retraction of the process of
“renewal” underway) and the Church organization (harms to appearance, disunity). The bonds
existing between the center and periphery parties seem not to have been personal so much as
official and Church-cultural, with religious belief and membership in the hierarchy being held
in common. The “fraternal” relationship between parties appears not so much to have served
as a limit on expressing disagreement privately, but more as a restriction on transparent
conflict handling that threatens the appearance of the Church “family.” The center and
periphery parties’ ties to fellow bishops – especially the American bishops’ conference – also
seems to have been a factor limiting the escalation of the conflict. At least in the short run,
these bishops had little to gain by seeing the conflict continue. The unrest the case was
generating in the pews did not make the bishops’ own tasks of leadership in their own
dioceses any easier, and those bishops who would be hosting the Pope in their own local
churches in the coming year had an additional reason to want to see the conflict resolved
quickly. Moreover, the readiness of the conference to be of “assistance” in the case offers a
practical limit to the escalation, providing a new route to an “integrative alternative” that had
not yet been pursued.
Let us now pause to consider the specific types of transformations related to contention that
can be viewed in the conflict.
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Signs of Escalation in the Rome-Hunthausen Conflict
1. Light to Heavy. The most obvious example of this occurs when center and periphery
challenge one another in public: open criticism of the other party replaces more polite
and hidden attempts to exercise influence. But both parties apply heavy tactics at other
times as well. The Vatican’s use of heavy tactics in the early stage (visitation, Wuerl
appointment) is striking. Why are such heavy tactics used so early on? And
Hunthausen appears to have a standing offer (threat?) to resign on the table during all
stages of the conflict.
2. Small to Large. The most pronounced proliferation of issues takes place during the
NCCB debates. Hunthausen is the main instigator, bringing issues such as secrecy, the
relationship individual bishops to Holy Father, the role of national episcopal
conferences, the place of pastoral discretion in bishop’s power of governance, the right
of Church goers to be involved in pastoral discernment, and the justice of
ecclesiastical procedures into the discussion. Perhaps the best example of the center
and periphery parties committing increasing resources in order to prevail is their
enhanced effort to recruit allies and supporters and their investment of personal
prestige in the conflict handling.
3. Specific to General. Specific issues give way to general issues as the discussion
moves from the consideration of specific pastoral problems and solutions in Seattle (as
summarized in the Ratzinger letter and, presumably, the Hickey report) to more global
questions of how the Church should be governed. Along the way, there is evidence of
a deteriorating relationship between center and periphery as positive forms of courtesy
are abandoned.
4. Doing Well to Winning to Hurting the Other. Ambiguous. Despite Hunthausen’s
declarations that the point is not about winning or losing, it is clear that both center
and periphery act on the basis of strong convictions and desire to prevail over the
position, if not the person, of the other. Much more doubtful is whether either party
gets to the point of wanting to “hurt” the other. I see little evidence for making this
claim.
5. Few to Many. The number of participants increases. Both direct participants (third
parties of bishops) become involved (Wuerl, Hurley, Malone, other bishops, the
commission) as well as the media and general public.
BOX 9.7
One of the challenging tasks of discernment in the case involves identifying when problem
solving takes place, as opposed to contention disguised as problem solving. In the
chronological table of strategies applied (above), I identify some acts as examples of two
strategies at once, to indicate this ambiguity. A related but different challenge for discernment
involves deciding when yielding is an end in and of itself (one yields on principle, or one
yields because no real alternative exists) and when yielding is more strategic in nature: that is,
when the concession is made for the sake of showing good faith or winning future
concessions. If we refer back to figure 9.6, we see that instances of yielding that were
apparently unavoidable (as when Hunthausen grants Wuerl faculties against his will) are
marked with a simple “Y” symbol and more ambiguous or apparently strategic instances with
a “Y/P” symbol. From the table we see that most of the identifiable acts of yielding (Y or
Y/P) take place in the early stage, with a few more in the late stage and none in the middle
stage. The table also conveys a sense of the importance of acts of yielding to the shape of the
conflict as a whole. Hunthausen’s unwilled yielding marks a crossing over into the heaviest
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phase of escalation, and the Vatican’s willingness to yield by creating a new vehicle for
problem solving (the commission) ushers in the stage of settlement.
I find only a few occasions of party inaction during the conflict. Mostly this is a matter of
Hunthausen’s waiting for Vatican action (while Rome processes the visitation findings and
while Rome decides what to do after the NCCB clash). But I also find a form of inaction on
Rome’s part when it makes room for the ad hoc commission to take the lead in the conflict
handling. I do not assume that the center and periphery parties in fact stopped all their efforts
to manage the conflict during these periods, but the evidence does seem to show that each
stepped back from a more active, interventionist approach during these times.
9.5.4 Stalemate and Settlement
The table carries forth my preference for understanding the conflict in terms of three distinct
stages (see section 5.2.1.5, above): roughly, an early stage of gradually rising conflict
intensity, wherein the parties feel one another out and employ a variety of conflict handling
approaches (problem solving / contending / yielding / inaction); a middle stage, wherein the
conflict intensity rises dramatically and contention is the norm; and a late stage, when a new
approach toward settlement is adopted and the level of conflict intensity diminishes
considerably.
Though I have chosen not to do so (since the period is brief and its conflict handling is not
very transparent), one might also mark off a fourth stage, stalemate. Following the airing of
views at the NCCB committee, both parties show a disinclination to escalate the conflict
further (cf. section 4.2.3, above), but steps toward agreement are also not apparent. Pruitt and
Rubin cite four major reasons for the development of a stalemate: the failure of contentious
tactics, the exhaustion of necessary resources, the loss of social support and unacceptable
costs. Of these possible reasons, the failure of contentious tactics and the prospect of
unacceptable costs seem to apply to both parties in the Rome-Hunthausen case, and the loss of
social support appears to have been an influence on Rome’s decision not to press Hunthausen
further. The contentious tactics failed in the sense that neither party achieved its own goals
outright by means of the increasing escalation, and potential for unacceptable costs presented
itself in the possibility of Hunthausen’s loss of leadership power altogether and public
relations damage for the Holy See.
Pruitt and Rubin observe that third parties often play a role in conflict settlement, though it is
not automatic that third party participants will enhance rather than hinder opportunities for
settlement. In the Rome-Hunthausen conflict we see a variety of third party participants. The
key third parties from within the hierarchy are Wuerl, the NCCB, the assessment commission
and Murphy. The roles of Wuerl and Murphy need to be distinguished from the roles played
by the NCCB and the commission. Whereas Wuerl and Murphy act in some sense as bridges
between the general ecclesiological interests of the center and periphery parties (concretely
addressing the source issues on a day-to-day basis over time), the involvement of the NCCB
and the commission, functionally speaking, is of limited duration and focused on the conflict
handling itself (rather than the source issues). Wuerl’s introduction as a third party becomes a
source of conflict in and of itself (because he is perceived as too closely aligned with the
center), and eventually he is removed from Seattle for that reason. The NCCB’s main role is
as a sounding board whereby the conflict issues may be aired publicly. By signalling a
significant level of conference support for Hunthausen, the NCCB puts pressure on Rome to
look for an alternative solution for Seattle. The assessment commission completes the difficult
assignment of finding specific proposals that would achieve Hunthausen’s cooperation and
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save face for Rome. Murphy, finally, serves as the linchpin of future harmony. His successful
working relationship with Hunthausen and his acceptability to Rome allows the resolution to
succeed over time.
Of the three models of conflict escalation that Pruitt and Rubin identify (aggressor-defender,
conflict spiral, structural change), the conflict spiral and structural change models appear most
directly applicable. It is insufficient to characterize Hunthausen as merely reacting or
defending himself against the actions undertaken by Rome, as in the aggressor-defender
model. Hunthausen shows a quality of self-certainty and a willingness to assert himself
(contend) from the beginning. As for the structural change model, perhaps the most noticeable
structural changes are on the psychological level. Hunthausen / Seattle comes to perceive
itself to be beset by an unfriendly, intrusive Rome; Rome comes to perceive Hunthausen to be
uncooperative as well as not firm enough. There are also changes that take place in the
perception of what the conflict is ultimately about -- from specific pastoral leadership
questions to control-vs.-freedom, for example.  Beyond the matter of perception, however,
one can also identify structural changes in the practice of the conflict handling itself, as when
the assessment commission is introduced. The conflict spiral model, on the other hand is
helpful for showing how specific conflict moves lead to specific responses, in escalating
fashion. Thus do we see the escalation that occurs when Hunthausen is forced to give over the
faculties to Wuerl. Hunthausen reveals the faculties (to Rome’s irritation), Laghi produces the
Vatican chronology in response, Hunthausen answers the chronology, and so forth.
The outcome to the conflict may be termed a compromise. Both center and periphery lower
their aspirations in order to come to agreement. Rome accepts the need to backtrack on its
earlier appointment of Wuerl and its decision to transfer power away from Hunthausen.
Hunthausen accepts the imposition of a coadjutor archbishop who is acceptable but not
necessarily of his choosing. In many respects, it is surprising that Hunthausen comes out as
well as he does, given his significant disadvantage in formal kinds of organizational power.
On the other hand, it is not at all clear that Hunthausen’s position has won in the long run. If
Rome’s purpose was to “send a message” through its intervention in Seattle, it appears to
have succeeded. Regardless of how Hunthausen himself emerged, the fact is there have been
almost no bishops willing to openly stand against the Vatican in the years since the
Hunthausen case (the French bishop Gaillot and the Zambian bishop Milingo have been
exceptions, but both have been disciplined and all but removed from the public scene). More
important is the question of whether the Church has won as a result of the handling of the
Rome-Hunthausen case. Was the goal of joining people more closely to one another and to
God furthered through these events? I will return to this question when I present my
conclusions in chapter ten.
9.5.5 Reconsideration of the Conflict Theory Framework
Pruitt and Rubin’s descriptive theory of social conflict has served our purposes by supplying
sensitizing concepts that have helped orient our consideration of the Rome-Hunthausen
conflict. Of particular value has been their discussion how assessments of interest (one’s own
and the other party’s) and feasibility play into decisions about strategic choice. Just as
important has been their highlighting of levels of mutual concern as a factor in strategic
choice. More specifically, their perspective has advanced this research by calling attention to
four strategies of contention that have been found to be relevant to center-periphery conflict
handling (ingratiation, gamesmanship, persuasive argumentation and threats). At a later stage
in this research, during and after confrontation of the case materials, Pruitt and Rubin’s theory
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has helped us to think about the variety of conflict events as an integrated whole, with
attention going to the transitions through conflict stages and the outcomes ultimately
achieved.
Having observed that Pruitt and Rubin’s theory has served us well in many respects, the limits
of the theory for our purposes must be noted as well. Pruitt and Rubin’s concern with social
conflict in general carries us only so far in understanding the specific dynamics of Church
center-periphery conflict. One of the more important presuppositions and findings of this
research is that organizational and societal pressures play a huge role in shaping conflict
choices. Pruitt and Rubin (1986, 187) acknowledge that, in their attempt to provide a general
theory of conflict that transcends levels and arenas of society, they run the risk of ignoring
“real differences between conflict arenas.” With this general theory, one is able to reach the
point of identifying the basic class of five strategic options, but one is not able to proceed to
say what specific forms those strategies are likely to take under what conditions. In short, the
social-psychological theory of Pruitt and Rubin needs to be complemented by organizational-
societal theories of conflict handling, such as the one I am pursuing here, which give us a
more specific idea of strategic choice in context.
9.6 Ascertaining the Validity of the Above-Named Findings from the Rome-Hunthausen
Case
Thus far in chapter nine I have offered a preliminary description and analysis of the coping
strategies I have found to be applied in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict. The question remains,
however, whether these findings can be taken to be accurate reflections of what actually
transpired in the case. Though I have tried at every step along the way to present the evidence
and logic leading to the conclusions drawn, I believe there is nonetheless value in imposing
two confirmatory / disconfirmatory tests to the findings. The first, whose results are presented
in the section that follows, is a control of the findings from the closely read selected
documents. The other is a more global test of validity, drawing on an interview with a case
informant (section 9.7 and following).
It must be acknowledged that these are only two among a number of different types of
confirmatory tests that might be conducted. While there is no general agreement among
researchers about how the validity of findings can be ascertained with great confidence (cf.
Miles and Huberman 1994, 262), I want as much as possible to guarantee the correctness of
my analysis. That is what I attempt to accomplish with the two tests named above, while
admitting that certain other kinds of tests (for representativeness of the case, researcher
effects, spurious relationships, etc.) are not conducted. These two tests in particular are chosen
because of priority concerns to see that 1) my selection of documents has not skewed the
findings (since many of my findings are based on the concentrated reading of limited number
of documents), and 2) my overall reading of the case has not wildly differed from the view of
actual participants.
9.6.1 Use of Control Documents
It is possible that the results described above may have been skewed through a
nonrepresentative selection of documents. Though I have attempted to avoid this problem by
choosing documents for analysis that have already been described as critical to the case by
external observers (i.e., the composite source), and that represent the discursive contributions
of a variety of participants in all of the stages of the conflict, it is nonetheless possible that the
chosen documents are not reflective of the conflict handling strategies applied in the case as a
whole. As a check on this possibility, therefore, I have reserved a set of documents for
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comparative purposes. This set of eight documents, representing the contributions of center,
periphery and third parties across all three stages of the conflict, can help us to determine
whether the findings from the earlier set of selected documents show up elsewhere in the
conflict data. (For a description of the control document selection process, see section 5.8.1,
above.) Here below one finds a list of the selected control documents. The numbering of the
documents picks up where the list of documents originally selected leaves off. Hence, the first
number here is 10.
Documents Selected for Control Analysis
10. Ratzinger, Letter to Hunthausen announcing Vatican reception of Visitation Report,
dated December 12, 1983 (The Progress, 26 Jan. 1984)
11. Hunthausen, Press Statement welcoming Wuerl as Auxiliary Bishop of Seattle, December 3, 1985
(The Progress, 5 Dec. 1985)
12. Wuerl, Press Statement regarding his appointment as Auxiliary Bishop, December 3, 1985 (The
Progress, 5 Dec. 1985)
13. Hunthausen, Press Statement offering first response to Vatican Chronology, released October 27,
1986 (The Progress, 30 Oct. 1986; Origins, 6 Nov. 1986)
14. Bishop Nicholas Walsh (Bishop Emeritus of Yakima, Washington and former Auxiliary Bishop of
Seattle), Newspaper column recounting his decision to make a recent trip to Rome to offer assistance in
Hunthausen case, published November 20, 1986 (The Progress, 20 Nov. 1986)
15. Hunthausen, Statement accepting Commission Report, released May 27, 1987 (The Progress, 28 May
1987)
16. Wuerl, Press Statement re. his reassignment, released May 27, 1986 (The Progress, 28 May 1987)
17. Laghi, Announcement of completion of work of assessment commission, released April 11, 1989.
BOX 9.8
In order to carry out this process of ascertaining validity, I prepared a statement of positive
expectations (presented below). The positive expectations declare what I have consistently
found in the documents previously analyzed and what I anticipated finding in other
documents from the case. Following the statement of expectations, I offer a table
summarizing the presence or absence of the specified strategy in each of the control
documents and a written assessment of the new findings. Besides generating a set of positive
expectations, I also produced a set of negative expectations (a search for negative evidence).
These expectations concern applications of conflict strategies that must not appear if my
findings are to be considered valid. Again, a table summarizes the absence or presence of
evidence of such a strategy being applied, followed by a written reflection on the findings.
9.6.2 Application of Positive Expectations to the Control Documents
Based on the analysis of the Rome-Hunthausen case as presented thus far, I have come to
expect that the following coping strategies will be applied in center-periphery conflict, and in
the Rome-Hunthausen case in particular.
Positive Expectations
1. All parties (Center, Periphery, Third) will always (in every stage of the conflict) show
deference to the order and mindset of the Church.
2. All parties will consistently associate their own efforts with the best interest of the
Church.
3. All parties will show a tendency to minimize the appearance of conflict, except for in
periods of unusually high tension.
4. All parties will show fraternity toward one another, but the quality of fraternity may be
more a matter of closed in-fighting than public bonhomie during periods of highest tension.
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5. All parties will practice courtesy consistently, with exceptions only during periods of
highest tension.
6. All parties will employ secrecy in some form during every stage of the conflict.
7. The center party will make little effort to recruit allies in the early stage, but more in the
middle and late stages. The periphery party will attempt to recruit allies in all three stages.
8. All parties will employ persuasive argumentation on occasion, but such argumentation
between the direct participants in the conflict will be shared privately. Public presentation of
persuasive argumentation will be directed to non-direct participants in the conflict.
9. The center party will show very little readiness to assert personal identity during the
conflict handling. The periphery party will show more readiness to do so.
Confirmation / Disconfirmation of Positive Expectations in the Control Documents
Key:
+ = expectation confirmed by the document
O = expectation disconfirmed by the document
A = it is ambiguous whether the expectation is confirmed by the document
NA = expectation is not applicable to party in question
Expectations Doc. 10 Doc. 11 Doc. 12 Doc. 13 Doc. 14 Doc. 15 Doc. 16 Doc. 17
1. + + + + + + + +
2. + + + + + + + +
3. + + + + + + + +
4. + + + + + + + +
5. + + + + + + + +
6. + + + + + + + +
7. A + NA + NA + NA +
8. + + + A + + + +
9. + + NA + NA + NA +
TABLE 9.9A
9.6.2.1 Commentary
Six of the eight control documents (documents 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 17) offered evidence
that confirmed each of the nine positive expectations. No documents showed evidence that
clearly disconfirmed the expectations. Two documents stood in ambiguous relationship to one
or more of the expectations.
Of the six documents which confirmed all expectations, two were produced by Hunthausen,
two by Wuerl, one by Laghi, and one by Bishop Nicholas Walsh, retired auxiliary bishop of
Seattle. Document 11, Hunthausen’s statement welcoming Wuerl as auxiliary bishop, is most
notable for its emphasis on fraternal good feeling, its heightened expressions of courtesy and
its complete neglect of the presence of conflict. Document 12, Wuerl’s press statement
acknowledging his appointment as auxiliary bishop is highly polite and deferential in its tone,
as is document 16, his press statement acknowledging his reassignment elsewhere. Since
Wuerl is a third party, expectations 7 and 9 do not apply to these documents. Document 14,
Bishop Walsh’s account of his trip to see the Pope, is an interesting example of a third party
interjecting himself discursively into the conflict handling. The text confirms all expectations
except for the two that do not apply to third party contributions. Document 15, Hunthausen’s
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statement accepting the commission report, is somewhat surprising in its inclusion of a
criticism of the commission report (Hunthausen says he is “not in agreement with a number of
important aspects” of the report and is “therefore not prepared to endorse it”), but, as has
consistently been his approach, Hunthausen refuses to criticize any member of the hierarchy
directly and he does not depart from his stance of deference. Document 17, Laghi’s
announcement of the completion of the work of the commission, is a minimalistic statement
much like his announcement of the commission’s formation. It is short and businesslike.
Two documents (10 and 13) confirmed all expectations but one. Document 10, Ratzinger’s
letter to Hunthausen announcing reception of the visitation report, is ambiguous in regard to
expectation 7. Though there is no clear evidence that Ratzinger attempts to recruit allies
through this statement, he does provide it to Hunthausen with approval for its public release,
which makes it a potential vehicle for seeking public support. Document 13, Hunthausen’s
first press statement commenting on the Vatican chronology is ambiguous in regard to
expectation 8. Though Hunthausen appears primarily to be addressing the public here, he
signals his intention to introduce counter-arguments and he previews some of those arguments
here. One can see this as a persuasive foray directed toward the Holy See.
In short, the positive expectations were confirmed across the selection of control documents,
with the exception of two instances of ambiguity.
9.6.3 Application of Negative Expectations to the Control Documents
Based on my analysis of the Rome-Hunthausen case thus far, I have come to expect that the
following phenomena will not be observable in the eight control documents.
Negative Expectations
1. An explicit attack on the order and mindset of the Church.
2. A profession of disinterest in what is best for the Church.
3. A statement highlighting the fact that conflict is taking place prior to Hunthausen’s
announcement of Wuerl’s possession of faculties.
4. A personal attack on a fellow bishop or an attack on the notion of episcopal fraternity.
5. An insult directed from one member of the hierarchy to another.
6. A written communication meant for the public that reveals in comprehensive detail an
intrahierarchical exchange that took place in private.
7. A refusal to address influential other parties during the period of open conflict (middle
stage).
8. An example of the center or periphery party directly engaging the other in persuasive
argumentation in a document intended for public release.
9. A strategic assertion of personal identity coming from the center party prior to the
November 1986 NCCB meeting.
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Confirmation / Disconfirmation of Negative Expectations in the Control Documents
Key:
+ = negative expectation confirmed
O = negative expectation disconfirmed
A = unclear whether negative expectation is confirmed or disconfirmed
NA = not applicable to document
Negative
Expectation
Doc. 10 Doc. 11 Doc. 12 Doc. 13 Doc. 14 Doc. 15 Doc. 16 Doc. 17
1. + + + + + + + +
2. + + + + + + + +
3. + + + + + + + +
4. + + + + + + + +
5. + + + + + + + +
6. + + + + + + + +
7. + + + + + + + +
8. + + NA A NA + NA +
9. + NA NA NA NA NA NA +
TABLE 9.9B
9.6.3.1 Commentary
A glance at the table shows that none of the nine negative expectations were clearly
disconfirmed by evidence in any of the documents. The one instance of ambiguity concerned
negative expectation 8 (one will not find the center or periphery party directly engaging the
other in persuasive argumentation in a document intended for public release) in document 13,
Hunthausen’s press release offering his first response to the Vatican chronology. In this
document it does appear that Hunthausen engages in a bit of persuasive argumentation which
can be seen to be as much intended for the center party as for any third parties.
A number of positions on the table are marked not-applicable. These can be accounted for by
the fact that negative expectation 8 does not apply to third parties and negative expectation 9
does not apply to periphery or third parties.
The most significant conclusion that we can draw from this confrontation of the control
documents with the negative expectations is that we find here no evidence which in and of
itself radically undermines the perspective of center-periphery conflict handling already
advanced in this research. But it is necessary to keep in mind that the absence of strong forms
of evidence to the contrary of expectations is no guarantee that the expectations themselves
are correct.
Perhaps the most interesting finding from the application of negative expectations to the
control documents was the ambiguity which arose concerning Hunthausen’s initial response
to the Vatican chronology (document 13). There, contrary to the (negative) expectation,
Hunthausen appeared to engage in a limited form of persuasive argumentation which was
directed toward the center party (though surely, and perhaps primarily, toward other parties as
well). One will recall that when I expressed a related expectation in positive form (positive
expectation 8, in section 9.6.2, above) the finding was also ambiguous in regard to this
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document. Thus, we have reason to look especially closely at our understanding of how the
strategy of persuasive argumentation was applied in the conflict. It appears to be less than
straightforward, given the results of validation attempted with the control documents.
9.7 Use of the Fr. Ryan Interview for Validation Purposes
Thus far I have applied one form of validation technique (the use of control documents) in
search of confirmation or disconfirmation of my findings from the Rome-Hunthausen case. I
will now apply another form of validation technique, drawing on an interview conducted with
a key participant in the conflict, Very Rev. Michael G. Ryan. Fr. Ryan served as
Hunthausen’s chief collaborator and adviser during the conflict, in a formal capacity as Vicar
General and Chancellor of the Seattle Archdiocese and in an informal capacity as friend. In a
late stage of the research process I asked Fr. Ryan to sit for an extended interview to discuss
the case. Fr. Ryan granted my request and the interview took place in two sessions (on Friday,
May 11, and Friday, May 18, 2001), each lasting two hours, with both taking place in the
rectory of St. James Cathedral, Seattle.
My purpose in conducting the interview was threefold. First, I wanted to hear him tell his own
version of the conflict history. Thus I started by presenting him with an open-ended question
(see appendix vi) and asked him to recount the story of the case from beginning to end. Once
Fr. Ryan had constructed a case narrative based on his own recollections, I then raised certain
informational questions in need of clarification which had emerged from my own research.
Finally, I asked Fr. Ryan to assess the credibility of a number of statements which articulated
key findings of my own at that point concerning the case (a direct attempt at validation).
What follows is a presentation of material from the interview. I begin by presenting new
information about the case garnered from the interview. Thereafter, I discuss statements from
the interview (empirical referents or opinions) which, variously, appear to confirm and / or
disconfirm my findings from the case. In particular, my focus goes to the use of coping
strategies in the case.
A few things need to be kept in mind while processing the findings from the Ryan interview.
First, Ryan, probably more than any person besides Hunthausen himself, was informed about
and committed to the periphery party position in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict. In that sense,
his recollections and opinions are highly illuminating but also partisan. To my mind that does
not detract from their value, but it is a factor to be considered when evaluating the comments.
Secondly, one of my tasks in interviewing Ryan was to gain access to how Hunthausen
himself saw the conflict and his own role in it. (Hunthausen himself refused my interview
request.) Though Ryan often served as Hunthausen’s ghost writer and appears to have been
his closest adviser, again, we must keep in mind that he stands a step removed from any
number of critical negotiations (and private, personal decision making processes) that
Hunthausen and others experienced first-hand. Finally, I asked Fr. Ryan about the case some
twelve years after it ran its course and eighteen years after it began. His recollections, as he
himself admitted more than once, are subject to limits of memory.
9.7.1 New Information from the Fr. Ryan Interview
Beyond providing insight into Fr. Ryan’s own perspective on the Rome-Hunthausen conflict,
my two-session interview with him also yielded information I had not yet encountered in my
own survey of the public record of the affair. Before discussing how Fr. Ryan’s observations
affirmed or challenged my own conclusions about the case, I want first to share some pieces
of information emerging from the interview that were new to me. I will summarize these
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findings in chronological order and in more or less “digital” fashion. As much as possible, the
statements below represent Fr. Ryan’s descriptions of what actually happened. I have tried to
exclude his opinions about or interpretations of what happened. But obviously, the
“objective” occurrences have been translated through the subjectivity of his perception and
subsequent communication to (through) me.
1. According to Ryan, Hunthausen first became aware that the Vatican was receiving letters of complaint
concerning his leadership sometime during the tenure of Archbishop Jean Jadot as Apostolic Delegate to the
U.S. When Jadot discussed this matter with Hunthausen, Hunthausen invited him to come to Seattle to see for
himself how the Church was operating. Jadot pronounced himself amenable to this idea, but the visit did not
transpire before he was withdrawn as Apostolic Delegate.
2. Fr. Ryan also cited one other, pre-visitation exchange of correspondence with the Holy See. It concerned
Hunthausen’s granting of an imprimatur to Philip Keane’s book, Sexual Morality: A Catholic Perspective. Rome
asked Hunthausen to withdraw the imprimatur, which he eventually did. Ryan recalled, however, that the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith had been somewhat impatient with Hunthausen’s request to consult
first with Keane’s superior (the Superior General of the Sulpicians). As Ryan remembers, Hunthausen had earlier
been told by the American Sulpician Provincial that the matter was already being handled between the Sulpician
Superior General and the Holy See. Hunthausen therefore thought it possible that there had been a
misunderstanding (or even that letters might have crossed in the mail) and for that reason, along with his own
vision of subsidiarity and collegiality, he politely requested permission to consult again with Keane’s Superior.
3. Archbishop Hunthausen first learned of the Vatican’s interest in conducting a visitation at a May 1983
meeting of the NCCB, which focused on the bishops’ peace pastoral. The possibility of conducting the visitation
was broached by the papal pro-nuncio, Archbishop Laghi, during a coffee break, in what was “an extremely
informal situation” and “rather rushed moment.”
4. After Archbishop Roach (then President of the NCCB) recommended to Hunthausen that he request a “bill of
particulars” to specify the concerns prompting the visitation, Hunthausen wrote to Archbishop Hickey shortly
after his appointment as visitator to request the same. Hickey wrote Hunthausen back in the latter part of August
(his response was delayed by illness) to say that such a legalistic approach was not necessary, since this was a
matter between brother bishops.
5. Ryan offered a breakdown of those within the archdiocese who complained about Hunthausen’s leadership.
He named the following persons or groups: (1) Erven Park, publisher of The Catholic Truth; (2) readers and
affiliates of the Wanderer World Forum; (3) persons who had had more standing in the archdiocese during the
administration of Hunthausen’s predecessor as Ordinary, Archbishop Connolly, who now felt themselves to be
marginalized; (4) persons who disagreed with Hunthausen’s stance on the nuclear arms question; (5) persons
who would have preferred to see Hunthausen take a more prominent anti-abortion stance; (6) persons who
complained about ministerial or teaching roles undertaken by laicised priests; (7) persons who were concerned
about instances of liturgical experimentation within the archdiocese; (8) Gary Bullert, author of The Hunthausen
File; Bullert disagreed strongly with Hunthausen’s nuclear arms stance and also felt that he had been wrongly
removed from archdiocesan teaching positions.
6. When Archbishop Hickey conducted the visitation, he was accompanied not only by Fr. William Coyle
(whom I mentioned in my account), but also by another priest, Fr. Lorenzo Albacete. Hickey had also intended
to bring Fr. William Levada (currently Archbishop of San Francisco), but Levada was unable to come.
7. Fr. Ryan took Archbishop Hickey to the airport after his work in Seattle was completed. During that trip,
Hickey encouraged Ryan to see how important his own role was in the affair and to draw on his Roman training
(Ryan had been a seminarian in Rome) to help Hunthausen meet Rome’s expectations.
8. Sometime in the aftermath of the visitation, but prior to Wuerl’s appointment, Archbishop Laghi suggested to
Hunthausen that he find another bishop to serve as a private sounding board – someone he might speak with
confidentially and ask for advice. Laghi suggested a few names, one of which was Archbishop Francis Hurley of
Anchorage, Alaska. Hunthausen took this suggestion and asked Hurley, who was his friend, to serve in this
capacity. Hurley agreed, and from that point forward served as an important adviser to Hunthausen during the
conflict.
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9. More than one option for the placement of a helper bishop in Seattle was discussed with Hunthausen in the
aftermath of the visitation. The first proposal from Rome came sometime in 1984. The Holy See raised the
possibility of sending a coadjutor archbishop to Seattle. Ryan reported that Hunthausen was unhappy with this
suggestion, since he was led to believe he would receive an auxiliary bishop. The next possibility discussed was
the appointment of an auxiliary bishop. When it became clear that Rome wanted to appoint an auxiliary from
outside the archdiocese. Hunthausen said that he could accept this arrangement if he were also allowed to receive
an auxiliary who came from within the archdiocese (thus, Seattle would receive two auxiliaries). Rome
eventually decided it wanted to appoint one auxiliary (from without) who would have special faculties.
10. Hunthausen learned of the plan to appoint Wuerl by means of a phone call from Archbishop Laghi in the
summer of 1985.
11. Ryan observed that, many times during his exchanges with the Vatican, Hunthausen offered to resign his
office. But the response from the pro-nuncio was also to say that the Holy Father did not want Hunthausen to
resign. Ryan said that Hunthausen’s willingness to resign and the Vatican’s resistance to this option was “one of
the motifs” running through much of the affair.
12. When Hunthausen conveyed his acceptance of the special faculties arrangement in a December 2, 1985 letter
to the pro-nuncio, inclusion of the key words of qualification in the letter (cited by Hunthausen in his November
1986 NCCB address) came at the suggestion of Archbishop Hurley. Ryan quoted the key passage:
It is further my understanding that this arrangement is being adopted in place of the first one proposed to
me in the letter of July 9, 1985, whereby Fr. Wuerl would have been empowered with special faculties in
accord with the provisions of canon 403, paragraph 2. Therefore, since the empowerment comes by way
of delegation from me, it is my understanding that it will not impinge on my ultimate authority as
ordinary of the archdiocese. [The second sentence here comes from Hurley.]
Five days later, the pro-nuncio wrote in response:
You are correct in noting that the special faculties empowering Fr. Wuerl to oversee the five listed areas
are to be granted by you. While this does not lessen your authority as a local bishop, it is understood that
this action is being undertaken at the specific instruction of the Holy See.
13. Communications between the Vatican and Hunthausen were normally passed on through the pro-nuncio.
Letters authored in Rome were sent to the pro-nuncio in a diplomatic pouch, who then passed them on to Seattle
through the U.S. mail in envelopes marked strictly personal and confidential.
14. Laghi often downplayed his own role as intermediary. “I am only a conduit,” he would say to Hunthausen.
15. When Cardinal Gantin sent his response to Hunthausen confirming that Wuerl was to have final say in the
designated areas of decision-making, he asked Hunthausen to put in writing to Wuerl his granting of these
faculties. Hunthausen then wrote Gantin back to say that as of August 1 (1986) he would convey the faculties. In
that letter, Hunthausen explained to Gantin that he had not been dissembling or delaying: he simply had been
acting according to the understanding he had from the beginning. Hunthausen carried out Gantin’s instructions in
a July 28 letter to Wuerl.
16. The matter of disclosing Wuerl’s faculties became a point of contention between Hunthausen and Laghi.
Hunthausen wanted to disclose the faculties, but Laghi did not want him to do so. Fr. Ryan recalled that there
were several phone conversations about this matter between Hunthausen and Laghi. Ryan assumed there were
also written exchanges between the two concerning that matter, but he could find no record of such exchanges in
his own file. Laghi eventually granted Hunthausen permission to make the disclosure, presumably (Ryan’s
presumption) motivated by his fear that Hunthausen might resign otherwise.
17. On August 31, 1986, Hunthausen and Wuerl met. Ryan did not specify the exact topic of their meeting.
Shortly thereafter, Hunthausen met with his staff. One task taken up in the meeting with the staff was the
drafting of a letter to the priests of the archdiocese, which was dated September 3, 1986. At that meeting,
Hunthausen also shared with his staff the contents of a letter he had drafted to Wuerl (dated September 4, 1986),
expressing his desire to make the new arrangement work.
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18. Ryan noted that with the conveyance of faculties, Hunthausen made a change in Wuerl’s role within the
administration. Whereas before, Wuerl had served as an unofficial “moderator of the curia” – whereby all
department heads reported to Hunthausen through Wuerl (but Wuerl had final say in no particular area) – in the
new arrangement (effective September 4, 1986), Wuerl did have final say in the specified areas, but no longer
served as an intermediary between Hunthausen and all the department heads. Department heads in areas not
specified could report to Hunthausen without Wuerl’s mediation.
19. In anticipation of Hunthausen’s chance to address the American bishops at the November 1986 NCCB
meeting, Fr. Ryan tried to obtain press credentials to be in some of the meetings at the conference, but this
request was refused.
20. When Hunthausen saw Ryan after the bishops had debated his case, Hunthausen mentioned that (then
retired) Cardinal John Dearden of Detroit had spoken especially strongly in his defense.
21. In Fr. Ryan’s view, Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago – who had been brought into conversations about the
Seattle situation prior to the NCCB meeting (his advice was sought; he gave his opinion) – was the person most
influential in bringing about the three-person assessment commission approach.
22. Responding to the decision to appoint an apostolic commission, Hunthausen wrote to Archbishop Laghi, in
letter dated February 6, 1987: “I welcome this step. It is my strong hope that the results of the assessment made
by the commission will provide the Holy See with a firm basis for returning the governance of the Archdiocese
to normal in the near future.”
23. In a letter to Bernardin, dated February 17, 1987, Hunthausen thanked Bernardin for his willingness to take
on the commission assignment and expressed Hunthausen’s hopes for resolution. The same letter made reference
to a meeting Hunthausen had with Bernardin in Dallas. The letter also made a suggestion to the commission
which originated with Fr. Ryan. Ryan had suggested that it would be profitable for the commission to meet with
the archdiocesan Board of Consultors. The commission took up this suggestion and met with the consultors (as
well as with the Northwest bishops and archdiocesan officials) on March 6-7 at St. Patrick Seminary, Menlo
Park, California.
24. In Fr. Ryan’s perception, Hunthausen consulted most closely with the following persons during the period of
the visitation controversy and its resolution: Bishop Wuerl, Archbishop Hurley, Fr. Ryan, Fr. Michael
McDermott (Director of Administration), Mr. Russ Scearce (Public Affairs Director), and on occasion, Fr. David
Jaeger (Director of Seminarians).
25. Hunthausen frequently had Ryan draft statements, after close consultation between the two. At times, others
(typically from the above-named inner circle) were asked to comment on the prepared draft. The comments
sometimes led to changes in the final draft. Ms. Marilyn Maddeford was normally the secretary who prepared the
letterhead copy for distribution.
26. Hunthausen often communicated directly in writing to the priests of the archdiocese (by letter) and chancery
department heads (by memorandum). Hunthausen also met in person with the department heads, with the
presbyteral council, and (less frequently) with all priests of the archdiocese. Hunthausen also met in person
regularly with the Archdiocesan Pastoral Council and the Archdiocesan Finance Council.
27. Ryan identified the archdiocesan newspaper, The Progress, as the most efficient way Hunthausen had of
reaching many Catholics within the archdiocese. On occasion, copies of The Progress were distributed to all
Catholic households within the archdiocese. Ryan was not aware of any way that the Vatican newspaper
L’Osservatore Romano played a significant role in the way that the conflict unfolded.
9.7.2 Confirmations / Disconfirmations of My Findings by the Ryan Interview
I will now consider each of my own findings from the case, as articulated in sections 9.1-
9.6.3.1 above, in light of the observations offered by Fr. Ryan in my interview with him. In
regard to each of my own findings, I will consider how Fr. Ryan’s provision of information
and commentary tends to confirm or disconfirm my own findings.
1. Show deference to the existing structural order and mindset of the Church.
In my interview with him, Fr. Ryan stressed that it was never Hunthausen’s intention to act
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out of any sort of disloyalty to the Church or to the Holy Father. (“He’s a unifier. He never
wanted himself to be perceived as at odds with the Pope, or our local church with Rome.”)
Though Ryan readily conceded that Hunthausen found himself in tension with positions
taken by, or roles played by Cardinal Ratzinger, Archbishop Laghi and Archbishop Hickey
(but not with these persons themselves), he emphasized that, according to the pro-nuncio,
the Pope did not want Hunthausen to resign. Ryan shared two anecdotes which illustrated
the persistence of positive personal feeling between Hunthausen and John Paul II. The first
recalled that the Pope had sent Hunthausen a telegram (an unusual move) wishing him well
during the time of his hospitalization for cancer surgery. The second anecdote originated
with Hunthausen himself. On the occasion of a party for his eightieth birthday, Hunthausen
recounted how he had been in Rome with other bishops for a meeting with the Pope in
1988. As the bishops exited the room from one of the sessions, the Pope came up to
Hunthausen, put his arm around him and said, “I’m very glad you came.” Ryan retold this
story because, in his words, “this would be partly what the Archbishop would want to have
known.”
Ryan acknowledged that Hunthausen did resist certain courses of action that
representatives of the Holy See wanted to pursue, but he characterized Hunthausen’s
resistance as “never… in the sense of do-or-die. Always the resistance was, ‘This was not
our understanding’ and he would try to keep the conversation going in terms of a
dialogue.” According to Ryan, Hunthausen strongly associated stances he took with a
vision of Church he acquired at the Second Vatican Council, which began less than two
months after Hunthausen was made bishop.
The Ryan interview confirmed my impression that Hunthausen ordinarily went through
“proper channels,” conducting critical negotiations with other members of the hierarchy
who had authority in the given area. Hunthausen made a point of keeping his fellow
bishops of the Northwest region informed. Disagreements with representatives of the Holy
See were normally pursued out of sight. Concerning Hunthausen’s relationship with the
pro-nuncio, Ryan observed that, though they were “sources of frustration to each other,”
their discourse toward one another remained “cordial.” Keeping up the appearance of the
Church was a priority for Hunthausen and other bishops. Ryan described the statement the
NCCB issued on the Seattle situation as sounding “exactly like you would have
expected… ‘We support the Holy See’ and ‘We’re concerned for our brother.’ It was even-
handed but it was certainly not saying, ‘We feel Archbishop Hunthausen has been wronged
and we are going to take his case.’ Nothing of the sort. They wouldn’t do that. But they, I
would have to say, privately must have felt that there was a very serious problem that
needed decisive and immediate action and advocacy.”
2. Associate one’s own efforts with the best interest of the Church
Certain observations offered by Fr. Ryan affirmed my perception that Hunthausen was
inclined to justify his own positions by relating them to the well-being of the Church – and
that this notion of well-being was associated in Hunthausen’s discourse with currents
emerging from the Second Vatican Council, particularly the Council’s focus on the
“people of God.” Thus, Ryan noted that Hunthausen based his resistance to keeping the
visitation secret on the grounds that such a policy was “unfair to the people of God.”
At one point, Ryan mentioned that Hunthausen had invited then-apostolic delegate Jadot to
Seattle to assess the state of the local Church for himself (in response to complaints that
had been communicated). Ryan paraphrased the argument Hunthausen had used to propose
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this idea to Jadot. “I would love it if you would come out to Seattle and spend some time in
the diocese and absorb whatever you can. Talk to people, listen to people, see how we
operate. Because I have nothing to hide. The Church is strong. It’s vital, it’s growing.” By
telling this anecdote, Ryan suggests that, in his view, Hunthausen associated his own
pastoral efforts with successes that could be measured (with positive outcomes) in terms of
Church strength, Church vitality and Church growth, and that the people of the Church
were the ones to offer evidence for these successes. In other words, Hunthausen saw the
best interest of the Church in terms of the experience of the people in the pews, and he saw
himself as contributing positively toward that end.
3. Minimize the appearance of conflict
Several pieces of information offered by Fr. Ryan confirmed my observation that members
of the hierarchy participating in the conflict showed a strong tendency to minimize the
appearance of the conflict. Ryan observed that the Vatican’s request to conduct a visitation
was brought to Hunthausen’s attention in a “rather rushed moment” and “very informal
situation” – during a coffee break from a May 1983 meeting of the NCCB. The choice of
moment and setting in which the pro-nuncio broached the possibility of a visitation
suggested that the Holy See (or the pro-nuncio himself) did not want Hunthausen to
consider the question to be a matter of great consequence. Nor, at that time, did Laghi give
Hunthausen any indication of what, specifically, the Vatican’s concerns were.
When Hunthausen later sought to receive a “bill of particulars” from Archbishop Hickey,
who was appointed visitator in July, Hickey responded that a bill of particulars was not
necessary because the visitation was not a legal matter, it was a matter among friends.
According to Ryan,
Hickey said he was simply coming out as a brother bishop to find out what was going on. The Holy See
had some concerns, Hickey said, and some people had complained. Hickey wanted to hear Hunthausen’s
response. Hickey also made clear that he wanted to keep the visitation as quiet and unobtrusive as
possible.
Fr. Ryan’s impression was that Hickey’s insistence on secrecy was rooted in instructions
he had received from the Holy See to keep the matter secret. When word of the imminent
visitation was leaked to the press, Hickey and Hunthausen jointly agreed to make a public
statement in order to (in Ryan’s words) “put as good a face as possible” on the situation.
As another example of the Vatican’s tendency to keep the conflict exchanges under wraps,
one can point to the Holy See’s refusal to allow Hunthausen to release the 9.30.85
Ratzinger letter, with its summary of the visitation findings. When I asked Ryan why
Hunthausen was not permitted to release the letter, he replied:
My feeling about it all along is that they wanted things quiet. It’s just their preferred way of doing things.
And that was true from the beginning with regard to the Visitation itself, it was true with regard to the
letter, and it was true, later, of the special faculties. The whole notion of disclosing these kinds of things...
that people have a right to know these things, is not in their vocabulary.
But it was not just Rome that tended to minimize the appearance of conflict. Ryan’s
reflections bear out the judgment that Hunthausen himself was disposed to minimize the
appearance of conflict. Ryan observed that
Hunthausen was never one to say that he was right and others were wrong but instead would say, “I
thought I knew what being a bishop was all about.” At worst, Ryan observed, he would express “a certain
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disillusionment” that the direction being taken seemed at odds with what he had learned at the Council.
It is telling, too, that Hunthausen’s general inclination was to comply with the requests for
secrecy, even when he himself opposed the idea (the disclosure of Wuerl’s faculties and
his text submissions to the NCCB being the most prominent exceptions). See also
Hunthausen’s assertion of positive relations with the Holy Father, even as recently as 2001
(cf. Ryan’s story above about Pope John Paul II’s greeting to Hunthausen during a 1988
visit to Rome). We also have Ryan’s statement that Hunthausen “never wanted to be
perceived as at odds with the Pope, or our local Church with Rome.”
This commitment to maintaining the appearance of harmony did not lessen the fact that
serious disagreements were being argued out behind the scenes. Ryan confirms the
impression given by the public record of the case that Hunthausen pushed hard in his
private negotiations to learn the precise reasons for the visitation, to learn the specific
information resulting from the visitation, to have his own choice of auxiliary bishop, to
have certain matters made public, and to determine the nature of the authority an auxiliary
(and later coadjutor) would have. Ryan also makes clear that he was not always happy with
the way his case was handled by his center-party counterparts and the decisions that were
handed down over his objections. Tensions arose at times, according to Ryan, in
Hunthausen’s negotiations with Laghi, Hickey, Ratzinger and Gantin.
Ryan also offered further evidence for a hierarchy-wide commitment to minimizing the
appearance of conflict when he observed that the NCCB did not and would not under
ordinary circumstances make a statement that showed itself to be standing in opposition to
Rome or to a brother bishop. During the crucial debate about Hunthausen’s case, not only
was the press denied access, but so too was Ryan himself, who served as Hunthausen’s
right-hand man. Certain things are for the hierarchy’s eyes only.
When I invited Fr. Ryan to use a pre-established scale (the selection of available answers
being: 5, very believable; 4, somewhat believable; 3, uncertain; 2, not believable; 1,
absurd) to characterize the following statements, he answered as follows. His answers are
in italics.
The Catholic hierarchy normally tries hard to avoid conflict within its ranks. -- Five.
This principle applied during the Rome-Hunthausen case. -- Five.
When conflict within the hierarchy does arise, the natural tendency is for members of the hierarchy to keep it out
of public view. -- Five.
This principle applied during the Rome-Hunthausen case. -- Five.
When conflict within the hierarchy exists and is in public view, the natural tendency of members of the hierarchy
is to minimize the appearance of conflict and downplay its significance. -- Five.
This principle applied during the Rome-Hunthausen case. -- Five.
4. Show fraternity
During the interview, Fr. Ryan emphasized how Hunthausen felt strongly connected to his
fellow bishops. Twice, Ryan explicitly invoked the concept of episcopal fraternity to
characterize Hunthausen’s relationship with (or vision of his relationship with) his fellow
bishops. As Ryan saw it, Hunthausen interpreted Vatican concerns within the context of
his awareness that other bishops faced similar challenges. “He talked to his brother bishops
a lot. They all had people who were writing letters to Rome. They all had struggles within
their own ministry that presented them with pastoral decisions that were not easy to come
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by.” Along this same line, Ryan observed that Hunthausen was careful to keep his fellow
bishops of the Northwest region informed of developments in his case, and he honored the
concept of  “collegiality” in his relationship with bishops in general (as exemplified in his
consultation of NCCB President Roach and his request to consult with Philip Keane’s
superior in the matter of revocation of the imprimatur Hunthausen had granted Keane’s
book).
At the same time, however, Ryan makes clear that fraternity can be more a matter of show
than of a deeply felt, familial or affectionate bond. Thus, Ryan expresses an obvious
wariness in regard to Archbishop Hickey’s profession, in the period prior to the visitation,
that he was simply coming out as a “brother bishop” to find out what the situation was in
Seattle. The implication in Ryan’s phrasing is that there was clearly something at hand that
was more troubling than Hickey wanted to make it sound. Ryan also hinted at his distrust
of occasional euphemistic employments of the concept of brotherhood in regard to the
NCCB statement on Hunthausen’s case. Though I have already quoted this in a prior
section, I will reintroduce it here because I find it to be a telling remark.
Fr. Ryan noted that the NCCB went on record with a public statement about the affair that “sounded
exactly like you would have expected. It must be on the public record. 'We support the Holy See' and
'We're concerned for our brother.' It was even-handed but it was certainly not saying, 'We feel Archbishop
Hunthausen has been wronged and we are going to take his case.' Nothing of the sort. They wouldn’t do
that. But they, I would have to say, privately must have felt that there was a very serious problem that
needed decisive and immediate action and advocacy.
On the whole, Ryan’s commentary on the case gives the impression that bishop-to-bishop
inquiries, consultations, negotiations and alliances were at the heart of the Rome-Seattle
conflict handling. It also shows that fraternity can be expressed in superficial as well as
substantial ways and can be conducted in public (rarely, as in the semi-public exchanges of
the November 1986 NCCB meeting) or in private (much more commonly, as in most of
Hunthausen’s individual consultations with other bishops).
One interesting bit of information emerging from the Ryan interview is that the suggestion
for Hunthausen to find one bishop in particular to consort with privately came from
Archbishop Laghi. Ryan praised this suggestion by Laghi, implying that it proved to be
especially helpful to Hunthausen over time. Laghi’s having made this suggestion offers
evidence that he saw genuine possibilities for more substantial kinds of mutual – fraternal
or collegial – support among bishops and that he, at the time he made the suggestion
(1984?), felt himself inclined to be supportive in this way toward Hunthausen (through the
act of making the suggestion).
In response to my inquiry, Fr. Ryan characterized as “very believable” the statement that
professions of unity, loyalty and episcopal collegiality are ordinarily features of
intrahierarchical conflict handling
5. Practice courtesy
Fr. Ryan’s comments offered confirmation of my finding that showing courtesy was a
priority in the handling of the Rome-Hunthausen conflict, and that often the use of
politeness put a harmonious façade before substantial tensions. The strongest evidence for
this was Ryan’s report of Hunthausen’s relationship with various opposing parties in the
conflict. Concerning Hunthausen’s relationship with Cardinal Ratzinger, Hunthausen
recalled that there were “tensions,” “disagreements,” and “seldom a meeting of minds”
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between the two, but their exchanges were “always cordial.” Ryan also acknowledged that
Hunthausen experienced tension in his exchanges with Cardinal Gantin (of the
Congregation for Bishops), specifically in regard to the multiple proposals of helper bishop
options that were advanced, but that, again, the exchanges between the two were “always
cordial.” Similarly, though Ryan admits that Archbishops Laghi and Hunthausen were
“sources of frustration to each other” (even “deep” frustration), he observes that “it was
always a cordial discourse” between the two.
I have already noted Fr. Ryan’s comment on the NCCB’s statement concerning
Hunthausen’s case. Ryan signalled his awareness of a discrepancy between the bishops’
conference’s neutral public statement (in Ryan’s words: “We support the Holy See” and
“We’re concerned for our brother”) and the reality of private discussions that were much
more heated (“they, I would have to say, privately must have felt that there was a very
serious problem that needed decisive and immediate action and advocacy”).
Near the end of my interview with him, I asked Fr. Ryan to characterize the credibility of
the following statements concerning the employment of courtesy in intrahierarchical
conflict in general and in the Rome-Hunthausen case in particular. Again, I invited him to
use the following scale of responses: 1 = very believable; 2 = somewhat believable; 3 =
uncertain; 2 = not believable; 1 = absurd. Ryan’s replies follow my questions.
When conflict exists between members of the hierarchy, a premium is placed on saving the face of all
those involved. -- “Five.”
This principle applied during the Rome-Hunthausen case. -- “Five.”
6. Employ secrecy
The Ryan interview confirmed a number of my own perceptions concerning the use of
secrecy in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict. It confirmed my overall sense that secrecy was a
key strategy used to defend or advance one’s own position within the conflict, and that this
strategy was employed more heavily, but not exclusively, by the center party side. It also
makes clear that the Vatican’s use of secrecy at several points placed Hunthausen at a
disadvantage. In response, he resisted not only the use of secrecy on those particular
occasions, but also argued against the use of secrecy in general.
Ryan identified the following occasions when the Vatican’s use of (or preference for)
secrecy either limited Hunthausen’s access to information he desired or otherwise placed
him at a disadvantage:
(1) Laghi approached Hunthausen about the Vatican’s interest in conducting a visitation,
but offered no specific accounting of the concerns prompting this request.
(2) Hickey insisted on keeping the visitation itself quiet. (Ryan had the impression that
Hickey’s insistence on secrecy was rooted in instructions he had received from the
Vatican.)
(3) The Holy See supplied only minimal information in response to Hunthausen’s inquiries
about how the visitation and his prior request for an auxiliary bishop were proceeding.
(4) The Holy See did not allow Hunthausen to make the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter, with its
report of visitation findings, public at the time Hunthausen received it.
(5) Laghi opposed Hunthausen’s intention to make Wuerl’s faculties public.
(6) Fr. Ryan was denied access (admission credentials) to the NCCB’s executive session
debate of the Hunthausen case.
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Ryan also identified one occasion when Hunthausen urged the non-disclosure of
information on the Holy See: when Hunthausen tried to persuade Laghi not to release the
Vatican chronology. According to Ryan, Hunthausen argued against its release on the
grounds that it was inaccurate and would not help anything. Ryan’s own description of this
event does not associate it with the notion of keeping something (Laghi’s understandings)
secret. He characterizes it instead as a matter of Laghi putting his own “spin” on the telling
of developments thus far and Hunthausen’s need to avoid having this misleading narrative
released. When Laghi went ahead and released the document, Hunthausen responded by
releasing his own documents, which, as Ryan saw it, served to “clarify, nuance and even
correct” the Laghi account.
In the picture that Ryan paints, Hunthausen was philosophically opposed to the use of
secrecy because it was not in the interest of the people of God. Ryan noted that for
Hunthausen the emphasis on secrecy was both “ill advised, out of keeping with the
American ethos, and unfair to the people of God.” (Ryan: Hunthausen argued that we
should trust the people -- they were mature enough to deal with [relevant information]. )
This standpoint, in Ryan’s view, was diametrically opposed to the Vatican’s consistent
preference to use secrecy, and the Vatican’s philosophical position that its use was
justified. In response to my question about why the Vatican wanted to keep the 9.30.85
letter out of public view, Ryan replied (I have quoted this passage once before) that this
decision was but one in keeping with the Vatican’s overriding policy of secrecy.
My feeling about it all along is that they wanted things quiet. It’s just their preferred way of doing things.
And that was true from the beginning with regard to the Visitation itself, it was true with regard to the
letter, and it was true, later, of the special faculties. The whole notion of disclosing these kinds of things...
that people have a right to know these things, is not in their vocabulary.
Ryan also shared the view that news disclosures (breaks with secrecy) played an important
role in the conflict management. He mentioned the following specific instances of one
party or another breaking with secrecy:
(1) The news leak concerning the visitation itself. According to Ryan, the leak originated
in Washington, D.C. (out of the office of the papal nunciature or of Archbishop Hickey).
He insists that the “two or three” persons in Seattle (Hunthausen, Ryan and…?) who were
aware of the plans for a visitation did not leak the news to the press. Ryan:
All I know is, in this See, secrecy was the word simply because the Archbishop, even though he thought it
was a bad idea, had agreed to go along with it, and being a man of his word that’s exactly what he did.
And it’s what the two or three of us who were aware of it did.
(2) In July of 1986, the National Catholic Register published an article which said that
Wuerl had been in Rome and he was going to get special powers. “Floods of phone calls”
came into the Archdiocese after this article was published. This response, Ryan said, was a
factor in Hunthausen’s later insistence about disclosing Wuerl’s possession of special
faculties to the priests. In response to the article, Bishop Wuerl, according to Ryan,
“indicated that he knew nothing about it.”
(3) Hunthausen’s disclosure of Wuerl’s faculties, in September of 1986. According to
Ryan, Hunthausen wanted to make word of Wuerl’s possession of faculties public, but
Laghi insisted that Hunthausen not tell anyone about the faculties. In Ryan’s recollection,
Hunthausen said in response that he needed to do one of two things. He needed either to
disclose the arrangement (“I’m not going to pretend to be what I am not” was his typical
way of expressing it”) or to resign. These were put forth, Ryan said, “not as a tactic but as
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a matter of conscience.” Laghi, eager that Hunthausen not resign, eventually agreed that he
could make a public announcement of the arrangement. Ryan recalls that there were
several phone conversations between Hunthausen and Laghi around this time and that
permission may have been granted over the phone. (Ryan noted too that this particular
disclosure was “the thing more than anything else that really touched off the firestorm” of
public controversy.)
At the time I interviewed Fr. Ryan, my focus was on the Vatican’s use of secrecy and
Hunthausen’s resistance to that practice. Thus, I asked him to assess the credibility of the
following two propositions, using a given scale (5 = very believable, 4 = somewhat
believable, 3 = uncertain, 2 = not believable, 1 = absurd). Here are the statements and
Ryan’s responses:
Secrecy was an essential tool the Vatican employed in its management of the conflict. – “Five.”
One technique Archbishop Hunthausen used to gain leverage in his conflict with the Vatican was to resist
Vatican preferences for silence and secrecy. -- “Four. It was less a question of resisting and more an attempt to
convince them it wasn’t a good idea.”
Had I conducted the interview at a later stage of the research, I would have probed more
deeply into Hunthausen’s complicity in the Vatican’s use of secrecy and his own
independent employment of secrecy, as a means of defending or advancing his own
position. Based on the interview material that is available to me, which I have just
summarized, I find little inclination on Ryan’s part to see Hunthausen’s own use of secrecy
as willed or conscientiously strategic, and much more of an inclination to see Hunthausen
as avoiding secrecy in practice and opposing the use of secrecy on principle. This more
neutral or “innocent” reading of Hunthausen’s motives and actions offers counterpoint
(i.e., some level of disconfirmation) to my own more “suspicious” view, which sees
Hunthausen as operating according to an awareness that the practice of secrecy and
resistance to secrecy, depending on the circumstances, offer distinct strategic advantages
for conflict handling.
7. Recruit allies
The interview with Fr. Ryan confirmed my impression that both the center and periphery
parties sought out strategic alliances with other parties as part of their conflict handling.
Ryan reaffirmed what Hunthausen said in his NCCB address, that Hunthausen had
consulted very early on with NCCB President John Roach, who suggested that Hunthausen
request what Roach termed a “bill of particulars” justifying the visitation. (Ryan tells us
that Hunthausen called Roach a second time after having waited some time to hear back
from Archbishop Hickey in answer to his request). Ryan also spoke of the key role of
Archbishop Hurley, who served as an adviser to Hunthausen for much of the duration of
the conflict and provided the specific language that placed conditions on Hunthausen’s
acceptance of an auxiliary bishop with special faculties. Neither of these consultations
could, according to Ryan’s report, be considered unusual, since Hunthausen “talked to his
brother bishops a lot,” but they do show his readiness to turn to friendly fellow bishops for
support. Another bishop Hunthausen consulted with along the line was Cardinal Bernardin.
Ryan did not supply many details of the manner our precise outcome of this consultation,
but he does make clear that, in his view, Bernardin played a pivotal role in bringing about
the formation of the assessment commission and the shape of its recommended resolution.
Ryan also shared his supposition that Bernardin was regularly in communication with a
key Hunthausen supporter in the media world, editor Tom Fox of the National Catholic
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Reporter. But Ryan could not state with certainty the existence of such a relationship.
The Ryan interview does not leaves us so much with a picture of Hunthausen courting
allies as it does a picture of seeking advice privately from fellow bishops, especially at
critical moments. Ryan has much to say about people rallying around Hunthausen. Among
the examples Ryan mentions: Hunthausen received a letter of support from Bishop Walter
Sullivan; vocal support at the NCCB meeting from Cardinal Dearden; and much support
from his own priests and local entities such as Concerned Catholics. He has little to say
about Hunthausen recruiting persons (members of the hierarchy or otherwise) who offered
possible strategic support for his cause.
8. Argue persuasively
The Ryan interview offers evidence that competing rationalities were at work in the Rome-
Hunthausen. Put simply, the implication emerging from Ryan’s commentary is that
Hunthausen’s people-based rationality stood in opposition to Rome’s control-based
rationality. Ryan described Hunthausen’s response to the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter as follows.
“He felt that many of the things were based on serious misunderstanding and misinterpretation. And there
is some very high-flown language in this letter that you would have to wonder, What in the world does it
mean?” Fr. Ryan cited an example from the letter: “’Incorrect notions of the Church’s mission and nature,
as well as flawed understandings of the dignity of the human person leading to false Christologies.’ Pretty
heady stuff!”
The suggestion here, and elsewhere in the Ryan interview is that the Vatican’s findings from
the visitation tended to focus on positions that could perhaps be justified intellectually but that
lacked relationship to human experience (particularly the experience of persons within the
local Church). As an example, Ryan cited Ratzinger’s criticism of the archdiocese’s use of
questionnaires in its pastoral planning process. Ryan:
The questionnaires asked about the beliefs people held. The Holy See interpreted this to be an effort to
gain “theological consensus by counting noses.” But Ryan recalls that the Archbishop understood the
function of the questionnaires differently. “How do we teach the people, how do we really effectively
catechize or evangelize if we don’t know where people are in their understanding. And if they don’t seem
to be very well informed about what the Trinity means or the two natures of Christ or you name it -- if
their Christology is flawed or their ecclesiology is one-sided -- we’d better know that so that we know
how to teach, how to catechize.” The Vatican held that the questionnaires gave people the impression
they were helping to establish what doctrine is. Ryan remembers that this issue came up more than once.
“I think it shows clearly how poorly the American way is understood in that culture, in the Vatican
culture.”
Ryan noted that Hunthausen himself tended to receive things at “the human level” in his own
thinking and observed more than once that it was Hunthausen’s view that the hierarchy
needed to trust the people of the Church (i.e., those not of the hierarchy) and entrust
responsibility to them.
Ryan points to the following examples of Hunthausen attempting to win over his center party
counterparts in private negotiations. (I list them in the order that Ryan mentioned them. Note
that many of Hunthausen’s assertions and proposals reflect his preferred ecclesiological
model of openness.)
1) Hunthausen tried to persuade Hickey to supply a bill of particulars enumerating the Vatican
concerns prompting the visitation. Hickey refused.
2) Hunthausen tried to persuade Hickey to publicly announce the visitation. Hickey refused at
first, but then agreed after the news leak.
327
3) Hunthausen presented his view of the state of the archdiocese in a lengthy interview with
Hickey during the visitation.
4) Hunthausen carried out a limited number of individual exchanges with Laghi and Ratzinger
during the extended period when Hunthausen waited to learn the visitation results.
5) Hunthausen tried to persuade apostolic delegate Jadot the come to Seattle to assess
conditions for himself (in the pre-visitation years).
6) Hunthausen proposed to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith that he first consult
with Philip Keane’s superior before withdrawing the imprimatur for Keane’s book.
7) Hunthausen argued against several options for the appointment of a helper bishop. He was
opposed to the appointment of someone from outside the archdiocese, he opposed having a
coadjutor, and he opposed the concept of special faculties.
8) Hunthausen made the case to Laghi that he needed to disclose Wuerl’s faculties. Laghi
resisted, but Hunthausen prevailed on this point.
9) Hunthausen argued against Laghi’s intention to release the Vatican chronology.
10) Hunthausen presented his view of the visitation / post-visitation controversy to his fellow
American bishops at the November 1986 NCCB gathering.
11) Hunthausen suggested to the assessment commission, in a letter to Bernardin, that they
interview the Seattle Board of Consultors to gain insight into conditions in the archdiocese.
The commission agreed to do so.
Ryan also cites instances when representatives of the Holy See attempted to persuade
Hunthausen to take a particular course of action:
1) Laghi requested Hunthausen’s cooperation in the carrying out of a visitation, in part by
suggesting that the visitation was not a matter to be worried about. Hunthausen agreed.
2) Hickey pressed Hunthausen to keep the imminent visitation secret. Hunthausen agreed
reluctantly. Hickey also suggested that the visitation itself was not something serious enough
for Hunthausen to become exercised about.
3) Ratzinger’s 9.30.85 letter presenting the visitation findings sought to bring Hunthausen
around to a particular view of what needed to be accomplished in the local Church.
4) The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith requested that Hunthausen withdraw his
imprimatur of the Philip Keane book.
5) Laghi attempted to persuade Hunthausen to accept various forms of helper bishop
arrangements.
6) Laghi argued against Hunthausen’s intention to disclose Wuerl’s faculties. Hunthausen did
not accept these arguments.
The Ryan interview bears out my view that most attempts by the center and periphery parties
to persuade one another took place in closed forums.
9. Assert personal identity
The Ryan interview challenged my views about the assertion of personal identity in the
Rome-Hunthausen case in one way in particular. My view has been that Hunthausen asserted
his own identity publicly in strategic fashion throughout the affair, but that representatives of
the center party did so minimally. More specifically, I have been struck by Pope John Paul
II’s absence from the observable dimensions of the conflict handling. Ryan countered my
perception that the Pope refused to become directly or personally involved in the affair by
telling two anecdotes of the Pope’s having reached out to Hunthausen in a personal way. I
recount these two stories, as Ryan told them, below.
In December of 1986 Archbishop Hunthausen had surgery for prostate cancer, which had been recently
diagnosed. “He received a telegram from the Holy Father, expressing his concern and his prayers for him.
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It was very difficult to tell whether it was authentic because I suppose anyone could have done that, so I
called the Nunciature and asked if they could verify that indeed a telegram had been sent from the Holy
Father to Archbishop Hunthausen. They said, ‘Absolutely impossible. The Holy Father never would send
a telegram directly to anybody. It would come through us.’ But shortly thereafter they called me back and
said, ‘The Holy Father did send a telegram directly to Archbishop Hunthausen.’ Which is an interesting
little piece. He obviously was aware of all the goings-on, and he certainly had a personal concern and a
regard for the Archbishop, so much so that he departed from the usual protocol – the normal way of doing
things.”
When I asked Fr. Ryan whether he recalled any instance where the Pope had weighed in on
the conflict itself in any public and specific way, he gave the following response. (This is the
second story.)
“No, I think that at a pastoral, personal level – witness the telegram, for instance – he did. It’s interesting.
You need to hear this little story maybe, because this would be partly what the Archbishop would want to
have known. The other night (May of 2001) at a party we had for Archbishop Hunthausen’s eightieth
birthday, I thought it was very vintage Hunthausen that the story he chose to tell his friends at the end of
Mass -- he didn’t give the homily at the Mass, he just spoke at the end -- was a story recalling how in
1988, I think it was, the Pope called all the archbishops of the country to Rome for a meeting. During an
early session they were given a chance to share their hopes and concerns. The Pope met with them and
listened to them in a formalized setting, which is typical of those Roman meetings. At the end of the
session they crowded into the aisle as the Pope was walking out. And [Hunthausen] told us how the Pope
came over to him, put his arm around his shoulder and said, ‘I’m very glad you came.’
“Hunthausen’s a unifier. He never wanted himself to be perceived as at odds with the Pope, or our local
Church with Rome. And I think he wanted the people in that room (at the party the other night) to be
reminded of our communion with the larger Church. I tell that story to you because I think it is vintage
Hunthausen. He could have told other stories but he chose to tell that one.
“So, to answer your question, No, I don’t think the Pope did weigh in any public way. It’s probably not
the normal way of doing things. I mean, think about some of the things that have happened over the years,
the theologians who have been silenced, for instance. These things always seem to get played out on a
different (lower) level and are handled by those cardinals whose role it is. Maybe the Pope preserved his
right to let the thing play out on a legal level, while he did the pastoral thing. That’s my guess.”
It was clear to me that the question of the Pope’s involvement in the affair was a sensitive
point for Fr. Ryan. Both of the stories he told were new to me at the time. Admittedly, only
one of the incidents described took place during the extended period of high conflict between
Rome and Seattle. My impression was that Fr. Ryan had two objectives in telling these
stories. One was to argue against the notion that the Pope was somehow unconcerned with the
affair. The other was to guard Hunthausen’s reputation (by making the case that Hunthausen
was both loyal – yesterday and today – and enjoyed a good relationship with the Holy Father).
Ryan, as Hunthausen himself consistently was in his public statements, was decidedly less
guarded in his comments about other high-ranking Church officials. While he did not openly
criticize these other persons, he did not hesitate to give the impression that Hunthausen did
not see eye-to-eye with these persons and the agendas they advanced. But not once did Ryan
make room for the suggestion that Hunthausen and the Pope were not on good terms.
9.7.3 An Additional Coping Strategy?: Shifting Ground (Gamesmanship)
One of the more interesting observations offered by Fr. Ryan in the interview was that the
Holy See adopted a strategy of “shifting ground” in its dealings with Seattle. Ryan used this
phrase four times in the interview, and he attributed the origin of his own use of the phrase to
Archbishop Hunthausen. In Ryan’s recollection, Hunthausen was frustrated at having to give
over the faculties to Wuerl after having long believed that that was not going to be necessary.
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Ryan: “The Archbishop would say sometimes, ‘We always seem to be standing on new
ground – shifting ground.’”
Later Ryan used this same phrase in reference Hunthausen’s being surprised on two other
occasions, both having to do with proposed solutions involving bishop appointments in
Seattle. Ryan:
First, he was to be given an auxiliary of his own choosing, then a coadjutor, then two auxiliaries (one from
Seattle and one from somewhere else), then an auxiliary with special faculties, and finally at the very end a
coadjutor without special faculties!  I may have the order a little confused here – I don’t think so -- but the point
is made: the ground was constantly shifting.
And again:
When the proposal came to send Bishop Thomas Murphy [of Great Falls-Billings, Montana] to Seattle,
Hunthausen expected it, based on previous discussions. What he did not expect was the stated intention that
Murphy should serve in Seattle as Coadjutor Archbishop [with right of succession]. “That was a big surprise. It
was not anticipated, but worked through. It was yet another question of the kind of shifting ground that
characterized so much of the entire saga.
On another occasion, once more in regard to Wuerl’s faculties, Ryan invoked the concept of
shifting ground and then extended the metaphor by association with another image. Ryan
compared the shifting ground experience to a chess game. “It was a kind of chess game –
that’s how I remember it. A chess game with frequently changing rules.”
The fact that Ryan repeatedly invoked the concept of shifting ground suggests to me that it is
a key to his understanding of how Rome dealt with Seattle in the conflict. The question
remains whether this concept can illuminate our own understanding of the conflict. One
reason for thinking that it might is that Pruitt and Rubin, as I have already noted, identify
something similar in their own conflict theory. There among the strategies of contention one
finds “gamesmanship.” Gamesmanship involves fostering a state of upset or unrest in the
other party as a means of reducing their resistance to yielding. Surprise is an important
element in the strategy – surprise which results in the other party becoming flustered or
feeling off balance or uncertain how to proceed.
If one simply looks at the effects of the Vatican’s conflict handling, and how this was
perceived on the Seattle side, it is easy to find reason to believe that the center party employed
gamesmanship as a means of obtaining its own objectives within the conflict. The Vatican’s
approach over time was indeed constantly changing – the Vatican representatives changed
(Ratzinger, Laghi, Hickey, Gantin, the assessment commission), as did the legal means
(visitation, power of appointment, assessment) and proposals for the kind of episcopal
appointment (coadjutor, two auxiliaries, one auxiliary with faculties, coadjutor with no
faculties) – and secrecy and delay compounded the uncertainty on the periphery party side.
Hunthausen rarely seemed to know what to expect or when to expect it. But the question
remains to what extent this approach was calculated by the Vatican and how much it was the
result of Rome’s disorganization and own uncertainty about how to proceed. At one point in
the interview, Fr. Ryan mentioned that Laghi and Ratzinger did not seem to speak with one
voice in their dealings with Seattle. As I understood it, Ryan was not suggesting that they
were consciously working at cross purposes but simply that, for whatever reason, their
communications were not always entirely in synch. It strikes me that to some degree Rome’s
conflict handling approach, which led Hunthausen (apparently) and Ryan to feel that the
ground was constantly shifting, can be attributed to organizational inefficiency (the delay in
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processing the Hickey visitation findings), a pre-given culture of secrecy (thus, applied as a
general rule rather than as a specifically chosen means for keeping Hunthausen off balance),
and poor internal communications between the Holy See’s representatives. But I have no
difficulty imagining as well, given the perspectives and findings of this study, that more
intentional forms of gamesmanship were applied for advantage.
Another interesting question, if we turn Ryan’s comment around, is whether Hunthausen
employed gamesmanship as a means of defending his position or gaining advantage. One
might well make a case that he did. For example, was Hunthausen practicing gamesmanship
by giving the Vatican the impression of cooperating with the Vatican’s objectives while in
fact resisting or doing little to realize those objectives? (Hunthausen himself said at the time
of the disbanding of the commission that little had changed in Seattle’s overall ministerial
approach as a result of the visitation process.) Or did Hunthausen practice gamesmanship by
wilfully misunderstanding the Vatican’s intention for Wuerl to have final say in the key areas
from the time of his appointment to Seattle? I do not have evidence that Hunthausen was
employing gamesmanship in these instances, but I cannot say definitively that he did not
employ such a strategy on these or other occasions.
Though I find Ryan’s observation intriguing, I will leave my own investigation off with these
comments I have just offered.
9.7.4 Summary of Findings from the Ryan Interview
Beyond providing numerous pieces of information I had not previously encountered, the
interview with Fr. Ryan brought new perspective to my view of how the conflict handling in
the Rome-Hunthausen case was carried out. On certain points Ryan confirmed views I already
held. On others he offered no support or challenged my views. The strongest confirmation
from Ryan came for my belief that secrecy was a key strategy whereby Rome maintained its
advantage of power in the conflict. Ryan also offered strong confirmation of my beliefs that
bishops are strongly disposed to show courtesy toward one another in their open exchanges
and that intrahierarchical disharmony is to be kept out of sight as much as possible. On an
informational level, Ryan also offered support for my view that the concept of episcopal
fraternity and a variety of forms of the same in practice are highly relevant to intrahierarchical
conflict handling. In a more indirect way, the material from the Ryan interview offered
support for my views that participants in center-periphery conflict will show deference to the
order and mindset of the Church, associate their own efforts with the best interest of the
Church, recruit influential allies, strive to make their applications of power look legitimate,
and use persuasive argumentation.
Ryan challenged my own view of the conflict handling in three key ways. First, he was much
more ready to attribute the cause of the visitation to some hidden arrangement between Rome
and the Reagan government that resulted from Hunthausen’s controversial stance on nuclear
weapons. Ryan cited three reasons for believing this to be true: (1) the visitation came very
close in time to the American government’s granting of diplomatic status to the Holy See (in
January of 1984); (2) a visitation of another “peace” bishop, Bishop Walter Sullivan of
Richmond, Virginia, took place at approximately the same time as the Seattle visitation
(though in a much quieter, less publicized fashion); and (3) the Holy See’s representatives in
the Hunthausen case seemed to “protest too much” when denying that the Seattle visitation
had anything to do with Hunthausen’s position on the nuclear arms question.
If Ryan is correct in his view, then my own findings here suffer from some serious
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deficiencies, because then the conflict would have been about something very different than
what I have believed it to be about. Moreover, there would have been a crucial participant
involved (one or more representatives of the U.S. government) that I have failed to identify.
Were this the case, I do not believe that my findings here would be entirely undermined
(whatever their ultimate motives, I think it is clear that the bishops participating in the Rome-
Seattle conflict used secrecy, politeness, etc. in strategic fashion), but obviously my overall
picture of the conflict would be less correct than I believe it to be. Regarding Ryan’s theory, I
can only say that I have not found enough evidence in my own investigation to establish its
credibility. The only additional piece of information that I have come across that might fit in
with this theory concerns the revelation of the FBI and U.S. Naval Intelligence files on
Hunthausen’s anti-nuclear activity. But this surveillance activity does not surprise me and
seems not, in and of itself, to increase the likelihood of there having been some sort of
cooperation / conspiracy between Rome and Washington. Perhaps someday further evidence
will give us an entirely new picture of the Hunthausen case. But in my view the evidence
presently available suggests that Rome was indeed concerned with pastoral issues and
maintaining its control over local churches. Involvement by the U.S. government in the affair
is only speculative at this point.
A second way Ryan challenged my own findings concerning the case was in his commentary
on the Pope’s involvement in the conflict. While I was struck by the fact of the Pope’s non-
involvement, Ryan painted a picture of the Pope being involved on the pastoral (and feeling)
level. Thus did Ryan tell two stories of Pope John Paul II reaching out to Hunthausen during
the conflict years, once in the form of a telegram wishing him well (at the time of
Hunthausen’s cancer surgery) and once with the gesture of putting his arm around
Hunthausen and saying he was glad Hunthausen came to a particular meeting of bishops in
Rome (in 1988). I must say that even after hearing these two anecdotes I remain mystified by
the Pope’s choice not to intervene in a more prominent way in the affair. John Paul never
offered his opinion in any clear way in public, a fact that puzzles me considering the publicity
which came to surround the case. Moreover, I am left to wonder what collegiality or fraternity
means when the head of the college of bishops does not sit down for an extended conversation
with a local ordinary in such a tense and consequential situation. I offer this judgment in
passing by way of introduction to my view that Ryan in the interview seemed to want to
protect the appearance of the Pope’s participation, much in the way he did Hunthausen’s.
Ryan was much more willing to be critical of other participants’ approaches to the conflict
handling, but Hunthausen and the Holy Father were both spared from criticism.
A third way Ryan challenged my view of the conflict was, as I have just suggested, in his
presentation of Hunthausen’s involvement. Ryan portrays Hunthausen much less suspiciously
than I do here. As I said, he offers no criticism of Hunthausen and, across the board,
emphasizes Hunthausen’s integrity, lack of ambition and commitment to the Church. In
response to this, I will say that I find reason to take Ryan’s viewpoint seriously. The other
side of saying that Ryan was too close to Hunthausen to be unbiased is to say that, by being
closer than anyone else, he may have had the best and most accurate view of all. I myself
have only a paper trail as evidence of the level of Hunthausen’s humility and guilelessness.
And while I find value in not rushing to embrace a person’s public image (Hunthausen as
prophet; Hunthausen as simple and honest Vatican II bishop), I recognize that never parting
from suspicion can be socially corrosive and can result in the distortion of the truth. Ryan’s
inclination to see nobility in Hunthausen’s motives offers a useful counterpoint to my own
inclination in this research to see a more or less calculated will to power at work (a human
trait that we all share) in the activity of all conflict participants.
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
10.1 Conclusions About Center-Periphery Conflict Handling Derived from the Rome-
Hunthausen Case
Near the beginning of this investigation, I posed the following question: What coping
strategies are observable in center-periphery conflict discourse? Having intensively studied
the Rome-Hunthausen case its breadth and depth, and to the level of minute detail – I will
now summarize my answer to that question. Here below I state the most pertinent findings.
Thereafter I formulate a series of propositions, based on the findings, that I believe have the
possibility of applying generally to cases of center-periphery conflict. These propositions
might well serve as hypotheses for future studies. In the final section of this chapter I evaluate
the total research project.
10.1.1 Summary of Findings and Statement of Propositions
General Stance toward Conflict Handling: All members of the hierarchy participating in
the Rome-Hunthausen conflict sought to save face for the Church organization and for
themselves. They also sought to enhance the Church’s possession of power and their own
possession of power. Participants appeared to want to pursue all four priorities
simultaneously, and much of the time (particularly during periods of lower conflict intensity)
the priorities seemed compatible. As the conflict intensified, however, it apparently became
more difficult to know what face saving (for self and for the Church) and power enhancement
(for self and for the Church) required. Finding themselves in opposition to one or more other
bishops seemed to complicate bishops’ discernments about what was in the best interest of the
Church organization and in their own best interest. As a result we saw signs of ambivalence
regarding how to proceed from both the center and periphery parties. Rome tried first to enlist
Hunthausen’s compliance through pressure applied in private, then through public challenges,
and finally it backed off of punitive steps it had taken earlier. Hunthausen continually walked
a fine line between local autonomy and conformity to Rome’s wishes. His ambivalence was
seen most starkly in his varying approach to the matter of secrecy. The discourse of both the
center and periphery parties shows a calculative attitude at work, wherein an attempt was
made to reconcile personal and organizational interests.
Proposition 1: Center-periphery conflict complicates participant bishops’ discernments
about what is in their own best interest and what is in the Church’s best interest.
Participants will need to reaffirm or reformulate the balance they have struck between
the priorities of saving face for self and the Church and enhancing power for self and
the Church.
In this research one sees a number of strategies, identified from the actual practice of center-
periphery conflict, that bishops employ in their effort to negotiate the tension between these
priorities.
Use of Power: All members of the hierarchy participating in the conflict strove for (the
appearance of) legitimacy in their employments of power. In the context of the center-
periphery conflict, the center placed on early emphasis on gaining the periphery’s agreement
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for its interventions (in the form of the visitation and auxiliary bishop with special powers). In
the face of resistance from the periphery, the center fell back on legitimation grounded in its
responsibility to the good of the Church and its legal right to intervene.
Hunthausen, for his part, tended to legitimate his actions by arguing that he had acted “in
good faith” (that is, ethically and in accord with Church norms, including legal norms). He
also justified his actions with reference to an ecclesiological perspective shift (his actions
were “right” according to worldly perspectives that a Church come of age must recognize).
In general, bishops showed a preference for having their actions appear virtuous and, short of
that, legal in ecclesiastical and civil terms.
Though the center party enjoyed a great advantage in almost every form of ecclesiastical
power in the Rome-Hunthausen case, it had serious difficulty achieving its will in Seattle.
Though Rome employed several rather heavy inducements (forms of raw power) to enjoin
Hunthausen’s cooperation (e.g.: legal-coercive interventions such as the visitation and
appointment of a bishop with special faculties; applications of social pressure to conform;
ecological power in its entrance of Hunthausen’s archdiocese while denying him access to the
Vatican decision-making center) these were not enough to gain his cooperation on key points
(such as acceptance of the loss of faculties to an auxiliary). Hunthausen, though on the surface
seemingly disadvantaged in his possession of power, managed to hold out surprisingly well in
his conflict with the Vatican, even forcing a significant retreat by Rome (in the form of the
reassignment of Wuerl and restoration of Hunthausen’s faculties).
The basis of Hunthausen’s success in achieving a compromise appears to lie with his
consistent maintenance of a posture of deference and loyalty – toward the Holy See (and Holy
Father in particular) and the Church, while waging his resistance quietly (in behind-the-scenes
negotiations) and in publicly defensible ways (when he did go on the attack in public against
the Vatican, it only came after he himself had been publicly attacked by the pro-nuncio; and
the case he argued on that occasion was one that the American bishops and American
Catholics in general could sympathize with). In essence, Hunthausen, through his consistently
respectful language and actions (with some minor exceptions) provided Rome with no
grounds for automatic removal. At the same time, he drew on his great popularity in his own
archdiocese and among liberal-progressive Catholics around the country, who admired his
stands on principle (something accentuated and communicated through his personal
charisma).
Surprisingly, while Hunthausen often drew effectively on his own charisma, the Pope offered
only a minimal projection of his own personality (and well-known charisma) into the affair.
After Hunthausen argued his case at the November 1986 NCCB meeting, the negotiations
reached an impasse. Rome was forced to choose between an unpopular departure from office
by Hunthausen (via resignation or removal) – and a likely public backlash during the Pope’s
papal visit in 1987 – or some loss of face for itself in the short time by retreating from the
hard line it had taken against Hunthausen. Rome decided to retreat, while imposing lesser
sanctions that allowed it to save face somewhat (by asserting its own power even in retreat).
In general, the use of power did not appear to follow an orderly progression (increase) in the
heaviness of tactics. Some of Rome’s most heavy-handed interventions (the visitation, the
imposition of an auxiliary bishop with special faculties) came fairly early in the conflict, after
little build-up (in public at least). Hunthausen’s use of contentious tactics appeared to escalate
in accord with rising feelings of frustration, desperation and the sense that he had little left to
335
lose.
Proposition 2: Bishops participating in center-periphery conflict will strive to have
their employments of power appear legitimate.
Proposition 3: Critical to a periphery bishop’s ability to survive a conflict with the
center is his ability to offer resistance without giving the appearance of disloyalty.
Specific Coping Strategies Employed:
1. Shows of deference to the existing structural order and mindset of the Church: The
evidence of the Rome-Hunthausen case shows this to be a cardinal rule of intrahierarchical
discourse. Nowhere in the case do we find any outright abandonments of this principle in
practice. All bishops made it a point not to criticize the Church itself and consistently showed
deference to other Church leaders (especially in the form of obedience to superiors). Use of
this strategy served to reassure fellow bishops and Church members at large that one was
loyally committed to the Church and not a threat to harmony or unity.
At the same time, it is clear that the structural order and mindset were under contestation in
the case. Hunthausen pushed for local autonomy and for a vision of Church that, while not
external to the (pluriform) total Church tradition, was not in a dominant position within the
Church organization. The rule of engagement appears to be that bishops may argue for their
own vision for Church thought and practice so long as they employ familiar concepts and
terminologies exclusively when doing so. We saw this rule applied in the Rome-Hunthausen
case when Hunthausen argued for “renewal” as justified by the Second Vatican Council.
Ratzinger, for his part, took a different approach, arguing for pastoral reforms in Seattle
according to norms expressed in an array of ecclesiastical instructions (papal, congregational,
conciliar).   
Proposition 4: Bishops participating in center-periphery conflict will show deference to
the order and mindset of the Church. Though they may challenge the Church’s
prevailing thought and practice, they will do so only in terms that are familiar from
Church tradition and Church culture and Church socialization.
2. Association of one’s own efforts with the best interest of the Church. This strategy is in
some sense an extension of the previous strategy. No Church leader wants to show himself to
be a danger to the Church: rather, he will want to appear to have its best interests at heart.
This was consistently evident in the Rome-Hunthausen case. All bishop participants signalled
with their words, often quite explicitly, that they were acting for the good of the Church.
(Though discussions about the nature of that interest were often avoided out of fear of
conflict.) As with the strategy of showing deference, we see in the conflict that differing
words and actions were adopted as expressions of this concern for the Church’s interest.
Center party representatives tended to focus on the need for control within the Church and the
adequate presentation of doctrine. Hunthausen associated his own efforts with the well being
of the people of the Church.
Proposition 5: Bishops participating in center-periphery conflict will associate their
own efforts with the best interest of the Church.
3. Minimization of the appearance of conflict. The bishop participants in the Rome-
Hunthausen conflict consistently sought to minimize the appearance of conflict, but briefly
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abandoned this strategy (by making press statements, leaking news, offering implicit and
implicit criticisms of opponents, and acknowledging the fact of conflict itself) during the most
tense phase of the conflict. Once a stalemate was reached in the conflict handling, members of
the hierarchy participating resumed the effort to minimize the appearance of conflict.
Proposition 6: Bishops participating in center-periphery conflict will minimize the
appearance of conflict but may briefly abandon this strategy for the sake of advantage.
4. Shows of fraternity. Bishop participants in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict drew upon their
fraternal relationship by calling upon one another for support (Hunthausen turned to Roach
and Hurley, and later appealed to the NCCB as a whole; the Vatican employed Hickey as
visitator, and later called Bernardin, O’Connor and Quinn to serve on the assessment
commission; etc.). This draw on fraternal relationship served both the center and periphery
parties well, but Hunthausen gained the most in the conflict by convincing the American
bishops to signal support for his position. All bishop participants showed a clannish tendency
to keep intrahierarchical disputes within the confines of the hierarchy. This tendency served
the center more than the periphery. Hunthausen gained greater leverage over Rome when the
conflict came more fully into the open. The concept of episcopal fraternity was frequently
invoked -- by all parties -- apparently as a reminder of obligations (as when the Pope
reminded the American bishops, in his message to them, of their accountability to Rome) or
as a signal of one’s own belonging and loyalty (as in many of Hunthausen’s pronouncements).
Proposition 7: Bishops participating in center-periphery conflict will show fraternity by
saving face for one another, by keeping the hierarchy’s business within the hierarchy
and by emphasizing the concept of episcopal fraternity.
5. Practice of courtesy. All bishop participants showed an almost invincible commitment to
graciousness toward one another in public. Tactically, this involved employing praise,
addressing one another respectfully, avoiding direct criticisms or assignments of blame and
maintaining silence about sensitive matters. Only briefly, at the point of greatest intensity of
conflict, did the center and periphery parties in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict forgo shows of
courtesy toward one another. In general, this compact of courtesy served center and periphery
bishops equally well, since it maintained the appearance of strength (through unity) in the
hierarchy. In the Rome-Hunthausen case it appeared that the opportunity to abandon courtesy
was increased by proximity to the center (and the greater possession of organizational power).
Hunthausen did not appear free to make statements critical of Rome’s approach until Rome
(Laghi, in the Vatican chronology) had openly criticized him (and then in harsher and more
personal attacks than Hunthausen would voice).
Proposition 8: Bishops participating in center-periphery conflict will show courtesy
toward one another in public almost without exception. When a breach in courtesy
comes, it will likely come first from the center party.
6. Employment of secrecy. All bishop participants in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict
practiced secrecy. The greatest information divide resulting from the use of secrecy lay
between those within the hierarchy and those without. Those outside the hierarchy almost
always had less access to information relevant to the conflict than those within the hierarchy.
Secrecy served to downplay the seriousness of the conflict, thereby preserving the appearance
of unity within the hierarchy. Secrecy also served to keep those not of the hierarchy out of the
conflict negotiations. Rome took the lead in maintaining this policy of secrecy over and
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against the public (in its containment of the visitation findings, for example). Hunthausen
alternately complied with and resisted this policy (thus, he participated in private meetings
and exchanges of correspondence and reserved information for himself, but he also revealed
Wuerl’s possession of faculties).
Within the hierarchy itself, there was also an information divide resulting from the use of
secrecy. Rome used secrecy against Hunthausen, repeatedly placing him at a disadvantage by
not supplying information he requested (the Hickey visitation report being the most prominent
example). Hunthausen fought this disadvantage during the middle stage of the conflict by
repeatedly bringing conflict issues into the open and by making secrecy itself an issue (at the
November 1986 NCCB meeting). By denying information to Hunthausen and excluding him
from discussions that would affect his fate, the Vatican kept tight control over what the
pertinent issues were and what the practical consequences should be. Through his resistance,
Hunthausen introduced his own voice into the decision making process and also the voices of
an interested public that was positioned to put social pressure on the negotiating bishops.
While adherence to secrecy was, to a high degree, a matter of standard practice in the conflict
handling, so too were breaks from secrecy. Both the center and periphery parties, on at least
one occasion, released information against the wishes of the other. Another significant form
of departure from secrecy were news leaks, which shaped the conflict on several occasions.
The source of the news leaks was in every instance unclear. One learning from this study was
that the use of secrecy created rifts within the hierarchy (between center and periphery) and
stood in problematic relationship with cultural expectations about transparency. Whereas
Hunthausen made this point explicitly, he apparently felt constricted enough by his role as a
bishop that he could never make a clean break from the use of secrecy himself. He remained
complicit in its use (though ambivalently) during the conflict and beyond.
Proposition 9: Bishops participating in center-periphery conflict will show a basic
preference for conducting their conflict negotiations in secret, but they will break with
secrecy when there is an apparent advantage to doing so.
Proposition 10: The center party will benefit more from secrecy than the periphery
party and will show a greater commitment to secrecy than the periphery.
7. Recruitment of allies. Center and periphery attempts to recruit fellow bishops as allies
increased as the conflict increased in intensity. Certain individual bishops were approached
early on (Rome brought on Hickey as visitator, Hunthausen consulted with Roach and
Hurley), but the main attempt to enlist support from fellow bishops took place prior to and
during the November 1986 NCCB meeting (during the discussions about the Vatican
chronology’s release and the NCCB debate itself). Hunthausen, being the lower power party,
was more in need of third party support and he pursued it more actively, turning not only to
fellow bishops but also to the public at large. The NCCB’s decision to stand by him (without
challenging Rome) was crucial to Hunthausen’s emerging as well as he did from the conflict.
Many bishops may have felt pressured to support Hunthausen in light of the widespread
popular support for his cause. The Vatican, for its part, made only a minimal attempt to win
public support to its side during the affair – or perhaps its attempts were simply ineffective, by
virtue of seeming heavy-handed (no public relations campaign laid the groundwork for the
use of heavy tactics such as the visitation and release of criticisms in the Vatican chronology).
338
Proposition 11: The lower power party in center-periphery conflict (likely the
periphery party) will have a greater need of bishop allies and will make a more
concerted effort to recruit them.
Proposition 12: While fellow bishops are the most important allies to have in center-
periphery conflict, popular support from outside the hierarchy can also have a strategic
impact on the conflict handling.
8. Use of persuasive argumentation. It was difficult to evaluate the use of persuasive
argumentation in the Rome-Hunthausen conflict because the most crucial conversations
between the principal parties were carried out in private. Most of the available evidence
shows the parties’ employment of rhetoric to win public support, with attempts to convince
one another having been already carried out in another, hidden, forum. But presumably the
argumentation that did come into view (employing rhetorical tactics such as ingratiation,
demonization, simplification / complexification, perspective shifts and God talk) was
somewhat reflective of the exchanges that took place in private.
The chief difference between the argumentation advanced by Rome and by Hunthausen may
well have been the discrepant ecclesiological visions at hand. What Rome saw as
Hunthausen’s main weakness, his flexible and tolerant leadership style (his lack of
“firmness”), was in Hunthausen’s view a necessary and valuable component of Church
leadership. Hunthausen presented himself as treating Church members as adults, making room
for participation and tolerating the unavoidable failures that accompany participation as an
acceptable cost. Hunthausen also showed a higher comfort level with intraecclesial diversity.
The Vatican position (expressed most concisely by Ratzinger), however, saw in this approach
of toleration a threat to the full realization of the Church’s own ideals. Toleration might make
Hunthausen popular in his own archdiocese, but it could also interfere with those same
people’s ability to face up to the difficult challenges that God has placed before them. In
simple terms, Hunthausen’s ecclesiology of forgiveness and charity clashed with the Roman
emphasis on the demands of the cross. Both are central and fully orthodox perspectives within
Christian theology: they are theologically inseparable but not always easily reconciled.
Proposition 13: Bishops participating in center-periphery conflict will make their
primary attempt to win over other bishops through persuasive argumentation in private.
Persuasive argumentation in public will be directed mainly to third parties.
9. Assertion of personal identity. Among the bishop participants in the Rome-Hunthausen
conflict, only Hunthausen regularly asserted his own personal identity in public as a means of
managing the conflict. Vatican representatives rarely drew attention to their individuality in
public as a conflict coping strategy. The strategy proved to be a great source of strength for
Hunthausen, humanizing his position and winning much support for his cause. Foregrounding
one’s own personality appeared to be a major taboo on the center party side, but in the late
stage of the conflict there were signs that the pro-nuncio attempted the strategy as well, to
counter Hunthausen’s effective use of the approach. Third party bishop negotiators (NCCB
leaders, the commission) consistently kept a low profile during their involvement in the
conflict.
The key to Hunthausen’s success with the strategy lay in highlighting his charismatic
personality and reputation for integrity, and establishing a link between his conflict positions
and these qualities. Also critical was the fact that he personalized his position (humanized it)
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without giving the appearance of grandstanding or willful disloyalty. His individualized
stance came to be associated with integrity and a commitment to principle and not with
putting himself above the best interest of the Church.
The Vatican’s disinclination to highlight individual personalities appeared to be related to
overriding commitment to managing the conflict out of public view (and perhaps to limit the
opponent’s access to the conflictual partner). The most visible representative of the Vatican
position was pro-nuncio Laghi. Curial officials and the Pope stayed almost entirely off the
record. It is unclear why the Pope chose not to interject his own personality into the affair in
any direct and public way, given his proven ability to assert his own personality effectively in
public.
Proposition 14: Center party bishops in center-periphery conflict will show little
inclination to assert their own identity in the course of the conflict handling. Periphery
party bishops will enjoy more freedom to assert their own personality and will have
more incentive to do so.
10.2 Generalizability of the Findings to Other Cases of Center-Periphery Conflict
How transferable are theses findings? Without making actual comparisons to other cases of
center-periphery conflict, it is difficult to know for sure, but observations about the prospects
for generalization – and the limits thereof -- are offered below.
In this study I have striven to lay the groundwork for future comparisons (as, for example,
with the aforementioned Alfrink case). I started with a review of theoretical materials to shed
light on the phenomenon of center-periphery conflict (chapters 2-5) and referred back to that
material repeatedly in the course of the investigation. Thus one may speak of an ongoing
engagement of empirical findings with existing theory, and a basis for theoretical
generalization.
Beyond that, I have adopted a “thick description” approach in my presentation of the case
findings, showing how I have built toward conclusions from the ground up. I have moved in
my analysis from the level of individual documents to the level of the constructed case
narrative to the extraction of conclusions, explaining my own methodological steps and
presenting the relevant data (or citing a consultable source) all along the way.
Moreover, I have consistently tried to give a three-dimensional picture of case developments
themselves, supplying enough data so that multiple potential influences on the case handling
(personal factors, organizational factors, societal factors) could be identified and considered.
This three-dimensionality favors the possibility of making cross-case comparisons fruitfully.
(Relevant similarities and differences can be more easily identified.)
Finally, I would point out that this case description does not simply confront us with a picture
of conflict coping behavior of two bishops (the Pope and the local bishop) over a brief time,
but with multiple samples of discursive coping from more than a dozen bishops (of multiple
nationalities) over a five-and-a-half year period. In that respect, I believe it provides a good
glimpse of widely prevailing discursive preferences within the hierarchy of the contemporary
Church and, again, a good foundation for theoretical generalization.
On this basis, I advance the fourteen propositions articulated above as fruitful possibilities to
inform future studies of center-periphery conflict.
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10.3 Relevance of the Findings
The following observations about the potential practical and practical theological relevance
of the research findings are normative and speculative in nature.
The Church is an organization that seeks to forge unity from diversity. The tension
between central control and local (peripheral) autonomy is a reflection of the effort to cull
oneness from plurality. Conflict between Rome and the local Church (or between the Pope
and a local bishop) is a phenomenon that can, from various angles, be understood as an
inherent characteristic of the Church, as the product of societal-historical conjuncture, or as
the challenge inevitably faced by any large-scale centralized and bureaucratized
multinational.
This research demonstrates that one may coherently read center-periphery conflict (and
arguably intrahierarchical conflict in general, given the findings’ multiple groundedness in
the Church’s belief system, culture, socialization, etc.) in terms of the hierarchy’s desire to
protect the appearance and preserve the power of the Church organization and of the
hierarchy itself, in the course of its quest for unity. The study does not conclude that these
are the only motivations compelling bishops in their leadership of the Church – normative-
ideological motivations remain highly relevant --  but simply that these motivations apply,
and are instrumental to greater extent than members of the hierarchy let on. Thus the study
offers a necessary amendment to the hierarchy’s own descriptions of what takes place and
is at stake in such conflicts.
Within the Church organization a taboo around conflict applies, apparently rooted in the
perception that conflict is incompatible with the preferred state of charity and unified
harmony. Because conflict is not supposed to arise, especially within the hierarchy, which
symbolizes Church unity, bishops show themselves to be unhelpfully constricted when
dealing with the conflicts that inevitably occur within their ranks. In the absence of Church
teachings that openly value conflicts (acknowledging them as unavoidable in organizations
of all kinds and useful when managed well), and lacking structures and guidelines for
handling conflicts productively, bishops “cope” by avoiding conflict with one another
(placing a premium on deference to rank and shows of courtesy) and minimizing its
appearance when it develops (downplaying its significance, hiding it, etc.). They seek to
contain the conflict handling within the bounds of the episcopal brotherhood, often by
means of secrecy. (The real arguments occur out of public view.) By default, bishops’
efforts at conflict problem solving depend on improvisation. The findings from this
research point to the urgent need for a Church teaching about conflict that does justice to
modern realities (such as expectations about transparency and wide participation) and
relevant normative, ecclesiological and practical concerns.
Within the prevailing approach to conflict handling (one of the contributions of this
research is to clarify what that approach is), the hierarchy – the center party in particular --
shows a reluctance to invite Church constituents (Catholics at large) into the discussion as
full-fledged participants. When the broader public does participate, it is often the result of
either having forced itself into the conversation (through letter writing, activism, media
barrages – compare the recent crisis around the question of pedophilia in the US Church)
or as the consequence of one party’s attempt to apply social pressure to the another. By the
exclusion of the Church public from the conflict discussion, the bishops deny Catholics the
opportunity to speak to issues that concern them directly and thereby underserve the
process of determining what is truly in their interest. Without knowing and addressing the
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real interests of the people they lead, bishops undermine their own authority and hinder the
possibility of attaining authentic unity. This is not to overlook practical limits that apply
(chaos would be the result of everyone speaking at once), nor is it to suggest that the
strategies currently applied for the resolution of center-periphery conflicts are in and of
themselves wrong. Showing deference and courtesy, minimizing the appearance of conflict
– these and the other strategies all can be helpful if used in the right way. The problem in
the current state of affairs, however, is that the strategies appear to be chosen unthinkingly
and applied (often) in the absence of communal consent and ecclesiological, ethical and
practical reference frames that offer explicit justification for their use. To take the highly
charged example of secrecy: secrecy can be used to harm, but it can also serve to protect
the vulnerable. The key is knowing when it is proper to use secrecy, given the Church’s
identity and mission, its ethical standards, and the practical limits on secrecy’s
effectiveness. The ongoing challenge of discernment about the appropriate use of conflict
handling strategies, recognized in the course of this study and in the light of its findings, is
an appropriate object of (future) reflection for the Church and for the normative science
that is practical theology.
10.4 Evaluation of the Total Research Project
The present study of center-periphery conflict has a number of strengths and weaknesses that
can be identified. In the following section I provide my own perspective on this matter,
assessing first certain weaknesses I recognize in my work.
One weakness I perceive is that I have reduced my analysis to a focus on manipulations of
power (through the use of language) for the sake of strategic advantage. This gives the
impression that I perceive only selfish (power-hungry) motives at work in the actors I have
studied. This type of analysis makes no room, really, for consideration of altruistic impulses
and for the participants’ own professions that God is somehow present to the conflict
handling. Nor does it account for more tortured kinds of wrestling with questions about power
and ideals (of the sort that the novelist Graham Greene described so well) that bishops may
experience internally. The result of this approach is a two-dimensional depiction of the
participants’ exchange: we see a shadow drama about power and not much else.
Acknowledging this deficiency, I will confess nonetheless to feeling justified in adopting this
approach. My reasons for having proceeded with this type of analysis are that one simply
cannot account for everything, a choice must be made; and to my mind, attention to how
power is manipulated in intrahierarchical conflict is a topic worthy of consideration that has
been neglected. This does not mean that there is nothing but the pursuit of power at work in
these conflicts, but rather that the way power is employed is crucial and is, without question, a
legitimate focal point. By at least offering some clarification to the power question, I believe
myself to be making a contribution to a later, fuller portrait of center-periphery conflict
dynamics that takes into account other dimensions of the conflict handling as well.
Another weakness in this work is a certain unbalanced quality in the treatment of the
participant parties. It was unavoidable, given my own circumstances, that I would gain more
insight into the periphery party position than into the center party position. Most of the
research was conducted in Seattle and most of the publications I had available for consultation
originated in Seattle or elsewhere in the United States. Knowing ahead of time that I would
not have the opportunity to travel to Rome for interviews or other kinds of research gathering
– and since Hunthausen himself refused an interview request early on – I decided to establish
as much balance in the data gathering as I could by giving most of my attention to the
documents released publicly by both sides. This seemed to me to offer something of a level
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playing field, since both Hunthausen and Vatican representatives had the opportunity, realized
in practice, to release texts that served to make their views known. In a perfect world, I would
have gained access to the principals on both sides for interviews and would have been able to
compare private documents with public documents. But in this real world I have had to settle
for piecing together, as best I could, the inside story based on the pieces of evidence that
turned up in the open in the places where I could get to them. I feel the need to add, too,
however, that Rome’s general orientation against transparency in its bureaucratic affairs
makes it harder for researchers like myself to tell the Roman side of the story completely.
As a means to overcome problems of lack of access – to hidden dimensions of the conflict
handling, for example – I employed in this research a method that is designed to help one read
between the lines of textual interchange. Critical discourse analysis, while offering valuable
techniques for perception, clearly has functional limits. One such limit is the subjectivity of
interpretation that applies when one describes the social function of a given text. To put it
bluntly, texts production and text consumption are highly ambiguous processes. A text
producer may write a certain way with a clear strategic intention, but he or she may also do so
out of habit or carelessness or with an entirely unexpected intention in mind. On the
consumption side, interpretations of a text vary according to the reader, time and setting of
consumption, and so forth. My basic approach to addressing this difficulty has been to
introduce the actual contents of the text, describe the context of its production / consumption
(while identifying key sources of information), and allow the reader to judge for herself or
himself the quality of the conclusions. My expectation is not necessarily that the reader agree
with my interpretation, but that he or she easily see how I arrived at that interpretation and
why.
As an analytical tool for gaining insight into the Rome-Hunthausen conflict handling, I have
drawn on a particular perspective on conflict handling, that of Pruitt and Rubin (1986). One
advantage of their approach for my own work is the attention they give to the perceptions and
consequent decision making of individual actors. This has worked well with my own
inclination to view the conflict participants as individual actors (decision makers, text
producers, text consumers), but there are obvious drawbacks to such an approach – in my own
work and that of Pruitt and Rubin. For example, the question of how group participation (on a
small scale) tends to influence individual choice is neglected. Also not incorporated into the
conflict model is a means for theoretically relating conflict events to more usual, tranquil
patterns of group or organizational life. The theory also leaves the potential long-term (post-
conflict) effects of the use of particular conflict strategies unexplored.
To my regret, certain strategies of interest did not come up for systematic examination
because they were recognized too late in the research process. These include the strategies of
establishing procedural control, avoidance, revealing and threats. These strategies are worthy
of future examination.
The main strengths I see in the present study are that, first, it relates -- systematically and with
attention to documentary detail -- an important story of intrachurch conflict that has not yet
been told in that fashion. (As a case in point, a recently released 144-page history of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle – published by the archdiocese itself – offers only a three-
sentence description of the entire conflict. Cf. Taylor 2000.) Simply for the sake of the
historical record, the chronological account of the case presented here makes a contribution
by consolidating dates, information sources, descriptions of events and document references
that are not yet available in any other single source.
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Secondly, this study makes a contribution as a social scientific work by providing a
theoretically- and empirically-grounded introduction to how members of the hierarchy use
language and actions to further their own interests and the interests of the Church organization
in conflict situations. Studies of intrahierarchical conflict handling are lacking and the
provision thereof has value for the organization and outsiders as well.
Finally, I believe that this work ultimately raises questions – difficult questions about what the
Church is called to be, and who will lead it, and how – that I believe the Church must confront
if it is to reach its own goals. I hope that this effort will help to gain for those questions a
more sustained hearing.
10. 5 Afterword
When I set out to investigate the Hunthausen case five years ago, I had a simpler and more
naïve view of the affair than I do now that I have completed this study. My intention was to
write about how the bishops involved used language to resolve the conflict. I was primarily
interested in the specific techniques bishops would use to dance around conflict issues I was
sure they would be queasy about (in public). What I was less conscious of was that whenever
I would be writing these reflections I would be writing about power, and that it would be
impossible to avoid confronting this question head on.
My previous awareness of the case had told me that people either loved Hunthausen as a
progressive leader of the Church or were frustrated with him because he was (reputedly) so
lax in his leadership. One or two more subtle writings I encountered early on speculated about
Hunthausen’s level of political astuteness: was he as mild and peaceable (and naïve) as he
seemed, or was this the preferred front of a canny infighter?
Though I have my own answer to that last question – that he was an idealist who was smart
enough to realize the situation he was in, and pragmatic enough to do what he had to to
survive (for himself but also for the sake of the ideals) – it seems to me to overlook an
important point. Ultimately there is something tragic about Hunthausen, not so much for what
he himself experiences in the case, but for the troubling constriction of leadership that his case
exemplifies.
One of the main points I make in my study of the case is that, while arguing for an “open
Church” – for transparency and broad participation in the leadership of the Church –
Hunthausen himself remained complicit, off and on, in the restrictive practices of silence and
secrecy that he himself argued against. I believe this proved to be the case because
Hunthausen was so strongly socialized to do so (thus, it was to a degree a matter of
unconscious habit), and because ultimately he realized that he could not say what he wanted
to say and change what he wanted to change and still remain in the hierarchy. I cannot help
but feel that on some level Hunthausen knew all too well that the self-protective mechanisms
of the hierarchical culture – which are fully operative when Church conflicts of interest arise –
pose a danger to the credibility of the hierarchy and to the viability of the Church. One need
only look as far as the recent crisis around the issue of pedophilia to recognize the calamity
that comes when bishops put the appearance of the Church and of the hierarchy ahead of the
open and honest acknowledgment of real problems. My sense is that Hunthausen felt himself
to be, to some extent, trapped within structures that he could not see a way to change and that
he felt frustrated as a result. I do not imagine him to be alone among bishops in feeling this
way.
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APPENDIX 1: CHRONOLOGY OF THE ROME-HUNTHAUSEN CASE
1983
5.83 Archbishop Pio Laghi, Papal Pro-Nuncio to the United States, informs Seattle Archbishop
Raymond Hunthausen, at a meeting of U.S. bishops in Chicago, that the Vatican wants to
conduct a Visitation of Seattle. Hunthausen agrees.
7.6.83 The Vatican names Washington, D.C. Archbishop James Hickey Apostolic Visitator.
9.83 Seattle Auxiliary Bishop Nicholas Walsh resigns for health reasons.
9.15-16.83 Hunthausen and Hickey, in Chicago, discuss how Visitation will be conducted.
9.22.83 Hunthausen in Rome for ad limina visit.
10.4.83 Date of letter (never released publicly) from Cardinal Ratzinger, Prefect of the Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith, to Hunthausen concerning forthcoming Visitation.
10.26.83 Hunthausen and Hickey announce the impending Visitation of Seattle.
11.2-8.83 Visitation of Seattle. Archbishop Hickey, accompanied by two assistants, interviews more than
seventy priests, Religious, and lay people, including Hunthausen and members of his staff.
12.12.83 Date of letter from Ratzinger to Hunthausen acknowledging the Vatican’s reception of
Hickey’s Visitation report.
1984
3.14.84 Date of Hunthausen letter (never released publicly) to Ratzinger responding to issues raised by
Visitation report.
7.6.84 Hunthausen installs Fr. Michael G. Ryan, archdiocesan chancellor, as vicar general of the
archdiocese as well. Hunthausen also names Fr. Michael McDermott director of administration.
1985
9.11.85 Date of Hunthausen letter to Laghi discussing possible appointment of helper bishop in Seattle.
9.30.85 Date of Ratzinger letter (released publicly 5.87) to Hunthausen concluding the Visitation and
outlining its findings.
10.9-10.85 Hunthausen and Laghi meet at Apostolic Nunciature in Washington, D.C. to discuss findings
from Visitation and follow-up action.
11.14.85 Date of Laghi letter to Hunthausen announcing conclusion of Visitation and outlining its
findings.
11.25.85 Date of Laghi letter (never made public) sent separately to Hunthausen and Wuerl in which
Laghi reportedly thanked Hunthausen for agreeing to welcome new auxiliary bishop.
11.27.85 Hunthausen releases Laghi letter announcing conclusion of Visitation.
12.2.85 Date of Hunthausen letter to Laghi discussing appointment of Auxiliary Bishop Wuerl and
matter of special faculties.
12.3.85 Laghi announces Vatican appointment of Donald Wuerl to serve as Auxiliary Bishop of
Seattle.
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1986
1.6.86 Pope John Paul II ordains Wuerl auxiliary bishop in Rome.
1.7.86 The Pope meets with Hunthausen and Wuerl in Rome.
1.23.86 Prior to Wuerl’s arrival in Seattle, Hunthausen meets with priests of Archdiocese and reads
Ratzinger letter of 9.30.85 to them. (Hunthausen had shared the contents of the same letter with
the archdiocesan presbyteral council in late 1985.)
1.26.86 Wuerl arrives in Seattle.
3.86 Hunthausen and Wuerl reach impasse in their power-sharing arrangement and discover they
have different understandings of what the arrangement entails. Both write to Laghi for
clarification.
4.29.86 Date of internal archdiocesan report (prepared by Wuerl, Fr. Michael G. Ryan and Fr. Michael
McDermott) meant to be a first step toward designing a process to address the concerns of the
visitation. The report was requested by Hunthausen and it was submitted to him. Later in the
same year, in September, Hunthausen would distribute the report more widely among
archdiocesan leaders.
6.86 Hunthausen and Wuerl meet with Laghi at the National Conference of Catholic Bishops
(NCCB) meeting in Collegeville, Minnesota. Laghi confirms that Hunthausen was to have
given Wuerl final authority in the specified areas.
6.26.86 Pope John Paul II meets with Wuerl and Bishop John Marshall of Burlington, Vermont at the
Vatican to discuss their work in the ongoing study of U.S. seminaries.
7.1.86 Hunthausen receives letter from Cardinal Gantin, prefect of the Congregation for Bishops,
reaffirming that the Vatican’s intention was for Hunthausen to have given final authority to
Wuerl in the specified areas.
7.27.86 National Catholic Register article, citing Vatican sources, says Wuerl will be assuming a
“heavier share of real authority” in Seattle.
7.28.86 Date of Hunthausen letter to Wuerl (never released to the public) officially granting the special
faculties, effective August 1, 1986.
8.1.86 Wuerl’s special faculties take effect.
9.3.86 Hunthausen makes public announcement of Wuerl’s possession of special faculties and
releases a chronology of the Visitation and subsequent events.
9.11.86 Seattle Archdiocesan newspaper, The Progress, features Hunthausen open letter concerning
changes in the Archdiocese and an interview with Hunthausen and Wuerl.
9.12.86 Hunthausen and Wuerl meet with 250 priests of archdiocese for five hours to discuss recent
developments and give priests opportunity to voice reactions.
9.18.86 Hunthausen and Wuerl meet with archdiocesan presbyteral council at St. Edward’s Hall,
Seattle. Others present included members of the Archbishop’s staff (Dennis O’Leary, Olivia
Zapata, Fr. Michael McDermott) and archdiocesan public relations director Russ Scearce.
9.19.86 Date of Wuerl letter to priests of Archdiocese discussing current situation.
9.22.86 Region XII bishops (Northwestern U.S.), meeting in Portland, Oregon, issue statement
expressing support for Hunthausen and Wuerl.
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9.26.86 Hunthausen and Wuerl meet with priests of Archdiocese, Archdiocesan Pastoral Council,
Archdiocesan Finance Council, and chancery department directors at St. Thomas Center,
Bothell, Washington.
9.29.86 Date of Hunthausen memorandum to “Designated Leaders in the Archdiocese of Seattle,”
which introduces the April 29, 1986 report prepared by Wuerl, Fr. Michael G. Ryan and Fr.
Michael J. McDermott. Hunthausen had appointed this committee of three to review the 9.30.8
Ratzinger letter and to begin developing a strategy for addressing its concerns in the
Archdiocese.
10.16.86 The Progress publishes Hunthausen letter to people of Archdiocese concerning recent
developments. The letter, dated 10.14.86, was also mailed to all registered Catholics in the
archdiocese.
10.23.86 Archbishop Hickey (Apostolic Visitator) meets privately with Pope John Paul II in Rome.
NCCB executive committee (Members: NCCB President James Malone, NCCB Vice President
John May, Cardinal Bernard Law of Boston, Auxiliary Bishop Eugene Marino of Washington,
D.C., and Bishop John McGann of Rockville Centre. It is not known if all participated) discuss
options for releasing the (Vatican) chronology prepared by Archbishop Laghi in a conference
call. Laghi had shown his chronology to Hunthausen prior to this date.
10.24.86 Laghi provides “A Chronology of Recent Events in the Archdiocese of Seattle” to the U.S.
bishops in anticipation of the imminent NCCB meeting.
10.27.86 NCCB President James Malone (Archbishop of Youngstown, Ohio) releases the Vatican
chronology to the press at the request of the Vatican and authorization of the Holy See.
Hunthausen releases statement in response to Vatican Chronology.
11.5.86 NCCB confirms that Pope John Paul II will visit eight cities during nine-day U.S. trip in
September, 1987.
11.10.86 NCCB fall meeting (five days) begins in Washington, D.C. The Rome-Hunthausen case is on
the agenda.
11.11.86 At the NCCB meeting, the bishops meet in closed executive session to discuss the Seattle
situation. Hunthausen addresses the body briefly. Four texts frame the debate that follows: (1)
the full text of Hunthausen’s address to the bishops; (2) Hunthausen’s written response to the
Vatican Chronology; (3) the Vatican Chronology; and (4) a draft of a statement from NCCB
President James Malone (Bishop of Youngstown, Ohio) which he proposes to release publicly
as the NCCB’s commentary on the Seattle situation.
11.12.86 The bishops as the NCCB meeting gather again in closed session in the morning to continue
discussion of the Rome-Hunthausen case. Later in the day Hunthausen’s address to the bishops
and his response to the Vatican Chronology are released to the press along with the final
version of Bishop Malone’s statement.
11.13.86 NCCB meeting concludes.
12.16.86 Hunthausen has surgery to remove cancerous prostate gland. He is released from the hospital
on 12.24.86.
1987
1.26.87 Date of Laghi letter to three bishops – Cardinal John O’Connor of New York, Cardinal Joseph
Bernardin of Chicago and Archbishop John Quinn of San Francisco -- appointing them to an ad
hoc commission to assess the Seattle situation.
2.9.87 Laghi issues brief written statement (in Washington, D.C., through the NCCB), announcing
formation of ad hoc assessment commission.
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2.10.87 Commission members meet with Hunthausen and Wuerl in Dallas, Texas. The pro-nuncio is
present for the morning but not the afternoon and evening sessions.
2.13.87 The National Catholic Reporter reveals that the FBI has kept a file on Hunthausen and on
another “peace bishop,” Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit.
2.16.87 Wuerl meets privately with the Pope at the Vatican. Wuerl’s visit to Rome is occasioned by his
work on the seminary study committee.
3.6-7.87 Commission hears testimony of eight bishops of the Northwestern U.S., five archdiocesan
officials and seven priests belonging to Seattle’s board of consultors at a meeting in Menlo
Park, California.
3.12.87 Commission, together with pro-nuncio, meets with Hunthausen and Wuerl individually in
Chicago.
3.18-21.87 Commission members in Rome as part of delegation of American cardinals and bishops
preparing for Pope’s forthcoming trip to U.S.
3.25.87 Commission members Bernardin and Quinn meet with (visitator) Hickey in Washington, D.C.
3.29.87 Quinn meets with Archbishop Francis Hurley of Anchorage, Alaska.
3.31.87 Quinn meets with Hurley and with Bishop Michael Kenny of Juneau, Alaska.
4.8.87 Hunthausen meets with Bernardin in Chicago.
4.20.87 Priests of Archdiocese meet in Seattle and many sign statement of support for Hunthausen.
5.7.87 Hunthausen informs commission he is willing to accept its proposed resolution of Seattle
situation.
5.19-20.87 Commission members and Laghi meet with Pope and other Curial officials (including
Congregation for Bishops) in Rome to discuss the proposed resolution the commission has
worked out with Hunthausen. The commission’s assessment report is dated 5.20.87.
5.23.87 Thomas Murphy, Bishop of Great Falls-Billings, Montana is notified of Holy See’s desire to
appoint him Coadjutor Archbishop of Seattle.
5.25.87 Date of commission report cover letter, addressed to U.S. bishops.
5.26.87 Hunthausen with Bishop Thomas Murphy in Great Falls, Montana.
5.27.87 Commission releases its report, together with a cover letter and a copy of Cardinal Ratzinger’s
9.30.85 letter to Hunthausen. Hunthausen holds press conference to discuss the report and
introduce newly appointed Coadjutor Archbishop, Thomas Murphy.
6.13.87 Archdiocesan service of welcome for Murphy in Seattle.
6.15.87 Hunthausen and Murphy hold press conference in Seattle.
7.16.87 Assessment commission meets with Hunthausen and Murphy in Chicago.
9.10-19.87 Pope John Paul II visits eight U.S. cities.
11.10.87 Assessment commission meets with Hunthausen and Murphy in Washington, D.C.
1988
2.12.88 Donald Wuerl appointed bishop of Pittsburgh, his home diocese.
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2.26.88 Assessment commission meets with Hunthausen and Murphy in Seattle. (Archbishop Quinn
was not present because of a leave of absence.)
6.28.88 Washington, D.C. Archbishop James Hickey elevated to Cardinal.
10.88 Final meeting between apostolic commission and Hunthausen, Murphy.
11.29.88-
12.6.88 Hunthausen and Murphy in Rome for ad limina visit. (Because of a scheduling conflict, the
Seattle archbishops travelled with the bishops of Region VII, instead of with their fellow
Region XII bishops, who had gone to Rome in August.)
1989
4.11.89 Laghi announces that the commission’s oversight of conditions in the Archdiocese of Seattle is
ended.
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APPENDIX II: FIELD OF DOCUMENTS IDENTIFIED
AND DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO PRODUCER AND STAGE
Field of Document of Document Possibilities
A. Significant Documents From the Case As Identified by the Composite Source
Document Identified in: Briggs Reese Granfield
Early Stage
1. Hickey, Visitation Report (never made public) x x
2. Ratzinger, Letter to Hunthausen with Visitation findings, x x
dated September 30, 1985 (released by assessment
commission on May 27, 1987)
3. Laghi, Letter to Hunthausen with Visitation findings, x x x
dated November 14, 1985
4. Hunthausen, Letter to Laghi re. giving over faculties, x
dated December 2, 1985 (never made public)
5. Laghi, Announcement of Wuerl's appointment, x
released December 3, 1985
6. Gantin, Letter to Hunthausen re. Wuerl's faculties, x
 (date of letter unknown; received by Hunthausen on
July 1, 1986)
Middle Stage
7. Hunthausen, Public announcement of  Wuerl's faculties, x x x
released September 3, 1986
8. Wuerl, Letter to priests of Archdiocese, x
dated September 19, 1986
9. Laghi, Vatican Chronology, x x x
released October 24, 1986
10. Hunthausen, Response to Vatican Chronology, x x x
released November 12, 1986
11. Hunthausen, Address to NCCB, x x x
released November 12, 1986
12. Malone, Statement at NCCB meeting, x x
released November 12, 1986
13. Laghi, Announcement of Commission appointment, x x
released February 9, 1987
Late Stage
14. Laghi, Announcement, Vatican accepts Commission Report, x
released May 27, 1987
15. Commission, Assessment Report, x x x
released May 27, 1987
16. Hunthausen, Announcement of Murphy’s appointment, x
released May 27, 1987
17. Hunthausen, Statement accepting Commission Report, x
Released May 27, 1987
B. Documents Identified by Other Sources
Document Source
Early Stage
1. Hunthausen, Open Letter to Seattle Catholics The Progress (27 Oct. 1983),
announcing Visitation, dated October 26, 1983 Origins (10 Nov. 1983)
2. Ratzinger, Letter to Hunthausen announcing The Progress (26 Jan. 1984)
Vatican reception of Visitation Report,
dated December 12, 1983
3. Hunthausen, Statement accompanying release of The Progress (26 Jan. 1984)
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Ratzinger letter of December 12, 1983. Undated,
Published in The Progress on January 26, 1984.
4. Hunthausen, Letter to Ratzinger re. Visitation Ratzinger Letter (30 Sept. 1985)
findings, dated March 14, 1984 (never made public)
5. Hunthausen, Letter to Pro-Nuncio re. appointment Vatican Chronology
of auxiliary bishop, dated September 11, 1985
(never made public)
6. Hunthausen, Open Letter to Seattle Catholics The Progress (26 Nov. 1985)
accompanying release of Nov. 14, 1985 Laghi Letter.
Hunthausen’s open letter appears in Nov. 26, 1985
issue of The Progress.
7. Hunthausen, Press Statement re. Wuerl's appointment The Progress (5 Dec. 1985)
as Auxiliary Bishop of Seattle, December 3, 1985
8. Wuerl, Press Statement re. his appointment as The Progress (5 Dec. 1985)
Auxiliary Bishop, December 3, 1985
9. Laghi, Letter to Hunthausen confirming that Hunthausen Letter (9 Sept. 1986)
Hunthausen was to have given Wuerl special
faculties, dated July 1, 1986 (never made public)
Middle Stage
10. Hunthausen, Letter to priests of Archdiocese re. Fr. Michael G. Ryan provided copy
Wuerl's special faculties, dated September 3, 1986
11. Hunthausen, Open letter to Seattle Catholics re. The Progress (11 Sept. 1986)
Wuerl’s special faculties, released
September 11, 1986
12. Public Affairs Office of the Seattle Archdiocese, The Progress (11 Sept. 1986),
Chronology of the Visitation, released Origins (18 Sept. 1986)
September 11, 1986
13. Wuerl, Letter to priests of Archdiocese re. power- The Progress (25 Sept. 1986),
sharing arrangement, dated September 19, 1986 Origins (9 Oct. 1986)
14. Hunthausen, Letter to chancery staff re. leadership Wasden Price collection
of archdiocese, dated September 22, 1986
15. Bishops of Region XII (Northwestern U.S.), The Progress (25 Sept. 1986)
Statement on Seattle situation,
Released September 22, 1986
16. Hunthausen, Open Letter to Seattle Catholics re. The Progress (16 Oct.1986),
recent events in Archdiocese, Origins (6 Nov. 1986)
released October 16, 1986
17. Hunthausen, Press Statement offering first response to The Progress (30 Oct. 1986)
Vatican Chronology, released October 27, 1986 Origins (6 Nov. 1986)
18. Hunthausen, Press Statement in Response to Malone The Progress (20 Nov. 1986)
Statement of November 12, 1986,
released November 12, 1986
19. Bishop Nicholas Walsh (Bishop Emeritus of Yakima, The Progress (20 Nov. 1986)
Washington and former Auxiliary Bishop of Seattle),
Newspaper article recounting his decision to make a
recent trip to Rome to offer assistance in Hunthausen
case, published November 20, 1986
20. Laghi, Letters to O’Connor, Bernardin and Quinn The Progress (12 February 1987)
appointing them to ad hoc Commission,
dated January 26, 1987 (never made public)
Late Stage
21. Commission, Letter to U.S. Bishops accompanying The Progress (28 May 1987)
its assessment report, dated May 25, 1987
22. Murphy, Press Statement re. his appointment as The Progress (28 May 1987)
Coadjutor Archbishop of Seattle,
released May 27, 1986
23. Wuerl, Press Statement re. his reassignment, The Progress (28 May 1987)
released May 27, 1986
24. Bernardin, Press Statement re. resolution of Seattle National Catholic Reporter (5 June 1987)
situation, released May 27, 1986.
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25. Laghi, Announcement of completion of work of Archdiocese of Seattle, Inter-office memorandum
assessment commission, released April 11, 1989. (11 April 1989), Wasden Price collection
26. Hunthausen, statement acknowledging  completion Archdiocese of  Seattle, Inter-office memorandum
of work of assessment commission, released April 11, (11 April 1989), Wasden Price collection
1989.
Distribution of Documents According to Producer and Conflict Stage when Produced
Letter-number combinations below refer to lists A and B above.
Early Stage Middle Stage Late Stage
Center Party A2, A3, A5,  A9, A13, B20 A14, B25 
A6, B2, B9
Periphery Party A4, B1, B3, A7, A10, A11, A16, A17, B26
B4, B5, B6, B10, B11, B12,  
B7 B14, B16, B17,
B18
Third Party A1, B8 A8, A12, B13, A15, B21, B22,
B15, B19 B23, 24
Key: Bold = Document selected for comprehensive analysis
Underline = Document selected for control analysis
Italics = Document not available to public
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APPENDIX III: TEXTS OF PRIMARY DOCUMENTS SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS
Document Number: 1
Document Title: Ratzinger Letter (9.30.85) Summarizing Visitation Findings
Source: Origins, 6/4/87, p. 41; The Progress, 5/28/87, p. 5.
Your Excellency,
I am writing to bring to a close the Apostolic Visitation process, which was assisted by the visit of
Archbishop James Hickey of Washington, D.C., to the Archdiocese of Seattle from November 2-8, 1983.
Prior to that visit, both significant criticism and considerable praise had been directed toward your own
pastoral ministry and that of your collaborators in Seattle. To quote from this Congregation’s own October 4,
1983 letter to you, “It was precisely because it did not want to give uncritical acceptance to the published and
private criticisms made about the Archdiocese of Seattle, that the Holy See has undertaken this project.” Toward
that end, the Visitor conferred with at least sixty-seven members of the clergy, religious and laity. In addition, he
examined many pertinent documents, statements issued by the Archdiocese, and letters. Principally, though,
Archbishop Hickey spent some four to five hours of intense discussion with you. That interview, taped and
transcribed, was later reviewed by you and approved. Archbishop Hickey, with a model sense of cooperation and
collegial concern, filed a lengthy and exhaustively documented report with this Congregation, and with that his
involvement with the Apostolic Visitation process ended.
After a careful review of the entire body of testimony and of other materials as well, this Congregation is
now in a position to make the following observations, which we hope will be received by you in the spirit in
which they are offered and will be of assistance to you as Archbishop of Seattle.
1. There are many indications that you have striven with heart and mind to be a good bishop of the Church,
eager to implement the renewal called for in the decrees of the Vatican Council. You have worked zealously to
bring into existence the various consultative bodies promoted by the Council and mandated by the recently
revised Code of Canon Law. Numerous people spoke of your laudable and conscientious efforts to involve the
laity in the work of the Church and you have sought diligently to be open and accessible to your people. You
have been repeatedly described as a man of gospel values, sensitive to the needs of the suffering and the
aggrieved. Your concern for justice and peace is well known. Time and time again you have given clear
evidence of your loyalty to the Church and you devotion and obedience to the Holy Father.
2. It is also true that you and those who assist you have suffered from exaggerated criticism and routine
misunderstanding. Our observations are based neither on the complaints of your more strident critics nor on
publications that are obviously biased. Nor do we wish to encourage extremist groups who are wholly lacking in
a spirit of cooperation and seek to destroy or suppress whatever is not to their liking. It is our intention, rather, to
support what you have done to promote the renewal of the Church in Seattle and to point out, at the same time,
areas which we consider are in need of correction and improvement.
3. It is with this background of your own commitment to the real service of the Lord and the authentic
renewal of his people that this Congregation wishes to outline these problems and to enlist your cooperation in
resolving them.
4. It appears that there has been a rather widespread practice of admitting divorced persons to a subsequent
Church marriage without prior review by your Tribunal or even after they have received a negative sentence.
Catholics have been advised that after divorce and civil remarriage they may return to the Sacraments. Such a
practice lacks foundation in the Church’s clear teaching about the indissolubility of a sacramental marriage after
consummation, and in sound jurisprudence. A clear presentation, then of the sacramentality and indisssolubility
of Christian marriage should be made to all your people. Every effort must be made to avoid written materials
which equivocate regarding the essential properties of marriage and which may encourage the divorced to
attempt a second marriage without the Tribunal’s declaration of nullity. At the same time, steps need to be taken
to ensure that your Metropolitan Tribunal, both in its constitution and practice, conforms with all the
prescriptions of the revised Code of the Church’s public law.
5. A number of other basic doctrinal problems can be identified. While it is impossible to judge how
widespread they are, and although they may seem to be abstract, they too often have had real implications and
concrete effects in the day-to-day life of the Church in Seattle.
a. It is important that clear and firm guidance be offered to those in the Archdiocese who seem reluctant to
accept the Magisterium as capable of giving definitive direction in matters of faith and morals.
b. It is important that the nature and mission of the Church be taught in their entirety. The Church should be
understood as more than a merely social entity, governed chiefly by psychological, sociological and political
processes. When it is viewed this way, its institutional or visible dimension is placed in opposition to its divine
origin, mission and authority. Such a view misunderstands the meaning of the Church and destroys all prospects
of the authentic renewal for which Vatican II so clearly called.
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c. Incorrect notions of the Church’s mission and nature, as well as flawed understandings of the dignity of
the human person, can frequently be traced to faulty Christologies. It is imperative that every effort be made to
ensure that the Church’s integral faith concerning Christ be handed on: his divinity, his humanity, his salvific
mission, his inseparable union with and Lordship over the Church.
d. Vigorous efforts must be made to engender in priests, religious and laity a correct appreciation of the
sacramental structure of the Church, especially as it provides for sacred ministry in the Sacrament of Holy
Orders. An effective seminary program needs to be established which inculcates in candidates for the priesthood
an understanding of the sacraments as the Lord’s gifts to His Church. While efforts to encourage the laity to
fulfill their apostolate and assume their proper roles in the Church should continue, the unique ministry and
office of the Bishop, as well as that of priests who assist him, must never be obscured.
e. A critical re-examination of policies and programs of the Archdiocese should be conducted to ensure that
they are based on the clear vision of the human person which is at the heart of the Gospel message. An
anthropology which is dominated by the tentative conclusions of the human sciences could well undermine many
pastoral initiatives, however well intentioned.
f. There is a need to correct misunderstandings concerning the role which conscience plays in making moral
decisions. In particular, it is necessary to highlight the valid claim on the Catholic conscience which is made by
the authoritative teaching of the Church.
In all these areas it is vitally important to consult with competent, faithful theologians, clergy and religious
to determine how best to proclaim the Church’s entire deposit of faith in our changing times.
When guided by an authentic theological method such efforts are not only not in conflict with the teaching
of the Church, they are a faithful response of her constant call to vindicate the rights of the poor.
It is also important that the faith be imparted in such a way which is sensitive to the suffering and the
powerless.
No bishop should hesitate to overrule advisers who propose opinions at variance with the authentic teaching
of the Holy See. At the same time, he must seek ways to hand on that teaching convincingly.
6. As per your letter of March 14, 1984, we realize that you have taken steps to correct the practice of
contraceptive sterilization which had been followed in local Catholic hospitals. Such procedures are clearly and
explicitly forbidden in all Catholic institutions. The clear moral teaching contained in this Congregation’s 1976
Declaration on Sexual Ethics, as well as the teaching found in the documents of the U.S. Bishops’ Conference
must be maintained in an effective manner.
7. In matters of pastoral practice, first Confession should precede first Communion. This decision, which
terminates any authorized experimentation, was incorporated in c. 914 of the revised Code. Accordingly, the
sequence of first Confession prior to first Communion is not optional, nor can a custom to the contrary be
established.
8. Similarly, the use of general Absolution must be strictly limited to the conditions listed in the relevant
documents of the Holy See and in particular in c. 961 par. 1. The fact that many penitents would naturally
congregate at times of great feasts, Christmas and Easter for example, would not of itself constitute the necessary
condition that they would be deprived of the grace of the sacrament for a long time if general absolution were
not given. Responsible supervision on the part of the office for Liturgy is indicated.
9. Likewise, the attention of the clergy and faithful should be drawn to the fact that non-Catholic Christians
may be admitted occasionally to communion in the Catholic Church under specific conditions as listed in c. 844
par. 4, and in the related documents of the Holy See on this question. Catholics, however, are permitted in some
cases to receive the Eucharist in non-Catholic churches, but only in those whose sacraments are recognized by
the Catholic Church, as is clear from c. 844, par. 2.
The Catholic Church believes the Eucharist to be a sign of unity already achieved. Routine intercommunion
on the occasion of weddings or funerals, wherever it is the practice, should be recognized as clearly abusive and
an impediment to genuine ecumenism.
10. Efforts to encourage full and lively participation in the sacred liturgy should be fostered. However,
practices which are not in accord with the Roman Sacramentary and the related directives of the Holy See should
be eliminated. The appointment of a carefully trained priest to aid in the supervision of sacramental and liturgy
discipline is indicated here as well.
11. Concern for priests who have left the ministry is obviously a duty of a bishop, but he must always be
aware of the Church’s discipline. Laicized priests are excluded from performing certain roles, as amply
described in their rescripts of laicization. The status of priests who have left the ministry but who have not been
laicized must be recognized as much more irregular, and they can hardly be employed formally or informally by
the Church in any way. The same applies for their civilly married wives.
12. It has been noted that in 1976 and in 1979, the Archdiocese of Seattle devised questionnaires to obtain
information useful for the formation and conduct of Archdiocesan programs. Some, unfortunately, understood
these questionnaires to be a kind of voting process on doctrinal or moral teachings. The questionnaire did reveal
certain deficient doctrinal understandings and the results point to the need for a more careful and extensive
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catechesis both for children and adults.
13. With regard to the role of women in the Church, the teaching of the Church regarding their God-given
dignity and importance should be given full weight. The current fierce politicization of this issue must not
impede the Church’s efforts to vindicate the rights of all. The exclusion of women from Sacred Orders was dealt
with at length in this Congregation’s 1975 Instruction, Inter Insigniores and should be explained unambiguously.
14. A final question of pastoral practice pertains to ministry to homosexual men and women. The
Archdiocese should withdraw all support from any group which does not unequivocally accept the teaching of
the Magisterium concerning the intrinsic evil of homosexual activity. This teaching has been set forth in this
Congregation’s Declaration on Sexual Ethics and more recently in the document, Educational Guidance in
Human Love, issued by the Congregation for Catholic Education in 1983. The ill-advised welcome of a pro-
homosexual group to your cathedral, as well as events subsequent to the Apostolic Visitation, have served to
make the Church’s position appear to be ambiguous on this delicate but important issue. A compassionate
ministry to homosexual persons must be developed that has as its clear goal the promotion of a chaste life-style.
Particular care is to be exercised  by any who represent the Archdiocese, to explain clearly the position of the
Church on this question.
In bringing all the above points to your attention, it has been our purpose to assist you as effectively as
possible in your offices as Archbishop of Seattle. We commend you for your kindness and patience during the
Apostolic Visit and during the many months needed by the Holy See for careful review and appropriate action.
May the Holy Spirit of Christ be with you and with His people whom you serve.
With my own best wishes, I am
Sincerely yours in the Lord,
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger
Prefect
[For text of document 2, see appendix iv, below.]
Document Number: 3
Document Title: Hunthausen Press Statement Announcing Wuerl Special Faculties
Source: Origins 9/18/86, pp. 250-251.
I am aware that for quite some time speculation has taken place, both in printed form and in less formal
ways, regarding the roles and responsibilities of Bishop Donald Wuerl. His appointment here shortly after the
formal conclusion of the apostolic visitation made it inevitable that people would wonder whether, in appointing
him as my auxiliary, the Holy See had intended for him to have some specific additional responsibilities with
reference to the findings and conclusions of the visitation. As a matter of fact, it did; but at the time of his
appointment both Bishop Wuerl and I, along with the apostolic pro-nuncio, judged it best to make no public
announcement to that effect. The importance of making Bishop Wuerl’s transition to the archdiocese as smooth
as possible and of assuring him of the best possible climate for beginning this ministry among us seemed to
outweigh any possible good that might have been realized by giving a full public acknowledgement of all the
specifications surrounding his appointment as auxiliary bishop.
However, at the time of his appointment, I did not understand the nature and extent of Bishop Wuerl’s
role. After considerable discussion with the Holy See, it was confirmed that it was the understanding of the Holy
See in December 1985 when appointing Bishop Wuerl  that he not only assist me by assuming a general
oversight for these five areas (identified in the apostolic visitation), but that he actually be delegated by me to
have complete and final decision-making power over them. The clarification of this decision took lace in June at
the Collegeville (Minn.) meeting of bishops, where I met with the apostolic pro-nuncio. It was subsequently
confirmed to me in a letter dated July 1, 1986.
Once I received this clarification, I not only took steps to carry out the wishes of the Holy See, but also
arrived at the conclusion that it was important for me to share these matters with my close collaborators in the
ministry and administration of the archdiocese.
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Document Number: 4
Document Title: The Vatican Chronology
Source: The Progress, 10/30/86, pp. 2-4; Origins, 11/6/86, pp.362-364.
A CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT EVENTS IN THE ARCHDIOCESE OF SEATTLE
1) Decision for an Apostolic Visitation of Seattle
a) For the past several years, at least since 1978, the Holy See, through the then Apostolic Delegation,
has corresponded with Archbishop Hunthausen on matters related to pastoral practices and the presentation of
the church’s teachings. Through this exchange the Holy See sought the assistance of the Archbishop of Seattle in
responding to the high volume of complaints that were sent to Rome by priests, Religious and faithful in the
archdiocese. The Holy See's interest in this matter reflected its responsibility for the well-being of the Universal
Church, as outlined in the “Constitution on the Church” of the Second Vatican Council. It should be stressed that
at no time did the Holy See pursue with Archbishop Hunthausen the criticisms it received on controversial
issues, e.g., nuclear weapons and the payment of taxes. The concerns were strictly and solely of a doctrinal and
pastoral nature.
b) The archbishop agreed that there were abuses in a number of cases and that corrective action was
needed. In fairness to Archbishop Hunthausen, he did address some of the problems brought to his attention by
the Holy See.
c) Substantial complaints nevertheless continued. But, the decision to inquire further was primarily
provoked by the documented responses of the archbishop himself. Moreover, in expressing their fraternal
concern for Archbishop Hunthausen and the church in Seattle, certain bishops suggested that there was a need to
“clear the air.” Prominent among their recommendations was the appointment of a brother bishop to visit
Archbishop Hunthausen and the church in Seattle in order to gather factual information on behalf of the Holy
See. Accordingly, on July 6, 1983, the Most Reverend James A. Hickey, Archbishop of Washington, was named
Apostolic Visitator.
2) Preparation of the Apostolic Visitation:
a) From the beginning the priorities of the Holy See were two-fold: 1) to promote the building up of the
church in Seattle in harmony with the Universal Church and 2) to protect the good name of Archbishop
Hunthausen. Consequently, it was determined that publicity would be kept to a minimum, so as to avoid
fostering criticism of the archbishop. Furthermore, it was the firm intention of the Holy See that any action
required would come only after fully informing Archbishop Hunthausen and making every effort to secure his
agreement and support.
b) Before Archbishop Hickey began the Apostolic Visitation, he consulted with Archbishop Hunthausen
both in a long telephone conversation and in a day-and-a-half meeting in Chicago. Both the procedure and the
various doctrinal and pastoral aspects were reviewed in detail. Many of those who had lodged complaints against
Archbishop Hunthausen had sent him copies of their letters to the Holy See and / or spoke to him personally.
Archbishop Hickey discussed these persons with Archbishop Hunthausen and asked for an evaluation of the
authenticity of their remarks and their reliability. The visitator also asked Archbishop Hunthausen's help in
drawing up a list of persons to be questioned. Archbishop Hickey stressed his desire to gain a balanced view of
the archdiocesan situation, the positive as well as the negative.
c) Archbishop Hunthausen insisted that a public announcement be made about the visitation. Once this
was done, the statements of Archbishop Hickey were designed to offer support and advice to Archbishop
Hunthausen in accord with the initial and constant wish of the Holy See.
3) The Visitation:
a) Information was gathered from the following sources:
1) Public documents such as archdiocesan policy statements on matters dealing with church
teaching and discipline.
2) The testimony given by those on the list prepared in advance. This was done through
consultation with Archbishop Hunthausen and Reverend Michael G. Ryan, vicar general of the
Archdiocese of Seattle, so that a cross section of the priests, Religious and laity in the
archdiocese would be represented. In all, this included 70 individuals, nearly one half of whom
were priests of the archdiocese.
3) The testimony of the archbishop himself, a written copy of which he reviewed and signed. It
should be noted that the visitator spent 13 hours in conversation with Archbishop Hunthausen.
Every effort was made to assess the credibility of the persons who had complained to the Holy
See.
b) Throughout the investigation a number of allegations were judged as insufficiently based in fact or as
corrected by an adequate response of Archbishop Hunthausen. However, after careful attention was given to the
facts verified by the three sources of information noted above, five areas of concern remained: the tribunal,
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liturgy, clergy formation, priests leaving the ministry or who are laicized, moral issues in health care institutions
and ministry to homosexuals. The testimony of “unfriendly” witnesses added little to the data on which the
criticism of the Holy See was based.
In more specific terms the problems included the following:
• The Tribunal – the misunderstanding and systematic misapplication of the so-called internal forum solution,
and the lack of a plan to employ degreed personnel in the Tribunal.
• The Liturgy – the widespread use of general absolution on a regular basis and the practice of First
Communion  before First Confession; repeated instances of intercommunion, e.g., permitting non-Catholics
to receive communion at Catholic Masses and Catholics in Protestant services.
• Health Care – the continued inadequate response in both teaching and practice to the directives of the Holy
See and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops regarding contraceptive sterilization in Catholic
hospitals.
• Homosexuals – the need to develop a ministry to homosexuals that is at once unequivocally based on the
teachings of the Magisterium, rather than on erroneous doctrines, and which avoids affiliations with groups
promoting doctrines contrary to the church’s teachings.
• Inactive Priests – the employment of those who have left the active ministry and / or who have been
laicized, in teaching positions and for the service in the liturgy contrary to the directives of the Holy See and
the rescripts of laicization.
• Clergy Formation – because of concern regarding the admissions practices for candidates for the priesthood
and because of concern and questions surrounding the continuing formation of the clergy, efforts must be
taken to ensure that the continuing education of priests be done in ways that emphasize the bonds of the
local church with the Universal Church, and which are firmly rooted in sound theology, especially in these
areas: Christology, Anthropology, the Role of the Magisterium, the Nature of the Church and Priesthood and
Moral Theology.
c) After hearing a preliminary report on the visitation, Archbishop Hunthausen concluded  that the Holy
See judged him to be an effective bishop in many respects. At the same time, Archbishop Hunthausen
understood that the Holy See considered him lacking the necessary firmness to govern the archdiocese. The
archbishop would dissent from such a judgment, but stated in a letter to the pronuncio (Sept. 11, 1985) that “if it
(the judgment) has been made, then I can perhaps begin to understand why the Holy See might reason that the
only workable solution to this matter is the appointment of a man to assist me whose principal responsibilities
will be to supply or ‘fill in’ in those areas where it is thought that I am lacking.”
4) The Decisions after the Visitation:
a) On Oct. 9 and 10, 1985, the results of the visitation were again shared with Archbishop Hunthausen in
extensive consultation with the Apostolic Nunciature. It should be noted that the actual raw data from the
interviews were not released to him given the confidentiality assured to those who provided the information.
However, the specific areas of concern to the Holy See were reviewed in detail and the archbishop was given the
possibility to offer a response and seek clarification. In large numbers he did not dispute the facts. Rather, it was
his interpretation of the importance of these matters and the inadequacy of his response that were the principal
concerns.
b) Before his request for an auxiliary was granted, consideration was given to a number of ways that another
bishop could be of assistance in addressing the five problem areas, e.g., the appointment of a co-adjutor with full
power, the temporary appointment of an administrator, the appointment of an auxiliary with special faculties
from the Holy See. In considering the alternative, the Holy See gave careful attention to the effects that any
decision would have on the church and the Archbishop of Seattle.
c) The Code of Canon Law (canon 403:2) does contemplate cases when the Holy See grants special
faculties. However, upon the recommendation of members of the hierarchy in the United States, it was agreed
that Archbishop Hunthausen, after accepting the auxiliary, would himself give Bishop Wuerl responsibility over
the areas of particular concern to the Holy See. This compromise, which the archbishop formally accepted in a
letter dated Dec. 2, 1985, was not to lessen the significance of those special faculties. Rather, it allowed the
archbishop to follow a procedure analogous or similar to that used by other diocesan bishops, who share
authority with auxiliaries in areas or over a territory. Simultaneously, the Archbishop of Seattle did acknowledge
that the Holy See could reserve to itself, in an uncontested way, the right to adopt such measures as may
subsequently become necessary. At no time did the Holy See require Archbishop Hunthausen to make a public
announcement that he had agreed to surrender any episcopal duties. This was never contemplated.
d) For more than six months after the arrival of Bishop Wuerl, the agreed-to faculties were not given. When
this was brought to the attention of Archbishop Hunthausen, he stated that, in his original understanding, he
agreed that the auxiliary would supervise or manage these areas of concern as he, the archbishop, determined.
This could be attributed to a misunderstanding or misinterpretation on his part. The pronuncio, therefore,
reminded him of the sequence of events that led to the compromise. The faculties, which were originally to be
given by Rome, would be given instead by him as archbishop, but with the same effect. The Archbishop of
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Seattle then petitioned the Holy See for an authoritative clarification.
e) When this was given, the Archbishop of Seattle granted the faculties and made the announcement that
they were mandated by Rome. In fact, a more precise description would have been that this was the agreement
reached between Archbishop Hunthausen and the Holy See after much discussion and effort to support him.
Regretfully, the surprise announcement made by Archbishop Hunthausen after granting the faculties was
interpreted as portraying this whole process as a one-sided affair.
f) The efforts made by the Holy See after the visitation were designed to address and strengthen those areas
that were found wanting, and at the same time, to respect and recognize the position of the archbishop. Meeting
these goals required the corresponding cooperation of the Holy See, of the man who was selected and accepted
as auxiliary, and of the Archbishop of Seattle.
October 24, 1986
Document Number: 5
Document Title: Hunthausen’s Detailed Response to the Vatican Chronology
Source: The Progress, 11/13/86, pp. 15-16; Origins, 11/20/86, pp. 406-408.
Your Eminence / Your Excellency:
Because of necessary time restrictions limiting my presentation about the Apostolic Visitation of the
Archdiocese of Seattle and related matters, I have decided it will be best for me to convey to you in printed form
my response to the “Chronology of Recent Events in the Archdiocese of Seattle,” released on October 24, 1986,
by the Apostolic Nunciature.
As you know, I chose to make a generic response at the time the Chronology was released. My respect
for Archbishop Laghi and for the position that is his made it difficult for me to do otherwise. I was convinced
that a point-by-point response at that time would only have escalated an already tense situation and that it would
cause further confusion for our people. Also, I had been offered by Bishop Malone, our President, the
opportunity to present a further response at this meeting.
I hesitate to burden you with further reading material at this time. I do so only because I think the record
demands it and because, from my perspective at least, what follows will shed light on an extremely complex
situation.
I want to say, too, that it frankly embarrasses me to be engaging in this form of exchange of
information. I have the greatest respect and admiration for Archbishop Laghi and appreciate his time and efforts
to resolve this matter. I trust you will understand, then, that the matters which I will set forth herein are in no
sense an attack upon his person or his integrity. That our recollections and interpretations differ in some
important respects should not be so surprising when one considers that we are both attempting to present in
capsule form a very  long and complicated series of events.
In the first place, it is probably important for you to know that, after I first read the Chronology, I asked
Archbishop Laghi not to publish it because I felt it would raise more questions than it could possibly hope to
answer. I feared it would generate a whole new round of publicity in a setting in which accusations and counter-
accusations rather than the voices of reason would dominate and that, in the minds of many, it would ultimately
reflect unfavorably on the Holy See, the very thing both Archbishop Laghi and I had striven to avoid all during
this time.
From the very outset of these events, which now go back some three-and-one-half years, I have been
concerned about adverse publicity for the Holy See. I expressed this concern in my earliest correspondence and
in all my correspondence with the Holy See, with Cardinal Ratzinger, Archbishop Laghi, Archbishop Hickey,
and even with the Holy Father himself. It was always my deepest desire and my strongly expressed wish that,
whatever steps might be taken to address certain concerns in Seattle, that they be taken in a way that would
strengthen and cement our relationship with the Holy See, and not in any sense detract from it.
As far as the Chronology itself is concerned, let me say that I believe it either attempts to do too much
(i.e., to tell the whole story in too brief a space), or to do too little (by that I mean that it doesn’t really get to
some of the deep, underlying problems which are at stake here).
As to particulars which are set forth in the Chronology, I must say that I find that the Chronology
contains some misleading things, some things that were quite new to me, some rather disappointing things and
some very real inaccuracies. I will address each of these four headings in sequence.
1) The Chronology contains some misleading things:
For example: reference is made early on to “substantial complaints” against my teaching or with regard to
certain pastoral practices in the Archdiocese of Seattle. My observation is that if there were substantial
complaints I was never told who made them or who substantiated them and on what basis. Nor was I told till
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considerably after the Visitation was decided upon and announced to me, (and then in only the most generic
manner) what some of those complaints were.
The Chronology goes on to indicate that certain responses I myself gave to inquiries were primary among
the causes that led to the decision to mount a Visitation. That may be so. But I would have to state clearly (and
our files certainly bear this out) that if certain responses I provided to inquiries made by the Holy See – some of
them as far back as 1978 – were viewed as unsatisfactory, then I must ask why I was never informed of this fat
as the time I made those responses. Why, instead, was I politely and routinely thanked for the information I
provided only to hear nothing further at all until the major decision was made that only an Apostolic Visitation
could set matters straight in Seattle. So, for anyone to review that correspondence now and suggest that it was
the cause of the Visitation troubles me greatly.
Another misleading point: the Chronology states that at the time I announced the granting of special
faculties to Bishop Wuerl I indicated that they were “mandated by the Rome” when, in fact, a more precise
description would have been that this was the “agreement” reached between the Holy See and myself. As a
matter of fact, in my letter to our priests and people, I made no reference to a “mandate from Rome.” I spoke
only of carrying out “the wishes of the Holy See,” which was manifestly what was at stake here. That I “agreed”
to go along with those wishes is clear, too, although I did not do so with any sense of freedom since the
consequences of my not agreeing to do so had been made clear to me on more than one occasion.
2) The Chronology contained some new learnings:
From the Chronology, I learned for the first time that the problem with our formation program for
seminarians (we have no seminary in Seattle) had to do with the admissions practices followed by the
Archdiocese. That was news to me. I had never before been told that. I also learned that the rather all-
encompassing theological concerns (embracing such things as the relationship of the local Church to the
Universal Church, the teaching of Christology and of a sound anthropology, the role of the Magisterium, the
nature f the Church, of priesthood and moral theology) were apparently all concerns that related to the programs
followed in the Archdiocese for the Continuing Education of our priests. I do not find this particularly
enlightening since our priests are certainly orthodox on these matters and our education programs employ the
same personnel and deal with the same themes as those of dozens of other dioceses in this country, but I do find
it revealing to discover that this was the context for all those serious theological concerns which I first learned of
last year at this time in a letter from Cardinal Ratzinger.
Whatever the case, it would have been helpful to have had this information during this past year when
painstaking efforts were being made to understand the precise nature of Cardinal Ratzinger’s concerns so that we
could address them in a conscientious and responsible manner.
I would also have to say that it came as a surprise to me that I had been judged by the Holy See to lack
the necessary firmness to govern the Archdiocese of Seattle. I had, of course, wondered out loud whether this
might indeed have been the case. I had even speculated bout it openly in a letter to Archbishop Laghi, but while I
had learned from him that I enjoyed no credibility whatever in Rome, I had never been told until the publication
of the Chronology that the judgment has been made that I lacked the necessary firmness to govern my
Archdiocese.
3) The Chronology contained some disappointing things:
I found very disappointing the intimation that in dealing with Bishop Wuerl and, specifically with regard to his
special faculties, I did not carry out my promises, that I exhibited a certain intransigence, or even that I acted in
bad faith. This is simply not true. The misunderstanding that came to light regarding the nature and extent of
Bishop Wuerl’s faculties was a genuine one. Indeed – and I don’t say this in any sense to be self-serving or
contentious – it is difficult for me to believe how anyone who was present to the conversations and who saw the
correspondence could interpret it any way other than the way I did. From the start of the Visitation and all during
the long process that took place with regard to the appointment of an Auxiliary Bishop, I had made certain things
abundantly clear. Among them was the fact that I would gladly resign the Archdiocese should that be the wish of
the Holy See or, of course, of the Holy Father himself.
Secondly, I made it clear that I would never carry out a public charade by pretending to be something I
was not. I am just not constitutionally capable of that. In other words, if significant or substantial powers were to
be taken away from me (and here it goes without saying that if final decision-making authority for critically
important areas of Archdiocesan life and governance were to be taken from me), I would choose to resign rather
than to stay on and pose as the Archbishop of Seattle when, in fact, I would scarcely be that except, perhaps, in
some vague, legalistic, and rather meaningless sense. My thinking in this regard, incidentally, had nothing to do
with any need I had to hold on to power. It had to do with my need for personal authenticity and my willingness
to get out of the way entirely if it was perceived that I was the source of some grave problems in my
Archdiocese. I always presented these convictions to Archbishop Laghi as matters of conscience for that is what
they were. With him I tried to discern as best I could what was for the good of the Church.
In a crucial letter dated December 2, 1985, which I wrote to Archbishop Laghi, I agreed to give
substantive authority without, however, relinquishing my ultimate authority. These are the words I used: “(this
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arrangement) will not impinge upon my ultimate authority as Ordinary of the archdiocese.” I went on to quote
the code of Canon Law to make the matter unmistakably clear. Archbishop Laghi’s response stated: “While this
does not lessen your authority as the local Bishop, it is understood that this action is being taken at the specific
instruction of the Holy See.” For this reason, it troubles me greatly not only that a great misunderstanding could
have later ensued, one that in the end I was informed was mine, but also that it would later be suggested publicly
that I might have acted in bad faith. I did not.
Perhaps it is at this point that I need to say a word about why in the end – this past July, to be exact –
after the Holy See had given its decisive interpretation of the precise nature and extent of Bishop Wuerl’s special
faculties, I agreed to accept the arrangement, preferring the course of resignation to what would amount to
pretending to be what, in fact, I was not. In the end, my very reluctant decision to remain as the Archbishop of
Seattle was made on the basis of what several trusted brother bishops and close advisers convinced me would be
for the ultimate good of the Church in the Archdiocese of Seattle.
4) The Chronology also contains some very real inaccuracies:
The Chronology speaks of my “insistence” that a public announcement be made at the time the
Apostolic Visitation was undertaken. A more accurate statement would have referred to my earnest desire,
expressed to Cardinal Ratzinger, Archbishop Laghi, and Archbishop Hickey that, if the Visitation did indeed
have to take place, I would like it to do so in as open and positive and constructive a spirit as possible. I took this
position because I honestly recognize the value in my own life of careful, objective evaluation, and because I felt
that our priests and people were mature enough to deal with such a process, particularly if they understood and
supported it – even welcomed it – as a step toward answering some of my more vocal critics and toward
improving certain aspects of a Church which is semper reformanda. In addition, I repeatedly expressed my fear
that to undertake a Visitation under the cloak of secrecy would be a mistake for at least two reasons: first, it
would smack of a method of operating that was more characteristic of the pre-Vatican II Church than of the post-
, and, second, it was clear to me that no amount f effort to maintain the curtain of secrecy would ever succeed,
and that the embarrassment which would follow any disclosure by “leak” would be far greater than that which
might accompany an open and honest disclosure from the start.
I made these points clear from the beginning, and I brought them personally to Cardinal Ratzinger
during my 1983 Ad Limina visit. I even offered to personally and publicly invite him or his designees to come to
the Archdiocese so that the onus for the Visitation would be on my shoulders. But my invitation and my point of
view were not accepted. Secrecy was to be the rule, and I adhered to it.
As matters turned out, when the inevitable leak did come, it came not from Seattle but from the East
Coast. Archbishop Hickey called to tell me about it and to say that, after consultation with Archbishop Laghi, he
had decided that we needed to issue a news release that would be given out simultaneously in Washington, D.C.,
and Seattle. This is what, in fact, took place.
A second inaccuracy: the Chronology makes reference to my “surprise announcement” at the time I
granted the Special Faculties to Bishop Wuerl, the implication being that I did something that was outside or
contrary to prior agreement or understanding between myself and the Pro-Nuncio. The record will show,
however, that I repeatedly made the point in my conversations and exchanges with Archbishop Laghi at
Collegeville this past summer, that, in the then unlikely event that I would agree to accept the special faculties
arrangement according to the manner in which they were being understood by the Holy See, I would have no
choice but to make this matter known to all my priests and close collaborators since it would be absolutely
essential for them to know to whom they were accountable and from whom they would receive orders and
directives. I never left the slightest doubt about this matter since I knew that to have acted in any other way
would have resulted in a chaotic situation with regard to the governance of the Archdiocese.
For this reason I am simply unable to understand how my subsequent announcement about the Special Faculties
could have been the source of surprise for anyone who had been party to our conversations, or how it could be
stated in the chronology that my actions had never “been contemplated.” I also find it difficult to understand how
anyone could ever have believed that keeping the Special Faculties a secret could possibly have worked in the
first place. If nothing else, the early history of the Visitation to which I have just referred should have clearly
indicated otherwise.
To the best of my ability, I have reflected on the contents of the Chronology and presented my
understanding of events. Since there seems to be such a divergence of opinion between my understanding and
interpretation and that set forth in the Chronology, I would certainly welcome some sort of review of all these
matters should that be the wish of the members of the Conference.
In my oral presentation during the Executive Session, I will attempt to address these and other matters
from a different perspective than that demanded by a response of this sort.
I am grateful to you for taking the time to read this rather tedious exposition. I sincerely hope that you
have found it helpful.
With warm and personal regards, I am
Fraternally in Christ,
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Raymond G. Hunthausen
Archbishop of Seattle
Document Number: 6
Document Title: Hunthausen’s Address to the NCCB
Source: The Progress, 11/13/86, pp.11-13; Origins, 11/20/86, pp. 401-405
My Friends in Christ,
Once before I had the privilege of addressing this assembly. It was at the time we came together in our
common quest for peace in a nuclear world. Today I come before you again in a the quest for peace, but for a
different kind of peace: peace for the Archdiocese of Seattle, peace for the Church in this country, peace within
this Conference, peace for the Church throughout the world, and my own personal peace with the Holy See.
I want to tell you right at the outset that I am personally very distressed by all the turmoil that has come
about in our Church because of what has transpired in Seattle. I wish it would all go away. How I wish that! And
I want to tell you also that I am particularly distressed about any anguish or even division that may have come
about among you, my brother bishops. If I could have done anything in good conscience to spare you this
moment I would have.
Most of you probably know me well enough to realize that I do not accept the invitation to make a
presentation this afternoon because I personally relish speaking in a forum like this. I accepted it  only because I
believe with all my heart, as I have from the very beginning, that in many respects the issues of the Seattle
Visitation are not just issues that touch the life of the Church in Seattle: they are issues that touch the lives of
each of our churches in one way or another to a greater or lesser degree. For that reason they are really our
issues. In what I have to say I will try to show you why I believe this to be so.
In making this presentation, I have a number of hopes that will become clear as I proceed. One
underlying hope is that you will come to understand that the Apostolic Visitation of the church of Seattle and its
aftermath is not simply my own personal struggle, nor is it, as some have suggested, some sort of battle of wits
between a maverick Archbishop and the Holy See. Those who suggest this do not really know me or my attitude
toward the Church I love and try to serve. It is my hope that you will see the Apostolic Visitation of the church
of Seattle as an ecclesial matter with serious theological implications which touch very directly and profoundly
on our individual role as bishops and on our corporate responsibilities as members of the College of Bishops.
And let me acknowledge at the start that it is surely not mine to presume to lecture the members of this
body on such subjects. Most of you know that I am not a professional theologian. Many of you know far more
about these matters than I do and can surely articulate them better. Nonetheless the experience that has been
mine over the past years can perhaps serve as something of a laboratory for viewing, studying, and probing the
issues in some way other than the purely theoretical. If that be so, then I honestly believe that this sad experience
which has been the source of such pain and confusion for the Church of Seattle and beyond – even to the point of
causing serious scandal for some – will not have been in vain, but will have been a path to a new moment of life
and growth.
You have already received in printed form my somewhat detailed response to the Chronology released by
the Apostolic Nunciature. I put that response together in a respectful spirit – in the hope that it would answer
some of the questions the Chronology may have raised in your minds. Obviously, it raised some in my own
mind, but I suppose it should be expected that there would be differing perspectives in a matter such as this. In
what follows I will refrain from making any further commentary on the Chronology itself and concentrate,
rather, on four main areas:
1) The process used in deciding to conduct the Visitation as well as the process followed in
carrying it out.
2) The five areas of my ministry singled out by the Holy See as areas of serious concern.
3) The identification of the important issues which this entire matter has brought to light.
4) Some thoughts and suggestions regarding the future.
I. First, the Visitation and its process. In my printed response I have already made reference to the
Visitation Process and to my dissatisfaction with the manner in which the decision was made to undertake an
Apostolic Visitation in the first place. I also alluded to the manner in which the Visitation was conducted and
followed up on. Please know that my reference here is not a personal one with regard to Archbishop Hickey who
carried out his duties as Visitator in a gracious and gentlemanly manner. My reference has to do with processes,
not persons.
My printed remarks allude to the matter of secrecy that was intended to surround the Visitation. I need
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to tell you that in agreeing to that, I feel I compromised my principles as a Bishop committed to the deep and
powerful reality  that we are all the Church and that we can only live out our common call as members of the
Body of Christ if we do so in a manner that respects the rightful role of each member of that Body, from child to
mature and committed adult. I would hope that, in the future, if the weighty decision is made to undertake an
Apostolic Visitation for the good of the Church, at least two lessons will have been drawn from this aspect of the
Seattle experience: 1) that secrecy does not work in matters of this sort, and 2) that secrecy should not work. I
realize that that is a value judgment. But it is a very considered one. And even though I acknowledge that in
some extraordinary circumstances secrecy might be warranted, the presumption should nevertheless be against it
because open disclosure  and candor are far more consistent with respect for persons in a mature Church.
And secrecy in situations like this has further inimical effects: secrecy is responsible for the fact that
there was a total  absence of dialogue with me as to whether a Visitation was needed in the first place, and, if so,
why and according to what specific ground rules. I was simply informed of the fact and given no opportunity
whatever to object or even to respond. In other words, I was presented with a fait accompli.
Yet another consequence of secrecy has to do with the concerns which prompted the decision to
undertake a Visitation in the first place. On the good advice of then President of this Conference, I asked at the
very beginning for a Bill of Particulars specifying the reasons for mounting the Apostolic Visitation and the
concerns to be talked over between Archbishop Hickey and any persons he might choose to interview. I was
never given such a list. Rather I was told that it was not necessary because what was to take place was in no
sense in the nature of a “trial,” that the Visitator himself was in no sense a “judge,” and that what was involved
was nothing more than a thorough and fraternal exchange of views and information.
In place of a Bill of Particulars, I was formally questioned by Archbishop Hickey about a range of issues
touching on matters both doctrinal and disciplinary, several of which were clearly based on simple
misunderstandings or miscommunications of facts, others of which had already been dealt with in what I had
been led to believe was a satisfactory manner, and one or two of which admittedly needed further attention on
my part. It is important to remember, however, that all of this took place several months after the decision had
already been taken to mount a full-scale Apostolic Visitation. From my point of view, had the kind of exchanges
I had with Archbishop Hickey been allowed to take place before that decision had been made, a great deal of
harm could have been avoided and the demands of justice would have been better served.
The shroud of secrecy spread even further – to what I have to regard as one of the most devastating
points of all. I have never been allowed to see the formal Visitation report including the testimony against me
and the appraisal made by Archbishop Hickey. All the witnesses were placed under secrecy, not just guaranteed
confidentiality. And, of course, once that stricture was made, it had to be respected. I must state emphatically,
however, that such unwitnessed, private questionings with no opportunity for the subject of the questionings to
face his accusers, or hear or to be informed of their allegations, or to defend himself are not a just manner of
proceeding. This kind of approach seriously wounds the community of faith and trust that is the Church. The
allegations, findings, judgments and conclusions made during the Visitation must surely be contained in a formal
report, yet no matter how many times I have asked, I have never been allowed to see that report. Instead, I have
been left with some generalities and a few particulars received in subsequent letters from the Holy See,
conversations with the Pro-Nuncio and, later, from comments appended to the Special Faculties I was directed to
give to Bishop Wuerl. To this I would have to add that each time a conversation has taken place, or a letter or
document issued, I seem to have learned something new, something which, I presume, must have appeared in the
Visitation Report in one form or another, but which I was prevented from seeing for reasons still unknown to me.
In my printed response to the Chronology I have already alluded to some very recent learnings, so I will not
dwell on them any further at this point.
My brothers, I hope that I have reported enough o make clear why I feel that the Visitation was so badly flawed
from the very start, not, as I have said, due to bad faith on anyone's part but due to a process that seems
extraordinarily inadequate given the kind of open Church we have become since the Second Vatican Council.
Before I proceed any further, there is still one more note that needs to be added here. It has to do with
the assurance I was given from the very beginning that nothing punitive was envisioned by the Visitation, only a
fraternal exchange of views for the purpose of gaining better information and understanding. Nonetheless, the
action taken as a result of the Visitation could hardly be interpreted as anything other than punitive and, indeed, a
recent public statement issued by a Vatican official in this regard made specific reference to the fact that the
action taken as a result of the Visitation was meant to be “disciplinary.” If this be the case, and I have no doubt
whatsoever that it is, I have to wonder why certain formal Church processes were not followed, processes that
would have better guaranteed the rights of all concerned. I have to wonder, too, why this change of attitude and
intent was not communicated to me much more directly.
Perhaps from all I have said, you will now begin to understand the level of confusion and anger that
exists among the priests of the Archdiocese as well as among all the ranks of the faithful. That this confusion and
anger should have heated up and even ignited to the point that it has spread to many areas of our country at this
moment is not surprising to me. Nor, perhaps will it be to you. But it is surely distressing because, as I have
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maintained from the very first, it need not have happened this way.
II. Let me now pass on to those five areas of concern which finally became enshrined in the Special
Faculties I was directed to give to Bishop Wuerl. I will deal with these concerns under four headings for the
purpose of clarity, but you should understand that some of them overlap a bit, especially that of “pastoral
judgment,” something that was involved in nearly every case. The four headings under which I will deal with the
concerns are these: 1) matters of history (i.e., matters already addressed); 2) matters of pastoral judgment; 3)
ongoing concerns; 4) matters I do not understand.
Let me begin with those that are matters of history. Under that heading I would include the issue of
some confusion that existed at one time in the Archdiocese with regard to the use of the so-called Internal Forum
solution; the lack of a plan to employ degreed personnel in the Archdiocesan Tribunal; and the practice of one
hospital of the Archdiocese permitting sterilization even for contraceptive purposes in some limited cases. For
the record, the teaching of the Church in this matter was never under question, only a long-standing pastoral
practice at one hospital, a practice that pre-dated my arrival in Seattle.) I can honestly say that none of the above
listed problems exists in the Archdiocese of Seattle today. They haven’t for some years now.
Others of the concerns come under the heading of pastoral judgment, something I scarcely need to tell you that
every pastor comes to recognize early on in his ministry as a rather imprecise “science” at best, even when
carried out prayerfully under the guidance of the Holy Spirit and with every due regard for Church Tradition and
Law. We all know well that matters of pastoral judgment are always open to further understanding and that in
such matter we never really get beyond the possibility of making a mistake no matter how hard we try to
faithfully discern the Spirit. Among such pastoral judgments for which I have not only been called to task but
deprived of my Episcopal responsibilities are the allowing of general absolution when the crowds of the faithful
are so very large, the numbers of available confessors so very small, and the opportunity for providing suitable
opportunities for the worthy celebration of the Sacrament of Reconciliation for each of these people so
demonstrably distant that general absolution seemed a prudent decision for the pastor on the spot to make.
 Another is the practice of preparing children for First Communion before undertaking the formal,
structured catechesis for First Confession – a practice we have for some time been studying in light of the
Revised Code of Canon Law and in dialogue with many other dioceses and archdioceses. Now that directives are
clear, I am committed to implementing them in fidelity to Church Law, but this will have to be done in a
pastorally sensitive manner.
Still another area has to do with the matter of ministry to homosexuals, something that has recently
called forth an Instruction from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith for the benefit of the entire
Church. From this, I would have to gather that the Church in Seattle is not alone in the sincere efforts it is
making to deal with the delicate matter of how best to minister faithfully and lovingly to these members of our
flock. Each of us Bishops is faced with the same question and each of us, I suppose, on the basis of careful and
prayerful discernment, has arrived at a pastoral judgment in this regard. That it will now be guided and
influenced by the most recent Instruction from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith I have no doubt,
but I am equally confident that, although Church teaching is abundantly clear on the matter of the specific
immorality of homosexual acts, and I have always made it plain that I stand in full accord with that teaching,
Church practice with regard to the best way to minister to these members is nowhere near as clear and, I
suppose, never will be. Again, we find ourselves in the oftentimes gray area which we call “pastoral discretion.”
In this context, I should make mention of my decision back in 1983 to allow the members of the Dignity
group to celebrate Mass in our Cathedral church. My public statement at the time reaffirmed Church teaching
and described my decision as a pastoral judgment. I have subssequently been informed that it was an ill-
conceived judgment. Perhaps it was. I am willing to stand corrected. But my decision does not differ in kind
from the decision made by many bishops to allow local Dignity groups to celebrate Mass in one or another
church on a regular basis. Again, pastoral practice will now need to be looked at carefully in light of the most
recent document from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, but I do not deem it fair to be placed under
a judgment, even to the point of being deprived of significant pastoral responsibilities, because of the conclusion
contained in a document that was not issued until some three years after my own conscientious, carefully studied
pastoral judgment was made, a judgment, by the way, which I shared with the Holy See in a timely fashion.
Under the heading of ongoing concern I would mention the employment in teaching positions and for
service in the liturgy of priests who have left the active ministry and / or who have been laicized. I believe I have
erred in this matter on one or another occasions since coming to Seattle. My doing so was never a purposeful
defiance of Church regulations, however. In one case it involved an oversight with regard to the employment of
an unlaicized priest; in two other cases it involved the well-accepted service as lector and Eucharistic Minister by
a laicized priest, a practice that had been going on long before I learned of it and one which, to have discontinued
it would have caused admiratio of the most severe kind. I am unaware of any cases beyond these.
Under the heading of matters I do not understand I would have to list that of the admissions process we
use for accepting candidates for the priesthood. The process we use was carefully reviewed and approved by an
NCCB Visitation Team and, as I understand it, has become something of a model for many other dioceses in this
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country. Under this heading I would also include the whole question of continuing education for clergy,
something I already dealt with in my response to the Chronology. Lastly, I would also list here the inaccurate
statement that I have permitted non-Catholics to receive Communion at our Masses or, conversely, for Catholics
to receive Communion at Protestant services. Our diocesan regulations governing communicatio in Sacris are
clear and unequivocal. It is, of course, impossible for me to oversee the pastoral implementation of those
regulations in any but the most global fashion. But I can assure you that when abuses have been brought to my
attention I have promptly and appropriately dealt with them, as the records will show.
III. I have spent considerable time addressing the concerns singled out by the Holy See. Now I believe I
have come to the point in this presentation where I can more clearly move toward delineating for you some other
very important issues which have been brought to light by the Visitation and its process.
As I do so, however, let me first say a word or two about what is certainly not at issue here.
1) First of all, we are not dealing with a matter of dissent in the Church. The news media have sounded
this theme and I suppose I can understand why, given other currents presently flowing in the Church. But I am
not a dissenter from the Church’s teaching. I hold with the Magisterium conscientiously and I make every effort
– personal and professional – to deepen my understanding of the teaching of the Church so that I willl be able to
present it to my people as the vital and living tradition it is – the very Gospel message of Jesus proclaimed
throughout the ages and in our own time in ways that reflect both its enduring significance as well as its
perennial relevance.
What I am is what each of us in this room is – or, perhaps I should say, what I strive to be is what each
of us in this room strives to be: a teacher, a pastor, and a servant of the Lord and of the Church. I think we all
struggle to teach in a manner that is both faithful and compelling: and we all strive in our own lives not only to
find the right words to call our people to service but to make the servant attitude of Jesus the most identifying
mark of our own lives. But I suppose there is on greater challenge given to us than the one to be good pastors.
The Lord himself must have grappled with this challenge as He reached out with love and compassion to those
weak in faith as well as to those involved in sin. Never did He compromise the truth He had come to reveal, but
neither did He fail to extend to all He encountered the warm and compassionate embrace of a loving God. That’s
the challenge I face day after day in my ministry to the Church in Seattle, and I know it is the struggle of each of
us in this room. I would never even for a moment maintain that I have always succeeded in carrying it out, or
deny that I have made many mistakes along the way. But I have never stopped trying and, please God, I never
will.
2) Another important point about what this matter most surely is not: it is not a case of personal
obduracy or obstinacy on my part. I suppose I am a strong-willed person (my priests would probably bear me out
on that!) but I have always striven to be a loyal son of the Church and a faithful member of the College of
Bishops. From the very start, I have always made it clear to the Holy Father and to everyone I have dealt with in
the Roman Curia that I would happily resign if my doing so would help this situation, and that I would sooner
resign than bring dishonor to our Church in any way. The voluminous correspondence between me and the Holy
See these past three years will make it clear that my attitude has always been a cooperative and obedient one. But
my understanding of the virtue of obedience, coupled with my role as a Bishop with responsibility not only for
my own Archdiocese but with shared responsibility within the Episcopal College for the entire Church – my
understanding of the virtue of obedience has never allowed me simply to acquiesce. It has, rather, prompted me
to engage in a process of dialogue, one which, to the best of my ability, I have always carried out in a respectful,
docile and faith-filled manner.
3) Perhaps I also need to acknowledge the extremely widespread publicity which has surrounded this
entire case, to the point of causing confusion and serious scandal for many of our people. I am grieved by this,
and I think it could have been otherwise. I have already told you that, and why. Our people have “come of age”
and they deserve to be treated as adults. They are capable of dealing maturely with problems where they exist
and they take seriously the “ownership” of the Church that is their birthright as baptized members of the Body of
Christ.
In view of this, I honestly believe that the current waves of adverse publicity could have been avoided
had the decision regarding the Visitation, the process followed in the Visitation, and all that has ensued since
been dealt with more openly and forthrightly. Had this happened, I know that the people in our Archdiocese who
have been so badly hurt, scandalized, and even outraged by these events would have found themselves in a far
different place. Much adverse publicity could have been avoided from the very start and the same outcomes
intended by the Holy See could have been achieved; namely the careful evaluation of my stewardship, my
ministry as Archbishop of Seattle, something which I would have warmly and enthusiastically welcomed, as I
am certain each of us here would.
IV. Having tried to set forth those matters which, in my judgment, have most assuredly not been at
stake in this whole case, may I attempt to conclude this overly-long presentation by suggesting some of those
which most certainly are involved in it? I will list them only briefly because they are, it seems to me, the sort of
things that need to be addressed carefully and systematically by this Conference.
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1) The first has to do with a relationship: the absolutely essential and life-giving relationship that exists
between an individual bishop and the Holy Father himself (and, I would have to add, to those who assist him in
the day-to-day administration of the Church.) The Second Vatican Council addressed this relationship in depth
from a scriptural and theological perspective, one that gave great hope to all of us, I think – certainly to me, a
bishop who got his first “on-the-job training” during the Council itself. Subsequently, this relationship has been
dealt with in documents such as De Episcoporum Muneribus and, most recently, by the Revised Code of Canon
Law. But very real practical questions remain, and those better equipped than I am need to address them. The
most obvious way of putting the question, to my way of thinking at least, is simply this: how does a diocesan
bishop who is himself the Vicar of Christ in his particular church, carry out his role with the degree of
independence which this role implies while at the same time doing so in full union with and under the rightful
authority of the Supreme Pontiff? I do not meant to suggest for a moment that we are dealing here with polarities
but they are surely values that sometimes find themselves in tension.
And, secondly, what is the proper role of National Bodies of Bishops such as this one, mandated by the
documents of the Council, yet variously interpreted as being anywhere from essential to collegial Church
governance to merely useful in carrying out certain forms of non-binding consultation? This question has far-
reaching implications, to be sure, but it has particular relevance to the whole matter of the decision to undertake
the Visitation of the church of Seattle and to how such a Visitation ought to have been carried out. I am firmly of
the opinion that it ought to have been carried out in close collaboration between the Holy See and this
Conference. I am further of the mind that this Conference should have been the very agency for carrying out the
Visitation. That is why, from the very beginning, I chose to keep the leadership of this Conference apprised of
each major development as it unfolded, and why I am gratified that the moment has finally arrived for it to be
dealt with by the entire active membership of this Conference. I believe that this will ultimately be of benefit to
the whole Church.
2) I believe, too, that it is the proper role of a Conference such as this to address the issue of the
legitimacy as well as the limits of local adaptations which are truly reflective of a particular Church., its history,
traditions, and lifestyle, not to mention its special characteristics and problems. You hardly need me to remind
you of the role of legitimate diversity within a Church that is called to be one—one in itself, one among the local
churches, and one with the See of Peter. We all know this. I mention it here because I believe it has applicability
with regard to our own Apostolic Visitation and to the reasons which prompted it in the first place.
3) My third over-arching concern has to do with another question which touches on us as a Conference.
Following the lead of our Holy Father who has repeatedly sounded the call for peace, not for peace at any price
but peace with justice, we have all labored hard these past many years, under some very able leadership and
thanks to the incredibly generous and gifted contributions of our members, to speak out publicly and forcefully
on some of the most delicate, complex and compelling moral and societal issues of our times. Our work this
week is only one case in point. We have often paid a price for speaking out honestly and without concern for our
own selfish interests. It is clear that each of us here has a deep and passionate concern for a more just and
Christian social and economic order, and that each one of us is committed to doing all he can to bring about his
order. I think our record is impressive, even if incomplete. At the same time, our ongoing commitment cannot
only be toward the order of things outside the Church. It must embrace as well the very Church we are trying to
become. Our people expect this of us. They will listen to us even more attentitively, I think, if they see mirrored
in our own honest relationships and just treatments of one another the same kind of loving and just relationships
to which we are calling them. I make this observation not in an accusatory fashion. Indeed, I must first speak
these words of challenge to myself and acknowledge innumerable ways in which I fail in this respect.
I have mentioned  three rather over-arching issues that I feel we must deal with. I would now like to
mention a concern that applies only to the Church of Seattle. It is this: I need some help, some direction in
coming to understand just how we in Seattle – bishops, priests and people working together – are to address the
issues identified by the Apostolic Visitation, and to satisfy the concerns of the Holy See, in a situation and
according to a methodology  that I, quite frankly, have to acknowledge as being all but impossible, even to the
point of being unworkable. I honestly do not know the answer to that question, but I must state it. And I must go
even further, especially in this setting, and say that with all due respect for the provisions of Church Law, I
believe that the very concept of special faculties – at least of the sort and extent we are dealing with here – is
already on somewhat shaky ground from a theological point of view. Given the present situation in Seattle,
however, the theological problem seems an academic luxury in the fact of the pressing practical problems that
are involved.
I have talked overly long and I apologize for that. I guess a lot has built up within me during the past
three and a half years in which these events have taken place. But it is not me I am concerned about. I am
concerned about the Church. And I guess my realization that each of you shares the same concern just as deeply
as I do has given me the courage to say more than I normally would in a situation like this. Thank you for letting
me.
At this point, I suppose, it is likely that the question on the minds of many of you is “What does he want
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us to do, anyway?” Let me attempt to answer that by reminding you that there are really three sets of issues here.
First, there is the question of my ministry, my stewardship over the Church entrusted to me. I have been found
wanting in some ways. Seriously wanting, it appears. And even though I object to the methods that were used to
arrive at this conclusion, I have to take to heart the need to I have to be evaluated, and I accept the fact that I
must work very hard with my priests and people, and as conscientiously as possible, in order to address and
correct any areas in which I have been found wanting. I am committed with all my heart to doing this.
The second set of issues has to do with what surely seems to be an unworkable situation as far as
Bishop Wuerl’s special faculties are concerned. And the problem here has nothing to do with Bishop Wuerl
personally. He is my brother and my friend and my heart aches for him when I consider the ordeal he has had to
suffer during this past years. But in view of the situation in which we find ourselves, I would hope that this
Conference would be willing to afford some positive assistance in helping bishop Wuerl and me to address this
issue with the Holy See. For the good of the Church in Seattle and beyond, I am absolutely convinced that the
matter of the governance of the Church of Seattle needs to be returned to normal as soon as humanly possible. I
would even say at once.
The third set of concerns are those I labelled “over-arching” toward the end of this presentation. There
are some major questions which will not go away now matter how much we might wish they would. They are
questions which will severely test our mettle as a Conference of Bishops. But we have been tested before and we
have almost always come through well. Amazingly well. And united, too. I firmly believe that the present
moment will be no exception.
A final word: my friends, we need not look upon this as a win / lose situation. I do not feel the need to
win so that others will have to lose. Winning or losing is not what this is all about. The good of the Church is
what is at stake here. Nothing less. We are all untie in our commitment to that goal, and for that reason I have no
doubt that we will find a way to address all the questions I have posed and others like them. And I have no
doubt, either, that we ill do so courageously – in a sprit that is truly and fully Catholic, with all that word implies:
a spirit that is at the same time faithful to the Lord and His Gospel, loyal to our Holy Father, and true to the
people of God whom we serve and who look to us now, perhaps, more than ever before, for guidance,
inspiration, and leadership.
Document Number: 7
Document Title: Bishop Malone’s Statement
Source: The Progress, November 13, 1986, p. 11; Origins, November 20, 1986, pp. 400-401.
In recent weeks all of us have felt much concern for those involved in the situation in Seattle. The pain
of Archbishop Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl, our brothers in the episcopacy, the abuse directed at the Holy
Father and the Holy See, the dismay and confusion experienced by many good people – these things are deeply
troubling.
Not only is there suffering in the church in Seattle, though: the controversy has spread via the media and
in other ways and has affected Catholics throughout the country. It is unusual for the conference of bishops to
address such a matter, but these are unusual circumstances.
The issues raised here touch on the relationship between the local churches and the universal pastor.
Bishops exercise their office in communion him and under his authority. On this occasion the bishops of the
United States wish to affirm unreservedly their loyalty to and unity with the Holy Father.
The conference of bishops has no authority to intervene in the internal affairs of the diocese or in the
unique relationship between the pope and individual bishops. By universal church law and the conference’s
norms, the conference is not able to review, much less judge, a case involving a diocesan bishop and the Holy
See.
Based on experience, bishops are conscious that in such matters the Holy See proceeds carefully and
charitably, employing procedures developed over many years to protect the rights of individuals and promote the
common good of the church. With specific reference to Seattle, while we are not authorized to judge the facts of
the case, I believe it is clear that the process employed by the Holy See was in accord with general principles of
church law and procedures. The decision reached at the end of the process was made by proper church
authorities. As such, it deserves our respect and confidence. Where there appear to have been misunderstandings
at one point or another along the way, the need now is to look to the future, not to the past, and carry out the
decision. The best assistance I or anyone can give is to offer precisely this counsel.
We could address the issues involved in this situation all week, but we would deceive ourselves if we
thought that such discussions would solve all the problems, heal all the hurt. We need to do some additional
things.
Is it paradoxically possible that what has happened in the Archdiocese of  Seattle has given, and
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continues to provide, a vivid demonstration of the unity of the church, perhaps the best demonstration we have
seen in many years? I am deeply convinced that the degree of pain which has been felt and enunciated in Seattle,
but far beyond Seattle, really is the kind of pain that can only be felt by members of a family. At least that is how
it feels to me.
If my analogy is correct, it suggests some of the directions in which we must go. There are certain
things that a family must do when it wants to resolve a problem.
A family comes together. Each member expresses the pain, the anxiety, the doubts they feel. These
things are listened to with respect and sympathized with, deeply and in the heart. Then support is expressed, for
the persons as persons, and for the responsibilities they must bear. This we bishops have done together in these
days. Archbishop Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl have been given a job to do by the Holy See. We are prepared
to offer any assistance judged helpful and appropriate by the parties involved.
A family also takes steps to see that, insofar as possible, a painful situation does not happen again. In
our case that means working to find creative ways of presenting the church’s teaching in the best light possible,
but also seeking the mechanisms of responding when confusion or error occurs. We must be seen as committed
to hearing and solving the problems.
There is at least one more thing a family of faith does when it is in difficulty, and that is pray. We of all
people must not give short shrift to this. Let us bring our people together in prayer for the church in Seattle, so
that what has happened may be an occasion of grace and growth, there and in the church universal.
Document Number: 8
Document Title: Laghi Announcement of Commission Appointment
Source: The Progress, February 12, 1987.
The Holy See has appointed an ad hoc commission composed of Cardinals Joseph Bernardin and John O’Connor
and Archbishop John Quinn to assess the current situation in the Archdiocese of Seattle. Archbishop Raymond
Hunthausen has expressed his concurrence.
Document Number: 9
Document Title: Assessment Commission Report
Source: The Progress, 5/28/87, pp. 3-4; Origins, 6/4/87, pp. 39-41; Archdiocese of Seattle
photocopy, Wasden Price collection.
Report to the Holy See Presented by the Commission Appointed by the Holy See to Assess the Current
Situation in the Archdiocese of Seattle
I. The history
The Commission appointed by the Holy See to assess the current situation in the Archdiocese of Seattle
was officially notified of its mandate in a letter from the Apostolic Pro-Nuncio, Archbishop Pio Laghi, dated
January 26, 1987 (prot. n. 317/87/2). In pursuit of its task the Commission conducted the following interviews:
1) On February 10, 1987, the Commission met with Archbishop Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl in
Dallas, Texas. The entire morning was spent  with them together in the presence of the Pro-Nuncio. In the
afternoon, the Commission met separately with Archbishop Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl. The Pro-Nuncio was
not present at these meetings, which occupied the entire afternoon and early evening.
2) On March 6 and 7, 1987, the Commission met at Menlo Park in the Archdiocese of San Francisco
with eight bishops of the ecclesiastical provinces of Seattle and Portland, with eight priest consultors of the
Archdiocese of Seattle and with four staff members of the Archdiocese of Seattle. All these individuals were
suggested by Archbishop Hunthausen.
3) On March 12, the Commission, together with the Pro-Nuncio, met individually with Archbishop
Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl in Chicago.
4) Subsequent to the above-mentioned sessions, individual members of the Commission met with the
following persons:
A) On March 19, Archbishop Quinn met with Father William Lane, an Archdiocesan
Consultor attending a continuing education program in Rome.
B) On March 25, Cardinal Bernardin and Archbishop Quinn interviewed Archbishop James
Hickey, who had been the Apostolic Visitator to the Archdiocese of Seattle, in Washington, D.C.
C) On March 29 and 31, Archbishop Quinn met with Archbishop Francis Hurley of
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Anchorage, Alaska, and on March 31 he met with Bishop Michael Kenny of Juneau and again with Archbishop
Francis Hurley.
During the entire month of April and into the month of May a number of visits and telephone
conversations, as well as an exchange of letters with individuals who had previously been interviewed took
place. In addition, Archbishop Hunthausen met with the Commission in Chicago April 8, 1987. Since then the
Commission has been in continuing contact with the Archbishop by telephone.
The Commission also studied voluminous documentation, all of which was available to Archbishop
Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl.
II. The assessment
The Commission was given no mandate on the procedure to be followed in carrying out its task. The
Commission, therefore, decided that while its task was official, its procedure would be informal and would
consist largely of informal discussions with bishops, priests and lay persons designated by Archbishop
Hunthausen, informal discussions with Archbishop Hunthausen and with Bishop Wuerl, and informal
discussions and shared prayer by the members of the Commission.
The Commission further decided that the primary context for its approach would be two documents,
both known to Archbishop Hunthausen, to the Holy See and to everyone concerned.
1) The summary of the Archbishop Hickey-Archbishop Hunthausen interview of November 8, 1983,
signed jointly by Archbishop Hickey and Archbishop Hunthausen as a fair and accurate summary.
2) The letter of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith signed by the Prefect, Cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger, September 30, 1985 (prot. no. 102/79), bringing to a close the Apostolic Visitation process and listing
fourteen specific observations, eleven of them raising questions or making recommendations and issuing
directives and guidelines for corrective action where required.
The Commission further agreed internally that it would base its conclusions only on documents seen by
Archbishop Hunthausen and on discussions with persons designated by him or consulted with his knowledge and
concurrence. Each person interviewed was free to share with Archbishop Hunthausen everything discussed with
the Commission and the Archbishop was free to seek any such information from any person interviewed by the
Commission.
Finally, and of critical importance to the integrity of the process and the merit of the conclusions, is the
fact that the Commission decided that it had been asked neither to prove nor to disprove anything whatsoever. It
interpreted its task as the mandate to make an assessment. The Commission was not asked to carry out an
Apostolic Visitation. It was asked to provide an assessment of the “current situation” in the Archdiocese of
Seattle. In common sense terms, it seemed quite clear that the Holy See was looking for a common-sense
judgment, and this is all the Commission attempts to provide here.
The following, then, is the unanimous judgment of the Commission:
1) Archbishop Hunthausen has taken laudable steps to carry out certain of the provisions of the letter of
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.
2) In spite of such steps, certain clear teachings of the Magisterium seem to be confused in the minds of
some, and certain practices mandated by the Holy See seem to be modified arbitrarily by some pastors and other
persons charged with responsibility for Archdiocesan activities.
3) Archbishop Hunthausen himself observed that the Archdiocese suffers an inadequacy in
communications. It seems possible, therefore, that certain ambiguities exist because not everyone is adequately
familiar with the Archbishop’s policies or with his articulations of Magisterial teaching.
4) At the same time, the Archbishop attributes great value to compassion. His own practice of
compassion has become almost legendary. While the Archbishop himself, however, seems generally to balance
compassion with the law and asserts unconditionally his own commitment to formal Church teaching, it seems
that some who admire his compassion may not give similar weight to the place and demands of law, bending it
in important matters under the aegis of compassion.
5) In sum, no matter how personally firm in his teachings and practice the Archbishop himself may be,
without intending it he is perceived as generating, or at least accepting, a climate of permissiveness within which
some feel free to design their own policies and practices.
6) It would not be difficult to illustrate each of the above observations with concrete examples. It is
tempting to do this, particularly since a number of persons interviewed informed the Commission that they felt
the Archbishop had been unfairly asked to correct aberrations without being told what they were, that is, without
being given an extensive list of concrete matters of teaching or practice requiring correction.
The Commission understands this allegation, but disagrees with its implications. The reason is that,
more than individual items which might need correction, it is the overall attitudinal “climate” or psychological
and ecclesiological orientation of the Archdiocese which is the ultimate key to the situation.
No substantive changes will perdure until this climate or orientation changes. And this climate or
orientation seems to have remained substantially unchanged since the time of the Apostolic Visitation and the
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letter of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. This is in no way to suggest a lack of sincerity or the
presence of malicious resistance to recommendations and directives of the Holy See. It is to suggest, however,
that the correction of individual aberrations, laudable though this be, is not sufficient.
7) The Commission believes that the letter of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith is
reasonably clear in both specifics and intent. Cardinal Ratzinger made no effort to provide an exhaustive list of
concrete points for correction, very probably, the Commission believes, for the reasons cited in no. 6 above. He
prefers, rather, to speak of “imperfect notions of the Church’s mission and nature,” or “faulty Christologies” or
the “role of conscience.” Hence, while providing certain concrete examples, he is speaking as bishop, as between
those who share one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one Church.
8) It is the conclusion of the Commission, therefore, that the letter of the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith should remain in place as the primary guide for the direction in which the Church in Seattle must
move beyond the point it has already reached. Despite its conviction that a listing of individual points does not
go to the heart of the problem, the Commission has orally provided the Archbishop with a number of specific
examples and is prepared to discuss these and others with him if so desired.
9) In submitting this assessment we express highest praise for Bishop Wuerl and his dedicated efforts to
carry out his special responsibilities in the Archdiocese of Seattle despite exceedingly difficult circumstances
beyond his control.
III. Proposal for Resolving the Problem and Concluding Remarks
The proposal for resolving the problem in the Archdiocese of Seattle was devised by the Commission in
consultation with the Holy See, taking into account both the concerns of Archbishop Hunthausen as well as those
of the Holy See.
Virtually all persons interviewed by the Commission agreed that the present arrangement of divided
authority (i.e. an auxiliary bishop with special faculties) was not effective and should be changed.
Hence, the proposal of the Commission contains these essential elements:
1) The auxiliary bishop should be transferred to another See.
2) The Archbishop should recover his faculties as diocesan bishop.
3) A Coadjutor Archbishop should be appointed.
4) The Holy See should establish target dates for the completion of the tasks referred to in the letter of
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.
5) The Commission should be mandated, for a period to be determined by the Holy See, to assist in
carrying out whichever of its elements the Holy See approves and directs.
Thoroughly aware of the steps taken by the Holy See up to this point, the Commission is convinced that
no steps were intended as punitive, regardless of perceptions to the contrary. The same must be said of the
proposal set forth above.
In the fulfillment of our task, we listened to many voices and weighed many views. We recognize that
some of those interviewed may not agree with our interpretation of their statements. Nevertheless, throughout we
kept before our eyes some very basic considerations: the need for charity and compassion, the need for fairness
and openness, the need to reach decisions and to make recommendations to the best of our ability. But we also
kept in mind the nature of the bishop’s role in the Church.
Hence we acknowledge the teaching of the Second Vatican Council, according to which: “The pastoral
charge, that is, the permanent and daily care of the flock, is entrusted to (bishops) fully; nor are they to be
regarded as vicars of the Roman pontiff; for they exercise the power which they possess in their own right”
(Lumen Gentium, 27).
At the same time, the Council also teaches that every bishop, by reason of his episcopal ordination, is a
member of the College of Bishops. He is not an independent agent standing in isolation. As a member of the
College of Bishops, he exercises his office only in communion with and obedience to the Head of the College of
Bishops, the Pope, the Successor of Peter and Bishop of Rome. Indeed, every bishop in his ordination publicly
declares his promise to fulfill his ministry in obedience to Peter and his successors.
From the first century to this, it has been the role of the Bishop of Rome to intervene in local, regional
or national situations when required by the greater good of the Church, as attested by the earliest documents of
Christian history. If the Church, spread through many cultures and existing on all continents, is to remain one
and maintain its identity, the Pope must make decisions which must be binding on the whole body of the Church.
In this connection we cite the words of Karl Rahner:
“We are and we shall remain also in the future the Roman Catholic Church....
“The papacy belongs to the binding content of our faith itself, in its proper place within the hierarchy of
truths and in our own Christian life. This holds absolutely....
“We can insist that the Church is not a secular reality, but has a quite different nature. But the Church
cannot be a debating society: It must be able to make decisions binding on all within it. Such a demand cannot be
a priori contrary to man’s dignity if -- as people today are never tired of impressing upon us -- he is indeed a
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social being. And then a supreme point at which all reflections and democratic discussions are turned into
universally binding decisions cannot be without meaning’ (Karl Rahner, SJ, The Shape of the Church to Come,
Part 2, c. 2).
With this in mind the Commission continues to hope and pray that all will walk together the Gospel
path of humility, obedience, charity and peace in accepting the decision of the Holy See.
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin
Archbishop of Chicago
John Cardinal O’Connor
Archbishop of New York
Archbishop John R. Quinn
Archbishop of San Francisco
373
APPENDIX IV: SAMPLE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENT
Text: Laghi letter to Hunthausen reporting visitation findings
November 14, 1985
Most Reverend Raymond G. Hunthausen
Archbishop of Seattle
910 Marion Street
Seattle, WA 98104
Dear Archbishop Hunthausen,
1. With this letter I write to inform you that the Apostolic
Visitation requested by the Holy See, and conducted by Archbishop
James A. Hickey of Washington, has been concluded and is
considered closed.
2. Prior to that Visitation, both significant criticism and praise
had been directed toward your pastoral ministry in Seattle. The Holy
See considered it necessary to evaluate certain allegations and also to
explore in a wider and more positive fashion your pastoral service in
the Archdiocese. Toward that end, the Visitator conferred with more
than seventy members of the clergy, religious and laity. In addition, he
examined many pertinent documents, statements issued by the
Archdiocese and letters. Most importantly, while in Seattle,
Archbishop Hickey spent some four or five hours to exchange views
with yourself, reviewing the allegations and seeking a deeper insight
into your governance of the Archdiocese. This had been preceded by
mutual discussions held in Chicago on September 15-16, 1983. It was
the Visitator’s role to speak to you as a brother bishop, to observe the
situation at firsthand, to obtain necessary facts and to analyze them for
the Holy See, and to offer you appropriate fraternal assistance and
support.
3. After a careful review of the entire body of testimony and, in
Honorary title (courtesy)
Visitation: euphemism (courtesy;
minimize the appearance of
conflict)
“Holy See” hides identity (secrecy)
Hickey: recruited ally; fraternity
Wide-ranging consultation: legitimizes action
Criticism: legitimizes intervention
Consultation with Hunthausen:
legitimation
Brother bishop (fraternity; minimize the
appearance of conflict)
Earlier discussions: further legitimation
Fraternal assistance: show fraternity;
minimize the appearance of conflict
Careful review: legitimation
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particular, on the basis of your own extensive testimony of November
8, 1983, I bring to your attention the following observations.
4. 1. There are many indications that you have striven with heart
and mind to be a dedicated bishop of the Church, eager to implement
the renewal called for in the Documents of the Second Vatican
Council. The record is clear that you have worked zealously to bring
into existence the various consultative bodies promoted by the
Council and mandated by the recently promulgated Code of Canon
Law. You have devoted much time and attention to bodies such as the
Council of Priests  and the Archdiocesan Pastoral Council, seeking to
enable them to function effectively.
5. Numerous witnesses spoke of your laudable and
conscientious efforts to involve the laity actively in the work of the
church. You have set up processes of dialogue with priests, religious
and laity, and you have sought most diligently to be open and
accessible to your people. You have been described repeatedly as a
man of Gospel values, sensitive to the needs of the suffering and
aggrieved. Your apostolic zeal and your concern for peace and justice
are well-known. Time and again you have given clear evidence of
your loyalty to the Church and your devotion and obedience to our
Holy Father.
6. 2. You have given much time to fostering the morale of your
priests and religious, meeting with them and encouraging them to
participate in a renewal of Church life. Efforts have been made to
develop local lay leadership and to deepen the life of prayer for the
people entrusted to your care. Your own special skills as a homilist
and speaker have played a significant role toward that renewal.
7. 3. At the same time, you and your collaborators have suffered
from exaggerated and mean-spririted criticism. These observations are
based neither on the testimony of strident critics, nor on obviously
Praise: courtesy
Renewal: code word (persuasion: associate
self with best interest of Church )
Praise: courtesy
Praise: courtesy
Praise: courtesy
Empathy: fraternity; persuasion
Praise: courtesy
Praise: courtesy
Praise: courtesy
Praise: courtesy
Praise: courtesy
Praise: courtesy
Attestation to fairness:
legitimation; persuasion
Observations: euphemism (courtesy;
minimize appearance of conflict)
You have worked zealously: praise (courtesy)
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biased publications. Nor are they offered to encourage in any way
extreme groups seeking to undermine the authority of a local bishop.
Rather, they are designed to support you in your efforts toward
Church renewal and to offer, where necessary, certain guidance and
advice.
8. 4. Against this basic background of an apostolate
conscientiously conducted, I wish to express the following concerns,
asking at the same time your assistance in addressing them in a way
that will contribute to the spiritual well-being of the Archdiocese of
Seattle.
9. a. The need to bring into clear focus – working together with
priests, religious and theologians – certain teachings of the Church
and their implications for the pastoral practice of the Archdiocese.
These include the role of the conscience in making moral decisions;
the role of the Magisterium in giving definitive guidance in matters of
faith and morals; the nature and mission of the Church, together with
its sacramental and hierarchical structure; an anthropology which
provides an authentic understanding of the dignity of the human
person; and a Christology which correctly reflects our Catholic faith
concerning Christ’s divinity, His humanity, His salvific mission, and
His inseparable union with the Church.
10. b. In particular, the need to present more clearly the Church’s
teaching concerning the permanence and indissolubility of marriage
and to ensure that the Archdiocesan Tribunal, both its constitution and
practice, conforms with all the prescriptions of the revised Code of
Canon Law.
11. c. Greater vigilance in upholding the Church’s teaching,
especially with regard to contraceptive sterilization and
homosexuality.
12. d. The need to ensure that pastoral practice regarding the
The need: indirect expression avoids
appearance of blaming Hunthausen
(courtesy; minimize the appearance of
conflict)
The need: indirect language avoids
blaming of Hunthausen (courtesy)
The need-indirect language (courtesy)
Intervention is designed to
support you: associate self with
best interest of Church
Conscientiously conducted: courtesy;
persuasion
Concerns: euphemism (courtesy; minimize
the appearance of conflict)
Contribute to the well being of archdiocese:
associate self with best interest of Church
Definitive guidance: control, surveillance
Authentic understanding: depends on expert power
Correctly reflects our Catholic
faith: expert power; associate self
with best interest of Church
Tribunal, Canon Law: legal power
Greater vigilance: avoids blame
(courtesy), highlights need for control
The Church’s teaching: tradition as
singular
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liturgical and sacramental ministry of the Archdiocese is in accord
with the Church’s universal norms, especially in the celebration of the
Eucharist. This includes, for instance, routine intercommunion on the
occasion of weddings or funerals. Such a need also involves the
Sacrament of Reconciliation, mentioning particularly the proper
sequence of first confession / first communion and regulations
regarding general absolution.
13. e. The need to review the ongoing education of the clergy and
the selection and formation of candidates for the priesthood, and to be
clear that laicized priests are excluded from certain roles in accord
with the rescripts of laicization.
14. In conclusion, I commend you, Archbishop Hunthausen, for
your loyal cooperation and kindness during the Apostolic Visitation
and during the many months of study needed by the Holy See for a
careful review and an appropriate reaction. Even as I offer these
observations, I am aware of your continuous efforts to promote
genuine growth and renewal in the Archdiocese of Seattle. The
Church is grateful for what you have accomplished and I am confident
that you will be able to address effectively the concerns expressed in
this letter. You can rely on my assistance and support.
15. Asking God’s many blessings on you and your people, I am
Sincerely yours in Christ,
Archbishop Pio Laghi
Apostolic Pro-Nuncio
The need-indirect language (courtesy)
I commend you: praise (courtesy;
minize the appearance of conflict)
Holy See: hides identity of
evaluators (secrecy)
Praise: courtesy; persuasion
God talk-pious interjection
The Church’s universal norms:
tradition as singular
Topic of leadership gatekeeping:
monitoring, control
Many months needed: legitimation of delay
Concerns: euphemism (courtesy)
My assistance and support: fraternity;
courtesy
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APPENDIX V: ANALYTIC SUMMARY TABLES
Observable Strategies: Early Developments, A. (From 1978 to 9.30.85 Ratzinger Letter)
Strategies Tactics Objectives
Center 1. Show deference
to the structural
order and mindset
of the Church
2. Associate one’s
own efforts with
the best interest of
the Church
3. Minimize the
appearance of
conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert personal
identity
1. a. Vatican employs canonically recognized
instruments of control and surveillance (ad
limina, visitation); b. Vatican shows preference
for bishop-to-bishop problem solving
2. a. Hickey says he comes to assist the Holy
Father and support Hunthausen in his ministry
3. a. Holy See confines discussion of issues to
private meetings and correspondence; b.
euphemism “visitation” paints over negative
quality of intervention; c. Hickey says he goes to
Seattle to offer “fraternal assistance and support;”
12.12.83 Ratzinger letter thanks Hunthausen for
his cooperation
4. a. Pro-nuncio acts as go-between; Laghi
approaches Hunthausen about visitation in
informal way; b. visitation intention posed as a
request; c. Vatican appoints fellow U.S. bishop as
visitator; d. Hickey explicitly stresses concept of
fraternity when arriving in and leaving Seattle
5. a. Hickey uses euphemisms to save face for
Hunthausen; b. Hickey praises Hunthausen
6. a. private meetings; b. private correspondence;
c. Hickey defends use of secrecy; d. visitation
interviews were conducted with interviews in
private; e. Hunthausen was not allowed to see
visitation report
7. a. Vatican enlists Hickey to serve as visitator
8. Ambiguous: a. Did Hunthausen try to persuade
Hunthausen to cooperate in its private exchanges
with him, 1978-83, and if so, how? b. Hickey
argues legitimacy of use of secrecy to press
9. NA (no evidence)
Bring Hunthausen to
correct the perceived
problems in the local
Church.
Maintain a low
profile for the
intervention.
Periphery 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize-
conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert identity
1. a. Hunthausen accepts Vatican monitoring (ad
limina, visitation); b. Hunthausen says publicly
that he welcomes Hickey’s visit
2. a. conceptualized with reference to “renewal,”
Vatican II, and guidance of the Holy Spirit
3. a. Hunthausen confines disagreement
discussions to closed forums; b. Hunthausen’s
public statements downplay the contentious
dimension of the visitation process
4. a. Hunthausen consults NCCB Pres. Roach; b.
Hunthausen welcomes Hickey to Seattle
5. a. Hunthausen welcomes Hickey into his
archdiocese (hospitality)
6. a. Hunthausen does not reveal details of his
exchanges with the Vatican which took place
prior to the visitation; b. Hunthausen cooperates
with Vatican wish for secrecy (though, by his
own account, he argued against its use, i.e. he
resisted)
7. a. Hunthausen turns to Roach for help; b.
Hunthausen addresses people of Seattle
Cooperate with Holy
See while
minimizing own loss
of power and
prestige.
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archdiocese in open letter in Progress
8. Ambiguous. a. Hunthausen denies wrongdoing
9. a. Hunthausen’s press statement announcing
visitation uses the first person repeatedly and
associates the ministerial situation with
Hunthausen himself (“my faith tells me that…”)
Third 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize-
conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert identity
1. Ambiguous: third party involvement is mostly
hidden.
2. Ambiguous: third party involvement is mostly
hidden.
3. Ambiguous: Roach advises Hunthausen to
request a bill of particulars (likely leading to
escalation), but he, like Hunthausen, keeps the
affair quiet
4. a. Roach advises Hunthausen
5. Ambiguous: third party involvement is mostly
hidden.
6. a. Roach cooperates with secrecy surrounding
visitation
7. NA (no evidence)
8. Ambiguous: Roach argues in favor of bill of
particulars?
9. Ambiguous: third party involvement is mostly
hidden.
Offer support to
friend Hunthausen.
Analytic Summary, Document 1 (9.30.85 Ratzinger letter to Hunthausen):
Overview Indications in Document
I. Analysis of Text
Construction
1. Production The Holy See is the principal and
Ratzinger is the author. Influence of
others on production is unknown.
Earlier draft in German? One-to-one
correspondence, intended to be
private (secret), but possibility of
public consumption is not ruled out
in production phase.
Sign of production is seal of the
congregation on original, with
administrative file no. 102/79. Only
Ratzinger’s signature appears.
Technical language is sign of
Hunthausen as intended audience ,
but balanced content and polite tone
suggest possibility of public
consumption is considered.
2. Distribution Postal courier, Ratzinger to
Hunthausen (via Laghi?).
Hunthausen shared with Seattle
insiders. An edited version of the
letter’s contents would appear in the
11.14.85 Laghi letter. Hunthausen
shared the Ratzinger letter with
priests of archdiocese. Assessment
commission had the Ratzinger letter
to read and they eventually released
it with their report.
Photocopies of the letter distributed
to the press in May, 1987 show the
congregational seal and Ratzinger’s
signature, but the gravity of these
signs is lost with photocopying. The
version of the letter printed in The
Progress retains the signature but
not the seal. Many newspaper
accounts carry neither and offer
only abridged accounts of the letter.
Broadcast reports carry even more
abbreviated accounts.
3. Consumption Consumption, as best I can discern,
took place in the following order: 1.
Ratzinger and the Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith; 2. other
Vatican insiders; 3. Laghi and
Hunthausen; 4. insiders in the Laghi
Letter is addressed formally to
Hunthausen alone. When the letter
was released in Seattle on 5.27.87,
members of the press received
photocopied packets which
included:  Hunthausen cover letter,
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and Hunthausen offices; 5. priests
of the Seattle Archdiocese; 6.
assessment commission; 7. U.S.
bishops; 8. news media.
Hunthausen statement, Murphy
statement, commission cover letter,
commission report, Ratzinger letter.
Newspapers then reproduced these
documents according to their own
priorities.
4. Text Type Business letter with aspects of a
personal letter and formal report.
Formal stationery, seal and use of
official form of address indicate that
it is a business letter. Ratzinger’s
reference to previous meetings with
Hunthausen, his words of praise and
expressed intention to be of
assistance personalize the
communication. List of
observations is typical of a formal
report.
5. Diction Formal, polite, church-bureaucratic.
Certain words appear heavily laden
with strategic intentionality. Other
word choices maintain secrecy.
“Your Excellency” greeting
establishes formal tone and elevated
diction carries throughout (“A
critical reexamination of policies
and programs of the Archdiocese
should be conducted…”). Politeness
is seen in praise (“There are many
indications that you have striven
with heart and mind to be a good
bishop…”) and euphemisms
(“visit/visitation instead of
investigation; “assist you” instead
of “correct you.”). Examples of
church-bureaucratic language are
ample: Apostolic Visitation,
Congregation, Vatican Council,
Canon Law, etc. Key strategic
words include: “renewal” (suggests
Vatican has affinity with
Hunthausen’s desire to lead in the
spirit of Vatican II), “extremist”
(appears to be a response to
Hunthausen’s charge that
“reactionary elements” and the
Church are opposed to his ministry),
and “clear and firm” (Ratzinger
repeatedly suggests that problems in
Seattle have to do with a failure to
provide clear and firm guidance to
the faithful: too many matters are
left ambiguous). Words which
maintain secrecy include: “Holy
See,” “this Congregation,” and
nonspecific use of “we.”
6. Usage Ratzinger repeatedly obscures
agency and causality. First- and
second-person comments appear
early on but give way to
depersonalizing third-person. The
relational modality is one of
exhortation and expected fulfilment:
Ratzinger tells Hunthausen what he
should (must) do, a manifestation of
normative power.
Obscured agency and causality:
“Catholics have been advised that
after divorce and civil marriage,
they may in conscience return to the
Sacraments.” (Passive voice hides
agency.) Third-person
depersonalizing: “this Congregation
is now in a position to make the
following observation.” Relational
modality: “Vigorous efforts must be
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made to engender in priests,
religious and laity, a correct
appreciation of the sacramental
structure of the Church.”
7. Substructures of the Text Greeting,, introduction, numbered
report of findings, salutation.
The main substructure is the list of
observations that makes up the heart
of the document. This section
makes up most of the letter and
produces a feeling that the text is
essentially bureaucratic in function.
8. Intertextuality References to previous
correspondence between
Congregation and Hunthausen, and
to visitation report place this letter
in context. Citations of magisterial
documents signals the specific
Church teachings (and forms of
authority) Hunthausen needs to
acknowledge and apply locally. A
citation of questionnaires produced
in the Seattle Archdiocese serves as
a counter-example of how
confusion can be spread.
Mention of Congregation’s 10.4.83
letter to Hunthausen, Hunthausen’s
3.14.84 letter to Congregation, and
Hickey visitation report suggest
formational history of issues
currently being discussed.
Magisterial documents cited:
decrees of the Vatican Council;
recently revised Code of Canon
Law; CDF’s 1976 Declaration on
Sexual Ethics; documents of U.S.
bishops’ conference; the Roman
Sacramentary; CDF 1975
Instruction, Inter Insigniores;
Congregation for Catholic
Education’s 1983 document,
Educational Guidance in Human
Love. All of these documents are
meant to provide Hunthausen with
clear reference points (limits) for
pastoral decision making. When
documents produced by the Seattle
Archdiocese are mentioned
(questionnaires developed by the
Seattle Archdiocese in 1976 and
1979), they are cited as examples of
pastoral outreach which can be
confusing to the faithful.
II. Coping Strategies in
Evidence
Tactics Indications in Document
1. Show deference to the
structural order and mindset
of the Church
Ratzinger uses formal Church titles,
invokes own authority as curial
official, engages in processing of
Church disciplinary procedure
(visitation), cites official sources of
Church teaching, and makes
arguments based on his perception
of the proper function of the
Church.
Titles: “Your Excellency,” “this
Congregation,” “Prefect.” Ratzinger
signals his own authority when he
says that he himself is closing the
visitation process.” Engagement in
process of visitation is in keeping
with Code of Canon Law.
Ratzinger’s citation of Church
teaching draws heavily on formal
instruction, most of which is the
product of the Roman Curia. He
does not cite Scripture, classics of
spirituality or teachings produced
within the local Church (with the
exception of one non-specific
reference to documents produced by
the U.S. bishops). The overall thrust
of Ratzinger’s argument focuses on
a vision of the Church that
Hunthausen and his archdiocese are
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failing to realize.
2. Associate one’s own efforts
with the best interest of the
Church
Ratzinger offers a vision of “the
Church” as a singular, definitive
entity which thrives on correct and
clear doctrine and practice. He
presents himself as a teacher and
defender of correct doctrine.
Example: “With regard to the role
of women in the Church, the
teaching of the Church regarding
their God-given dignity and
importance should be given full
weight… The exclusion of women
from Sacred Orders was dealt with
at length in this Congregation’s
1975 Instruction, Inter
Insigniores…”
3. Minimize the appearance of
conflict
Privacy and indirect language are
the primary tactics used to minimize
the appearance of conflict.
Ratzinger writes Hunthausen
privately and individually and then
refuses his request to make the letter
public. Ratzinger brings the
“observations” to Hunthausen’s
attention, but never once directly
blames Hunthausen for abuses
taking place.
4. Show fraternity This strategy is employed but not
with great emphasis. Ratzinger
frames this letter as an offer of
assistance and an expression of
well-meant concern. (Notably,
however, explicit references to the
episcopal fraternity and episcopal
collegiality are absent.)
“It is our intention, rather, to
support what you have done to
promote the renewal of the Church
in Seattle and to point out, at the
same time, areas which we consider
are in need of correction and
improvement.”
5. Practice courtesy The use of the honorary title “Your
Excellency” and the invocation of
the Holy Spirit of Christ at the end
are standard forms of courtesy we
would expect to find in formal,
episcopal correspondence. Other
forms of courtesy in the letter are
praise for Hunthausen and a refusal
to criticize him directly.
“You have been repeatedly
described as a man of Gospel
values, sensitive to the needs of the
suffering and the aggrieved.”
“It is important that the nature and
mission of the Church be taught in
their entirety.”
6. Employ secrecy The letter is addressed to
Hunthausen alone. The Holy See
(presumably Ratzinger) refused
permission to make the letter public.
Other examples of private
correspondence are mentioned in
the letter (these have never been
made public). The use of the terms
“Holy See” and “this Congregation”
hides various actors’ identities.
Hickey report, cited here, was never
made available (even to
Hunthausen). Ratzinger offers no
details about who participated in the
process of evaluating the Hickey
report and how.
Ratzinger mentions two previous
letters exchanged between Rome
and Seattle (see Intertextuality
section above). “’It was precisely
because it did not want to give
uncritical acceptance to the
published and private criticisms
made about the Archdiocese of
Seattle, that the Holy See… has
undertaken this project.” “… this
Congregation is now in a position to
make the following observations…”
“Archbishop Hickey… filed a
lengthy and exhaustively
documented report with this
Congregation…”
7. Recruit allies NA. This appears to be a letter
meant for Hunthausen alone,
thought the possibility of wider
distribution appears to be foreseen,
given the cautious character of its
expression.
NA.
8. Argue persuasively Ratzinger holds that the visitation
was a rational process, the
Ratzinger cites reasons for
undertaking the visitation
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conclusions are rational, and that it
would be rational for Hunthausen to
respond in the recommended
fashion.
(criticisms made against
Hunthausen). He stresses the careful
process of evidence collection and
the fact that “obviously biased” and
“extremist” accounts were
recognized as such thus: it was an
objective evaluation). One can also
read the section praising
Hunthausen as a demonstration of
Ratzinger’s ability to see both sides.
Ratzinger’s extended section
identifying the problems shows his
organizational ability, his eye for
detail, and his knowledge of Church
teaching – all of which lend gravity
to his argument. Ratzinger provides
various kinds of evidence for his
conclusions and he backs up his
own opinions with citations of
Church documents. He also
repeatedly makes distinctions
between concepts that are
apparently only partially grasped (in
Seattle) and the fullness of
understanding that must ultimately
prevail.
9. Assert personal identity NA. Ratzinger submerges his own
identity. The use of the first person
does not reveal much of his own
identity: more commonly, self-
references are to “this
Congregation.”
“To quote from this Congregation’s
own October 4, 1983, letter to
you…”
“this Congregation is now in a
position to make the following
observations…”
III. Overall Coping Strategy Explanation Indications in Document
a. Contending This document reflects the fact that
the Holy See unilaterally made a
decision to conduct the visitation (I
consider Hunthausen’s agreement to
have been a formality that did not
represent a real choice) and carry it
out on its own terms. The
Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith determined what the relevant
findings were and presented these to
Hunthausen in the form of
“problems” for him to resolve.
There is no invitation to discuss
further whether the issues were
accurately identified and indeed
constituted problems.
Though Ratzinger consistently
avoids language that criticizes
Hunthausen himself, the letter offers
a thoroughgoing critique of the
pastoral ministry taking place under
his guidance. Criticism (appearing
in 21 paragraphs) heavily outweighs
praise (appearing in 4 paragraphs).
Ratzinger is at pains to show the
critique is justified: “the Visitor
conferred with at least sixty-seven
members of the clergy, religious
and laity” and filed “a lengthy and
exhaustively documented report.”
The congregation itself made a
“careful review of the entire body of
testimony.” These statements pre-
empt possible Hunthausen
arguments that he was evaluated
unfairly. Another contentious tactic
Ratzinger employs is repeatedly
drawing distinctions between truths
or doctrines that are only partially
grasped and those that are fully and
properly understood. He repeatedly
suggests that Hunthausen has failed
to bring people to a full
383
understanding of Church teaching
(with the implication that
Hunthausen himself may be falling
short in his own understandings.
Observable Strategies: Intervening Developments, B. (October, November 1985)
Strategies Tactics Objectives
Center 1. Show deference to
the structural order
and mindset of the
Church
2. Associate one’s
own efforts with the
best interest of the
Church
3. Minimize the
appearance of conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert personal
identity
1. a. Center exercises own
decision making power; b.
by partially agreeing to
Hunthausen’s request,
shows respect for his
office as bishop
2. NA (no evidence)
3. a. CDF refuses
Hunthausen’s request to
make Ratzinger letter
public
4. Ambiguous. Activity is
mostly hidden, but the
exchanges between
Ratzinger, Hunthausen
and Laghi show a
preference for keeping the
business within the
episcopal fraternity (CDF
gives in to Hunthausen’s
request for publishable
letter; Laghi produces new
letter at request of CDF)
5. NA (no evidence)
6. a. Rome does not allow
Hunthausen to release
Ratzinger letter; b. Rome
does not allow
Hunthausen to read
Hickey report; c. Laghi
functions as gatekeeper
7. NA (lack of evidence)
8. Ambiguous. Discussion
of letter for public
distribution likely
involved persuasive
argumentation
9. NA (no evidence)
To maintain a low profile
for the affair as a whole
and to ensure
Hunthausen’s continued
cooperation.
Periphery 1. Deference-Church
2. Associate-Church
3. Minimize conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
1. a. Hunthausen defers to
decision of superior in the
hierarchy
2. Ambiguous
3. a. Hunthausen carries
out dialogue with Vatican
in private; b. Hunthausen
respects Vatican wishes
about not publishing
Ratzinger letter
4. a. Hunthausen carries
To learn what the
visitation findings are and
to reveal them without
further alienating Rome.
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9. Assert identity on dialogue in private with
Laghi
5. a. Hunthausen respects
Vatican wishes
6. a. Hunthausen engages
in private dialogue with
Vatican representatives; b.
Hunthausen cooperates
with Vatican intention to
keep Ratzinger letter
secret. c. [Resist]
Hunthausen presses to
make Ratzinger letter
public.
7. NA
8. a. Hunthausen argues to
be provided with some
document he can release
publicly
Third 1. deference-Church
2. Associate-Church
3. Minimize conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert identity
No third party activity
accounted for.
NA
Analytic Summary, Document 2 (11.14.85 Laghi letter to Hunthausen):
Overview Indications in Document
I. Analysis of Text
Construction
1. Production The Holy See is the principal and
Laghi is the author. It is unknown if
others besides Ratzinger directly
influenced the content of the letter.
The letter was written in response to
Hunthausen’s request to make the
9.30.85 Ratzinger letter public. That
request was refused, but this letter
was supplied in its place.
That the Ratzinger letter is a source
for this letter becomes clear by
comparing the wording and
information of the two letters. The
Laghi letter follows the organization
and wording of the Ratzinger letter
closely.
2. Distribution Laghi passed on a copy to
Hunthausen (presumably to
Ratzinger also, at the same time or
in advance). Hunthausen released
the letter to the press.
Hunthausen published the letter in
the November 28, 1985 issue of The
Progress.
3. Consumption An influence on consumption for
many would be the sense of
curiosity and expectation
concerning what the visitation
issues were for the Vatican.
There is a reference to “the many
months of study needed by the Holy
See for a careful review and
appropriate reaction.”
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4. Text Type Personalized business letter meant
for public consumption.
Marks of a business letter present
here include the formal heading,
greeting and words of closure. The
body of the letter consists primarily
of a brief report of the visitation
findings in elevated but not
technical language.
5. Diction Several instances of rewording
soften the tone of the Laghi letter,
as compared with the Ratzinger
letter. The word choices are also
less formal and technical. The word
“renewal” gets notably heavy use.
One example of rewording
softening the tone is Laghi´s use of
“concerns” in the place of
“problems.” Another is Laghi´s
choice to address Hunthausen as
“Archbishop Hunthausen” rather
than “Your Excellency” (for
Americans, the latter is an unusual
and exceptionally formal usage).
Much of the technical vocabulary
from the Ratzinger letter drops
away altogether (e.g., Latin names
of curial documents) to be replaced
by general, summary descriptors for
Church thought and practice. The
word “renewal,” which has already
cropped up in earlier texts (from
Hunthausen and Ratzinger) and
which appears to be a site of
ideological contestation, appears 5
times here. Ratzinger’s emphasis on
clarity also reappears here.
6. Usage Laghi hides agency by providing no
concrete referent for his term “the
Holy See.” Laghi praises
Hunthausen directly in the second
person, but then switches to indirect
constructions that lack defining
subjects and verbs when he lists the
identified concerns.
“The Holy See considered it
necessary to evaluate certain
allegations”: Who, precisely, was
involved in the decision? Example
from the list of concerns: “Greater
vigilance in upholding the Church’s
teaching, especially with regard to
contraceptive sterilization and
homosexuality.” The nominalization
employed here hides Hunthausen’s
relationship to the problem and the
specific nature of the problem.
7. Substructures of the Text Standard forms of epistolary
greeting and closure, brief history of
visitation process, report of
conclusions (in the form of a
numbered list).
There is a significant change in the
proportionality of parts, in
comparison with the Ratzinger
letter. This letter divides into even
thirds: preliminary comments
(review of visitation process), praise
for Hunthausen, concerns re.
archdiocese. Thus, whereas the
Ratzinger letter read primarily as a
highly detailed description of
problems, this comes across as a
more collaborative and friendly text.
8. Intertextuality Laghi makes explicit reference to
the texts that the Visitator
examined; the Documents of the
Second Vatican Council; and the
Code of Canon Law.  Notably
absent are references to previous
correspondence, to specific  curial
“There are many indications that
you have striven with heart and
mind to be a dedicated bishop of the
Church, eager to implement the
renewal  called for in the
Documents of the Second Vatican
Council.”
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instructions, and to the 1976 and
1979 Archdiocesan questionnaires,
all of which appeared in the
Ratzinger letter. In a hidden way, of
course, the letter also refers directly
to and depends on the Ratzinger
letter.
II. Coping Strategies in
Evidence
Tactics Indications in Document
1. Show deference to the
structural order and mindset
of the Church
Laghi shows deference first by
carrying out his assignment of
composing the new letter. He shows
his respect for Ratzinger’s higher
position in the Church hierarchy by
adhering closely to the
compositional structure that
Ratzinger has established. The new
material that Laghi adds is primarily
praise for Hunthausen. The material
that he subtracts implies
Hunthausen’s criticism of
Hunthausen’s leadership. By
making these changes, Laghi
precludes opportunities for outsiders
to see a bishop (and
intrahierarchical relations) of the
Church put in a less than favorable
light.
Note that Laghi himself does not
“close” the visitation (as Ratzinger
does) but he “informs” Hunthausen
of its closure, thus signalling that,
within the hierarchy it is not his
place to make this decision.
Another example of deference to
hierarchical structure: “It was the
Visitator’s role to speak to you as a
brother bishop… to obtain
necessary facts and to analyze them
for the Holy See.” Example of
respecting Hunthausen’s office and
presenting Church intrahierarchical
relations positively: “The Church is
grateful for what you have
accomplished and I am confident
that you will be able to address
effectively the concerns expressed
in this letter.”
2. Associate one’s own efforts
with the best interest of the
Church
Near the end of the letter, Laghi
allows himself to speak on behalf of
“the Church.”
“The Church is grateful for what
you have accomplished and I am
confident that you will be able to
address effectively the concerns
expressed in this letter.”
3. Minimize the appearance of
conflict
The letter as a whole, by its very
existence and by the way it re-
presents the contents of the
Ratzinger letter, provides strong
evidence of the Holy See’s desire to
minimize the appearance of conflict.
Ratzinger’s more critical letter is
replaced by a much milder version
which can be distributed publicly.
Added paragraph of praise (not
appearing in Ratzinger letter): “You
have given much time to fostering
the morale of your priests and
religious, meeting with them and
encouraging them to participate in
the renewal of the Church…. Your
own special skills as a homilist and
speaker have played a significant
role toward that renewal.”
4. Show fraternity This is more strongly in evidence
than in the Ratzinger letter. Laghi
describes Hickey’s involvement as
an act of “fraternal assistance and
support,” a phrase that does not
appear in the Ratzinger letter. Laghi
also praises Hunthausen for his
loyalty and cooperation and offers
his own future assistance.
In contrast with the Ratzinger letter,
which praised Hunthausen for his
“kindness and patience” during the
visitation, Laghi speaks of his
“loyalty and cooperation.” Laghi
then says, “You can rely on my
assistance and support.” In
Ratzinger’s letter he mentions only
the assistance he and his
congregation have offered up to this
point (“In bringing all the above
points to your attention, it has been
our purpose to assist you as
effectively as possible…”).
Ratzinger makes no explicit offer of
future assistance.
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5. Practice courtesy Many politeness tactics are repeated
from the Ratzinger letter (especially
the indirect language which avoids
blaming Hunthausen outright for the
problematic conditions in his
archdiocese).  What is new is the
omission of the detailed description
of problems and the increased
amount of praise.
What were “problems” in the
Ratzinger letter become “concerns”
here.
6. Employ secrecy Laghi hides the same things that the
Ratzinger letter does (Who does
“the Holy See” refer to exactly?
What was in the visitation report?)
and more (the involvement of the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith, the existence of the Ratzinger
letter and the specific contents of
the letter).
Compare this sentence from the
Laghi letter – “Greater vigilance in
upholding the Church’s teaching,
especially with regard to…
homosexuality” – with the
following from Ratzinger: “The
Archdiocese should withdraw all
support from any group which does
not unequivocally accept the
teaching of the Magisterium
concerning the intrinsic evil of
homosexual activity.” Laghi keeps
inflammatory language from public
view.
7. Recruit allies Though the letter is addressed to
Hunthausen, it shows clear evidence
of being written for a more general
readership, with fellow bishops
being likely consumers.
Technical terms and references to
congregational documents
disappear: they are not inviting or of
interest to the general public. The
removal of critical passages and
addition of laudatory passages
suggests that Laghi wants not to
offend Hunthausen supporters and
fellow bishops.
8. Argue persuasively Ambiguous. The organization and
content are mostly taken over from
Ratzinger. Laghi is more concerned
to placate Hunthausen than
persuade him.
Placation: See the added passages of
praise, e.g., “You have given much
time to fostering the morale of your
priests and religious…”
9. Assert personal identity NA. Laghi’s self-presentation is
warmer and more prominent than
what we find in the Ratzinger letter,
but his personal identity is only
minimally revealed.
Warmer tone to self-presentation:
“Even as I offer these observations,
I am aware of your continuous
efforts to promote genuine growth
and renewal…”
III. Overall Coping Strategy Explanation Indications in Document
a. Yielding By ordering the production and
distribution of this letter, the
Vatican gives in to Hunthausen’s
request to have something he can
make public regarding the outcome
of the visitation. It is only a partial
concession because Hunthausen had
asked to make the Ratzinger letter
public. This amounts to a notable
but not dramatic concession of the
center party to the periphery party.
The document itself (its availability
for distribution) is the indication.
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Observable Strategies: Intervening Developments, C. (November 1985-September 1986)
Strategies Tactics Objectives
Center 1. Show deference
to the structural
order and mindset
of the Church
2. Associate one’s
own efforts with the
best interest of the
Church
3. Minimize the
appearance of
conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert personal
identity
1. a. center applies own powers of appointment
and governance
2. a. Pope’s letter installing Wuerl speaks of
good of Church
3. a. Holy See keeps exchanges regarding
special powers hidden
4. a. Pope, Wuerl and Hunthausen pose for
picture together in Rome; b. they also meet
privately; c. Pope’s letter installing Wuerl
speaks of brother bishops, unity
5. a. Pope’s letter is gracious
6. a. Vatican does not disclose intention for
Wuerl to have special faculties
7. NA (no evidence)
8. Ambiguous. Though textual evidence is
lacking, it is apparent that the pronuncio
attempted to persuade Hunthausen to accept
bishop with special powers
9. NA (no evidence)
Transfer power from
Hunthausen to Wuerl
without raising
further controversy.
Periphery 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize
conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert identity
1. a. Hunthausen thanks pro-nuncio and Holy
See publicly for having supported his ministry;
b. Hunthausen expresses gratitude and joy for
Wuerl appointment; c. praises Wuerl
2. a. Hunthausen says he accepts presentation of
concerns in spirit in which they were offered
4. a. Hunthausen says concerns were presented
to him in a “fraternal and constructive spirit”
5. a. Hunthausen thanks Laghi for letter and
thanks Laghi and Holy See for support
6. a. Hunthausen does not disclose existence of
Ratzinger letter when releasing Laghi letter; b.
Hunthausen does not mention intention for
Wuerl to have unusual degree of oversight; c.
[Sign of resistance] Hunthausen reads
Ratzinger letter to priests of the Archdiocese
7. NA (no evidence)
8. a. Hunthausen assesses contents of letter
(noting concerns and affirmations); b. defends
self, saying he has already taken action; c.
pledges to deal with all concerns; d. calls for
cooperation
9. a. Hunthausen admits limitations; b. makes
personal appeal for support
Maintain appearance
of cooperation with
Rome.
Surrender as little
power as possible to
Wuerl.
Third 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize
1. a. Wuerl expresses joy at appointment; b.
Wuerl praises Hunthausen and Seattle
Archdiocese; c. Wuerl thanks Holy Father
2. a. Wuerl uses imagery of service in Christ’s
vineyard
3. a. Wuerl does not mention visitation
Wuerl: Present self as
humble servant of
Church.
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conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert identity
4. a. Wuerl speaks of serving “distinguished
archbishop”
5. a. Wuerl responds enthusiastically and
gratefully to news of his appointment
6. a. Wuerl does not acknowledge special nature
of his assignment
7. NA (no evidence)
8. Ambiguous. a. Wuerl argues with
Hunthausen about faculties he is supposed to
have.
9. Ambiguous: Wuerl speaks in first person but
in conventionally self-effacing way.
Analytic Summary, Document 3 (9.3.86 Hunthausen Press Statement Announcing
Wuerl’s Special Faculties):
Overview Indications in Document
I. Analysis of Text
Construction
1. Production Hunthausen is the principal.
Hunthausen’s vicar general, Fr.
Michael G. Ryan was probably the
author, and Hunthausen’s secretary,
Marilyn Maddeford, was probably
the animator. The text was produced
and released to the press in Seattle.
Hunthausen releases the document
to the press in his own name and
writes in the first person. (Fr. Ryan
indicated in a private interview that
he typically wrote Hunthausen’s
statements and that Ms. Maddeford
normally prepared the typed
version. After producing a first
draft, Ryan would give the text to
Hunthausen, who might choose to
solicit input from other advisers as
well.)
2. Distribution Normally, a final draft press release
was passed on from Hunthausen /
Ryan to Archdiocesan Public
Affairs Director Russ Scearce, who
would then share it with the press.
Archdiocesan statements were also
normally published in The Progress.
(The Progress editor at the time was
Bill Dodds.)
In this case, the statement was
released to the press by the
archdiocesan public affairs office.
This statement was not published in
The Progress. Instead, Hunthausen
published a similar but more
detailed statement there. Various
newspapers reprinted the full text of
the statement as did Origins
(9.18.86).
3. Consumption The target audience that is
mentioned are Hunthausen’s “close
collaborators” in archdiocesan
ministry and administration, but
obviously the text was distributed to
a much wider audience than this.
Consumption of the statement took
place in various formats including
those of: the original news release,
newspaper articles, radio and TV
broadcast reports, later magazine
and journal versions. Notably,
accompanying the statement in
many forms of distribution was a
“Chronology of Events Related to
Origins published both the first
statement and the accompanying
chronology from Seattle under the
heading, ‘Archbishop Hunthausen
Statement: Authority of Seattle’s
Auxiliary Bishop.” In The Progress
(9.11.86), a subsequent more
detailed version of the original
statement appears addressed to
“Dear Friends in Christ,” and is
accompanied by the Seattle
chronology.
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Apostolic Visitation and
Appointment of Auxiliary Bishop
Donald W. Wuerl…” issued by the
archdiocesan public affairs office. It
is likely that reading this
supplementary document would
have colored one’s reading of the
Hunthausen statement (though how
exactly it would have influenced
this reading is hard to say).
4. Text Type Press announcement. Chronological
narrative.
No explicit addressee is indicated,
which is common for a press
release, but Hunthausen does
express a general need to make this
news known, and in particular to his
collaborators in ministry and
administration. Hunthausen states
that earlier he did not feel a full
public acknowledgment of Wuerl’s
faculties was called for, but now he
felt the need to “share these matters
with my close collaborators in the
ministry and administration of the
archdiocese.” Chronological
narrative: Hunthausen tells the story
of his understanding of Wuerl’s role
in Seattle, from the fall of 1985 to
September of 1986.
5. Diction Hunthausen repeatedly refers to
“the Holy See” but does not say
whom he means with this term.
Hunthausen also suggests the
inadequacy of the word “assist” to
describe Wuerl’s role in Seattle:
Wuerl is obviously in place to do
more than assist. Hunthausen’s
diction is nonconfrontational. He
presents himself as one who
passively receives “understanding”
and “clarification.”
There are four uses of “the Holy
See.” Hunthausen chooses the
pronoun “it” to refer to this
antecedent, which draws out the
sense that the Holy See is some sort
of faceless, impersonal entity.
“Assist” brings an echo of both the
Ratzinger and Laghi visitation
findings letters, both of which
emphasized the Vatican’s desire to
provide Hunthausen with assistance.
“Once I received this clarification,
I… took steps to carry out the
wishes of the Holy See.”
6. Usage Hunthausen writes in the first
person. Apart from announcing
Wuerl’s faculties, this also offers a
self-presentation (and justification)
of Hunthausen’s actions thus far.
Hunthausen’s usage also hides (or
reveals that he does not know)
aspects of process insofar as the
Holy See is involved.
Six of the nine sentences contain a
first-person pronoun. “…I did not
understand the nature and extent of
Bishop Wuerl’s role.” Process
involving the Holy See: “After
considerable discussion with the
Holy See, it was confirmed that it
was the understanding of the Holy
See…”
7. Substructures of the Text There is a fact (Wuerl’s possession
of powers) presented in the middle
of a story (how we got to this point
from the time of Wuerl’s
appointment).
The fact: Wuerl has “complete and
final decision-making power” in the
designated areas. The story: There
was a discussion; Hunthausen
misunderstood; now he understands.
8. Intertextuality The only document explicitly
named is a July 1, 1986 letter which
confirmed that Hunthausen was to
delegate final-decision making
“It was subsequently confirmed to
me in a letter dated July 1, 1986.”
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power in the five areas to Wuerl. A
more oblique reference to other
texts is Hunthausen’s mention of
speculation about Wuerl’s role
which had taken place “in printed
form.” His mention of the formal
conclusion of the visitation brings to
mind the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter.
II. Coping Strategies in
Evidence
Tactics Indications in Document
1. Show deference to the
structural order and mindset
of the Church
Hunthausen adopts a tone of humble
submission and acceptance of his
subordinate position within the
hierarchy. Hunthausen does not
contest the legitimacy of the
process.
Submission: “Once I received this
clarification, I… took steps to carry
out the wishes of the Holy See.”
2. Associate one’s own efforts
with the best interest of the
Church
Hunthausen indicates that his
silence regarding Wuerl’s role was
precipitated by a concern for the
successfulness of Wuerl’s ministry.
Hunthausen’s concluding sentence
also suggests that the present
disclosure is undertaken for the
success of his own ministry and that
of his collaborators.
“assuring Wuerl of the best possible
climate for beginning this ministry
among us…”
“I… also arrived at the conclusion
that it was important for me to share
these matters with my close
collaborators in the ministry…”
3. Minimize the appearance of
conflict
Ambiguous. Hunthausen expresses
no anger or disappointment here
concerning the delegation of
faculties to Wuerl. Hunthausen also
admits that he had not made his
earlier understanding of Wuerl’s
special responsibility known out of
a desire to minimize friction in the
transition. On the other hand, by
making this announcement, he
brings the conflict into the open.
“The importance of making Bishop
Wuerl’s transition to the
archdiocese as smooth as possible
and of assuring him of the best
possible climate for beginning this
ministry among us seemed to
outweigh any possible good that
might have been realized by giving
a full public acknowledgment…”
4. Show fraternity Ambiguous. Hunthausen provides
an example of collegial (possibly
fraternal) decision making. His
expressed desire to have given
Wuerl a smooth start in Seattle can
be considered and act of fraternity.
Decision making: “Bishop Wuerl
and I, along with the apostolic pro-
nuncio, judged it best to make no
public announcement…” Smooth
start: “The importance of making
Bishop Wuerl’s transition… as
smooth as possible…”
5. Practice courtesy Ambiguous. The usual, exaggerated
forms of courtesy are absent, but
Hunthausen offers no criticism of
the other parties or the process.
NA.
6. Employ secrecy Hunthausen indicates that he
practiced secrecy himself in regard
to Wuerl’s role. He also uses the
term “the Holy See” to avoid
naming specific agents. But here
Hunthausen also resists secrecy by
bringing the business into the open.
“at the time of his appointment both
Bishop Wuerl and I, along with the
apostolic pro-nuncio, judged it best
to make no public announcement to
that effect…”
“After considerable discussion with
the Holy See, it was confirmed that
it was the understanding of the Holy
See…”
7. Recruit allies By revealing his own loss of power,
Hunthausen makes an implicit plea
for help.
“Once I received this clarification,
I… arrived at the conclusion that it
was important for me to share these
matters…”
392
8. Argue persuasively Hunthausen offers a brief
explanation and justification for his
actions.
“The importance of making Bishop
Wuerl’s transition… as smooth as
possible… seemed to outweigh any
possible good that might have been
realized by giving a full public
acknowledgment.
9. Assert personal identity NA. Though Hunthausen gives his
account in the first person, he seems
mostly concerned to pass on the
basic information (and not to
highlight aspects of his own identity
for the sake of advantage)
NA.
III. Overall Coping Strategy Explanation Indications in Document
a. Contending This is a subtle form of contending.
Hunthausen makes a show of
humbly submitting while
undertaking an act sure to displease
the Vatican (forcing the discussion
into the open).
“Once I received this clarification, I
not only took steps to carry out the
wishes of the Holy See, but also
arrived at the conclusion that it was
important for me to share these
matters…”
Observable Strategies: Intervening Developments, D. (September-October 1986)
Strategies Tactics Objectives
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Center 1. Show
deference to the
structural order
and mindset of
the Church
2. Associate
one’s own efforts
with the best
interest of the
Church
3. Minimize the
appearance of
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert
personal identity
1. a. Laghi works through structure of
episcopal conference to release his chronology
2. a. Laghi, in press comments, speaks of need
to keep Church energies in a straight line
3. a. Laghi discussions with NCCB and
Hunthausen are held in private; b. Vatican
officials request endorsement for chronology,
NCCB distribution, in private;
4. a. Laghi, Holy See work in cooperation with
NCCB; b. Laghi shows Hunthausen the
chronology before he releases it; c. see the
complicated sequence leading to NCCB release
of the Vatican chronology: Laghi calls Rome;
Laghi calls Bernardin; Bernardin calls Malone;
Malone calls Laghi; Malone calls 2nd executive
committee meeting
5. a. Laghi shows Hunthausen the chronology
before releasing it publicly
6. a. Holy See conducts its negotiations with
NCCB and with Hunthausen re. chronology  in
secret; b. [Leak] Vatican official Costalunga
says taking power from Hunthausen was
disciplinary and not necessarily permanent; c.
[Leak] Vatican spokesman Navarro-Valls says
Vatican action was regular in accord with
canon law and perhaps reversible
7. a. NCCB seeks to bring NCCB (via its
executive committee) on board as an ally; b.
Laghi calls on Bernardin after failing to gain
NCCB endorsement for chronology
8. a. Laghi argues for NCCB endorsement of
Chronology
9. NA (no evidence)
To formulate a public
response to the outcry
that arose in conjunction
with Hunthausen’s
announcement of Wuerl’s
faculties.
Periphery 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Personal
identity
1. a. Hunthausen (& Wuerl) interview is highly
respectful of Church; b. so too are
Hunthausen’s letters to local Catholics (“I feel
honored and deeply privileged to be able to
serve this Church”)
2. a. Hunthausen, in interview, says he acted in
good faith; b. in letter to Catholics, Hunthausen
says he is “firmly committed” to witnessing to
the Gospel
3. Resist: Though Hunthausen consistently
employs measured language when doing so, he
makes a clear and concerted effort to bring the
conflict issues (and his view thereof) into the
open via various statements.
4. a. Hunthausen emphasizes his solidarity with
Wuerl; b. Hunthausen stresses that he acted in
good faith (i.e., not intentionally against
Rome’s wishes); c. Hunthausen participates in
NCCB negotiations re. Vatican chronology
5. a. Hunthausen interview shows courtesy
toward Wuerl and Rome; b. Hunthausen letters
show courtesy toward Wuerl and Rome
6. a. Hunthausen engages in secret negotiations
re. release of Vatican chronology; b.
Hunthausen asks Laghi not to release Vatican
chronology; c. Sign of resistance:
Hunthausen’s PR campaign is a concerted
To show that Hunthausen
has acted in good faith
and to shore up his
personal support within
the Seattle Archdiocese.
394
effort to tell his side of the story and to reveal
past developments that put his past and current
decisions in a favorable light
7. a. Hunthausen’s interview explains his
position and answer questions for people of his
own archdiocese (shoring up support); b.
Hunthausen’s letters to local Catholics explain
his position and explicitly ask for help (“I
cannot do it alone”); c. Hunthausen’s
negotiations with NCCB almost certainly
involve a search for allies
8. a. Hunthausen interview offers persuasive
argumentation; b. so too do his letters to local
Catholics; c. see also the behind-the-scenes
NCCB negotiations, where Hunthausen gave
reasons to Laghi not to release his chronology
(would distract NCCB; would cause further
division)
9. a. Strong assertions of personal identity by
Hunthausen appear in the interview; b. and in
the letters to local Catholics also (“I feel it is
important for me to tell you that…”).
Third 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Personal
identity
1. a. Wuerl in interview refuses to call the
visitation process “unjust;” b. Wuerl, in his
letter to priests, quotes Vatican’s praise of
Hunthausen’s leadership; c. Wuerl considers
visit / consultation in Rome; d. NCCB exec.
committee abides by Vatican request for
conference to release Vatican chronology; e.
Cardinal Bernardin restarts NCCB discussion
at Laghi request.
2. a. Wuerl in interview: “I think it’s important
for the good of the church… to always say this
is not an injustice”
3. a. Wuerl, in interview, stresses the existing
unity in the Church and says that while a
painful situation has developed, it is not the
product of an unjust process (i.e., he refuses to
assign blame); b. Wuerl in his letter to priests:
“It is clear to me that the person of the
archbishop and the sincerity of his ministry
were never challenged, much less attacked;” c.
[Counterpoint] Wuerl acknowledges the
dispute that took place among the priests; d.
Statements of individual bishops (Walsh,
Power, Law) are tight-lipped about the
conflict; e. NCCB negotiations, struggles take
place in secret
4. a. Wuerl refuses to criticize Hunthausen or
Vatican; b. NCCB exec. committee consults
with Laghi and with Hunthausen; c. Cardinal
Bernardin intervenes with NCCB exec.
committee at request of Laghi
5. a. Wuerl, in his letter to priests, cites
Vatican’s praise of Hunthausen
6. a. NCCB executive committee conducts
discussion of release of Vatican chronology in
secret
7.  a. Much lobbying takes place in NCCB
executive commitment regarding endorsement
Wuerl: To defend the
Vatican against attack
while showing loyalty to
Hunthausen.
NCCB Executive
Committee: To respond
to the Vatican’s wishes
without taking a stand
against Hunthausen.
Individual bishop
commentators: To
respond to questions
about the affair and
perhaps signal a view
without committing
oneself to a specific
position.
395
/ release of Vatican chronology.
8. Ambiguous. Possible evidence for: Wuerl
argues against the idea that the visitation was
an unjust process; b. the NCCB exec.
committee argues for the need to maintain
neutrality
9. a. Wuerl steps forward by himself to
challenge priests who would call the visitation
unjust (Wuerl’s letter to priests)
Analytic Summary, Document 4 (The Vatican Chronology, 10.24.86)
Overview Indications in Document
I. Analysis of Text
Construction
1. Production The Holy See is the principal; Laghi
is the author. The influence of
others on the text (Ratzinger?
Gantin?) is unknown. The document
was produced (probably in
Washington, D.C.) amid the
controversy which followed
Hunthausen’s announcement of
Wuerl’s faculties.
A signal of the impetus leading to
production: “Regretfully, the
surprise announcement made by
Archbishop Hunthausen after
granting the faculties was
interpreted as portraying this whole
process as a one-sided affair.”
2. Distribution Laghi prepared the document and
released it, with an authorization
from Rome, for distribution to the
U.S. bishops and the press through
then NCCB President James
Malone (Bishop of Youngstown,
Ohio). A neutrally-phrased Malone
cover letter accompanied the letter’s
distribution. (The 10.31.86 National
Catholic Reporter offers a detailed
discussion of the behind-the-scenes
negotiations regarding the
chronology’s distribution. Many
persons gave input in this matter
including Hunthausen, Ratzinger,
Gantin and members of the NCCB
executive committee.) Hunthausen
asked Laghi not to publish the
Chronology.
The report, dated 10.24.86,
appeared in newspapers on 10.28. It
appeared in the 10.30 issue of The
Progress and in the 10.31 issue of
the National Catholic Reporter.
Hunthausen, in his response to the
Chronology: “after I first read the
Chronology, I asked Archbishop
Laghi not to publish it because I felt
it would raise more questions than it
could possibly hope to answer…”
3. Consumption The NCCB executive committee
and Hunthausen were able to
preview the document before its
distribution to the NCCB. Cardinals
Ratzinger and Gantin in Rome also
had the opportunity to preview the
document. Thereafter the American
bishops were the next known
consumers, followed immediately
by members of the press and then,
thereafter (via newspapers and other
publications) the public. The
primary intended consumers appear
to be the American bishops, given
The text is constructed with
multiple layers of units and sub-
units, most of which are assigned
numbers or letters. This
construction makes the text easily
consumable for readers, gives the
impression of rationality, and allows
easy citation of the various points in
future discussions.
396
the direct distribution to them and
the structuring of arguments toward
winning support for the Vatican
position and the public at large
(note the limited use of technical
language).
4. Text Type A chronology. This is a much more
argumentative chronology than the
one issued by the Seattle
Archdiocese accompanying
Hunthausen’s announcement of
Wuerl’s possession of faculties.
The title: “A Chronology of Recent
Events in the Archdiocese of
Seattle.” The narrative moves
forward in time from 1978, with
date indications along the way, up
to the date of the issuance of the
chronology itself (October 24,
1986).
5. Diction Though much of the diction is
measured (polite, euphemistic), we
see significant breaks from
graciousness. Laghi contests a word
choice which he attributes to
Hunthausen (the granting of
faculties were “mandated” by
Rome) – inaccurately, as it turns
out, since Hunthausen did not use
the term in his press announcement.
Laghi drops the euphemism
“visitation” in favor of
“investigation” at one point.
Hunthausen’s “firmness” as leader
of the archdiocese is called in into
question, as is adequacy of his
response to Vatican concerns.
“[Hunthausen] granted the faculties
and made the announcement that
they were mandated by Rome. In
fact, a more precise description
would have been that this was the
agreement reached by Archbishop
Hunthausen and the Holy See…”
6. Usage Gives appearance of objectivity
(almost entirely in third person,
excludes self-references from
Laghi: at one point Laghi refers to
himself in the third person as “the
pronuncio.”). No center party
participants are named, apart from
the visitator, Hickey. There are
numerous agentless, passive-voice
constructions. Hunthausen’s
opposition is a bureaucratic fog
(“The Holy See”).
“Substantiated complaints
nevertheless continued. But, the
decision to inquire further was
primarily provoked by the
documented responses of the
archbishop himself.”
“It should be stressed that at no time
did the Holy See pursue with
Archbishop Hunthausen the
criticisms it received on
controversial issues, e.g., nuclear
weapons and the payment of taxes.”
7. Substructures of the Text The chronology is divided into four
sections, each of which stands in
time and topical relation to the
apostolic visitation. These
subdivisions make the case that the
visitation was undertaken for good
reason, was conducted thoroughly
and with the cooperation of
Hunthausen himself, and has fairly
resulted in the current outcomes.
The numbered section titles:
1) Decision for an Apostolic
Visitation of Seattle.
2) Preparation of the Apostolic
Visitation.
3) The Visitation.
4) The Decisions after the
Visitation.
8. Intertextuality It is interesting that the Laghi issues
a chronology just seven weeks after
Seattle issued its own, but the two
are functionally dissimilar. The
Seattle chronology appears to be
little more than a fact sheet for the
press, whereas the Vatican
chronology is a complex piece of
argumentation. Nonetheless, one
can imagine that Laghi’s choice of
A sample of explicit references to
other texts contained within the
Vatican chronology:
“the Holy See sought the assistance
of the Archbishop of Seattle in
responding to the high volume of
complaints that were sent to Rome
by priests, Religious and faithful…”
“The Holy See’s interest in this
matter reflected its responsibility for
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text type was prompted by the prior
example. This text makes explicit
reference to multiple other texts.
Almost always the references to
other texts are part of a strategy of
justification of the Vatican’s
handling of the affair. Thus, there
are references to complaints sent to
Rome; to troubling “documented
responses” of the archbishop; to the
documentation that served as
evidence on which the visitation
conclusions were based; to the
archbishop’s interview text, which
he “reviewed and signed” (attesting
to its accuracy); to a 9.11.58 from
Hunthausen to the pro-nuncio which
acknowledged the Vatican doubts
about Hunthausen’s leadership; and
to other correspondence and
documentation. Across the board
the intertextual references work to
undermine Hunthausen’s position.
References to official Church
documents (Vatican II’s
“Constitution on the Church” – i.e.,
Lumen Gentium; blanket references
to directives of the Holy See and
NCCB, and the “teachings of the
Magisterium;” the Code of Canon
Law) serve the same purpose.
the well-being of the Universal
Church, as outlined in the
“Constitution on the Church” of the
Second Vatican Council.
“the decision to inquire further was
primarily provoked by the
documented responses of the
archbishop himself…”
“Many of those who had lodged
complaints against Archbishop
Hunthausen had sent him copies of
their letters to the Holy See…”
“Information was gathered from the
following sources: 1) public
documents such as archdiocesan
policy statements… 2) The
testimony given by those on the list
prepared in advance… 3) The
testimony of the archbishop himself,
a written copy of which he reviewed
and signed…”
“The Code of Canon Law (canon
403.2) does contemplate cases when
the Holy See grants special
faculties…”
II. Coping Strategies in
Evidence
Tactics Indications in Document
1. Show deference to the
structural order and mindset
of the Church
Laghi refers to teaching of Vatican
II. He refers to Vatican’s
prerogative to appoint a visitator.
He emphasizes the many steps taken
to consult with and respect the
office of the local bishop. He notes
Church standards that apply to the
pastoral practices in question.  He
calls attention to Holy See’s power
of episcopal appointment. He refers
to Canon Law.
The Vatican II teaching cited is the
“Constitution on the Church”
(Lumen Gentium).
Visitator appointment: “on July 6,
1983, the Most Reverend James A.
Hickey… was named Apostolic
Visitator.”
Consultation / respect: “since 1978,
the Holy See… has corresponded
with Archbishop Hunthausen on
matters…”
Church standards that apply: See the
presentation of the six areas of
concern.
Power of appointment: see extended
discussion in section 4.
Canon Law: reference is to canon
403.2, in section 4.
2. Associate one’s own efforts
with the best interest of the
Church
Laghi makes this point explicitly in
the text.
“The Holy See’s interest in this
matter reflected it responsibility for
the well-being of the Universal
Church.”
“From the beginning the priorities
of the Holy See were two-fold: 1) to
promote the building up of the
church in Seattle in harmony with
the Universal Church and 2) to
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protect the good name of
Archbishop Hunthausen.”
3. Minimize the appearance of
conflict
Resistance. The text brings the
Vatican’s side of the controversy
into the open. The text contains
numerous explicit and implicit
criticisms of Hunthausen’s handling
of the affair and of his leadership
ability.
“Archbishop Hunthausen
understood that the Holy See
considered him lacking the firmness
necessary to govern the
archdiocese”
“For more than six months after the
arrival of Bishop Wuerl, the agreed-
to faculties were not given.”
4. Show fraternity NA (no evidence). NA.
5. Practice courtesy Resistance. Laghi questions
Hunthausen’s firmness as a leader
and his cooperativeness.
“the Holy See considered him
lacking the firmness necessary”
“it was his [Hunthausen’s]
interpretation of the importance of
these matters and the inadequacy of
his response that were the principal
concern”
6. Employ secrecy Though this document brings
information and certain of Laghi’s
views into the open, it also conceals
the identity of those involved in
Rome and keeps secret the great
majority of the contents of previous
discussions between Laghi and
Hunthausen
Laghi begins by telling us that the
conversation between the Apostolic
Nunciature (Delegation) has been
taking place since 1978, but this
brief accounting is the first report
from the nunciature regarding those
exchanges.
Laghi quotes from Hunthausen’s
letter of Sept. 11, 1985, but we have
no idea of the remainder of the
letter’s contents.
7. Recruit allies Laghi’s statement makes a case (to
fellow bishops in particular) that the
Vatican has been thorough and fair
in its dealings with Hunthausen, that
it has legitimate concerns, and that
its current frustrations have much to
result from Hunthausen’s failure to
cooperate fully. Laghi also points
out that “other bishops” were the
ones who suggested the need for a
visitation.
“the Holy See sought the assistance
of the Archbishop of Seattle in
responding to the high volume of
complaints”
“The archbishop agreed that there
were abuses in a number of
cases…”
“Substantial complaints
nevertheless continued…”
After the visitation, “five areas of
concern remained”
“For more than six months… the
agreed-to faculties were not given”
“Regretfully, the surprise
announcement… was interpreted as
portraying this whole process as a
one-sided affair.”
8. Argue persuasively The entire text argues the pro-
nuncio’s position. There is an
appeal to common standards, both
ecclesiastical (Church teaching,
Canon Law) and ethical (fairness,
thoroughness, reasonableness, the
importance of living up to one’s
word, etc.) On the one hand, the text
strives for a feeling of rationality
and objectivity (the first person is
avoided; it moves from “facts” to
analysis to conclusions). On the
other hand, the language at certain
points is passionately critical.
Appeal to standards: The Holy
See’s involvement “reflected its
responsibility for the well-being of
the Universal Church, as outlined in
the Constitution of the Church’”
“It was the firm intention of the
Holy See that any action required
would come only after fully
informing Archbishop Hunthausen
and making every effort to secure
his agreement and support.”
Critical language: “the Holy See
considered him lacking the firmness
necessary to govern the
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archdiocese…”
9. Assert personal identity NA. Laghi downplays his own
identity in this document. It is not
issued in his name and in the
contents of the text he refers to
himself as “the pro-nuncio.”
NA.
III. Overall Coping Strategy Explanation Indications in Document
Contending In response to a wave of negative
publicity, Laghi prepares a
document to tell Rome’s side of the
story. He also attempts to gain an
NCCB endorsement for his version,
an effort that fails.
The criticisms of Hunthausen are
the strongest indications of its
contentious intent. Note, too, that
the document was released against
Hunthausen’s wishes.
Observable Strategies: Intervening Developments, E. (October-November, 1986)
Strategies Tactics Objectives
Center 1. Show
deference to the
structural order
and mindset of
the Church
2. Associate
one’s own efforts
with the best
interest of the
Church
3. Minimize the
appearance of
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert
personal identity
1. a. Pope’s message to NCCB reflects on the
mystery of the Church and the responsibilities of
leadership
2. a. Pope describes own role as a matter of
promoting the universality of the Church,
protecting legitimate variety, guaranteeing
Catholic unity, etc.
3. Ambiguous. a. Laghi’s message to NCCB
does not mention conflict; b. Pope’s message to
NCCB does not mention conflict; but c. Rome
shows a willingness to have the case be debated
in the wider context of the NCCB.
4. a. Pope speaks of ecclesial communion among
bishops, referring to “collegitas effectiva et
affectiva”
5. a. Pope offers no criticism of Hunthausen; b.
Pope addresses American bishops respectfully
6. a. Pope keeps his personal assessment of the
affair hidden, speaking of applicable issues only
in general terms; b. Laghi participates in closed
executive session of NCCB meeting.
7. a. Pope and Laghi appear to be recruiting the
conference as a whole
8. a. Pope’s address offers doctrinal arguments
for his own intervention and the bishops’
responsibility to be loyal
9. NA. Laghi’s assertion of  his own identity
with his comment about his role in bishop
appointments is fairly minor. Mostly he
withdraws from public assertion of his person.
The Pope’s involvement is also impersonal.
To establish symbolic
(territorial) control over
the NCCB meeting and
remind the bishops of
their duty to be loyal to
the Holy See.
Periphery 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize-
conflict
4. Show
1. a. Hunthausen explicitly declares his “respect
for Archbishop Laghi and for the office he
holds” and his “personal loyalty” to the Pope
2. a. Hunthausen: “let us do all we can to
preserve the bond of unity that is ours as faithful
members of the church”
3. Resistance: a. Hunthausen acknowledges the
reality of the conflict and brings discussion of its
issues into the open: “Let us help break the cycle
To profess loyalty to
Rome while offering a
first challenge to the
Vatican chronology.
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fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Personal
identity
of tension that now exists… to rise above any
contentious spirit;” Hunthausen’s mixed feelings
are shown by his argument  for rising above
contentious spirit, coupled with his preparation
of  two contentious statements for distribution to
NCCB.
4. a. Hunthausen refers to his respect for Laghi,
his loyalty to the Holy Father and his intention
to speak to his fellow bishops at their
forthcoming meeting
5. a. Hunthausen refuses to criticize Laghi or
Pope; b. Hunthausen expressly affirms his
bondedness to them
6. a. Hunthausen hides his experience and
feelings in his first response to Vatican
chronology
7. a. Hunthausen prepares texts to persuade
NCCB
8. a. Hunthausen uses complexity argument to
challenge the Vatican chronology (Laghi
oversimplifies: it is all more complex than that)
9. a. Hunthausen speaks in the first person here
but he does not foreground his personality nearly
as much as in some other statements
Third 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize-
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Personal
identity
1. a. Malone shows strong inclination to protect
Church’s favored appearance of unity; b. NCCB
agenda grants speaking time to pro-nuncio, who
offers his own comments and message from
Pope
2. a. Malone speaks of need to address
“developing estrangement” between Church in
the U.S. and the Holy See
3. a. Meeting opening address shows hurry to
resolve the conflict (wants no discussion of
“past” issues); b. NCCB meeting agenda shows
interest in limiting the debate.
4. a. Malone says purpose is “to offer fraternal
support to Archbishop Hunthausen and Bishop
Wuerl” and refers to “the collegial spirit which
unites us with one another and with the Holy
Father”
5. a. Malone shows respect toward Hunthausen
and Holy See
6. a. Malone gives no indication of all the
preliminary conversations that have shaped the
current agenda for the meeting
7. a. NCCB discussion is focused on generating
support for one position or the other.
8. a. Malone points out two sides of center-
periphery Church control question and argues
that the two of necessity go together (“We
cannot exist alone. We are a communio. We are
a church.”)
9. NA (No evidence).
NCCB Executive
Committee: To use
control of bishops’
meeting agenda to
prevent the debate from
becoming too divisive.
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Analytic Summary, Document 5 (Hunthausen’s 11.11.86 Response to Vatican
Chronology)
Overview Indications in Document
I. Analysis of Text
Construction
1. Production Hunthausen is the principal.
Hunthausen’s Vicar General, Fr.
Michael G. Ryan was the author.
Hunthausen secretary Marilyn
Maddeford was (I believe) the
animator.
Hunthausen’s status as principal is
affirmed by his signature at the
bottom of the text, by his use of the
first person, and by the contents,
which are only coherent if read as
the testimony of Hunthausen
himself. Indications of the
involvement in Fr. Ryan and Ms.
Maddeford in the production
process are not self-evident within
the final text products distributed
through the media (unless one is
able to identify particular elements
of Fr. Ryan’s writing style).
2. Distribution Hunthausen prepared a written copy
of the text, which was then
distributed through the NCCB
leadership to all of the bishops
present at the Nov. 1986 NCCB
meeting shortly prior to
Hunthausen’s oral address to the
body. After the two sessions of
debate of his case (Nov. 11 and 12),
Hunthausen’s text was released to
the press (on Nov. 12), along with
the written copy of Hunthausen’s
address to the bishops and the
Malone statement. Further
distribution took place through
various media outlets.
In what is, I presume, an early copy
of the text prepared for distribution
as a press release, one finds the
archdiocesan letterhead, the date
November 11, 1986 and a space for
Hunthausen’s signature (but no
signature) at the bottom. There is a
reference to the fact that this
response was distributed to
Hunthausen’s fellow bishops in
Hunthausen’s NCCB address (see
doc. 6). The NCCB released the text
to the press on 11.12.86. The full
text of Hunthausen’s response to the
Vatican chronology was published
in the 11.13.86 Progress (with a
reproduction of Hunthausen’s
signature) and in the 11.20.86
Origins. Only excerpts from the text
were shared in an 11.12.86 National
Catholic News Service report and in
the 11.13.86 newspaper accounts of
the New York Times, Seattle Times
and Seattle Post-Intelligencer.
3. Consumption Bishops present at the NCCB
meeting consumed the text
simultaneously, reading individually
( facsimiles of) the letter-report that
Hunthausen supplied. Their
interpretation would be influenced
by his oral remarks, which offered a
partisan frame of reference and
influenced by the tension of the
imminent debate. The press got its
first look at the text at the
conclusion of the NCCB debate of
the Hunthausen case and in the
immediate aftermath of hearing
Malone’s statement wrapping up the
Cues for consumption:
Letter format, but the contents show
it to be a formal report and it is
released in a formal, communal
setting. Thus, Hunthausen
apparently wanted to invite a
personal response to a rather serious
matter of official business.
Hunthausen leads with a series of
pre-emptive remarks, which appear
designed to soothe potential points
of irritation ahead of time:
“I hesitate to burden you with
further reading material at this
time…. I want to say, too, that it
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debate. The press’ reading of the
Hunthausen text was likely
influenced by comments from other
bishops about the debates that had
taken place and the presence of the
accompanying texts (the
Hunthausen address, the Malone
statement) which served as a
context (together with the Vatican
chronology). Other consumers were
dependent on second- and third-
hand reports from individuals, and
on newspaper and broadcast news
reports. (And later, magazine
accounts.)
frankly embarrasses me to be
engaging in this form of exchange
of information…. I trust you will
understand, then, that the matters
which I will set forth herein are in
no sense an attack upon his person
[Laghi] or his integrity…” Along
these same lines, Hunthausen says
that he has long been concerned
about the prospect of negative
publicity for the Holy See resulting
from the visitation and subsequent
events.
4. Text Type An open letter that functions
rhetorically as an argumentative
point-by-point response and a
general apologia.
Hunthausen opens the letter with the
greeting, “Your Eminence / Your
Excellency” and he closes it with
the salutation, “Fraternally in
Christ” and his signature. All four
of the internal section titles refer to
the Vatican chronology, indicating
Hunthausen’s concern to respond
directly to the contents of the
chronology (which his own contents
do). As an example of Hunthausen’s
intention to offer an apologia that
goes beyond the chronology itself,
see comments such as: “It was
always my deepest desire and my
strongly expressed wish that,
whatever steps might be taken…
they be taken in a way that would
strengthen and cement our
relationship with the Holy See…”
5. Diction The diction is largely non-technical
and plainspoken, which reflects
Hunthausen’s usual style but also an
interest in reaching a wide audience.
Hunthausen contests certain word
choices of the Vatican chronology
(“mandate;” “insistence;” “surprise
announcement”) as a part of an
attempt to claim the high ground in
the argument. Hunthausen also uses
less guarded language here: thus he
speaks of the Vatican “mounting” a
visitation (echoes mounting an
attack), uses critical terms such as
“misleading” and “disappointing,”
and he straightforwardly uses the
words “tense” and “confusion” to
acknowledge the difficulties of the
conflict situation.
Example of non-technical,
plainspoken language: “I want to
say, too, that it frankly embarrasses
me to be engaging in this form of
exchange of information.”
Contestation of word choices: “I
made no reference to a ‘mandate
from Rome.’” “The Chronology
speaks of my ‘insistence’… A more
accurate statement would have
referred to my earnest desire…”
“The Chronology makes reference
to my ‘surprise announcement’…”
Less-guarded language: “The
Chronology contained some
misleading things…” “a point-by-
point response at that time would
only have escalated an already tense
situation…”
6. Usage Hunthausen’s use of the first person
contributes to his highly personal
style. Active voice gives the text
clarity. Hunthausen is selectively
clear about agency, but there is
significantly more naming of names
First person: “after I first read the
Chronology, I asked Archbishop
Laghi not to publish it…”
Naming: “I expressed this concern
in my earliest correspondence and
in all my conversations with the
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than we have seen previously
(Hickey, Laghi, Ratzinger and “the
Holy Father” are named on one or
more occasions). Shifts between
past and present tense: Hunthausen
describes and criticizes past
developments and declares present
bewilderment, disappointment.
Grammatically, Hunthausen makes
the Chronology the antagonist. He
challenges persons only indirectly.
Holy See, with Cardinal Ratzinger,
Archbishop Laghi, Archbishop
Hickey, and even with the Holy
Father himself.”
Obscured agency: “response I
provided to inquiries made by the
Holy See… were viewed as
unsatisfactory…”
Use of tense: “So, for anyone to
review that correspondence now
and to suggest that it was the cause
of the Visitation troubles me
greatly.”
Chronology as antagonist: “As far
as the Chronology itself is
concerned,… it either attempts to do
too much… or to do too little…”
7. Substructures of the Text The text has the ordinary
subdivisions of a letter (address /
greeting; body; conclusion /
salutation). It also contains four
easily distinguishable topical
sections, each of which has a
numbered title referring to a
particular problem with the Vatican
chronology. Prior to the first
numbered section, one finds a rather
personal preamble addressed
directly to the bishops themselves in
the second person.
Greeting: “Your Eminence / Your
Excellency:”
Titles of topical sections: 1) The
Chronology contains some
misleading things; 2) The
Chronology contained some new
learnings; 3) The Chronology
contained some disappointing
things; 4) The Chronology also
contains some very real
inaccuracies.
Sample from personal preamble: “I
hesitate to burden you with further
reading material at this time. I do so
only because I think the record
demands it…”
8. Intertextuality In an immediate sense, the reason to
be for this text is to respond to
another, the Vatican chronology.
Throughout this letter, Hunthausen
cites and cross-examines Laghi’s
chronology. Other explicit
references to other texts focus on
correspondence and public
statements pertinent to the conflict
handling itself – not to official
Church documents, teachings, laws,
etc.
Opening reference to Chronology:
“I have decided it will be best for
me to convey to you in printed form
my response to the “Chronology of
Recent Events in the Archdiocese of
Seattle…”
Other texts cited: general references
to correspondence with the Holy
See; Hunthausen’s letter to Laghi,
dated Dec. 2, 1985; one mention of
the Code of Canon Law; the news
release announcing the visitation;
Hunthausen’s announcement of
Wuerl’s possession of faculties;
Hunthausen’s address to the NCCB.
II. Coping Strategies in
Evidence
Tactics Indications in Document
1. Show deference to the
structural order and mindset
of the Church
 Hunthausen professes his respect
for the pro-nuncio. Hunthausen
apologizes to the NCCB for
burdening them. He says he is
embarrassed to be engaging in the
present exchange. He expresses his
loyalty to the Holy See and his
concern for its public appearance.
Respect: “My respect for
Archbishop Laghi and the position
that is his…”
Apology: “I hesitate to burden you
with further reading material at this
time…”
Embarrassment: “it frankly
embarrasses me to be engaging in
this form of exchange of
information”
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“I feared it would ultimately…
reflect unfavorably on the Holy
See”
2. Associate one’s own efforts
with the best interest of the
Church
Hunthausen explicitly states his
concern for the Church.
“It was always my deepest desire…
[that the steps taken would]
strengthen and cement our
relationship with the Holy See”
3. Minimize the appearance of
conflict
Resistance. Hunthausen provides
this argumentation not only to the
bishops, but also to the press.
“The record will show… that, in the
then unlikely event that I would
agree to accept the special faculties
arrangement… I would have no
choice but to make this matter
known…”
4. Show fraternity Hunthausen takes his case directly
to his fellow American bishops. He
asks for their support and invites a
review by the members of the
Conference.
“I would certainly welcome some
sort of review of all these matters
should that be the wish of the
members of the Conference.”
5. Practice courtesy Ambiguous. Hunthausen’s
language avoids personalizing the
attack (he attacks the chronology
and not Laghi) and he professes to
want to save face for the Holy See,
but his language is also highly
critical.
Re. Laghi: “the matters… herein are
in no sense an attack on his person
or integrity…”
But Hunthausen says the
chronology contains “misleading
things… disappointing things…
inaccuracies”
6. Employ secrecy Hunthausen keeps much
information from previous
exchanges secret, but he also resists
the use of secrecy by taking his case
to the bishops and the public.
“The Chronology speaks of my
‘insistence’ that a public
announcement be made at the time
the Apostolic Visitation was
undertaken. A more accurate
statement would have referred to
my earnest desire… that, if the
Visitation did indeed have to take
place, I would like it to do so in as
open and positive and constructive a
spirit as possible”
7. Recruit allies Hunthausen invites his fellow
bishops and the public to understand
his predicament and take up his
cause.
“To the best of my ability, I have
reflected on the contents of the
Chronology and presented my
understanding of events. Since there
seems to be such a divergence of
opinion… I would certainly
welcome some sort of review of all
these matters should that be the
wish of the members of the
Conference.”
8. Argue persuasively Hunthausen attacks the contents of
the chronology on the grounds that
some things were misleading, some
were new to him, some things were
disappointing and some were
inaccurate.
“As far as the Chronology itself is
concerned, let me say that I believe
it either attempts to do too much
(i.e., to tell the whole story in too
brief a space) or too do too little (by
that I mean that it doesn’t really get
to some of the deep, underlying
problems which are at stake here).
9. Assert personal identity This is a highly personal plea.
Hunthausen tells his story in terms
of his own recollections and
experience, in stark contrast with
the impersonal approach of the
Vatican chronology.
“In the first place, it is probably
important for you to know that, after
I first read the Chronology, I asked
Archbishop Laghi not to publish it
because I felt it would raise more
questions than it could possibly
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hope to answer.”
III. Overall Coping Strategy Explanation Indications in Document
Contending Hunthausen aggressively pursues
the support of his fellow bishops
and of the public.
Hunthausen’s profession of being
embarrassed to be involved in such
an exchange of information is a
good indicator of this document’s
likelihood to fuel controversy.
Analytic Summary, Document 6 (Hunthausen’s 11.11.86 Address to the NCCB)
Overview Indications in Document
I. Analysis of Text
Construction
1. Production Hunthausen is the principal, Fr.
Michael G. Ryan the ghost writer
and the animator was likely
Hunthausen’s secretary Ms. Marilyn
Maddeford. Hunthausen was
offered the opportunity to address
the US bishops, but later learned
that he would only have a few
minutes for oral remarks. Thus this
text reads as if it were meant to be
read aloud, but in fact it was
consumed in a collective silent
reading. This text was produced in
conjunction with another text,
Hunthausen’s response to the
Vatican chronology.
The intent to read the speech aloud
is indicated by the opening words:
“Once before I had the privilege of
addressing this assembly… Today I
come before you again…”
Reference to the Vatican
Chronology: “You have already
received in printed form my
somewhat detailed response to the
Chronology released by the
Apostolic Nunciature…. I will
refrain from making any further
commentary on the Chronology
itself and concentrate, rather, on
four main areas…”
2. Distribution Hunthausen distributed photocopies
of this text, with the cooperation of
the NCCB leadership, to his fellow
bishops during the closed executive
session of the NCCB (Nov. 11). The
next day the text was released to the
press along with Hunthausen’s
response to the Vatican chronology
and the Malone statement on behalf
of the conference.
The distribution pattern is
essentially the same as that of
Hunthausen’s response to the
Vatican chronology (see doc. 5,
above), since the two were
distributed together.
3. Consumption The U.S. bishops were the first
persons, apart from people close to
Hunthausen himself, who had the
opportunity to read the document.
Though the document was written
to be read aloud, the bishops
consumed it by reading silently
during a limited amount of time set
aside for this at the beginning of the
closed executive session. They read
this document side-by-side with
Hunthausen’s response to the
Vatican chronology and an early
draft of the Malone statement that
would be finalized and released the
next day. The press first read it
immediately after the press
conference where Malone read his
(final draft) statement for television
Archbishop Hurley of Anchorage
commented (The Progress,
11.20.86) that Hunthausen’s
“respectful” way of communicating
his views to the NCCB “was much
appreciated by the bishops.” Hurley
reported that there was loud
applause after Hunthausen spoke,
but not a standing ovation. “That
reflected the delicacy we all felt in
the situation,” he said.
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cameras. (The Malone statement
was greeted with rousing applause
from the bishops.)
4. Text Type An orational apologia. This is a
formal, self-justifying speech that
adopts a rather familiar, personal
tone. The emphasis is on persuading
other bishops to identify with
Hunthausen’s difficulty and his
cause. The argumentation here
supplements the arguments in his
response to the Vatican chronology.
Here he takes on the topic of the
affair as a whole, giving his
perspective on it all.
Hunthausen signals the text type
with this opening words: “My
Friends in Christ,
Once before I had the privilege of
addressing this assembly…”
Hunthausen quickly invites empathy
for his position by first empathizing
with the other bishops: “And I want
to tell you also that I am personally
distressed about any anguish or
even division that may have come
about among you, my brother
bishops.”
5. Diction An important technique of
Hunthausen’s argumentation is his
presentation of dichotomous word
sets, which allows him to contrast
concepts in tension to advantage.
Hunthausen’s word choices are
mostly polite but certain selections
are heated, direct and
confrontational, acknowledging the
fact of conflict and emphasizing his
own sense of having been treated
unjustly.
“Vatican II” appears to be a code
word for Hunthausen (for a view of
Church that emphasizes freedom,
transparency and participatory
leadership). “The Holy Spirit” also
has the status of a code word
(guaranteeing the orthodoxy of
those who are allowed to be free).
Dichotomous word sets:
Hunthausen associates himself with
a desire for peace over turmoil and
openness over secrecy. He makes a
case for the place of pastoral
judgment alongside the directives of
Canon Law. And he discusses the
built-in tension between the offices
of Pope and local ordinary.
Breaks from politeness: “fait
accompli,” “mounting / mount” a
visitation, “shroud of secrecy;”
“such.. are not a just manner of
proceeding;” “the Visitation was so
badly flawed from the very start;”
“punitive… disciplinary;”
“confusion and anger… have heated
up and even ignited;” “in a situation
and according to a methodology that
I, quite frankly, have to
acknowledge as being all but
impossible, even to the point of
being unworkable.”
Code words: “a process that seems
extraordinarily inadequate given the
kind of open Church we have
become since the Second Vatican
Council…;” “me, a bishop who got
his first ‘on-the-job training’ during
the Council itself;”  “pastoral
judgment, something…every pastor
comes to recognize rather early on
in his ministry as a rather imprecise
‘science’ at best, even when carried
out prayerfully under the guidance
of the Holy Spirit…. We never
really get beyond the possibility of
making a mistake no matter how
hard we try to discern the Spirit.”
6. Usage First-person account, foregrounds
self. Hunthausen avoids personal
attacks: instead he challenges the
visitation process and the judgments
made (omitting agency). He blends
First person: “In making this
presentation, I have a number of
hopes that will become clear as I
proceed.”
Avoiding personal attacks: “my
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first-person-singular and second-
person-plural references into first-
person-plural references
(establishment of connection on the
grammatical level). Use of the past
tense primarily depicts the flawed
handling of the visitation and
subsequent steps. The present tense
focuses on the current impasse. The
future tense (employed least of all)
expresses positive expectations for
overcoming the problems at hand.
dissatisfaction with the manner in
which the decision was made to
undertake an Apostolic Visitation.”
Toward the first-person plural:
“Most of you probably know me
well enough to realize that I did not
accept the invitation to make a
presentation this afternoon because
I personally relish speaking in a
forum like this. I accepted it only
because I believe… they are really
our issues…”
Past: “the shroud of secrecy spread
even further…”
Present: “I am grieved by this
[widespread publicity], and I think
it could have been otherwise.”
Future: “I have no doubt that we
will find a way to address all the
questions I have posed and others
like them.”
7. Substructures of the Text Introductory comments with focus
on the other bishops and
Hunthausen himself. Then comes
the body of the address, which is
divided into four numbered sections
that organize Hunthausen’s
complaint and (concluding) hopes
for the future. Sections II, III and IV
are also further divided into
numbered subpoints.
Introduction: Hunthausen notes that
he and the other bishops have
worked together successfully in the
past. He apologizes for burdening
them with this matter, but he
expresses his view that it is an
important matter and addressing it
can serve the Church. The four
sections making up the body of the
text: 1) “The process used in
deciding to conduct the Visitation as
well as the process followed in
carrying it out. 2) The five areas of
my ministry singled out by the Holy
See as areas of serious concern. 3)
“The identification of the important
issues which this entire matter has
brought to light.” 4) “Some
thoughts and suggestions regarding
the future.”
8. Intertextuality Hunthausen refers directly to the
Vatican chronology and his
response to the same but says he
will refrain from offering any
further commentary on the
chronology itself (thus, it is present
to and absent from this text).
Nonetheless, Hunthausen does
make reference to his response, as
in his treatment of the matter of
secrecy. Hunthausen mentions the
Hickey visitation report and
complains that he has never been
allowed to see it. Apart from the
references to the chronology and his
response to the chronology, there is
no other text that is a recurrent
reference point (explicitly cited).
Instead we have references to a
Reference to chronology response:
“You have already received in
printed form my somewhat detailed
response to the Chronology…. I
will refrain from making any further
commentary on the Chronology….
My printed remarks [the chronology
response] allude to the matter of…
secrecy…”
Hunthausen also mentions:
subsequent letters from the Holy
See, conversations with the Pro-
Nuncio, “comments appended to the
Special Faculties I was directed to
give to Bishop Wuerl, “a recent
public statement issued by a Vatican
official,” the CDF’s instruction on
ministry to homosexuals, the Gospel
message of Jesus, the Vatican II
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range of Church textual authorities
(Biblical, legal, magisterial…).
document De Episcoporum
Muneribus, the Revised Code of
Canon Law.
II. Coping Strategies in
Evidence
Tactics Indications in Document
1. Show deference to the
structural order and mindset
of the Church
Hunthausen expresses respect for
Church, the Holy See and fellow
bishops.
Respect for Church: “Those who
suggest this do not really know me
or my attitude toward the Church I
love and try to serve.”
Respect for Holy See: “the
absolutely essential relationship that
exists between an individual bishop
and the Holy Father”
Respect for fellow bishops: “I am
particularly distressed about any
anguish or even division that may
have come about among you, my
brother bishops.”
2. Associate one’s own efforts
with the best interest of the
Church
Hunthausen repeatedly claims that
he has the best interest of the
Church in mind (which he
associates with the teachings of
Vatican II)
“What I am is each of us in this
room is… a teacher, a pastor, and a
servant of the Lord and of the
Church”
“a process that seems
extraordinarily inadequate given the
kind of open Church we have
become since the Second Vatican
Council”
3. Minimize the appearance of
conflict
Resistance. Hunthausen
acknowledges the fact of conflict
and brings the discussion of several
conflict issues into the open for the
first time, including the legitimacy
of the visitation process, the use of
secrecy, and the question of
collegiality.
Acknowledges conflict: “I am
personally very distressed by all the
turmoil that has come about”
Legitimacy of visitation process:
see discussion is section I.
Use of secrecy: section I.
Collegiality: section IV.
4. Show fraternity Hunthausen invites fellow bishops
to empathize, and repeatedly
mentions their bond as bishops.
“Each of us bishops is faced with
the same question and each of us, I
suppose, on the basis of careful and
prayerful discernment, has arrived
at a pastoral judgment in this
regard.”
“They are questions which will
severely test our mettle as a
Conference of Bishops. But we
have been tested before…”
5. Practice courtesy Ambiguity. Hunthausen refuses to
engage in personal attacks, but he
goes so far as to question the
justness of the visitation process.
Avoiding personal attacks: “Please
know that my reference here is not a
personal one with regard to
Archbishop Hickey who carried out
his duties as Visitator in a gracious
and gentlemanly manner. My
reference has to do with processes,
not with persons.”
Justness of process: “such
unwitnessed, private questionings
with no opportunity for the subject
of the questioning to face his
accusers… [is] not a just manner of
proceeding”
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6. Employ secrecy First distribution of document is in a
closed forum. Hunthausen
selectively reveals information
(revealing some, hiding some), but
he also [resistance] attacks the use
of secrecy.
Hides: Hunthausen refers to
visitation process and previous
exchanges with Vatican, but these
experiences remain mostly opaque
in his descriptions.
Hides / reveals: Hunthausen
mentions his “voluminous
correspondence” with the Holy See
over the last three years, but the
contents of these exchanges remains
hidden.
Resistance to secrecy: “that secrecy
does not work in matters of this
sort, and… should not work”
7. Recruit allies Hunthausen puts his appeal to his
fellow bishops in personal terms.
He justifies the positions he has
taken. He points to the vulnerability
of his fellow bishops that the case
illustrates. And he makes an explicit
request for help.
Personal terms: “ I am particularly
distressed about any anguish or
even division that may have come
about among you, my brother
bishops…”
Justification: A linchpin of his case
is his claim that the process used
was not just.
Shared vulnerability: “the issues of
the Seattle Visitation are not just
issues that touch the life of the
Church in Seattle: they are issues
that touch the lives of each of our
churches…”
Request for help: “I would hope that
this Conference would be willing to
afford some positive assistance…”
8. Argue persuasively Hunthausen structures his argument
around an attack on the visitation
process, an attack on its findings, a
consideration of relevant
ecclesiological / pastoral /
theological  issues and an appeal for
empathy and support.
The Visitation process: considered
in section I.
The visitation findings: considered
in section II.
The theological issues: sections III
and IV.
The appeals for support: throughout
the text, but most especially in the
introductory and concluding
remarks.
9. Assert personal identity The strategy is strongly present in
the document. Hunthausen speaks in
the first person, on a feeling level,
about his own experience and
experiences shared with his fellow
bishops.
“Today I come before you again in
the quest for peace…”
“I need to tell you that in agreeing
to that I feel I compromised my
principles as a Bishop”
III. Overall Coping Strategy Explanation Indications in Document
Contending The address reads as an extended,
alternately attacking and pleading,
challenge to the Vatican’s position.
It is Hunthausen’s all-out attempt to
win support for his cause from his
fellow bishops and from the public.
“This kind of an approach seriously
wounds the community of faith and
trust that is the Church.”
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Observable Strategies: Intervening Developments, F. (November 11-12, 1986)
Strategies Tactics Objectives
Center 1. Show
deference to the
structural order
and mindset of the
Church
2. Associate one’s
own efforts with
the best interest of
the Church
3. Minimize the
appearance of
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert personal
identity
1. NA (no evidence).
2. NA (no evidence).
3. Ambiguous. Closed forum discussion is
one means of minimizing appearance of
conflict.
4. Ambiguous. Laghi is present during floor
debate, a sign of fraternity, but his
contributions are unknown.
5. NA (no evidence).
6. Floor debate is secret.
7. Attempt to win allies is underway during
floor debate.
8. Ambiguous. Hickey argues for the
legitimacy of the visitation process and
suggests that there is more to the case than
Hunthausen tells.
9. Ambiguous. Hickey calls attention to own
role. Laghi’s contributions are unknown.
Objective is ambiguous.
There is little observable
center party movement
during this period.
Periphery 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize-
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert Identity
1. a. Hunthausen stays within prescribed
limits and format for addressing NCCB; b.
Hunthausen states explicitly in his oral
remarks that he never had any intention of
challenging papal authority
2. a. Hunthausen, in his oral remarks, shares
his concern of the hurt caused to the Church
by the affair
3. Resistance. Hunthausen brings his
complaints to a much wider audience (all US
bishops and national press)
4. a. Hunthausen pleads his cause before his
fellow bishops
5. a. Hunthausen implied no ill will on
anyone’s part (oral remarks)
6. a. Hunthausen addresses bishops in closed
executive session
7. a. Hunthausen’s plea is a request for
support from his fellow bishops
8. a. Hunthausen argues that he is not being
rebellious and that it is understandable that
differences of perception have arisen
9. a. Hunthausen speaks of his own pain and
embarrassment (oral remarks)
To reassure his fellow
American bishops that he
has no rebellious
intentions.
Third 1. Deference- 1. a. Wuerl calls for support in making NCCB: To send three
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Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Personal
identity
Seattle situation work according to Vatican
wishes; b. Bernardin says it is essential that
the conference offer Rome its support; c.
O’Connor says the conference needs to be
one with Rome
2. Bishops declare the need to be faithful to
Rome and Hunthausen and to address the
specific challenges to the Church posed by
the situation.
3. Resistance: a. the NCCB acknowledges
the fact of conflict, debates its issues; b.
individual bishops make some of contents of
debate known to the press.
4. a. Bishops take up the matter in the
fraternal body which is the NCCB; b. the
NCR reports that “most speakers offered
Hunthausen significant fraternal support;” c.
Wuerl calls on bishops’ support to make
Seattle situation work; d. Bernardin stresses
unity in the conference; e. O’Connor speaks
of need to help Hunthausen
5. a. Bishops offer applause in response to
Hunthausen’s oral remarks
6. a. Bishops consider the case in closed
executive session; b. Hunthausen’s oral
remarks are not made public, nor are the
remarks of the other bishops
7. a. Hurley and Hickey recruit support for
Hunthausen’s position.
8. a. Weakland argues Malone statement
should be changed; b. Bernardin argues for
unity; c. Hickey argues legitimacy of his
own role; d. Hurley argues that
Hunthausen’s version of events is correct; e.
O’Connor argues for need to support Rome
and Hunthausen
9. a. Several bishops take individual stands
during the NCCB debate.
signals to the outside
world: The bishops are
loyal to Rome, they
support Hunthausen, and
they are internally unified
as a conference.
Analytic Summary, Document 7 (Bishop Malone’s Statement, 11.12.86)
Overview Indications in Document
I. Analysis of Text
Construction
1. Production Malone drafts early version of
statement, which is submitted to
fellow bishops at the beginning of
the debate of the Hunthausen case.
The statement is revised after the
NCCB gives its input. The NCCB
approves the revised version.
No version of the first draft was
available for comparison. Press
accounts (and Hunthausen himself)
later reported that the phrase “just
and reasonable,” to describe the
visitation process, was excised from
the text. One sign of the individual-
collective tension of production
appears in the uneasy mix if first-
person-plural and first-person-
singular statements.
2. Distribution The text was distributed to the press
simultaneous with a televised press
conference, wherein Malone read
None.
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the statement aloud. Upon
completion of the reading, Malone’s
words were greeted with loud
applause from the bishops.
3. Consumption The bishops received their own
copies first hand, and were privy to
the context of production. Most
others received the text through
broadcast or printed (newspaper)
reports.
Newspaper presentations placed the
statement in the middle of other
articles and statements from the
affair.
4. Text Type A reassuring press release. (It calls
to mind a corporate chairman
putting stockholders’ minds at
ease.)
Malone delivers the message
himself: “In recent weeks all of us
have felt much concern for those
involved in the situation in
Seattle…. Based on experience,
bishops are conscious that in such
matters the Holy See proceeds
carefully and charitably…. While
there appear to have been
misunderstandings at one point or
another along the way, the need
now is to look to the future, not the
past…”
5. Diction Malone downplays the fact of
division with euphemisms, upbeat
words and images of family. He
talks of pain suffered but does not
assign culpability.
Euphemisms: “situation” in place of
“conflict;” “dismay and confusion”
instead of anger, bitterness, etc.;
“misunderstandings” instead of
something more sinister; “an
occasion of grace and growth.”
Family: “the degree of pain which
has been felt and enunciated in
Seattle, but far beyond Seattle,
really is the kind of pain that can
only be felt by members of a
family.”
Who is responsible?: “The pain of
Archbishop Hunthausen and Bishop
Wuerl… the abuse directed at the
Holy Father and the Holy See, the
dismay and confusion experienced
by many good people – these things
are deeply troubling.”
6. Usage The point of view shifts make it
unclear who is speaking. A
euphemistic erasure turns the
conflict into an experience of
“unity.”
Point of view:  “In recent weeks all
of us…”
“On this occasion the bishops of the
United States wish to affirm
unreservedly their loyalty…”
“while we are not authorized to
judge the facts of the case…”
“At least that is how it feels to me”
Euphemistic erasure: “Is it
paradoxically possible, that what
has happened in the Archdiocese of
Seattle has given, and continues to
provide, a vivid demonstration of
the unity of the church…?”
7. Substructures of the Text There are no obvious markers
internally dividing the text
(numbers, subheadings, etc.).
Topically, Malone moves from a
The family metaphor: the pain felt
in Seattle and beyond “is the kind of
pain that can only be felt by
members of a family… There are
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brief acknowledgment of the
difficult “situation” to a statement
that the NCCB has no authority to
intervene to a statement of
confidence in the Holy See and,
finally, to the extended metaphor of
family. This last is can be
considered a distinct, interesting
substructure because it is highly
developed and makes up a full one-
third of the statement. In effect, the
metaphor allows Malone to talk
around the conflict in a comforting
way without grappling with the
issues or assigning blame.
certain things a family must do
when it wants to resolve a problem
(comes together, shares feelings,
listens, show respect and sympathy,
express support, see that painful
situation does not recur, pray)
“This we bishops have done
together in these days.”
8. Intertextuality Malone does not refer to specific
texts but does refer to Church law
and NCCB rules. He also makes
reference to “the church’s
teachings,” which the bishops have
the responsibility to present.
Implicitly, this text has obvious
reference to the Vatican chronology
and the two texts Hunthausen
submitted to the NCCB.
“By universal church law and the
conference’s norms, the conference
is not able to review, much less
judge, a case involving a diocesan
bishop and the Holy See.”
II. Coping Strategies in
Evidence
Tactics Indications in Document
1. Show deference to the
structural order and mindset
of the Church
Malone affirms bishops’ loyalty to
Holy Father.
Loyalty: “On this occasion the
bishops of the United States wish to
affirm unreservedly their loyalty to
and unity with the Holy Father.”
2. Associate one’s own efforts
with the best interest of the
Church
Malone asserts bishops’ interest in
well-being of local and universal
Church.
“Let us bring our people together in
prayer for the church in Seattle, so
that what has happened may be an
occasion of grace and of growth,
there and in the church universal.”
3. Minimize the appearance of
conflict
The statement hurries past the fact
of conflict to the restored unity.
Malone suggests that the conflict
itself is a sign of unity.
“The need now is to look to the
future, not to the past…”
“Is it paradoxically possible that
what has happened… has given, and
continues to provide, a vivid
demonstration of the unity of the
church…?”
4. Show fraternity Malone expresses concern for
bishops of Seattle and Holy See.
The statement also reflects on the
familial relationship of bishops.
“The pain of Archbishop
Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl, our
brothers in the episcopacy, the
abuse directed at the Holy Father
and the Holy See, the dismay and
confusion experienced by many
good people – these things are
deeply troubling.
Family: “A family comes
together…. This we bishops have
done…”
5. Practice courtesy The statement declares sympathy
for all involved and attempts to save
face for both center and periphery.
“the kind of pain that can only be
felt by members of a family”
6. Employ secrecy The statement discloses little of the
contents of the debate that has
shaped the statement.
“These things are listened to with
respect… Then support is
expressed… This we bishops have
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done together in these days.”
7. Recruit allies The statement advocates showing
support for both of the parties to the
conflict.
“A family also takes steps to see
that, insofar as possible, a painful
situation does not happen again. In
our case, that means working to find
creative ways of presenting the
church’s teaching… but also
seeking mechanisms of responding
when confusion or error occurs”
8. Argue persuasively The text recommends faithfulness to
Rome, sympathy and support for
Hunthausen, and a quick resolution
to the conflict.
“The decision reached at the end of
the process was made by proper
church authorities. As such, it
deserves our respect and
confidence.”
“We are prepared to offer any
assistance judged helpful and
appropriate by the parties involved.”
9. Assert personal identity NA. Ultimately this is a collective
expression, not a statement from
Malone himself.
NA.
III. Overall Coping Strategy Explanation Indications in Document
Problem solving The statement signals a willingness
to take Hunthausen’s complaints
seriously and to stand by him. But it
also acknowledges the untenability
of a direct challenge to Rome and
the need to demonstrate loyalty to
the Holy See. The NCCB tries to
smooth over the conflict, but also
offers to be of further assistance if
the principal parties so desire. The
statement also recommends prayer.
“We are prepared to offer any
assistance judged helpful by the
parties involved.”
Observable Strategies: Intervening Developments, G. (November 1986-February 1987)
Strategies Tactics Objectives
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Center 1. Show
deference to the
structural order
and mindset of
the Church
2. Associate
one’s own efforts
with the best
interest of the
Church
3. Minimize the
appearance of
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert
personal
identity
1. a. Pope’s interview comments on the
universal Church; b. Laghi defends secrecy
and canon law procedures
2. a. Pope, in interview, says he and the
U.S. bishops are both concerned for the
“good of the church”
3. a. Vatican official calls the Malone
statement “amicable and satisfactory;” b.
The Pope tells reporters, “Sometimes one
creates divisions that do not exist”
4. a. Pope emphasizes his unity with U.S.
bishops; b. Pope’s telegram to Hunthausen
expresses his “fraternal solicitude; c.
Vatican appoints commission of 3
American bishops to work with Hunthausen
and “assess the situation”
5. a. Pope refuses to criticize anyone in
interview; b. Pope sends supportive
telegram to Hunthausen when he undergoes
cancer surgery.
6. a. Pope in interview refuses to discuss
specifics of case or share his own view; b.
Vatican’s decision making process during
these 2+ months is hidden; c. Laghi defends
the use of secrecy in his NY Times
interview
7. Continuing to clarify and defend its
position serves as a tactic in support of the
recruitment of more bishop allies to the
Vatican side.
8. a. Two Vatican officials both put their
own “spin” on the NCCB debate outcome;
b. Pope argues that conflict is less than the
media makes it out to be; c. Laghi defends
secrecy and offers responses to several of
the specific charges made by Hunthausen
9. a. Laghi interview exposes him to
questions and includes his own view of
events and admission of fallibility
To put the best possible spin
(media-distributed
interpretation) on the
outcome of the NCCB
debate and to privately
formulate a new plan for
resolving the conflict.
Periphery 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Personal
Identity
1. a. Hunthausen’s response to Malone
statement says he supports the statement; he
also refers to unity with Holy Father; b.
2. a. Hunthausen expresses concern about
the possibility of a “rift in the church”
3. Ambiguous. a. Hunthausen’s response to
Malone statement has conciliatory tone; b.
[resistance] Back in Seattle, Hunthausen
says he is “in the middle of a conflict that
has the potential of causing a rift in the
church;” c. [resistance] Hunthausen offers
details of how the “just and reasonable”
description was dropped; d. [resistance]
Hunthausen unmasks the euphemism
“apostolic visitation;” e. Hunthausen
maintains silence about the conflict after
Nov. 14
4. a. Hunthausen says the Malone statement
“emerged from a very honest exchange of
many different points of view” among
“brother bishops” and “respects our identity
To assert (one more time)
the need for a new
arrangement in Seattle
(facilitated, preferably, with
the help of the NCCB) and to
refrain from further
contentious acts until the
Vatican’s next step is clear.
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as a Conference… united with each other
and with the Holy Father”; b. In his
response to the Malone statement and in
Seattle, Hunthausen draws attention to the
NCCB’s offer of assistance; c. Hunthausen
speaks of possibility of Rome trip
5. Ambiguous. a. Hunthausen praises
Malone statement; b. Hunthausen, in
Seattle, resists characterizing conflict as
matter of winning or losing (desire for face
saving for both sides); c. [resistance]
Hunthausen implies that the Vatican lost on
the “just and reasonable” question; d.
[resistance] In Seattle, Hunthausen
criticizes the visitation process once again
6. a. Hunthausen does not reveal much
specific information from NCCB debate; b.
after Nov. 14 Hunthausen keeps silence
about the affair
7. a. Hunthausen continues to plead his
case.
8. a. In Seattle, Hunthausen argues that the
case is still unresolved and still unworkable
9. a. In his response to the Malone
statement, Hunthausen expresses his
hopefulness; b. Back in Seattle, he
expresses his hopefulness but also his
feelings of dissatisfaction and pain
Third 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Personal
identity
1. a. O’Connor speaks of loyalty to Holy
See; b. Pilarczyk defends canon law; c.
Wuerl praises the tenor of the NCCB debate
2. a. Pilarczyk defends canon law, which he
says is designed for the good of the Church
3. Ambiguous. a. O’Connor emphasizes the
unity of the bishops with the Holy See; b.
Wuerl describes NCCB debate as fraternal
and respectful; c. [resistance] Kenny
criticizes the way the case has been handled
4. a. O’Connor says the Malone statement
shows the unity of bishops and their loyalty
to the Holy See; b. Wuerl describes the
NCCB debate as “fraternal”
5. Ambiguous. a. O’Connor, Pilarczyk and
Wuerl offer no criticism of Holy See or of
Hunthausen; b. [resistance] Kenny
criticizes Rome’s handling of the case
(without naming Rome outright)
6. a. None of the bishops offer much about
the debate that took place
7. a. Various bishops take public stances in
favor of supporting either Hunthausen or
Rome.
8. a. O’Connor argues that the Holy See
acted charitably and justly; b. Kenny argues
that the Vatican treated Hunthausen
unfairly; c. Pilarczyk argues that canon law
procedures should not be judged by civil
law principles
9. a. Kenny sticks his neck out by criticizing
the Vatican’s treatment of Hunthausen
Individual bishops: to signal
whether they align
themselves more closely
with the center or periphery
positions.
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Analytic Summary, Document 8 (Laghi Announcement of Commission Appointment,
2.9.87)
Overview Indications in Document
I. Analysis of Text
Construction
1. Production The Holy See is the principal. The
Apostolic Nunciature releases the
text. Laghi, presumably, is the
author.
A National Catholic News Service
article encapsulating the text of the
statement in the 2.12.87 Progress
attributes the statement to Laghi,
but the text itself reads, “The Holy
See has appointed an ad hoc
commission…” (emphasis mine).
Laghi does not refer to himself in
the text.
2. Distribution The Apostolic Nunciature hands the
text over to the NCCB for release.
Carl Eifert, information officer for
the NCCB, refers questions about
the statement to Laghi, who is at a
bishops meeting in Dallas at the
time.
None, but see the 2.9.87 Seattle
Times, the 2.10.87 Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, the 2.12.87 Progress
and 2.9.87 archdiocesan inter-office
memo in the Wasden Price
collection.
3. Consumption Seattle Archdiocese “Central
Agency Managers” receive an inter-
office memo 2.9.87 with a text of
the statement, which cites the
Apostolic Nunciature as the source
of the statement. The statement is
widely distributed through the
Catholic and secular press. Laghi
offers some comments in a
telephone interview with the NY
Times from Dallas, which provide
some context for interpretation.
Some background / interpretive
material, provided by the
nunciature, accompanies the press
statement.
Laghi in his telephone interview
with the NY Times: “This is just an
assessment.” The background
material accompanying the press
statement notes that the formation
of the commission relates to the
NCCB’s Nov. 1987 offer of
assistance in the case (cf. Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, 2.10.87).
4. Text Type Press release. The impersonal style and use of the
third person (the “Holy See” is the
subject of the first sentence), as seen
here, are standard in press releases.
The text is formal in tone and
businesslike in its two declarations.
5. Diction Two key word choices: “assess” and
“situation.” “Assess” makes room
for a variety of approaches and
outcomes. “Situation” downplays
the difficulty of the conflict.
“The Holy See has appointed an ad
hoc commission … to assess the
current situation in the Archdiocese
of Seattle.”
6. Usage Both statements are in the present
perfect tense. Laghi reports on (just)
completed actions. There is no room
for discussion or debate.
“The Holy See has appointed….
Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen
has expressed his concurrence.”
7. Substructures of the Text There is one sentence to represent
each party to the conflict. The Holy
See acts, and Hunthausen accepts
the action.
“The Holy See has appointed an ad
hoc commission…. Archbishop
Raymond Hunthausen has
expressed his concurrence.”
8. Intertextuality There are no explicit references to
other texts in the statement, but the
See the 2.10.87 Seattle Post-
Intelligencer for a description of the
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accompanying background material
refers explicitly to the Malone
statement offer of assistance by the
NCCB. The word “situation”
implicitly refers to the NCCB
statement, where Malone
prominently employs the same
word.
contents of the background material
provided by the apostolic
nunciature.
II. Coping Strategies in
Evidence
Tactics Indications in Document
1. Show deference to the
structural order and mindset
of the Church
Laghi acknowledges (the statement
takes for granted) the Holy See’s
right to create the commission.
“The Holy See has appointed an ad
hoc commission composed of
Cardinals… and Archbishop…”
2. Associate one’s own efforts
with the best interest of the
Church
NA (no evidence). NA.
3. Minimize the appearance of
conflict
The statement makes no mention of
conflict or of controversial issues.
The conflict is declared a
“situation.”
“to assess the current situation in
the Archdiocese of Seattle.”
4. Show fraternity Ambiguous. Creation of the
commission establishes a new
avenue of fraternal engagement.
Mention of Hunthausen’s
concurrence is a sign of a fraternal
approach.
“Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen
has expressed his concurrence.”
5. Practice courtesy Mention of Hunthausen’s
concurrence is a minor
demonstration of courtesy.
“Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen
has expressed his concurrence.”
6. Employ secrecy The statement hides the logic for
choosing to establish a commission
– and why these three bishops in
particular?
The brevity of the statement is the
chief indication of how little it tells.
7. Recruit allies Ambiguous. At the very least, the
statement signals the Holy See’s
effort to take seriously the NCCB
debate and its outcomes.
Background material provided with
the statement made reference to the
NCCB’s offer of assistance.
8. Argue persuasively Ambiguous. The mention of
Hunthausen’s concurrence gives the
impression that the Vatican is
treading lightly.
“Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen
has expressed his concurrence.”
9. Assert personal identity NA (no evidence). NA.
III. Overall Coping Strategy Explanation Indications in Document
Yielding This statement signals the Vatican’s
intention to look for a new route to
resolution. It amounts to a
concession in that symbolically and
practically it accepts Hunthausen’s
recommendation and the NCCB’s
offer for other (American) bishops
to be involved.
One needs to refer back to the
NCCB debate (to the Hunthausen
and Malone statements) to see the
significance of this statement.
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Observable Strategies: Intervening Developments, H. (February-May 1987)
Strategies Tactics Objectives
Center 1. Show deference
to the structural
order and mindset
of the Church
2. Associate one’s
own efforts with the
best interest of the
Church
3. Minimize the
appearance of
conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert personal
identity
1. a. Laghi, in NC News Service interview,
indicates that implementation of a
resolution proposed by the commission
will depend on the approval of Rome and
Hunthausen.
2. Ambiguous. a. Laghi: “I am the first
one to hope their will be some
reconciliation.”
3. a. Center party keeps conflict handling
and commentary out of sight during this
period.
4. Ambiguous. a. Vatican trusts
commission of 3 fellow bishops to come
up with a solution. b. Laghi says that a
solution will depend on the agreement of
all parties.
5. a. Rome voices no criticism of
Hunthausen during these months.
6. a. Rome makes no report of progress of
commission negotiations.
7. a. Appointing these three American
bishops may be a subtle form of
recruitment (to do Rome’s bidding)
8. a. The commission tries to persuade
Hunthausen (and later the Pope) to accept
its proposed resolution (in private)
9. a. Laghi NC News Service interview
Maintain silence and trust
in appointed third party
(assessment commission)
to come up with
acceptable resolution.
Periphery 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize
conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Personal
Identity
1. a. Hunthausen’s silence is a sign of
deference to Rome and submission to the
process Rome has initiated. b. [Resist]
Hunthausen resists the commission’s
proposal and threatens to go over its head
to Rome.
2. NA (no evidence).
3. a. Hunthausen maintains silence and
does  not reveal his conflict with the
commission.
4. Ambiguous. a. Hunthausen cooperates
with the assessment commission: private
negotiations
5. a. Hunthausen shows politeness by
refraining from voicing criticism
6. a. Commission negotiations are in secret
7. a. The number of those publicly
supporting Hunthausen grows. It is unclear
how active he is behind the scenes to
promote this.
8. Ambiguous. a. Hunthausen argues with
the commission for the right to determine
who the coadjutor will be; b. he also
argues for changes in the commission
assessment report
9. NA (no evidence).
Maintain silence and
pursue advantageous
outcome in secret
negotiations with
assessment commission.
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Third 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize
conflict
4. Show fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Personal identity
1. a. Commission accepts Holy See’s
appointment & says it will report to Pope
when done; b. Wuerl reports to Pope on
progress of seminary evaluation; c. third
party bishops respect the privacy of the
process
2. a. Commission says it will do the work
and report to the Holy See when done.
3. a. Wuerl and NW bishops cooperate
with commission in maintaining privacy of
conflict negotiation
4. Ambiguous. a. Commission negotiates
directly with Hunthausen and Wuerl and
also seeks counsel of NW bishops
5. a. Third party bishops refrain from
public criticisms of process and avoid
speaking publicly about conflict issues; b.
commission does not voice complaints
about Hunthausen’s resistance in public
6. a. Commission carries out its process in
secret: discussions and structure of
assessment itself are not revealed while it
is underway; b. [resistance] Certain
insiders (who?) leak information to NC
Register and NC Reporter
7. NA (no evidence).
8. Ambiguous. a. Commission seeks to
bring Hunthausen around to its plan for
resolution (coadjutor appointment)
9. NA (no evidence).
Commission: Develop
plan acceptable to both
Hunthausen and Rome.
Wuerl: Keep low profile.
Northwest bishops: Share
opinion about
Hunthausen’s case with
commission (in private
exchange).
Third parties not of the
hierarchy:
Seattle priests: Push for
restoration of
Hunthausen’s power by
publicly declaring support
for him.
Other Seattle activists:
Support or criticize
Hunthausen privately to
other bishops or Rome and
publicly to the press.
National Catholic
Reporter: Support
Hunthausen (request and
report existence of FBI
file)
Analytic Summary, Document 9 (Assessment Commission Report, 5.20.87)
Overview Indications in Document
I. Analysis of Text
Construction
1. Production After the commission finishes its
initial work of assessment, Laghi
refers to it as the “Bernardin
commission,” suggesting an
unofficial or official role as chair
(and lead writer?) of the group.
Briggs 1992 says the harder edge of
Hunthausen criticism in the
document originates mostly with
O’Connor. The commission, after
two months of consultation with
Hunthausen, Wuerl and others,
prepares a draft assessment report,
which Hunthausen rejects in April
1987. Hunthausen reluctantly
accepts a rewritten (toned-own)
version in May. The report offers a
rather detailed description of the
steps laying the groundwork for
composition of the report, including
references to persons and
documentation consulted.
The text itself does not distinguish
between the contributions of the
three commission members to the
actual writing of the report. It does
cite documents and persons
contributing information during the
assessment process (sections I-III).
See Briggs 1992 for details of
production process.
See Laghi announcement of
conclusion of commission’s work,
4.11.89 for reference to Bernardin’s
chairmanship of commission.
Various issues of the National
Catholic Reporter from April-May,
1987 also offer clues about the
production process.
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2. Distribution Before it was released to the public,
the report was shown to
Hunthausen, to the Pope, to
members of key congregations in
Rome (and undoubtedly to Laghi,
though I have no record of this).
The report was mailed individually
to the U.S. bishops prior to its
distribution to the press.
The accompanying cover letter
(dated May 25, 1987) to bishops is
one sign of an intended distribution
route. The text was released to the
press on May 27. Hunthausen issues
copies of the report at a press
conference with Murphy on the 27th.
3. Consumption Conflict insiders first consume the
report in the context of directly
personal conflict negotiations
(Hunthausen with the commission;
the commission with Vatican
officials and the Pope). The
American bishops receive their own
copies in the mail, accompanied by
a cover letter and a copy of the
Ratzinger letter (two documents that
provide interpretive context).
Reporters receive the first copies of
the report and Ratzinger letter at a
press conference. The public at
large first reads about it in
newspaper and electronic broadcast
accounts. The commission, with its
argumentation in the report, strives
to create an impression among
readers that the commission has
judged the situation carefully and
fairly.
4. Text Type A formal report from an appointed
commission to its organizational
superior.
Title: “Report to the Holy See
Presented by Commission
Appointed by the Holy See To
Assess the Current Situation in the
Archdiocese of Seattle.”
5. Diction There is an emphasis on neutrality
and fair-mindedness, as signalled by
noncritical word choices such as
“assess” and “situation.” The
language is consistently formal and
impersonal. For the most part,
however, the report avoids highly
technical (intraecclesial)
terminology and professes a
“common sense” orientation
(accessible to all). The discussion of
certain words (“firm,” “punitive”) is
under contestation. Ecclesiological
language at the end appears to be
directed toward bishops in
particular.
Neutrality: “The Commission
appointed by the Holy See to assess
the current situation in the
Archdiocese of Seattle was
officially notified of its mandate in
a letter…”
Formal, impersonal language: “The
proposal for resolving the problem
in the Archdiocese of Seattle was
devised by the Commission in
consultation with the Holy See
taking into account both the
concerns of Archbishop Hunthausen
as well as those of the Holy See.”
Use of nontechnical language: “it
seemed quite clear that the Holy See
was looking for a common sense
judgment, and this is all the
Commission attempts to provide
here.”
Contested words: (1) “In sum, no
matter how personally firm in his
teachings and practices the
Archbishop himself may be, without
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intending it, he is perceived as
generating or at least accepting a
climate of permissiveness…” (2)
“the Commission is convinced that
no steps were intended as punitive,
regardless of perceptions to the
contrary.”
Ecclesiological language: “The
papacy belongs to the binding
content of our faith itself, in its
proper place within the hierarchy of
truths and in our won Christian
life.”
6. Usage The commission’s habit of referring
to itself in the third person (and not
distinguishing between the
contributions of individual members
of the commission) gives an
impression of impersonality,
detachment and objectivity.
The use of the (first person plural)
pronoun “we” in section III adds an
accent of personal conviction the
conclusion of the report, but again
the report does not distinguish
between the three commission
members. The first two sections are
primarily descriptive, the final
section couches exhortations in
descriptions.
Impersonality / detachment /
objectivity: “In common sense
terms, it seemed quite clear that the
Holy See was looking for a
common sense judgment, and this is
all the Commission attempts to
provide here.”
First person plural: “In the
fulfillment of our task, we listened
to many voices and weighed many
views. We recognize that some of
those interviewed may not agree
with our interpretations of their
statements. Nevertheless…”
Exhortation as description: “Hence
the proposal of the Commission
contains these essential elements: 1)
the Auxiliary Bishop should be
transferred to another See; 2) the
Archbishop should recover his
faculties as diocesan bishop…”
7. Substructures of the Text There are three subsections to the
report that are marked with Roman
numerals and titles. The first section
is a description of the commission’s
activity. The second is a rationale
for how the commission reached its
conclusions. And the third declares
their proposal. A theological
reflection closes out the third
section and the report as a whole.
Section titles: I. The history; II. The
assessment; III. Proposal for
resolving the problem and
concluding remarks.
The theological reflection considers
the relationship between the Bishop
of Rome and the other bishops of
the Church.
8. Intertextuality The commission traces its own
mandate to a letter of empowerment
from the pro-nuncio. There are
references to the conversations and
documentation that inform the
commission’s recommendations in
the section I “history.” Two key
documents that are cited as
reference texts are the summary of
the Hickey-Hunthausen interview
and the 9.30.85 Ratzinger letter. An
allusion to documents not seen by
Hunthausen indirectly points to
other texts. As theological reference
documents, the commission invokes
Lumen Gentium and a work of
Mandate: “The Commission… was
officially notified of its mandate in
a letter from the Apostolic Pro-
Nuncio, dated January 26, 1987
(prot. n. 317/87/2).”
Meeting references: There are
multiple dates given (section I.) for
meetings that took place between
the commission and Hunthausen /
Wuerl / other bishops and / or
priests.
Documentation reference: “The
Commission also studied
voluminous documentation, all of
which was available to Archbishop
Hunthausen and Bishop Wuerl.”
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theologian Karl Rahner. The references to the interview
summary and Ratzinger letter
appear early in section II.
Allusion to documents not seen by
Hunthausen: “The Commission
further decided that the primary
context for its approach would be
two documents both known to
Archbishop Hunthausen, to the
Holy See and to everyone
concerned…. The Commission
further agreed internally that it
would base its conclusions only on
documents seen by Archbishop
Hunthausen.”
The Lumen Gentium passage
quoted (chapter 27) acknowledges
that bishops are not merely vicars of
the Roman pontiff: they exercise
power in their own right.
The Rahner quotation comes from
his The Shape of the Church to
Come.
II. Coping Strategies in
Evidence
Tactics Indications in Document
1. Show deference to the
structural order and mindset
of the Church
The commission refers to its
appointment and mandate from the
Holy See. It refers to the various
forms of Church authority (the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith, Church teaching, Church
law…)
“The Commission appointed by the
Holy See to assess the current
situation in the Archdiocese of
Seattle was officially notified of its
mandate in a letter from the
Apostolic Pro-Nuncio…”
“It is the conclusion of the
Commission… that the letter of the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith should remain in place as the
primary guide…”
“Hence we acknowledge the
teaching of the Second Vatican
Council”
2. Associate one’s own efforts
with the best interest of the
Church
The Commission declares its
concern for the Holy See and for
Hunthausen
“The proposal for resolving the
problem in the Archdiocese of
Seattle was devised by the
Commission in consultation with
the Holy See taking into account
both the concerns of Archbishop
Hunthausen as well as those of the
Holy See.”
3. Minimize the appearance of
conflict
The document is designed to close
down the conflict debate. Thus the
issues discussed are already
resolved within the context of the
document.
“Hence, the proposal of the
Commission contains these essential
elements: 1) The Auxiliary Bishop
should be transferred to another
See. 2) The Archbishop should
recover his faculties…”
4. Show fraternity The Commission emphasizes its
effort to hear concerns on both
sides.
“The Commission further decided
that the primary context for its
approach would be two documents,
both known to Archbishop
Hunthausen , to the Holy See, and
to everyone concerned.”
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5. Practice courtesy There are no direct criticisms of
Hunthausen or of the Holy See.
There is  praise for Hunthausen, but
it is mixed at best.
“Archbishop Hunthausen has taken
laudable steps to carry out certain of
the provisions of the letter of the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith.”
6. Employ secrecy The report does not explain how it
came up with the coadjutor solution.
“A Coadjutor Archbishop should be
appointed.”
7. Recruit allies The Commission seeks the support
of other bishops for its plan for
resolution.
“With this in mind the Commission
continues to hope and pray that all
will walk together the Gospel path
of humility, obedience, charity and
peace in accepting the decision of
the Holy See.”
8. Argue persuasively Much argumentation legitimates the
Commission’s own process and
decision-making rationale.
“We listened to many voices and
weighed many views”
9. Assert personal identity NA. The commission identity is a
collective one, exclusively.
NA.
III. Overall Coping Strategy Explanation  Indications in Document
Problem solving The Commission proposes a give-
and-take solution. Hunthausen’s
power is to be restored and Wuerl
removed. But a coadjutor with right
of succession will be appointed and
the commission will stay on in a
role of oversight.
“In the fulfillment of our task, we
listened to many voices and
weighed many views…. We kept
before our eyes… the need for
charity and compassion, the need
for fairness and openness, the need
to reach decisions and make
recommendations…”
Observable Strategies: Intervening Developments, I. (May 1987-April 1989)
Strategies Tactics Objectives
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Center 1. Show
deference to the
structural order
and mindset of
the Church
2. Associate
one’s own efforts
with the best
interest of the
Church
3. Minimize the
appearance of
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert personal
identity
1. a. Laghi announcement of termination of
commission recalls Vatican’s power to form and
dissolve the commission;
2. a. Laghi statement of completion of
commission’s work notes that Hunthausen and
Murphy will continue to address the “issues
which have been of concern to the Church”
3. a. Laghi statement makes no mention of past or
present tensions; b. brevity and businesslike style
reopens the conflict discussion only minimally
4. a. Laghi refers to cooperative efforts of
commission, Hunthausen, Murphy and Holy See
5. a. Laghi’s statement is polite in the sense that
no criticisms are voiced and no unpleasant
subjects are raised; but it lacks expressions of
praise or thanks.
6. a. The Vatican is secretive about the ongoing
negotiations between Hunthausen, Murphy and
the commission  from beginning to end
7. a. The Vatican continues to have an interest to
see that the commission aligns itself with Rome’s
interest in the course of the negotiations with
Hunthausen.
8. NA (no evidence).
9. NA (no evidence).
To take the conflict
off the public agenda
permanently.
Periphery 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize-
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert Identity
1. a. Hunthausen accepts the proposal of the
apostolic commission; b. Hunthausen says
commission report was obviously the result of
prayer; c. Hunthausen says he is confident this is
what God wants
2. a. Hunthausen resists characterizations that
speak of winning or losing by either side; b.
Hunthausen emphasizes the need to move
forward; c. Hunthausen’s statement at the time of
the commission’s termination speaks of “renewed
dedication and commitment to the Gospel and the
Universal Church”
3. Ambiguous. a. Hunthausen speaks positively
about the commission solution; b. Hunthausen
says he is not prepared to endorse commission
report; c. Hunthausen says it is not a matter of
winning or losing; d. Hunthausen speaks of the
need to move forward, beyond conflict
4. a. Hunthausen accepts proposal of fellow
bishops; b. Hunthausen welcomes Murphy to
Seattle; c. Hunthausen praises Wuerl; d.
Hunthausen thanks Pope for Murphy
appointment; Hunthausen praises commission.
5. Ambiguous. a. Hunthausen welcomes
Murphy; b. Hunthausen thanks Pope for Murphy
appointment; c. Hunthausen says he is not
prepared to endorse commission report; d. at end
of commission’s service, Hunthausen thanks
them for their pastoral assistance; e. at end of
commission’s work, Hunthausen says little has
changed in ministerial situation of archdiocese
To conclude the
Vatican intervention
in Seattle once and for
all, while signalling a
refusal to capitulate
entirely.
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6. a. the commission negotiations remain a secret
affair
7. a. the process of trying to “win over” the
commission continues so long as the commission
stays in existence
8. a. Hunthausen argues that commission report is
dissatisfying in some important respects but that
it is time to move on; b. at end of commission’s
service, Hunthausen argues that little changed
ministerially in the archdiocese
9. a. Hunthausen’s initial responses to
commission resolution convey his (mixed)
feelings: relief, resignation, hope, dissatisfaction;
b. Hunthausen’s comments at the time of the
disbanding of the commission show his lingering
combativeness.
Third 1. Deference-
Church
2. Associate-
Church
3. Minimize-
conflict
4. Show
fraternity
5. Practice
courtesy
6. Employ
secrecy
7. Recruit allies
8. Argue
persuasively
9. Assert identity
1. a. Murphy agrees to appointment; b. Murphy
pledges his loyalty to Holy See; c. Bernardin says
he believes commission has addressed needs of
local and universal Church
2. a. Murphy says he hopes to be of help and
service to Church of Seattle; b. Bernardin says he
believes commission has addressed needs of local
and universal Church
3. a. Wuerl statement calls Murphy’s appointment
a welcome sign of the resolution of the difficulty
and tension that has developed;” b. Bernardin
statement suggests concerns of all sides have
been addressed
4. a. Wuerl thanks Hunthausen and people of
Seattle; b. Wuerl praises Murphy; c. Bernardin
wishes Murphy and Wuerl well; d. Wuerl says he
had a good relationship with Hunthausen
personally; e.  Murphy continues private meetings
with Hunthausen and commission for almost two
years
5. a. Murphy calls his appointment “a great
honor;” b. Wuerl praises Murphy and thanks
Hunthausen; c. Bernardin extends prayers and
good wishes for Murphy, Wuerl and people of
Seattle.
6. a. Commission continues to meet with Murphy
and Hunthausen privately for almost two years.
7. NA (no evidence).
8. a. Bernardin argues that commission has
addressed the concerns of all sides; b. Wuerl
challenges “myths” that developed during his
time in Seattle
9. a. Murphy uses his sense of humor to ease his
transition in Seattle; b. Wuerl offers a
forthcoming interview to the Pittsburgh diocesan
newspaper, challenging mistaken notions about
himself and his role in Seattle
Murphy: To show
himself to be a
trustworthy coadjutor
(to the people of
Seattle in particular,
but also to Rome).
Wuerl: to exit Seattle
gracefully.
The commission: to
complete the period of
oversight without
further controversy.
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APPENDIX VI: OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW QUESTION POSED TO FR. RYAN
At the beginning of the interview, I posed the following question to Fr. Ryan:
In November of 1983, Washington, D.C. Archbishop James Hickey conducted an Apostolic
Visitation of Seattle on behalf of the Holy See. This occurrence gained much media attention,
as did events subsequent the Visitation, including the appointment of Donald Wuerl as
auxiliary bishop with (as was later made public) special faculties, Archbishop Hunthausen’s
address to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in November of 1986, and the
appointment of a three-man commission of bishops, in 1987, to assess what had become a
highly problematic situation.
During the period described above, you served as both Chancellor and Vicar General of the
Archdiocese. In these roles you worked closely with Archbishop Hunthausen and had the
opportunity to observe up-close the unfolding of the events I mention above and any number
of other related occurrences. Could you please now share with me your recollections of the
Visitation and the controversies that followed?
Fr. Ryan’s response to this question took approximately three hours.
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CONFLICTEN BINNEN DE KATHOLIEKE HIËRARCHIE:
EEN STUDIE NAAR STRATEGIEËN IN HET HANTEREN VAN DE KWESTIE
HUNTHAUSEN, MET BIJZONDERE AANDACHT VOOR DISCURSIEVE
STRATEGIEËN.
Overzicht
De uitdrukking “centrum-perifeer conflict” kan gebruikt worden om conflicten binnen de
Rooms-Katholieke hiërarchie te beschrijven, die de structurele spanning tussen het centrale
gezag van Rome en het lokale leiderschap van de  Kerk aan het licht brengen. Hoewel er sinds
het tweede Vaticaans Concilie een aantal van dergelijke conflicten tot ontwikkeling is
gekomen, door de media kritisch onderzocht werden en onderwerp waren van theologische
studie, is er verrassend weinig systematisch analytische aandacht geweest voor de strategieën
om zulke conflicten te kunnen hanteren. De voorliggende kwalitatieve studie is er op gericht
om in deze lacune te voorzien en wel door middel van een literatuurverkenning, gevolgd door
een zorgvuldig, empirisch onderzoek van een recent voorbeeld van een dergelijk “centrum-
perifeer conflict”, nl. de kwestie Rome-Hunthausen. Richting aan het onderzoek gaf de
centrale vraag: “Welke strategieën zijn waarneembaar in de taal van het centrum-perifeer
conflict?”. Hieronder vindt men een samenvatting van de Hunthausen-casus, gevolgd door
een beschrijving van de onderzoeksmethodologie, de bevindingen, de conclusies en de
relevantie van dit onderzoek.
Samenvatting van de Hunthausen-kwestie
In 1983, informeerde de pauselijke pro-nuntius in de Verenigde Staten, aartsbisschop Pio
Laghi, de aartsbisschop van Seattle, Raymond Hunthausen, dat het Vaticaan een apostolische
visitatie wenste door te voeren in het aartsbisdom van Seattle. Hunthausen beloofde mede-
werking aan de visitatie zonder het doel van het bezoek precies te kennen. Daarop volgende
mediaverslagen speculeerden over de redenen, met name zich richtend op Hunthausens
reputatie als een linkse, tolerante kerkleider, en als een tegenstander van de Amerikaanse
nucleaire wapenopbouw die geen blad voor zijn mond nam. Commentatoren veronderstelden
dat één of beide van deze aspecten van Hunthausens leiderschap tot ongenoegen had(den)
geleid in Rome.
In september 1985 informeerde kardinaal Ratzinger Hunthausen over de resultaten van zijn
onderzoek. Uitgaande van de uitkomsten, verwachtte Rome van Hunthausen in elk geval
tweeërlei: dat Hunthausen adequater toezicht zou houden op bepaalde, welomschreven
gebieden van het pastoraat in zijn aartsbisdom en dat hij daartoe de hulp zou accepteren van
een hulpbisschop met specifieke bevoegdheden. (De kernwapens werden niet expliciet
genoemd.) Kort daarna accepteerde Hunthausen de benoeming van Donald Wuerl als
hulpbisschop van Seattle. Tijdens diens eerste acht maanden in Seattle, werd niet publiekelijk
bekend gemaakt dat hem specifieke bevoegdheden door het Vaticaan verleend waren.
Hunthausen maakte dit feit in september 1986 bekend, waarbij hij aangaf niet volledig
begrepen te hebben hoever de macht van Wuerl reikte toen deze door het Vaticaan werd
benoemd. Hunthausens bekendmaking was het begin van een periode van grote onrust
alsmede van acties en publiciteit in de lokale en nationale  Kerk, met als hoogtepunt de
verhitte debatten gedurende de bijeenkomst van de Bisschoppenconferentie (National
Conference of Catholic Bishops – NCCB) in november 1986. Gedurende de NCCB,
presenteerde Hunthausen zijn lezing van de zaak in een voordracht die sterk afweek van een
eerder feitenoverzicht van de apostolische pro-nuntius. Dertien weken na de NCCB maakte de
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pro-nuntius bekend dat de Heilige Stoel een apostolische commissie had aangewezen van drie
Amerikaanse bisschoppen (Bernardin, O`Connor en Quinn) om de situatie in Seattle te
beoordelen. Na vier maanden van onderhandelen met Hunthausen en de Heilige Stoel, kwam
de commissie eind mei 1987 met zijn beoordeling naar buiten. Meteen werd het voorstel van
de commissie in alle openheid doorgevoerd: hulpbisschop Wuerl werd overgeplaatst, weg uit
Seattle, en Thomas Murphy, toentertijd bisschop van Great Falls-Billings, Montana, werd
benoemd tot coadjutor aartsbisschop van Seattle (zonder speciale bevoegdheden, maar met
het recht van opvolging). Hunthausen aanvaardde deze nieuwe regeling met enige aarzeling.
Bovengenoemde commissie bleef periodiek ontmoetingen hebben met Hunthausen en
Murphy, tot april 1989. Op dat ogenblik eindigde de gerichte interventie van het Vaticaan in
Seattle.
Methodologie
Hoewel dit onderzoek geen expliciet theologische reflectie biedt, speelt het zich af binnen de
theoretische kaders van de praktische theologie, opgevat als een empirisch georiënteerd
interdisciplinair veld (in sterke mate steunend op sociale wetenschappen) en gericht op de
bestudering van de kerkelijke praktijk. Hieronder wordt hoofdstuksgewijs de onderzoeksgang
beschreven die geleid heeft tot de bevindingen en conclusies van deze studie.
Hoofdstuk 1 van dit proefschrift introduceert het probleem van steeds weer optredende
“centrum-periferie conflicten” – hierna CPC te noemen – in de Kerk en het ontbreken van
systematische studies van dit verschijnsel. Het levert de aanzet tot het onderhavige onderzoek,
presenteert de leidende vraagstelling en resumeert de gekozen onderzoeksbenadering om deze
vraag te beantwoorden.
Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 bieden tezamen een overzicht van de concepten, ontleend aan relevante
literatuur, die dienen om de teksten van het gekozen, concrete voorbeeld van een CPC, nl. de
Hunthausen-kwestie, opmerkzaam aan een analytische lectuur te kunnen onderwerpen.
Hoofdstuk 2 plaatst het CPC in een organisatorische context. Het geeft aandacht aan:
- de potentiële deelnemers en hun hiërarchische rollen in een CPC;
- het type organisatie (bureaucratie – clan – politiek economische markt – missie)
dat de Kerk is;
- de overkoepelende, non-operationele doelstelling van de Kerk (het bijeenbrengen
van alle mensen bij God);
- specifieke, operationele doelstellingen van de Kerk (het laten groeien en goed
leiden van de Kerk, liefdadigheid organiseren, erop toezien dat interne verschillen
de eenheid voeden, verkondigen van de boodschap, vieren van de sacramenten,
noden lenigen, groeien in heiligheid);
- de menselijke en materiële hulpmiddelen die de Kerk daartoe ter beschikking
heeft;
- en de middelen voor coördinatie en sturing, beschikbaar aan kerkelijke leiders
(acht types van bisschoppelijke machtsuitoefening worden besproken: afgeleide
macht, beloningsmacht, dwang, verder: sociale, wettelijke, traditionele,
deskundigheids- en charismatische macht).
De reflectie op elk van deze aspecten van het kerkelijk institutionele leven, loopt uit op een
beschouwing hoe het betreffende aspect doorgaans speelt in het hanteren van een CPC.
Hoofdstuk 3 plaatst een CPC in een maatschappelijke context. Omdat een CPC plaatsvindt
binnen de kerkelijke organisatie in de moderne wereld, is het noodzakelijk de kwaliteit van de
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kerkelijke betrokkenheid bij die wereld in ogenschouw te nemen. De Kerk wordt opgevat als
een open systeem dat de omgeving beïnvloedt maar ook door die omgeving beïnvloed wordt.
Kernvragen in dit hoofdstuk zijn de positiebepalingen van de top met betrekking tot de
betrokkenheid bij de wereld (met speciale aandacht voor de leer van Vaticaan II) en met
betrekking tot de situatie van de moderniteit (zoals uiteengezet in het werk van A. Giddens).
Beide spelen naar verwachting steeds in de afwikkeling van een CPC. Aan het einde van dit
hoofdstuk wordt samengevat wat men mag verwachten met betrekking tot het hanteren van
het CPC (inclusief de benoeming van zeven mogelijke strategieën); daarmee is richting
gegeven aan de aansluitende lectuur van de casus.
Hoofdstuk 4 biedt een conflicttheoretisch kader ter bestudering en analyse van de casus. Het
doel van dit hoofdstuk (dat steunt op het werk van D. Pruitt en J. Rubin) is het scheppen van
een referentiekader ter analyse van het Rome-Hunthausen conflict als conflict. De gekozen
theorie dient dit doel door beschrijvende en verklarende duidingen te leveren van
karakteristieke elementen van interpersoonlijke conflicthantering, met speciale aandacht voor
vragen als het belang der partijen, de waarneming van andermans belangen en de
haalbaarheid van bepaalde acties, alsmede de strategieën die toegepast worden indien partijen
onderling een belangverschil constateren. Behulpzaam in de theorie was ook het verband
tussen strategieën en het stadium, waarin het conflict verkeert. In hoofdstuk 9 wordt de
conflicttheorie geraadpleegd in een poging specifieke bijzonderheden van het conflict tussen
Rome en Hunthausen te belichten.
Hoofdstuk 5 geeft een gedetailleerd overzicht van de methodologie die gebruikt werd in de
confrontatie met de “case data”. Het bespreekt de afbakening van de casus, de constructie van
het relaas van de casus, en hoe het case-materiaal (in het bijzonder de documenten die door de
bisschoppen geproduceerd zijn) onderzocht is met de techniek van de zogeheten “critical
discourse analysis” (N. Fairclough). Dit hoofdstuk legt tevens uit hoe al hetgeen uit de
documenten naar voren komt, in verband is gebracht met begrippen van conflictstrategieën..
Het eindigt met een bespreking van validatietechnieken die toegepast werden zodra de
onderzoeksbevindingen provisorisch geformuleerd waren.
Hoofdstukken 6 t/m 8 vertellen het verhaal van het conflict tussen Rome en Hunthausen,
steunend op de documenten die door de conflictanten zijn geproduceerd alsmede op de
geschreven verslagen van waarnemers, die buiten het conflict stonden. De behandeling van
een negental kerndocumenten vormt de ruggengraat van deze hoofdstukken. Elk document is
geanalyseerd naar zijn strategische ‘functionaliteit’ binnen het conflict. Eveneens
geanalyseerd (met een alternatieve methode) zijn de daaraan voorafgaande, de interveniërende
en de daaropvolgende ontwikkelingen, die ons toestaan om de conflictactiviteiten te zien als
een geïntegreerd geheel.
Hoofdstuk 9 integreert de analyse van de gevonden hanteringstrategieën die in een
geleidelijke opbouw in de hoofdstukken 6 t/m 8 is gepresenteerd. Om te beginnen worden de
bevindingen uit het empirische voorbeeld geresumeerd en worden deze vergeleken met de
verwachtingen die op basis van de literatuurstudie waren geformuleerd. Vervolgens worden
deze bevindingen in verband gebracht met het theoretische model van conflicthantering.
Hoofdstuk 9 sluit af met een verslag van de resultaten van twee validaties. De eerste betrof
een controle op het niveau van de documenten. De tweede was een controle op het gehele
relaas van en de centrale gebeurtenissen in deze kwestie; deze controle werd doorgevoerd via
een interview met een conflictinsider (de eerwaarde Michael G Ryan, de vicaris generaal van
aartsbisschop Hunthausen).
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Hoofdstuk 10 ten slotte formuleert de uiteindelijke conclusies en evalueert het onderzoeks-
project.
Conclusies en relevantie
De conclusies geven een uiteindelijk beeld van de kwestie Rome-Hunthausen. De daarmee
verbonden stellingen verduidelijken dat aspecten van de casus vermoedelijk veralgemeniseer-
baar zijn naar andere CPC´s. Deze stellingen kunnen als hypothesen in andere, soortgelijke
kwesties getoetst worden.
Algemene positiebepaling ten aanzien van conflicthantering:
Alle leden in de hiërarchie betrokken bij de kwestie Rome-Hunthausen waren erop uit het
gezicht te redden van de kerkelijke organisatie en van zichzelf. Zij streefden naar de
machtshandhaving van zichzelf alsmede van de Kerk.
Gebruik van macht:
Alle leden van de betrokken hiërarchie streefden naar de (schijn van) legitimatie van hun
machtsgebruik. Hoewel de centrale partij (Rome) een groot voordeel genoot in nagenoeg alle
vormen van kerkelijke macht in de kwestie Rome-Hunthausen, had ze toch de grootste moeite
om haar wil door te zetten in Seattle. De basis van Hunthausens succes (de perifere partij) lijkt
te liggen in zijn consistent vasthouden aan een houding van achting en loyaliteit – naar de
Heilige Stoel (de Heilige Vader in het bijzonder) en de Kerk – terwijl hij tegenstand bood (in
onderhandelingen achter de schermen), stilletjes en op een voor het publiek aanvaardbare
manier.
Toegepaste hanteringstrategieën:
1. Toont hoogachting voor de bestaande structurele orde en het gedachtegoed van
de Kerk: Alle betrokken bisschoppen zien erop toe de Kerk niet te bekritiseren en
volmondig trouw te betuigen aan andere kerkleiders. Nergens in de casus vinden we
een enige substantiële afwijking van deze praktijk.
2. Het eigen streven in verband brengen met positieve belangen van de Kerk: Alle
betrokken bisschoppen lieten blijken, vaak in uitdrukkelijke bewoordingen, dat ze ter
wille van de Kerk handelden. Vertegenwoordigers van het centrum (Rome) waren
geneigd dit kerkelijk belang te formuleren in termen van het noodzakelijke toezicht op
en de juiste vertolking van de kerkelijke leer, terwijl Hunthausen het belang van de
Kerk (en zichzelf) in verband bracht met het welzijn van het kerkvolk.
3. Minimaliseert de zichtbaarheid van het conflict: De betrokken bisschoppen in het
conflict Rome-Hunthausen zochten gedurende het gehele conflict en consequent naar
wegen om het conflict naar buiten toe te minimaliseren (omvang, relevantie,
betekenis); slechts in de spannendste fase van het conflict werd deze strategie – en dan
nog slechts kort – verlaten.
4. Toont broederschap: De bisschoppen die deel hadden aan het conflict tussen Rome
en Hunthausen spraken elkaar aan op hun broederlijke relatie door bij elkaar een
beroep op bijstand te doen. Alle bisschoppen vertoonden de clan-achtige neiging om
ruzies in hun geledingen ook binnen die perken te houden. Het (kerkelijk) idee van
‘bisschoppelijke broederschap’ werd regelmatig aangehaald, door alle partijen, om de
betrokkenen aan hun verplichtingen te herinneren of als een teken van de eigen
binding en loyaliteit.
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5. Hoffelijkheid: Alle bisschoppen die deel hadden aan het conflict toonden een bijna
niet kapot te krijgen toewijding aan beminnelijkheid jegens elkaar, zeker publiekelijk.
Tactisch gesproken betekende dit: elkaar prijzen, elkaar respectvol bejegenen,
rechtstreekse kritiek of verwijten vermijden, en zwijgen over gevoelige zaken. Slechts
kort, toen het conflict het hevigst was, lieten zowel de centrale als de perifere partijen
in het conflict tussen Rome en Hunthausen dit vertoon van hoffelijkheid naar elkaar
achterwege.
6. Geheimhouding: Alle bisschoppen die deel hadden aan het conflict tussen Rome en
Hunthausen brachten geheimhouding in praktijk. Het belangrijkste verschil in
informatie ten gevolge van deze geheimhouding, lag tussen degenen binnen de
hiërarchie en degenen die erbuiten stonden. Geheimhouding diende om de ernst van
het conflict te minimaliseren, zodat de schijn van eenheid binnen de top bewaard
bleef. Geheimhouding diende ook om degenen die buiten de hiërarchie staan buiten de
conflictonderhandelingen te houden. Binnen de top gebruikte Rome geheimhouding
tegen Hunthausen; door hem de gevraagde informatie te onthouden werd hij
regelmatig in een nadelige positie geplaatst. Hunthausen vocht terug door (gedurende
het middelste stadium van het conflict) zaken in de openbaarheid te brengen en de
geheimhouding zelf tot kwestie te maken, maar meestal hield hij zichzelf wel aan het
gebruik van geheimhouding in de hiërarchie. Terwijl vasthouden aan geheimhouding
tot op grote hoogte een standaard manier van doen was in het hanteren van het
conflict, was het verbreken van geheimhouding dat ook (meestal om daar voordeel uit
te halen), net als het lekken van nieuws.
7. Medestanders winnen: Pogingen van het centrum en van de periferie om collega
bisschoppen als medestanders te winnen namen gelijk met het oplopen van het conflict
toe. De belangrijkste poging om steun te verwerven onder collega bisschoppen vond
plaats voor en tijdens de nationale bisschoppenconferentie (NCCB) van november
1986. Hunthausen had als minder machtige partij meer behoefte aan de steun van een
derde en zocht er daarom ook actiever naar dan Rome. Het uiteindelijke besluit van de
NCCB om achter Hunthausen te gaan staan (zonder Rome te schofferen) was cruciaal
voor Hunthausens succes om het conflict redelijk goed te doorstaan.
8. Gebruik van overtuigende argumentatie: Het was lastig een oordeel vellen over de
pogingen van de belangrijkste partijen om elkaar rechtstreeks te overtuigen met behulp
van steekhoudende argumenten omdat het merendeel van de meest relevante
gesprekken zich aan het gezicht onttrok. Voor zover dergelijke argumentaties wèl
waarneembaar waren, laten de meeste ervan zien dat de partijen hun welsprekendheid
aanwendden om publieke steun te verwerven. Letten we op de waarneembare
uitwisselingen tussen de voornaamste betrokkenen, dan blijkt echter dat het
belangrijkste verschil tussen de argumentatie van Rome en Hunthausen van doen heeft
met uiteenlopende ecclesiologische visies, waarbij Hunthausen de klemtoon legt op de
volwassenheid van de kerkleden en op hun wettige autonomie, terwijl Rome
geconcentreerd is op de behoefte om kerkelijke praktijken en locale vertolkingen van
de kerkelijk leer te controleren.
9. Persoonlijke identiteit poneren: Onder alle bisschoppen die deel hadden aan het
conflict tussen Rome en Hunthausen bracht alleen Hunthausen bij tijd en wijle zijn
persoon(lijke identiteit) in het openbaar naar voren als een van de middelen het
conflict aan te kunnen. De vertegenwoordigers van het Vaticaan vestigden slechts
zelden openlijk en bij wijze van conflictbeheersing de aandacht op hun persoon(lijke
identiteit). Deze manier van doen bleek voor Hunthausen een bron van kracht: ze
vermenselijkte zijn positie en schiep aanhangers van zijn standpunt. De eigen
persoon(lijkheid) op de voorgrond plaatsen leek een klein taboe aan de kant van de
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centrale partij, en zolang ze in het conflict gemoeid waren, waren de bisschoppen van
de derde partij die de onderhandelingen voerden eveneens geneigd een laag profiel te
kiezen. De meest zichtbare vertegenwoordiger aan Vaticaanse zijde was de pro-
nuntius Laghi. Curiefunctionarissen en de paus bleven bijna volledig buiten beeld. Het
is onduidelijk waarom de paus ervoor koos met zijn persoon(lijkheid) niet op een
directe en openlijke manier tussenbeide te komen in het conflict, gegeven zijn evidente
vermogen zijn eigen persoon(lijkheid) doeltreffend in het openbaar naar voren te
brengen..
Algemene stellingen:
Stelling 1: CPC maakt het voor de betrokken bisschoppen moeilijk te onderscheiden wat in
het belang is van henzelf en wat in het belang van de  Kerk. De participanten zullen het
evenwicht moeten herbevestigen of herformuleren dat ze gevonden hebben tussen de
prioriteiten van het voorkomen van gezichtsverlies voor henzelf en de Kerk enerzijds, en het
versterken van de macht voor henzelf en de Kerk anderzijds.
Stelling 2: Bisschoppen die deelhebben aan een CPC zullen ernaar streven dat hun machts-
uitoefening legitiem lijkt.
Stelling 3: Van beslissend belang voor een perifere bisschop om een conflict met het centrum
te kunnen overleven is zijn vermogen om weerstand te bieden zonder de schijn op zich te
laden dat hij disloyaal is. De perifere partij moet gedurig zijn loyaliteit belijden alsmede
gehoorzaamheid aan het centrum tonen en elke woord of handeling zien te vermijden dat/die
rechtstreeks het gezag van het centrum zou aantasten.
Stelling 4: Bisschoppen, gewikkeld in een CPC, zullen respect betuigen aan de voorschriften
en het gedachtegoed van de Kerk. Hoewel ze het heersende denken en handelen van de  Kerk
ter discussie mogen stellen, kunnen ze dat alleen zodanig doen dat het past binnen de traditie,
de cultuur en de socialisatie van de  Kerk.
Stelling 5: Bisschoppen, gewikkeld in een CPC, zullen hun eigen inspanningen in verband
brengen met het belang van de Kerk, maar wat men in concreto ziet als de beste bijdrage aan
het belang van de Kerk, kan botsen en zelf een bron van conflict worden.
Stelling 6: Bisschoppen, gewikkeld in een CPC, zullen de zichtbaarheid van het conflict mini-
maliseren, maar kunnen ter wille van het voordeel deze strategie even terzijde laten.
Stelling 7: Bisschoppen, gewikkeld in een CPC, zullen broederschap aan de dag leggen door
gezichtsverlies bij elkaar te voorkomen, door zaken van de hiërarchie in die geledingen te
houden en door de idee van bisschoppelijke broederschap te benadrukken.
Stelling 8: Bisschoppen, gewikkeld in een CPC, zullen in het openbaar en vrijwel zonder
uitzondering wellevendheid jegens elkaar tonen. Wanneer deze regel doorbroken wordt,
gebeurt dat meestal door de centrale partij.
Stelling 9: Bisschoppen, gewikkeld in een CPC, vertonen een standaard voorkeur om hun
onderhandelingen over het conflict in het geheim te voeren, tenzij er een duidelijk voordeel is
om dat niet te doen.
Stelling 10: De partij van het centrum heeft meer voordeel bij geheimhouding dan de perifere
partij en zal dus vaker vasthouden aan geheimhouding dan de periferie.
Stelling 11: De onderliggende partij – vanuit machtsoogpunt – in CPC, meestal de perifere
partij, heeft meer behoefte aan bisschoppelijke bondgenoten en zal een gerichtere poging doen
deze ook te werven.
Stelling 12: Hoewel collega bisschoppen de belangrijkste medestanders zijn in een CPC, kan
ook de steun van buiten de hiërarchie strategische invloed hebben op het aankunnen van het
conflict.
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Stelling 13: Bisschoppen, gewikkeld in een CPC, zullen allereerst trachten andere
bisschoppen in de privé sfeer over te halen met overtuigende argumentatie. Overtuigende
argumentatie die openlijk wordt ingezet, zal voornamelijk gericht zijn op derde partijen.
Stelling 14: Bisschoppen van de centrale partij zullen in de loop van een CPC weinig geneigd
zijn hun persoon(lijkheid) in te brengen om het conflict aan te kunnen.. Bisschoppen van de
perifere partij, zullen meer vrijheid genieten om hun eigen persoon(lijkheid) naar voren te
schuiven en hebben ook meer motivatie om dat te doen.
Relevantie:
Onderstaande opmerkingen over de praktische en praktisch theologische relevantie van het
onderzoek zijn normatief en speculatief van aard.
De Kerk is een organisatie die poogt uit diversiteit eenheid te smeden. De spanning tussen
centrale beheersing of controle en lokale (perifere) autonomie is een weerspiegeling van de
krachtsinspanning veelheid tot eenheid te verzamelen. Strijd tussen Rome en de plaatselijke
Kerk (of tussen de paus en de plaatselijke bisschop) is dan ook een verschijnsel dat, vanuit
verschillende invalshoeken, opgevat kan worden als een onvermijdelijke kenmerk van de
Kerk, als de uitkomst van een maatschappelijk-historische conjunctuur of als de
onvermijdelijke uitdaging die elke grootschalige, gecentraliseerde en gebureaucratiseerde
multinational onder ogen moet zien.
Het onderzoek laat zien dat men zonder problemen een conflict tussen centrum en periferie
(en op goede gronden conflicten binnen de top überhaupt, gegeven de uitkomst van de
veelzijdige verworteling in het geloofssysteem, de cultuur , de socialisatie etc. van de Kerk )
kan uitleggen in termen van de wens van de top het aanzien en de macht van de kerkelijke
organisatie en van de hiërarchie zelf te bewaren met het oog op het streven naar eenheid. De
studie trekt niet de conclusie dat dit de enige motieven zijn die de bisschoppen bewegen in
hun kerkelijk leiderschap – normatief-ideologische beweegredenen blijven buitengewoon ter
zake doend – , maar stelt slechts dat deze (andere) motieven in de praktijk voorkomen en op
een grotere schaal werkzaam zijn dan leden van de hiërarchie toegeven. Op die manier biedt
de studie een noodzakelijke aanvulling op de eigen beschrijving door de top van wat er
plaatsvindt en op het spel staat in zulke conflicten.
Er heerst binnen de kerkelijke organisatie een taboe op conflicten, kennelijk gebaseerd op de
idee dat ruzie onverenigbaar is met de wenselijke situatie van liefde en eensgezindheid.
Omdat conflicten geacht worden niet te rijzen, in het bijzonder niet binnen de top die de
eenheid van de Kerk symboliseert, blijken bisschoppen in een onhandige klem te raken
wanner ze toch van doen krijgen met conflicten die in hun geledingen onvermijdelijk
voorkomen.Bij gebrek aan een kerkelijk leer die conflicten klip en klaar op hun waarde schat
(toegevend dat ze in geen enkele organisatie ontlopen kunnen worden en nuttig zijn indien ze
goed geleid worden) en bij ontstentenis van structuren en richtlijnen om conflicten productief
aan te pakken, ‘behelpen’ bisschoppen zich met onderlinge conflictmijding (terwijl ontzag
voor posities en blijken van hoffelijkheid beloond worden) en het minimaliseren van de
zichtbaarheid indien het conflict opbloeit (geringschatten van zijn betekenis, het verbergen
etc.). Ze streven ernaar de omgang met het conflict binnen de perken van bisschoppelijke
broederschap te houden, meestal met behulp van geheimhouding. (De werkelijke onenigheden
zijn voor het grote publiek onzichtbaar.) Door dat tekort komen de pogingen van bisschoppen
conflicten het hoofd te bieden af te hangen improvisatie. De uitkomsten van dit onderzoek
wijzen op de dringende behoefte aan een kerkelijke leer omtrent conflicten, die recht doet aan
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de moderne werkelijkheid (zoals de wens van doorzichtigheid en brede deelname) en aan ter
zake doende normatieve, ecclesiologische en praktische bekommernissen.
Volgens de heersende manier om met conflicten om te gaan (een van de bijdragen van dit
onderzoek is opheldering te verschaffen wat die manier is) vertoont de top – in het bijzonder
de centrale partij – weerzin om het kerkelijk draagvlak (katholieken in het algemeen) uit te
nodigen om als volwaardige deelnemers mee te praten. Als het brede publiek al meedoet, dan
komt dat vaak ofwel doordat het met kracht binnendringt in de discussie (door het schrijven
van brieven, door acties, door een stortvloed van media-aandacht – vergelijk de jongste crisis
in de Amerikaanse  Kerk rond pedofilie) ofwel dankzij de poging van de eigen partij sociale
druk op de ander uit te oefenen. Door het katholieke publiek buiten de discussies over
conflicten te plaatsen, ontnemen de bisschoppen katholieken de gelegenheid zich uit te
spreken over kwesties die hen direct aangaan en dienen zo het proces waarin bepaald kan
worden wat werkelijk in hun belang is in het geheel niet. Zonder kennis van en tegemoet te
komen aan de werkelijke belangen van de mensen die ze leiden, ondermijnen bisschoppen
hun eigen gezag en vormen ze een hinderpaal voor de mogelijkheid waarachtige eenheid te
bereiken. Hiermee wordt niet voorbij gezien aan de praktische beperkingen die in acht
genomen moeten worden (als allen tegelijk zouden spreken, is chaos het resultaat) en evenmin
wordt beweerd dat de huidige strategieën die aangewend worden ter oplossing van centrum-
periferie conflicten in en uit zichzelf fout zijn. Hoogachting en hoffelijkheid aan de dag
leggen, de zichtbaarheid van het conflict minimaliseren – deze en de andere strategieën
kunnen stuk voor stuk behulpzaam zijn als ze op de juiste manier worden aangewend. Het
probleem op dit moment is echter dat de strategieën onnadenkend gekozen lijken te worden
en (vaak) toegepast worden los van gemeenschappelijke overeenstemming en los van
ecclesiologische, ethische en praktische referentiekaders die nadrukkelijk een rechtvaardiging
voor hun gebruik bieden. Om het zwaarwegende voorbeeld van de geheimhouding te nemen:
geheimhouding kan gebruikt worden om te schaden, maar ook dienen om de kwetsbare te
beschermen. Het komt erop aan te weten wanneer het juist is geheimhouding te gebruiken,
gegeven de identiteit en opdracht van de Kerk, gegeven ook haar ethische standaarden, en de
praktische beperkingen die met de doeltreffendheid van geheimhouding zijn gegeven. De
voortdurende uitdaging een scherp oog te krijgen voor het passende gebruik van strategieën
om conflicten aan te kunnen, zoals onderkend in de loop van deze studie en het licht van de
uitkomsten ervan, is voor de Kerk en voor de normatieve wetenschap die praktische theologie
is een geëigend onderwerp van (toekomstige) onderzoek.
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